Current Affairs 18 June 2026

India–UAE Meeting at G7 Summit, Évian: Bilateral Outcomes and India’s Global South Message

Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the 52nd G7 Outreach Session (2026) in Évian, France — held under the French G7 Presidency with the theme “Forging New Partnerships and Rebuilding International Solidarity.” India held bilateral meetings with Canada, the United Kingdom, and the UAE, yielding significant deliverables in trade, defence, nuclear energy, and strategic alignment.

• Global Trust Deficit: India argued that the world’s most critical shortage is of mutual trust — not resources — and that global challenges stem from this deficit rather than a shortage of capital.
• Beyond Donor-Recipient Models: India called for development partnerships built on equality, mutual respect, and shared responsibility rather than charity-based frameworks.
• Voice of the Global South: Developing and middle-income countries seek equitable participation in global governance, not merely financial transfers.
• India–Africa Cooperation: India showcased its South-South development partnership with Africa as an alternative model for development finance.
• Important distinction for Prelims: India attends as an Outreach Invitee, not as a G7 member.

• India-UK Vision 2035 Framework: Leaders reviewed bilateral progress under this long-term strategic framework.
• India-UK Free Trade Agreement: Reaffirmed commitment to early implementation with focus on technology, defence, and education partnerships.

• Strait of Hormuz: Both nations called for free, safe, and unimpeded navigation and commerce. Approximately 20–21 million barrels of oil transit the Strait daily (~20% of global oil supply). India imports ~85% of its crude oil; Gulf accounts for ~65% of India’s crude imports.
• BRICS Summit 2026: PM Modi formally invited UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) to the 18th BRICS Summit, hosted by India in 2026. The UAE joined BRICS in January 2024 as part of the BRICS expansion from 5 to 10 members.
• This was the third bilateral meeting between PM Modi and President MBZ in 2026, reflecting the depth of the India-UAE Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

• India-UAE CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement): Signed February 2022; came into force May 2022 — India’s first CEPA with a Gulf country. Bilateral trade exceeds USD 85 billion annually including services.
• UAE is India’s 3rd largest trading partner globally and 2nd largest export destination. India’s UAE diaspora: over 3.5 million — the largest expatriate community in the UAE.
• India-UAE Comprehensive Strategic Partnership elevated in February 2022.

• Conclude India-Canada CEPA by 2026: The target deadline aligns with both nations’ trade diversification imperatives following the 2023 diplomatic rupture (Nijjar assassination row).
• Operationalise GSOIA negotiations: Classified information sharing will deepen defence industrial cooperation, especially in space and cyber domains.
• Leverage BRICS 2026: India hosting BRICS provides an opportunity to set the agenda on reform of multilateral financial institutions and Global South priorities.
• Strait of Hormuz vigilance: India must continue engaging the Gulf through multilateral frameworks (IONS, GCC) to protect energy supply corridors.

Korea District’s ‘5% Model’ — Community-Led Groundwater Revival in Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh’s Korea district has emerged as a national model of participatory rainwater harvesting and climate resilience. Its ‘5% Model’ — encouraging farmers to dedicate 5% of agricultural land for soak pits — produced measurable groundwater improvement, was highlighted by PM Modi in Mann Ki Baat (March 2026), and prompted the Union Jal Shakti Minister C R Patil to recommend national adoption.

• Farmers voluntarily dedicate 5% of their agricultural land for constructing soak pits — unlined or semi-lined pits that allow rainwater to percolate into the soil, recharging groundwater, retaining soil moisture, and improving agricultural productivity.
• Officials from the Korea Zila Panchayat trained villagers in pit construction; the model self-replicated as benefits became visible.
• Scale: Grew from 2,000 soak pits (March–May 2025 season) to 30,000 soak pits (February–May 2026) — a 15-fold increase in one year; deployed across farms, backyards, and kitchen gardens.

• Primarily executed under MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) — enacted under MGNREGA, 2005; guarantees 100 days of wage employment per rural household per year. Water conservation works (check dams, recharge pits, contour trenches) are explicitly permissible under Schedule I.
• Locally rebranded as Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) at the district level; the national scheme nomenclature (MGNREGS) remains unchanged.
• Synergy with Jal Sanchay Jan Bhagidari (national community-led water conservation initiative under Ministry of Jal Shakti) and Jal Jeevan Mission (JJM) — the model directly addresses JJM’s biggest implementation bottleneck: depleted groundwater preventing functional piped water supply even where infrastructure is installed.

Data from the Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) — nodal agency under Ministry of Jal Shakti for groundwater assessment and management — confirms:

• Post-monsoon groundwater level improved from 6.6 metres Below Ground Level (BGL) in 2024 to 3.89 metres BGL in 2025 — an improvement of 2.71 metres (water table rose).
• Two villages identified as model centres for intensive intervention; complaints about borewells drying up are already decreasing.
• The Jal Jeevan Mission — stalled despite pipelines and tanks installed in these villages due to depleted groundwater — now has a viable source base to draw from.

• India is the world’s largest groundwater user, extracting approximately 245–250 billion cubic metres (BCM) annually — roughly 25% of global groundwater extraction.
• Agriculture accounts for approximately 89% of India’s groundwater use.
• NITI Aayog’s 2018 Composite Water Management Index (CWMI) flagged 21 Indian cities at risk of groundwater exhaustion.
• Groundwater is a State subject under the Constitution; Centre plays an advisory and regulatory role through CGWB and national missions.
• The Korea model demonstrates that in-situ decentralised recharge (on-farm soak pits) can be more cost-effective than large centralised infrastructure when scaled through community participation.

• Atal Bhujal Yojana (ABY): Launched 2020; Centrally Sponsored Scheme for sustainable groundwater management in 7 water-stressed states (Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, MP, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, UP). Korea district (Chhattisgarh) is outside ABY coverage but follows compatible principles.
• National Aquifer Mapping Programme (NAQUIM): CGWB’s programme for detailed aquifer mapping to guide groundwater management decisions.
• PM Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY): Includes watershed development component (WDC-PMKSY); conceptually aligned with the Korea model’s approach.

• National Scaling via MGNREGS: Formalise the soak-pit approach as an additional permissible sub-category under MGNREGS Schedule with a per-pit incentive, enabling all gram panchayats to replicate.
• Integration with JJM Source Sustainability: Make groundwater-level assessment and soak-pit density a prerequisite evaluation metric before JJM piped water infrastructure deployment in deficit areas.
• Expand Neer Nayika Network: Link with the SHG ecosystem under DAY-NRLM (Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana — National Rural Livelihoods Mission) for women-led water conservation leadership.
• CGWB Evidence Base: Establish mandatory before-after groundwater monitoring for all districts replicating the model to build a national evidence database for policy.

The RBI’s Record ₹2.87 Lakh Crore Surplus Transfer — Fiscal Role and Federal Concerns

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) approved a record surplus transfer of ₹2.87 lakh crore to the Union government for FY26. The RBI’s balance sheet grew by 20.6% in one year to ₹91.97 lakh crore by March 2026, with gross income rising over 26%. The transfer, though fully consistent with the Economic Capital Framework (ECF), raises deeper questions about the evolving role of India’s central bank as a fiscal instrument.

• After making all provisions (bad debts, depreciation, Contingency Risk Buffer, etc.), the balance of annual profits must be paid to the Central Government. This is mandatory statutory profit repatriation, not a discretionary transfer.
• The surplus is not a grant or subsidy — it reflects genuine income earned by the RBI from its core monetary operations.

• ECF revised 2019 following the Bimal Jalan Committee (2018–19) recommendations.
• Contingency Risk Buffer (CRB): Set at 5.5%–6.5% of RBI’s balance sheet; retained by RBI as a capital cushion against unexpected shocks.
• Whatever the balance sheet carries above the CRB threshold becomes distributable surplus — payable to the Central Government.
• The 2019 ECF revision was a structural tipping point: it allowed release of excess provisions accumulated over years, resulting in the large FY2019 transfer of ₹1.76 lakh crore.

• Interest on Government Securities: RBI holds large portfolios through OMO (Open Market Operations) and LAF (Liquidity Adjustment Facility) operations.
• Foreign Currency Assets (FCA): India’s forex reserves are primarily invested in US Treasuries and sovereign bonds of other countries — generating significant interest income.
• Gold and Forex Transactions: The article reports RBI may have sold ~$12 billion worth of gold and bought ~$7.5 billion in foreign-currency assets (to manage rupee pressure) — generating realised gains included in surplus.
• Net Effect: Reserve management decisions taken primarily for monetary stability are simultaneously producing growing fiscal revenues for the sovereign — the core concern of the article.

• Classification: RBI surplus is classified as non-tax revenue of the Union government, falling entirely outside the divisible pool distributed by the Finance Commission.
• No Automatic State Share: Under Article 280, the Finance Commission distributes income tax and GST revenue between Centre and States. RBI profits are not subject to this formula — States have no legal claim.
• Article 293 — State Borrowing Constraints: States with outstanding Central government loans cannot borrow from markets without Central consent. Combined with the RBI surplus staying entirely with the Centre, this represents progressive fiscal centralisation.
• The article argues that dividend transfers, cesses, surcharges, and borrowing restrictions — individually defensible — together show a structural shift in India’s fiscal landscape toward the Centre.

• Operational independence: RBI sets interest rates through the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) — a 6-member statutory body under the Monetary Policy Framework (2016). Inflation target: 4% ± 2% (CPI).
• Institutional distance: Central bank credibility rests on perceived distance from government fiscal compulsions — not just legal design. Large and growing surplus transfers risk eroding this perception.
• FRBM Act, 2003 (amended 2018): Mandates Centre fiscal deficit at 3% of GDP. Large RBI transfers reduce market borrowing requirements and ease FRBM compliance — but without the discipline of taxation or market accountability.
• Not QE, but analogous: Advanced economies entangled central banks with fiscal policy through quantitative easing. India’s link comes through the growing fiscal value of central bank earnings — a different mechanism, similar institutional-distance concern.

• Transparent ECF Communication: Publish detailed CRB computation methodology in a form accessible to States and civil society, ensuring accountability without altering the legal framework.
• Federal Consultative Mechanism: Create a standing mechanism for States to be informed of (though not entitled to share in) major RBI surplus transfers — analogous to the pre-budget Finance Commission consultation process.
• Preserve MPC Independence: Ensure rate-setting decisions remain insulated from fiscal considerations arising from the RBI’s growing income significance.

India–Russia RELOS: What the Logistics Support Agreement Actually Allows

The India–Russia bilateral Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS), signed in Moscow on February 18, 2025, was ratified by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 15, 2025 and operationalised in January 2026. Social media claims that the agreement allows stationing of 3,000 Russian troops on Indian soil permanently — suggesting a military alliance — are factually incorrect. The article clarifies RELOS’s actual scope by comparing it with India’s existing LSA network.

• LSAs are foundational military cooperation agreements for administrative purposes — enabling reciprocal use of each other’s bases, ports, and airfields for supplies, repair, and refuelling during mutually agreed engagements.
• Standard permissible uses: joint exercises, training events, port calls, and HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) operations.
• LSAs do not provide for: permanent basing of forces, establishment of military bases, or any arrangement resembling a military alliance.
• India maintains strategic autonomy — it is not part of NATO, AUKUS, or any formal military alliance. All LSAs are consistent with this doctrine.

• Coverage: Joint military exercises; training; HADR; port calls of warships; use of airspace and airfield facilities; logistics, technical support, and medical support; delivery of food and technical resources; reciprocal access to military facilities including airbases and ports.
• 3,000-Troop Ceiling: This is a broad upper limit accounting for the maximum size of visiting contingents and number of ships or aircraft during any mutually agreed engagement. It is not a provision for permanent stationing of troops.
• Validity: Five years; subject to revision to reflect changing circumstances.
• No Permanent Basing: Explicitly confirmed — “No permanent or long-term stationing has been agreed upon as part of the Agreement.”
• Arctic Dimension: RELOS gives Indian forces access to Russian Arctic military facilities. As new Arctic navigation routes open due to climate change — the Northern Sea Route reduces India–Europe shipping time by ~40% compared to the Suez Canal — India’s logistics interest in Arctic facilities is economically and strategically motivated.

• India’s broader US foundational agreement architecture: LEMOA (2016, logistics) + COMCASA (Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement, 2018, secure comms) + BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, 2020, geospatial intelligence) + GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement, 2002).
• The article’s argument: If the 3,000-troop figure in RELOS implies Indian-Russian alliance, then by the same logic LEMOA with the US implies a US military alliance — which is clearly incorrect.
• India exercises with US forces at a larger scale than RELOS’s ceiling — further demonstrating that RELOS’s 3,000 figure is operationally standard, not alliance-level.

• India sources approximately 50–60% of its defence equipment from Russia (historically): S-400 Triumf air defence system, INS Vikramaditya (refurbished carrier), Su-30MKI (HAL-built under licence), MiG-29K, AK-203 assault rifles (Korwa, UP).
• India is diversifying defence imports toward US, France, and Israel — Russia’s share is declining but remains substantial for decades-old platforms.
• Arctic Council: India has observer status since 2013. RELOS’s Arctic dimension deepens India–Russia cooperation in a strategic region that is increasingly important as polar ice retreats.

• Operationalise for HADR: Use RELOS primarily for HADR exercises and port calls in the Arctic, signalling the agreement’s defensive humanitarian character rather than alliance optics.
• Maintain Strategic Autonomy: Ensure RELOS operationalisation does not create perceptions of Indian alignment with Russia at a time of the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict and associated Western sanctions pressure.
• Leverage Arctic Access: Explore joint India–Russia scientific and hydrographic surveys in Arctic waters under RELOS logistics support to build practical interoperability in a new frontier.

Bangladesh’s Padma Barrage — Water, Geopolitics, and the Ganga Treaty Clock

Bangladesh approved the Padma Barrage — a 2.1-km structure on the Padma River (the Ganga in Bangladesh) — at a cost of Tk 50,443 crore (₹39,170 crore) over seven years. The barrage will be located 180 km downstream of India’s Farakka Barrage in West Bengal. Its approval comes as the landmark 1996 Ganges Water Treaty nears its December 2026 expiry, adding urgency to India–Bangladesh water diplomacy.

• The Padma is the main distributary of the Ganga River in Bangladesh — the Ganga crosses the India-Bangladesh border near Rajshahi and becomes the Padma.
• The Padma merges with the Jamuna (Bangladesh name for the Brahmaputra) near Aricha, then with the Meghna near Chandpur, before draining into the Bay of Bengal.
• The Padma basin drains approximately 80% of Bangladesh’s territory and supports the livelihoods of roughly a third of the population.

• Location: Murshidabad district, West Bengal; completed 1975; 2,240 metres long with a 38.38 km feeder canal.
• Purpose: Divert Ganga water into the Bhagirathi–Hooghly river system to flush the Kolkata Port of silt and maintain navigability.
• Impact on Bangladesh: Reduces downstream flow in the Padma → reduced groundwater recharge; increased salinity in coastal areas; riverbank erosion; silt accumulation on the Padma riverbed (causing flash floods during monsoons); reduced freshwater flow to the Sundarbans.

• Teesta River Treaty: Draft treaty agreed at Union level in 2011; blocked by West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee’s non-concurrence. Critical for Bangladesh’s northern agricultural belt. Remains unsigned.
• Six other rivers — Feni, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla, Dudhkumar — with pending water-sharing frameworks.
• Joint Rivers Commission (JRC): Established 1972; bilateral body for river data sharing, flood warning, and treaty implementation. Meets at ministerial and technical levels.

• Reduced Groundwater Recharge: Channelling water into a cement storage structure prevents natural diffuse seepage from a freely flowing river basin — robs surrounding agricultural areas of passive recharge.
• Silt Trap: Barrages reduce sediment transport downstream — the sediments that build the Padma delta, maintain the Sundarbans’ soil structure, and sustain inland fisheries get trapped behind the barrage.
• Sundarbans Threat: The world’s largest contiguous mangrove forest (UNESCO World Heritage Site, 1987) spans India (~4,264 sq km) and Bangladesh (~6,017 sq km). It requires brackish water equilibrium — any reduction in freshwater inflow accelerates salinization.
• Flood Paradox: Silt accumulation on the Padma riverbed (caused by reduced flow) makes the river shallower — it overflows more rapidly during monsoons. The barrage may exacerbate this by creating a similar effect downstream.
• Expert Alternative: A series of smaller check-dams would be ecologically preferable — they do not dramatically alter river flow. But this requires cross-border planning and sustained maintenance.

• China Factor: Bangladesh officially stated it will use its own resources; experts suggest it likely lacks the engineering capacity for a project of this scale without external support. Likely Chinese engineering involvement — mirroring China’s growing role as dominant water infrastructure manager in South Asia.
• Mekong Parallel: China’s Lancang dam cascade has reduced dry-season flows for Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Analysts fear a similar pattern for the Ganga–Brahmaputra system via Chinese infrastructure upstream.
• Regional Dam Spree: Over 160 hydroelectric projects underway in South Asia (2023 review). China building the world’s largest dam on the upper Brahmaputra (Motuo/Medong project, ~60 GW). India’s counter-programme: ₹6.4 lakh crore hydroelectric programme with 200+ dams in the Northeast.
• India’s Position: India has not directly commented on the Padma Barrage. Construction close to the border with possible Chinese engineering and a sceptical India–Bangladesh political climate creates a complex trilateral dynamic.

• Modernise and Renew the Ganges Treaty (December 2026): The expiry deadline is an opportunity to negotiate a climate-resilient, comprehensive framework covering the Ganga, Teesta, and other shared rivers.
• Joint Environmental Impact Assessment: India and Bangladesh should commission a bilateral EIA of the Padma Barrage before construction, assessing cross-border hydrological impact.
• Alternative Technical Assistance: India could offer technical and financial support for distributed check-dam networks as a preferable ecological alternative to a single large barrage.
• Strengthen JRC: Make Joint Rivers Commission’s data-sharing mechanisms real-time and binding, especially for dry-season flow monitoring at Farakka.

Universe’s Expansion Is Still Accelerating: Dark Energy Confirmed

A new study published in Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society (2026), co-led by astrophysicist Brodie Popovic (University of Southampton) and including Nobel laureates — among them Adam Riess (Johns Hopkins University) — has confirmed that the universe’s expansion is still accelerating. The study rebuts a 2025 paper from Yonsei University (Seoul) that claimed acceleration had stopped due to an ‘age effect’ in Type Ia supernova brightness calibration.

• The Big Bang (~13.8 billion years ago) initiated the universe, which has been expanding ever since.
• In 1998, two independent research teams simultaneously discovered that this expansion is accelerating — not decelerating as expected: the High-Z Supernova Search Team (Brian Schmidt, Adam Riess) and the Supernova Cosmology Project (Saul Perlmutter).
• This discovery was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics 2011 to Perlmutter, Schmidt, and Riess.
• The hypothesised driver of acceleration is an invisible force called dark energy, associated with Einstein’s cosmological constant (Λ) in General Relativity.

• A Type Ia supernova occurs when a white dwarf (the dense remnant of a low-to-intermediate mass star) in a binary system accretes mass from its companion until it reaches the Chandrasekhar limit (~1.4 solar masses) — triggering a thermonuclear explosion.
• Since the trigger mass is always approximately the same, all Type Ia supernovae have approximately the same intrinsic luminosity — making them ‘standard candles.’
• By measuring how bright these supernovae appear from Earth (observed brightness), scientists calculate their distance. Combining distances with recession velocities (from redshift) reveals the universe’s expansion history.
• Distant supernovae appearing dimmer than expected indicated they were farther away than a decelerating universe would predict — evidence for accelerating expansion.

• Remnant of a low-to-intermediate mass star (0.8–8 solar masses) after it exhausts fuel and sheds its outer layers as a planetary nebula.
• Composed primarily of carbon and oxygen; roughly the size of Earth but with the mass of the Sun.
• Held up by electron degeneracy pressure (not nuclear fusion). Collapses or explodes (Type Ia supernova) if it accumulates mass above the Chandrasekhar limit.
• Named after Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar — Indian-American astrophysicist; Nobel Prize in Physics, 1983.

• 2025 Yonsei University paper: Argued that Type Ia supernova distances must be calibrated differently, accounting for the ‘age effect’ — the age of the host galaxy’s stellar population affects supernova brightness. Conclusion: dark energy may be weakening; cosmic expansion no longer accelerating.
• 2026 Southampton-led paper: Found no evidence for the claimed ‘age effect’ in the largest calibrated supernova samples used by the cosmology community over the past decade. Conclusion: “The universe is still accelerating.”
• Both papers published in Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society. The debate reflects active frontier cosmological research — calibration methodology is a legitimate scientific disagreement, not settled controversy.
• Adam Riess (Johns Hopkins): “We found no evidence for the claimed ‘age effect’ in the largest calibrated supernova samples.” Yonsei University’s Young-Wook Lee defended the 2025 findings, citing methodological issues with the 2026 paper.

• Lambda-CDM Model (Standard Model of Cosmology): Λ = cosmological constant (dark energy); CDM = Cold Dark Matter. Predicts ~5% ordinary matter, ~27% dark matter, ~68% dark energy.
• Cosmological Constant (Λ): Introduced by Einstein to produce a static universe (his ‘blunder’); later shown to be consistent with accelerating expansion and associated with dark energy.
• Alternative dark energy theories: Quintessence (dynamic dark energy field that changes over time); Phantom Energy (dark energy that could eventually cause the Big Rip — universe tears apart).
• Hubble Tension: Unresolved discrepancy between H0 measured locally using supernovae/Cepheids (~73 km/s/Mpc) and from the Cosmic Microwave Background via Planck data (~67 km/s/Mpc). Suggests possible gaps in the Lambda-CDM model.
• Dark Matter ≠ Dark Energy: Two entirely distinct phenomena. Dark matter provides gravitational scaffolding for galaxy formation; dark energy drives the large-scale expansion of the universe. They have different properties, scales, and effects.

• ESA Euclid Mission (launched July 2023): Designed to map dark energy and dark matter across 10 billion years of cosmic history by observing billions of galaxies.
• DESI (Dark Energy Spectroscopic Instrument, Kitt Peak, Arizona): Creates 3D maps of the large-scale universe structure to constrain dark energy properties.
• James Webb Space Telescope (JWST): Contributes to cosmological distance measurements and high-redshift galaxy studies relevant to dark energy constraints.
• Vera C. Rubin Observatory (LSST): Legacy Survey of Space and Time; will image billions of supernovae and galaxies — the dataset expected to resolve supernova calibration debates.

• Multiple Measurement Techniques: Dark energy constraints must triangulate across Type Ia supernovae, Baryon Acoustic Oscillations (BAO), CMB anisotropies, and gravitational lensing — no single method is sufficient.
• India’s Role: India’s AstroSat (multi-wavelength astronomy satellite) and ISRO’s future observatory plans should include participation in dark energy survey data pipelines and cosmological computing infrastructure.