Updated: August 2026 · GS-II Polity & Constitution
Article 39 of the Constitution Six Principles of State Policy
Article 38 states the goal — a just social order. Article 39 is the operating instruction. Its six clauses cover livelihood, distribution of resources, concentration of wealth, equal pay, worker and child health, and the development of children. Two of them — 39(b) and 39(c) — carry a constitutional privilege no other Directive Principle has: the protection of Article 31C.
Structure
Six clauses · (a) to (f)
Article 31C shields
Only 39(b) & 39(c)
Amendment
39(f) · 42nd CAA, 1976
Latest ruling
9 judges · 5 Nov 2024
Article 39 — Bare Text
📌 Read the opening words carefully
"The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing…" — the phrase "in particular" links Article 39 back to Article 38. Article 38 states the general goal; Article 39 specifies what the State must secure to reach it.
Clause-by-Clause Explanation
Article 39(a) — Adequate means of livelihood
39(a)
What it says: citizens, men and women equally, must have the right to an adequate means of livelihood.
Key points:
• The word is "citizens" — unlike most of Part III, this clause is citizen-specific.
• "Adequate", not merely "some" — the standard is sufficiency, not bare survival.
• "Men and women equally" makes gender parity part of the livelihood guarantee itself.
Judicial use: in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), the Supreme Court read Article 39(a) with Article 21 to hold that the right to livelihood is part of the right to life — the classic instance of a Directive Principle giving content to a Fundamental Right.
Key points:
• The word is "citizens" — unlike most of Part III, this clause is citizen-specific.
• "Adequate", not merely "some" — the standard is sufficiency, not bare survival.
• "Men and women equally" makes gender parity part of the livelihood guarantee itself.
Judicial use: in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), the Supreme Court read Article 39(a) with Article 21 to hold that the right to livelihood is part of the right to life — the classic instance of a Directive Principle giving content to a Fundamental Right.
Article 39(b) — Distribution of material resources
39(b)
What it says: the ownership and control of the material resources of the community must be so distributed as best to subserve the common good.
Key points:
• Targets both ownership and control — a resource may be privately owned but publicly controlled.
• "Material resources" covers land, minerals, forests, water, spectrum and similar natural and productive assets.
• The test is "common good", which is what makes redistributive legislation constitutionally defensible.
Why it matters: this is the clause behind zamindari abolition, land ceiling laws, nationalisation statutes and natural-resource allocation policy — and it is one of the two clauses protected by Article 31C.
Key points:
• Targets both ownership and control — a resource may be privately owned but publicly controlled.
• "Material resources" covers land, minerals, forests, water, spectrum and similar natural and productive assets.
• The test is "common good", which is what makes redistributive legislation constitutionally defensible.
Why it matters: this is the clause behind zamindari abolition, land ceiling laws, nationalisation statutes and natural-resource allocation policy — and it is one of the two clauses protected by Article 31C.
Article 39(c) — Concentration of wealth
39(c)
What it says: the operation of the economic system must not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.
Key points:
• Directed at the system, not at individual transactions — it is a structural instruction.
• Concentration is objectionable only "to the common detriment"; wealth creation as such is not barred.
• Covers means of production as well as wealth — productive capacity, not just money.
Legislative expression: the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (since replaced by the Competition Act, 2002), and progressive taxation. Along with 39(b), it is protected by Article 31C.
Key points:
• Directed at the system, not at individual transactions — it is a structural instruction.
• Concentration is objectionable only "to the common detriment"; wealth creation as such is not barred.
• Covers means of production as well as wealth — productive capacity, not just money.
Legislative expression: the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (since replaced by the Competition Act, 2002), and progressive taxation. Along with 39(b), it is protected by Article 31C.
Article 39(d) — Equal pay for equal work
39(d)
What it says: there must be equal pay for equal work for both men and women.
Key points:
• Not a Fundamental Right on its own — but the courts have made it enforceable by reading it with Articles 14 and 16.
• The comparison is work-based, not designation-based: the same work must fetch the same pay.
Judicial use:
• Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) — equal pay for equal work is "not a fundamental right by itself" but is a constitutional goal capable of enforcement through Articles 14 and 16 read with Article 39(d).
• State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2016) — temporary, daily-wage, ad hoc and contractual employees performing the same duties as regular employees are entitled to the same minimum pay scale. Denying it was held to be "exploitative, demeaning and oppressive".
Legislative expression: the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, now subsumed into the Code on Wages, 2019.
Key points:
• Not a Fundamental Right on its own — but the courts have made it enforceable by reading it with Articles 14 and 16.
• The comparison is work-based, not designation-based: the same work must fetch the same pay.
Judicial use:
• Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) — equal pay for equal work is "not a fundamental right by itself" but is a constitutional goal capable of enforcement through Articles 14 and 16 read with Article 39(d).
• State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2016) — temporary, daily-wage, ad hoc and contractual employees performing the same duties as regular employees are entitled to the same minimum pay scale. Denying it was held to be "exploitative, demeaning and oppressive".
Legislative expression: the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, now subsumed into the Code on Wages, 2019.
Article 39(e) — Health and strength of workers and children
39(e)
What it says: the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children, must not be abused; and citizens must not be forced by economic necessity into avocations unsuited to their age or strength.
Key points:
• The phrase "forced by economic necessity" is the constitutional recognition that poverty itself coerces — the same idea the Court used in PUDR v. Union of India (1982) to hold sub-minimum wages to be forced labour under Article 23.
• Covers both occupational safety and unsuitable employment.
Judicial use: read with Articles 21, 23 and 24 in Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) and M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) to sustain directions on bonded labour and hazardous child labour.
Key points:
• The phrase "forced by economic necessity" is the constitutional recognition that poverty itself coerces — the same idea the Court used in PUDR v. Union of India (1982) to hold sub-minimum wages to be forced labour under Article 23.
• Covers both occupational safety and unsuitable employment.
Judicial use: read with Articles 21, 23 and 24 in Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) and M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) to sustain directions on bonded labour and hazardous child labour.
Article 39(f) — Development of children
39(f)
What it says: children must be given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, and childhood and youth must be protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.
Key points:
• Two limbs: a positive one (opportunities and facilities for healthy development) and a negative one (protection against exploitation and abandonment).
• "Moral and material abandonment" is a distinctive phrase — it covers neglect as well as active exploitation.
• Extends to "childhood and youth", so it is not capped at fourteen years.
Judicial use: read with Articles 21, 21A and 24 in M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996), Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) and the line of cases establishing the right to education before Article 21A was inserted.
Key points:
• Two limbs: a positive one (opportunities and facilities for healthy development) and a negative one (protection against exploitation and abandonment).
• "Moral and material abandonment" is a distinctive phrase — it covers neglect as well as active exploitation.
• Extends to "childhood and youth", so it is not capped at fourteen years.
Judicial use: read with Articles 21, 21A and 24 in M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996), Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) and the line of cases establishing the right to education before Article 21A was inserted.
Amendment to Article 39
42nd CAA
1976
1976
The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 — Section 7.
1. Clause (f) was substituted — the old clause was replaced with a new one.
2. The change took effect on 3 January 1977.
3. Clauses (a) to (e) were left untouched and stand as originally enacted in 1950.
1. Clause (f) was substituted — the old clause was replaced with a new one.
2. The change took effect on 3 January 1977.
3. Clauses (a) to (e) were left untouched and stand as originally enacted in 1950.
What exactly changed in clause (f)
BEFORE 3 JANUARY 1977 — original 39(f)
- "that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment"
- Purely protective in character
- Framed the child as someone to be shielded from harm
AFTER 3 JANUARY 1977 — substituted 39(f)
- Adds: "that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity"
- Retains the entire original protective limb
- Adds a developmental and positive obligation on the State
- Framed the child as someone entitled to conditions for growth, not merely protection
📌 The trap: Article 39(f) vs Article 39A
The 42nd Amendment, 1976 did two different things in this area, in two consecutive sections:
• Section 7 — substituted Article 39(f), on the healthy development of children.
• Section 8 — inserted Article 39A, an entirely new Article on equal justice and free legal aid.
Both took effect on 3 January 1977. Questions frequently swap "substituted 39(f)" with "added 39A" — they are separate changes to separate provisions.
📌 The four DPSPs added by the 42nd Amendment
For revision: the 42nd Amendment's contribution to Part IV was Article 39(f) as substituted (healthy development of children), Article 39A (equal justice and free legal aid), Article 43A (participation of workers in management of industries) and Article 48A (protection and improvement of environment, forests and wildlife). Compare with the 44th Amendment, 1978, which added only one — Article 38(2).
Why Article 39(b) and (c) Are Special — Article 31C
Every Directive Principle is non-justiciable under Article 37. But clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 have something no other DPSP has — a law made to give effect to them cannot be struck down for violating Article 14 or Article 19.
25th CAA, 1971
Art. 31C inserted for 39(b) & (c) → Kesavananda Bharati, 1973
First limb upheld; second struck down → 42nd CAA, 1976
Widened to all DPSPs → Minerva Mills, 1980
Expansion struck down → Property Owners Assn., 2024
Original 31C survives
Art. 31C inserted for 39(b) & (c) → Kesavananda Bharati, 1973
First limb upheld; second struck down → 42nd CAA, 1976
Widened to all DPSPs → Minerva Mills, 1980
Expansion struck down → Property Owners Assn., 2024
Original 31C survives
Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024)
9 judges
The bench: nine judges, majority opinion authored by Chief Justice D. Y. Chandrachud. Justice B. V. Nagarathna partially dissented; Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia dissented.
Holding 1 — Article 31C survives. Unanimously, the Court held that Article 31C as upheld in Kesavananda Bharati continues to exist in its original form, covering only Articles 39(b) and 39(c), notwithstanding that the 42nd Amendment's expansion was struck down in Minerva Mills. The reasoning: the 42nd Amendment intended only to widen the immunity, not to repeal the original provision.
Holding 2 — "material resources of the community" narrowed. By majority, the Court held that not all privately owned property automatically qualifies as a material resource of the community under Article 39(b). It departed from the expansive view taken by Justice Krishna Iyer in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977) and followed in Sanjeev Coke (1982).
Holding 3 — a contextual test. Whether a private resource falls within Article 39(b) depends on factors such as the nature and characteristics of the resource, its scarcity, its impact on community well-being, and the consequences of concentrating it in private hands. Courts may examine whether a law genuinely gives effect to Article 39(b) before allowing it Article 31C protection.
Holding 1 — Article 31C survives. Unanimously, the Court held that Article 31C as upheld in Kesavananda Bharati continues to exist in its original form, covering only Articles 39(b) and 39(c), notwithstanding that the 42nd Amendment's expansion was struck down in Minerva Mills. The reasoning: the 42nd Amendment intended only to widen the immunity, not to repeal the original provision.
Holding 2 — "material resources of the community" narrowed. By majority, the Court held that not all privately owned property automatically qualifies as a material resource of the community under Article 39(b). It departed from the expansive view taken by Justice Krishna Iyer in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977) and followed in Sanjeev Coke (1982).
Holding 3 — a contextual test. Whether a private resource falls within Article 39(b) depends on factors such as the nature and characteristics of the resource, its scarcity, its impact on community well-being, and the consequences of concentrating it in private hands. Courts may examine whether a law genuinely gives effect to Article 39(b) before allowing it Article 31C protection.
Article 39 — Clause, Case and Statute Grid
| Clause | Subject | Leading case | Statutory expression |
|---|---|---|---|
| 39(a) | Adequate means of livelihood, men and women equally | Olga Tellis (1985) — livelihood read into Article 21 | MGNREGA, 2005 |
| 39(b) | Distribution of material resources for the common good | Property Owners Association (2024); earlier Ranganatha Reddy (1977), Sanjeev Coke (1982) | Zamindari abolition and land ceiling laws; nationalisation statutes |
| 39(c) | Preventing concentration of wealth and means of production | Kesavananda Bharati (1973); Minerva Mills (1980) on Article 31C | MRTP Act, 1969, replaced by the Competition Act, 2002 |
| 39(d) | Equal pay for equal work | Randhir Singh (1982); State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2016) | Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, now within the Code on Wages, 2019 |
| 39(e) | Health and strength of workers; tender age of children | PUDR (1982); Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) | Factories Act, 1948; Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; OSH Code, 2020 |
| 39(f) | Healthy development of children; protection of childhood and youth | M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) | Juvenile Justice Act, 2015; Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act as amended in 2016; RTE Act, 2009 |
📌 Also worth knowing — Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997)
The Supreme Court read Articles 38, 39 and 46 with the Fifth Schedule to hold that transfer of government and tribal land in Scheduled Areas to non-tribals and private mining companies was impermissible — a direct application of Article 39(b)'s "common good" standard to natural resources in tribal areas.
Article 39 at a Glance — Mind Map
Article 39 · Six Clauses
(a) LivelihoodCitizens · men and women equally · adequate means · Olga Tellis (1985)
(b) Material resourcesOwnership and control · distributed to subserve the common good · protected by Art. 31C
(c) ConcentrationEconomic system must not concentrate wealth and means of production to the common detriment · Art. 31C
(d) Equal payEqual pay for equal work · enforced via Arts. 14 and 16 · Randhir Singh · Jagjit Singh
(e) Health & strengthWorkers and children not abused · no avocation unsuited to age or strength · "forced by economic necessity"
(f) Child developmentOpportunities and facilities · freedom and dignity · protection against exploitation and moral and material abandonment
Amendment42nd CAA, 1976, s.7 — clause (f) substituted, w.e.f. 3 January 1977. Clauses (a)–(e) unamended.
Article 31C arc25th CAA (1971) → Kesavananda (1973) → 42nd CAA (1976) → Minerva Mills (1980) → Property Owners (2024)
2024 ruling31C survives in original form · not all private property is a "material resource" · contextual test
Prelims Traps to Guard Against
- Only clause (f) of Article 39 has been amended. Clauses (a) to (e) stand as originally enacted.
- Clause (f) was substituted, not inserted — an original clause (f) already existed in 1950. The 42nd Amendment replaced it with a wider version.
- Article 39A is a separate Article, inserted by Section 8 of the 42nd Amendment. Do not confuse it with the substitution of Article 39(f) by Section 7.
- Article 31C protects only Articles 39(b) and 39(c) — not the whole of Article 39, and not any other Directive Principle.
- Article 39(a) uses "citizens", so it is citizen-specific.
- Equal pay for equal work is not a Fundamental Right by itself. It is enforced by reading Article 39(d) with Articles 14 and 16.
- Article 39(f) covers "childhood and youth" — it is not limited to children under fourteen.
- The 42nd Amendment added four DPSPs — 39(f) as substituted, 39A, 43A and 48A. The 44th Amendment added only one — Article 38(2).
- Article 31C's expansion by the 42nd Amendment was struck down in Minerva Mills (1980), but the original Article 31C survives, as the nine-judge Bench confirmed in 2024.
- Article 39(b) speaks of "ownership and control" — both, not merely ownership.
Mains Angle
Question (GS-II, 15 marks, 250 words): "Article 39(b) has been the constitutional engine of redistribution in India; the Supreme Court's 2024 ruling has recalibrated it." Examine the scope of Article 39 and the significance of the recent judicial reinterpretation.
Structure the answer around three pivots:
- What Article 39 directs.
Six clauses — livelihood 39(a), distribution of material resources 39(b), concentration of wealth 39(c), equal pay 39(d), health and strength 39(e), child development 39(f).
The 42nd Amendment, 1976 substituted clause (f) to add a positive developmental duty towards children. - How it became legally potent.
Article 31C gives laws implementing 39(b) and (c) immunity from Articles 14 and 19 — a privilege no other DPSP enjoys.
Courts have read 39(a) into Article 21 (Olga Tellis), 39(d) into Articles 14 and 16 (Randhir Singh, Jagjit Singh), and 39(e) and (f) into Articles 21, 23 and 24 (PUDR, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, M. C. Mehta). - The 2024 recalibration.
Property Owners Association (5 November 2024, nine judges): Article 31C survives in original form; not all private property is a "material resource of the community"; and a contextual test now applies — nature, scarcity, community impact and consequences of private concentration.
Significance: strengthens private property protection, narrows the State's automatic redistributive claim, and restores judicial review over whether a law genuinely serves Article 39(b).
Conclusion: Article 39 remains the operative core of Part IV, but the 2024 ruling shifts the burden — the State must now demonstrate, resource by resource, that redistribution serves the common good, rather than assume it.
Key Takeaways
- Article 39 lists six principles the State must direct its policy towards securing — (a) adequate means of livelihood for citizens, men and women equally; (b) distribution of the material resources of the community to subserve the common good; (c) preventing concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment; (d) equal pay for equal work; (e) protecting the health and strength of workers and the tender age of children; (f) healthy development of children and protection of childhood and youth.
- Only clause (f) has been amended. It was substituted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 7, with effect from 3 January 1977 — adding a positive duty to provide opportunities and facilities for development, alongside the original protective limb.
- Article 39A is a different provision, inserted by Section 8 of the same 42nd Amendment. The 42nd Amendment's DPSP additions were 39(f) as substituted, 39A, 43A and 48A.
- Article 31C protects only Articles 39(b) and 39(c) — laws giving effect to them cannot be struck down for violating Articles 14 or 19. No other Directive Principle has this immunity.
- Article 39 has become legally effective indirectly — 39(a) read into Article 21 (Olga Tellis, 1985), 39(d) into Articles 14 and 16 (Randhir Singh, 1982; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, 2016), and 39(e) and (f) into Articles 21, 23 and 24.
- Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024), a nine-judge Bench: Article 31C survives in its original form, and not all privately owned property is a "material resource of the community" — a contextual test now governs, and courts may review whether a law genuinely gives effect to Article 39(b).
