Current Affairs 17 June 2026

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and French President Emmanuel Macron held high-level bilateral talks in Nice, France on June 14, 2026 — their first official summit since the elevation of the India-France relationship to a Special Global Strategic Partnership in February 2026. The two leaders adopted the India-France Innovation Roadmap 2030 and launched a first-of-its-kind Economic Security Dialogue covering supply chain resilience in critical minerals, semiconductors, energy, and cybersecurity.

• Innovation Roadmap 2030: A comprehensive blueprint for co-development in critical and emerging technologies, deepening academic mobility, and strengthening trusted technology ecosystems.
• Economic Security Dialogue: A high-level annual mechanism targeting doubling bilateral trade within five years and securing supply chains in semiconductors, critical minerals, and green energy.
• Trusted AI Alliance: Joint India-France AI Working Group for safe, ethical, and risk-based AI governance; child safety online designated as a priority sub-pillar.
• UPI Expansion: Globalisation of India’s Unified Payments Interface across major French hubs, including Charles de Gaulle airport and Nice.
• Kanpur Aeronautics Centre: France and India to establish an aeronautical training campus at the National Skill Training Institute in Kanpur under Ministry of Skill Development & Entrepreneurship.
• Station F & Student Mobility: France to incubate 10 additional Indian startups at Station F (Paris); target of welcoming 30,000 Indian students by 2030.
• Bharat Innovates 2026: Union Ministry of Education organised a three-day showcase of 120 Indian deep-tech startups across 13 technology pillars for global investors.

• Diplomatic relations established 1947; Strategic Partnership launched 1998 — India’s first strategic partnership with a Western nation.
• Three traditional pillars: non-interference in internal affairs, strict commitment to strategic autonomy, and avoiding involvement in each other’s military alliances.
• In February 2026, during President Macron’s visit to India for the AI Impact Summit 2026, bilateral ties were elevated to a Special Global Strategic Partnership.
• Long-term cooperation guided by the Horizon 2047 Roadmap, marking 25 years of deep strategic trust.

• France is India’s second-largest arms supplier after Russia.
• Major procurement: contract finalised for 26 Rafale-Marine fighter jets; Scorpène-class (Kalvari-class) submarines built under Naval Group licence.
• H125 Helicopter Final Assembly Line operationalised in Tumakuru, Karnataka — joint venture between TATA Advanced Systems and Airbus Helicopters; India’s first private sector helicopter facility.
• Annual tri-service exercises: Shakti (Army), Varuna (Navy), Garuda (Air Force).

• Building on the 2008 civil nuclear pact; partnering on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Advanced Modular Reactors under a 2025 Declaration of Intent.
• France welcomed India’s 100 GW nuclear target by 2047 and the passage of the SHANTI Act, 2025, which permits private investment in the nuclear value chain.
• TRISHNA Mission (Thermal Infrared Imaging Satellite for High-resolution Natural Resource Assessment): joint ISRO-CNES Earth observation satellite.
• ISRO-CNES Letter of Intent on microgravity research and human space exploration; India-France space events co-hosted in Bengaluru and Paris in September 2026.

• France is India’s 3rd largest trading partner in the EU (after Netherlands and Germany); bilateral trade reached €13.59 billion in 2025–26.
• France is the 11th largest foreign investor in India; top equity inflows concentrated in services (17.65%), cement, and air transport.
• Both nations are co-chairs of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) for 2024–26.

• Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project (JNPP): The 9,900 MW project has been stalled for over 15 years due to techno-commercial disputes over European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) tariffs and India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act, 2010.
• Digital Governance Divergence: India’s open DEPA architecture clashes with the EU’s GDPR and the newly enforced EU AI Act, creating regulatory friction in deep-tech cooperation.
• Geostrategic Asymmetries: France is preoccupied with continental Europe (Ukraine) and Francophone Africa; India’s focus remains the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean Region. India’s sustained Russia engagement tests EU sensitivities.
• Trade-Strategic Dissonance: Bilateral trade remains modest relative to geopolitical depth; India-EU FTA negotiations concluded politically but not yet implemented.

• Resolve JNPP Impasse: Accelerate SMR cooperation under the 2025 Declaration of Intent rather than waiting on the EPR deadlock.
• Bilateral AI Governance Framework: Use the Joint AI Working Group to develop a democratic, innovation-friendly model bridging DEPA and GDPR approaches.
• Co-Development over Transfer: Advance co-development of jet engines, UCAVs, and space-based defence with shared IP and co-ownership.
• Deepen Maritime Cooperation: Leverage French Indian Ocean bases for joint patrols and Indo-Pacific maritime domain awareness.

The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is accelerating the deployment of technologies in Kusunpur village, Kendrapara district, Odisha, under its Smart Village initiative. Among the planned interventions is an AI-enabled wild animal detection and alert system to mitigate the chronic human-crocodile conflict that has claimed over 20 lives in the district over the past four years.

• Implementing Agency: CSIR under its lab-to-land principle — bringing technologies developed in national laboratories directly to rural communities.
• Scale: Over the next three years, scientists from 17 CSIR laboratories will visit Kusunpur to ensure deployment of technologies for the village’s overall development.
• Objective: Transform Kusunpur into a model of integrated rural development — combining safety infrastructure, green livelihoods, and modern processing technologies.
• Alignment: Consistent with the government’s broader rural technology mission and CSIR’s mandate under the Ministry of Science & Technology.

Kendrapara district is one of India’s worst zones for human-wildlife conflict involving crocodiles. Kusunpur sits near the river and canal systems surrounding Bhitarkanika National Park — India’s second-largest mangrove reserve and home to the country’s largest population of the estuarine (saltwater) crocodile (Crocodylus porosus). Fishing communities living along river channels face repeated encounters with this apex predator, which can grow to over 6 metres in length.

The AI detection system is planned at two key entry points to the village, issuing real-time alerts whenever a crocodile approaches human settlements.

• CSIR = Council of Scientific & Industrial Research: Autonomous body under the Department of Scientific & Industrial Research (DSIR), Ministry of Science & Technology; operates 37 national laboratories across India.
• CSIR-CBRI = Central Building Research Institute: Headquartered in Roorkee, Uttarakhand; specialises in construction technologies, building materials, and infrastructure innovations; the nodal CSIR lab for this Smart Village project.
• CSIR’s lab-to-land model bridges the gap between laboratory-scale research and real-world community deployment.

• Human-Wildlife Conflict Mitigation: AI-based early warning systems represent a scalable, non-lethal intervention that can be replicated across other conflict zones in India.
• Rural Transformation: Integrates safety, livelihood, and infrastructure in a single mission-mode framework — demonstrating applied science for social impact.
• Green Jobs: Technologies like dry flower processing, biodegradable tableware, and beeswax products create sustainable micro-enterprises without ecological pressure.
• CSIR’s Strategic Role: Demonstrates the institutional capacity of national laboratories to address village-level challenges, reinforcing the relevance of public science institutions.

Home Minister Amit Shah chaired a crucial meeting in New Delhi at which consensus was reached among six Yamuna basin states on the long-pending Kishau Multi-Purpose Dam Project. Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, and Rajasthan agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding, after which the project will be placed before the Union Cabinet for approval.

The Kishau Dam is a proposed multi-purpose storage and hydropower project located on the Tons River (Tamsa) at the Himachal Pradesh–Uttarakhand border. The Tons River is Yamuna’s largest tributary by volume, joining the main Yamuna stream near Kalsi in Dehradun district — at their confluence, the Tons actually carries more water than the Yamuna itself. Water stored by the Kishau Dam will augment Yamuna flows downstream, directly benefiting all six basin states.

• Yamuna Rejuvenation: Increased clean water flow from the Tons into the Yamuna will improve river health downstream, including through Delhi — where the Yamuna’s pollution crisis is acute.
• Multi-State Cooperation: The six-state MoU represents a breakthrough in inter-state water-sharing negotiations that have stalled for decades — a model for cooperative federalism on river resources.
• Water Security: Provides a reliable drinking water and irrigation source for multiple states, reducing dependence on groundwater extraction.
• Hydropower: Adds renewable electricity to the northern grid, supporting India’s clean energy transition.
• Flood Moderation: Storage capacity on the Tons will moderate flash-flood risk downstream during high monsoon discharge.

• Fast-track the Union Cabinet approval and detailed project report finalization after MoU signing.
• Establish a robust inter-state project implementation committee with technical and legal representation from all six states.
• Integrate environmental clearance with rehabilitation planning for project-affected communities in the Tons valley.

The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) issued a blocking order against the messaging platform Telegram under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, at the request of the National Testing Agency (NTA). The order was in response to the organised use of Telegram channels by cheating rackets to defraud candidates appearing for the NEET (UG) 2026 re-examination scheduled on June 21, 2026. The government also directed Telegram to disable its message-editing feature until June 30, 2026, preventing administrators from substituting attached documents (such as PDFs) after posting while retaining the original timestamp.

Section 69A empowers the Central Government to issue written directions to block public access to any information generated, transmitted, received, or stored in a computer resource. Such a direction may be issued when the government is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so in the interest of:

• Sovereignty and integrity of India
• Defence of India
• Security of the State
• Friendly relations with foreign States
• Public order
• Preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to the above

Reasons must be recorded in writing. Blocking orders are subject to review by an inter-ministerial Review Committee constituted under Rule 7 of the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act as unconstitutional but upheld Section 69A as constitutionally valid, noting its procedural safeguards.

• Founded in 2013 by Pavel Durov and his brother Nikolai Durov; currently headquartered in Dubai.
• Features: supergroups supporting up to 2 lakh (200,000) members for interactive messaging; broadcast channels with unlimited subscribers; multi-device sync.
• Has over 1 billion active users worldwide and over 150 million users in India, ranking second only to WhatsApp.
• In August 2024, French authorities arrested Pavel Durov at Le Bourget airport over Telegram’s alleged failure to moderate illegal content — a landmark platform-liability case.

• Telegram channels openly demanded amounts ranging from a few thousand to several lakh rupees in exchange for purported access to the re-examination paper — a direct threat to examination integrity.
• The message-editing feature was being used to substitute PDFs after posting, evading detection by posting legitimate content initially and replacing it with exam material later.
• NTA argued this fell within the “public order” and “preventing incitement to cognizable offences” grounds under Section 69A.

• Disproportionality: Telegram’s founder noted the block punished over 150 million ordinary Indian users rather than the specific bad actors; cheating rackets reportedly migrated to other platforms immediately.
• Free Speech Implications: Platform-level bans raise Article 19(1)(a) concerns; blocking an entire service for misuse by a subset of users may not satisfy proportionality standards.
• Precedent Risk: Selective blocking of communication platforms based on misuse by fringe actors could be invoked broadly in future situations.

• Targeted Takedowns: Rather than blanket platform blocks, authorities should issue channel-specific takedown orders as a proportionate remedy.
• Platform Accountability: Platforms should be required to implement real-time flagging mechanisms for examination-fraud-related keywords, coordinated with NTA’s cyber cell.
• Examination Integrity Architecture: Invest in a secure digital examination delivery system that eliminates the paper-leak vector entirely.
• Legislative Clarity: Enact clearer procedural standards for platform blocking under Section 69A, incorporating sunset clauses and mandatory proportionality tests.

Twenty rebel Trinamool Congress (TMC) Lok Sabha MPs submitted a notice to the Lok Sabha Speaker announcing their decision to merge with the Nationalist Citizens Party of India (NCPI), claiming they constitute two-thirds of the TMC’s Lok Sabha legislature party and are therefore entitled to merge without attracting disqualification under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The move has reignited debate over the scope and interpretation of the anti-defection law’s merger provisions.

Frequent defections of legislators during the 1960s and 1970s created political instability across States, prompting the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, which inserted the Tenth Schedule — the anti-defection law. A member of Parliament or a State legislature is liable for disqualification if they voluntarily give up membership of their political party or vote against their party’s direction. The “political party” is the entire organisation; the “legislature party” is all its members in a specific House.

The Schedule originally had two exceptions: Paragraph 3 (split — immunity for 1/3 of legislature party forming a separate group) and Paragraph 4 (merger — immunity when 2/3 of legislature party approves merger of the political party). Paragraph 3 was deleted by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003.

• Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others (1992): The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule. It also held that the Speaker’s decisions on disqualification are subject to judicial review, though courts cannot intervene before the Speaker decides.
• Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. The Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020): The SC held that Speakers must decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable time; courts can intervene if there is inordinate delay.
• Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023): Arising from the Shiv Sena split, the SC criticised the Speaker’s delay and noted that the Speaker should decide disqualification petitions promptly; also noted the need for an independent tribunal.

• BSP Rajasthan (Sept 2019): All 6 BSP MLAs merged with the Congress, claiming Para 4 protection.
• Goa Congress-BJP (Sept 2022): 8 of 11 Congress MLAs merged with BJP; Bombay High Court upheld the merger (appeal pending in SC).
• Shiv Sena Split (June 2022): Eknath Shinde faction — a case of 2/3 members effectively defecting while claiming to be the original political party.
• NCP Split (July 2023): Ajit Pawar faction used a similar approach.
• AAP Rajya Sabha MPs (April 2026): 7 of 10 AAP Rajya Sabha MPs merged with the BJP under Para 4.

A plain reading of Para 4 authorises a merger of the political party (the entire organisation) with another party, provided that at least two-thirds of the legislature party approves. It does not authorise two-thirds of a legislature party in one House to unilaterally merge themselves with another political party. The distinction is critical: the merger provision was designed for when an entire political party as an organisation joins another — not for 2/3 of only one chamber’s elected members declaring a “merger.”

An additional interpretive question is whether the “original political party” can only merge with a party that already has members in the legislative house. The Speaker must decide on these questions, with courts available for review thereafter.

• Independent Tribunal: The Supreme Court, most recently in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020), recommended that Parliament amend the Constitution to vest anti-defection adjudication in an independent tribunal headed by former judges, removing the inherent conflict of a Speaker from the ruling party deciding disqualification cases.
• Delete Para 4: The Law Commission’s 170th Report (1999) recommended deleting Para 4 entirely — making all defections, including mergers, grounds for disqualification and compelling fresh elections as the only legitimate route to changing political allegiance.
• Authoritative SC Judgement: A constitution bench ruling specifically on the scope of Para 4 — particularly whether 2/3 of only one chamber’s legislature party can constitute a valid “merger” — would reduce ambiguity.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) will participate in Exercise Pitch Black 2026, the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) premier multinational air combat exercise. The exercise is scheduled to be held in Australia’s Northern Territory (primarily at RAAF Base Darwin and RAAF Base Tindal) from July 20, 2026. The announcement, made by Australia’s High Commissioner to India, cited the exercise as an opportunity to strengthen regional interoperability across the Indo-Pacific. The exercise will bring together more than 100 aircraft and personnel from 19 allied and partner nations.

• Conducted by: Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) — largest international exercise in the RAAF’s annual calendar.
• Frequency: Biennial (held every two years).
• Location: Northern Territory, Australia — RAAF Base Darwin and RAAF Base Tindal provide vast, low-traffic airspace for large-scale air combat training.
• Objective: Enhance operational interoperability, strengthen multilateral military cooperation, and refine air combat tactics among allied and partner air forces.
• Scale (2026): 100+ aircraft; 19 nations; includes advanced air combat simulation across multiple threat environments.
• India’s previous participation: IAF has participated in earlier editions of Pitch Black, deepening aviation interoperability with RAAF and other partners.

• Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Signed in June 2020 during the PM Modi–PM Morrison virtual summit — the highest level of bilateral engagement.
• Quad membership: Both India and Australia are members of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) alongside the United States and Japan — the central framework for Indo-Pacific security cooperation.
• ECTA (Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement): Signed April 2022; entered into force December 2022 — India’s first FTA with a major developed economy in over a decade.
• Bilateral defence exercises: AustraHind (Army); AUSINDEX (Navy); Pitch Black (Air Force — multilateral).
• Critical minerals partnership: Australia is a key supplier of lithium, cobalt, and rare earths critical to India’s clean energy and EV transition.

• Indo-Pacific Interoperability: Participation in large multinational exercises enhances IAF’s ability to operate seamlessly within coalition frameworks — critical as India deepens its Indo-Pacific security commitments.
• Tactical Learning: Exposure to diverse air combat tactics, advanced threat simulation, and electronic warfare scenarios from 19 partner air forces.
• Strategic Signalling: IAF participation in the RAAF’s flagship exercise signals India’s growing comfort with multilateral defence engagement beyond bilateral ties.

At the 28th meeting of IORA’s Committee of Senior Officials (CSOM), held in New Delhi, Canada’s application to become a dialogue partner of the Indian Ocean Rim Association is being examined by member states. The Secretary-General noted Canada’s considerable expertise in maritime safety, security, and connectivity as strong grounds for inclusion. The meeting also took note of developments in the Strait of Hormuz, where an Iran-US agreement could end months of maritime hostilities, underscoring the Indian Ocean region’s continuing strategic sensitivity.

• Canada has extensive coastal zones on three oceans — Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic — making it one of the world’s largest maritime powers by coastline.
• Expertise in maritime safety, Search and Rescue (SAR), Arctic navigation, and ocean connectivity infrastructure that would benefit IORA member states, particularly smaller island economies.
• Significant diaspora connections with key IORA members, particularly India; growing Indo-Pacific strategic engagement.
• Potential contribution to IORA’s disaster risk management agenda given Canada’s experience in climate-linked coastal resilience.

• India is a founding member and one of IORA’s most consequential voices, given its position at the heart of the Indian Ocean and its extensive maritime interests.
• IORA provides a multilateral framework for India to advance its SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI).
• Aligns with India’s blue economy priorities: fisheries, maritime connectivity, and sustainable ocean resource management.
• Climate action: The Indian Ocean faces disproportionate climate impacts; IORA’s disaster response agenda is central to India’s neighbourhood diplomacy.

A major international study published in the journal Nature Sustainability has found a significant link between household poverty, fuelwood dependence, and lower tree species diversity in community-managed tropical forests. The research — covering 322 community-managed forests in 15 countries from 1993 to 2017 using data from the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) network — concludes that poverty is not the cause of biodiversity loss, but limited livelihood options drive resource pressure that produces the same outcome. The findings have direct implications for India’s conservation strategy.

• Forests with more poor households and higher fuelwood dependence had lower tree species diversity.
• Forests where communities had access to alternative livelihoods (such as farming) showed greater tree species richness.
• Similar patterns were found in densely populated areas with higher poverty levels.
• Greater dependence on forest resources was consistently associated with lower biodiversity — but the causal mechanism is resource pressure from limited options, not poverty per se.
• Key insight: The way out is to improve economic opportunities, not to restrict forest access without providing alternatives — the latter increases deprivation without reducing pressure.

Most forests in India are managed by State Forest Departments under the fortress model — where protected areas are managed by minimising human activity and restricting access to forest resources. While this model has helped recover iconic species and strengthen wildlife protection, it has significant limitations:

• Protected areas are increasingly becoming isolated islands surrounded by human-dominated landscapes, cutting off wildlife corridors.
• Forests in human-dominated landscapes are smaller and bear a heavy burden of extraction from approximately 275 million people who depend on them for livelihoods.
• The fortress model generates conflict rather than conservation partnership with local communities, undermining long-term biodiversity outcomes.

• LPG and Clean Cooking: State Forest Departments have distributed subsidised LPG connections and efficient cooking stoves near tiger reserves — reducing fuelwood pressure. The study supports scaling this up along wildlife corridors.
• Wildlife Corridor Prioritisation: The study’s findings on species richness can be applied by prioritising conservation in corridor forests — the patches linking isolated protected areas used by large mammals for dispersal.
• Joint Forest Management (JFM): India’s JFM programme since 1990 provides a framework for community participation in forest protection with benefit-sharing. Expanding it with robust governance is critical.
• Wildlife Tourism Revenue Sharing: Wildlife tourism is a multi-million-dollar industry, yet only a small fraction reaches communities adjacent to forests. Greater revenue-sharing would create stronger conservation incentives.
• The noted ecologist and biodiversity champion Madhav Gadgil was a strong advocate for inclusive conservation, arguing that communities who have lived alongside forests for generations possess irreplaceable traditional ecological knowledge that must complement scientific approaches.

The International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research network was founded by the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom at the University of Michigan. Ostrom received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 (the first woman to do so) for her work demonstrating that communities can sustainably manage shared natural resources — a finding that directly underpins the community forestry model. The IFRI dataset covers community-managed forests across 15 countries since the early 1990s.

The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has forecast that an El Niño event may develop by July 2026 and persist through winter, significantly increasing the risk of coastal flooding, disrupted rainfall patterns, and agricultural stress across multiple continents. Climate scientists warn that when El Niño conditions coincide with long-term sea-level rise, coastal communities face a “double whammy” of compound flood risk. Unusually intense events are informally called “Godzilla El Niño” in public discourse — a term that originated during the exceptionally strong 2015–16 episode.

El Niño is the warm phase of the ENSO (El Niño-Southern Oscillation) cycle — a natural, recurring climate pattern in the tropical Pacific Ocean that alternates between warm, cool, and neutral conditions and influences weather systems worldwide.

• Normal conditions: Trade winds blow westward along the equatorial Pacific, pushing warm surface water toward Australia and Asia, allowing cooler deep water to upwell along South America’s coast.
• El Niño onset: Trade winds weaken → warm water pools in the central and eastern Pacific → sea surface temperatures rise → the Walker Circulation (equatorial atmospheric loop driven by temperature contrast) weakens.
• Global impact: The weakened Walker Circulation redistributes convective rainfall — bringing floods to some regions (South America, southern US) while suppressing rainfall in others (Australia, South Asia).
• Sea level effect: Warm water expands thermally; El Niño raises sea levels in the eastern Pacific, amplifying coastal flooding when combined with storm surges.

• El Niño is typically associated with a weaker Southwest Monsoon (SWM) over India, as the shift in Pacific convection suppresses the low-pressure systems that drive Indian monsoon onset.
• This correlation is strong but not absolute: a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) — warmer sea surface temperatures in the western Indian Ocean relative to the eastern Indian Ocean — can partially offset El Niño’s suppressive effect on SWM.
• The India Meteorological Department (IMD) incorporates ENSO state and IOD phase into its annual Long Range Forecast (LRF) for the Southwest Monsoon, released each April.
• Agriculture: weak monsoon → reduced kharif output → food inflation pressure; groundwater depletion accelerates as irrigation demand rises.
• India’s peak electricity demand (above 250 GW in recent years) climbs further in hotter-than-average El Niño summers, straining grid infrastructure.

• 1877–78: One of history’s most severe El Niño events; contributed to catastrophic global famines, particularly in South and East Asia, and in South America and Africa — documented in climate literature as a defining episode of 19th-century climate-driven social disruption.
• 1982–83: Major El Niño causing severe droughts in Australia and floods in South America.
• 1997–98: One of the strongest on modern record; widespread droughts, wildfires in Southeast Asia, disrupted fisheries globally.
• 2015–16: Tied with 1997–98 as the strongest recorded; officially nicknamed “Godzilla El Niño” by US media; contributed to record global surface temperatures.

• Early Warning Systems: Integrate ENSO forecasts into IMD’s district-level weather alerts to enable pre-emptive agricultural advisories and flood preparation.
• Crop Diversification: Promote drought-resilient crops in El Niño-vulnerable districts; expand the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana’s weather-indexed coverage.
• Coastal Flood Infrastructure: Invest in sea walls, mangrove restoration, and early-warning networks in coastal states vulnerable to the El Niño – sea-level-rise compound effect.
• Grid Resilience: Accelerate grid strengthening and demand-side management in preparation for peak demand spikes during hot El Niño years.