The Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly has taken up a resolution seeking the immediate restoration of statehood. Amendments seeking to include Articles 370 and 35A were moved and then withdrawn — bringing the Union Territory’s constitutional history back into focus.

• Delhi Agreement (July 1952): between the Union and State Governments. The State accepted the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and the supremacy of the national flag (the State flag continued alongside). It also accepted the President’s power under Article 352 for internal disturbance, subject to the State’s concurrence.
• Constitution (Application to J&K) Order, 1954: extended large parts of the Constitution and inserted Article 35A through an Appendix. Article 35A empowered the State legislature to define “permanent residents” and reserve for them rights to property, government jobs and scholarships.
• Constitution of J&K: adopted on 17 November 1956 and in force from 26 January 1957, after which the State’s Constituent Assembly dissolved.
• 1965: the State’s constitution was amended to replace the titles “Sadar-i-Riyasat” and “Prime Minister” with Governor and Chief Minister.

• Constitution (Application to J&K) Order, 2019 (C.O. 272), 5 August 2019: superseded the 1954 Order and applied the entire Constitution. It amended Article 367 so that “Constituent Assembly of the State” would read as “Legislative Assembly”. With the State under President’s Rule, the Assembly’s role was exercised through Parliament and the Governor.
• C.O. 273 (6 August 2019): declared Article 370 inoperative except for a modified clause (1).
• J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019: created two Union Territories from 31 October 2019 — J&K (with a legislature) and Ladakh (without one). This was the first conversion of a State into a Union Territory.

• Statehood ≠ special status: restoring statehood means a full-fledged State under Articles 3 and 4. Reviving Article 370 is legally foreclosed by the 2023 verdict — which is why the amendments on Articles 370 and 35A were withdrawn.
• Procedure: Parliament would need to amend the J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 by ordinary law under Articles 3 and 4. This is not a constitutional amendment under Article 368.
• Democratic accountability: in the present dyarchy, the elected government lacks control over police, while the Lieutenant Governor is not answerable to the legislature.

• Federal precedent: reducing a State to a UT without its legislature’s consent raises concerns under cooperative federalism. The Court left this question open.
• Security considerations: the Union cites a sensitive border and militancy as reasons for caution on timing.
• No timeline: “at the earliest” is not enforceable, and the absence of a time-bound roadmap sustains political uncertainty.
• Integration and alienation: administrative integration is complete, but trust-building and representative governance remain unfinished.

Hearing public interest petitions on the affordability of medicines, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court described steep mark-ups on essential medicines, particularly cancer drugs, as a burden on patients and taxpayers. It asked the Centre why the 16% retailer margin under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 2013 should not apply uniformly.

Figure 2 — The Mark-ups Flagged by the Court

A cancer drug with a PTR of about ₹3,000 retailed at about ₹27,000 — a nine-fold mark-up. A non-scheduled statin cost more than its price-controlled combination with aspirin. Image courtesy The Hindu; reproduced with credit for educational use.

• Disproportionate margins: about ₹24,000 of a single pack’s price was absorbed in the distribution chain, not in manufacturing cost.
• Regulatory anomaly: Rosuvastatin (non-scheduled) cost about ₹240 per strip, while its combination with aspirin — a scheduled formulation — cost about ₹70. The combination was cheaper only because it falls under price control.
• The Centre’s response: the Solicitor General acknowledged the concern and said a way forward would need to balance equities among patients, industry and distributors.

• Narrow coverage: price control applies only to NLEM formulations; a large part of the market is non-scheduled.
• Trade-margin incentives: high MRPs allow large discounts to retailers and stockists. Branded and “trade” generics compete on margins offered to the trade rather than on price to patients.
• Weak prescriber discipline: the Uniform Code for Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (UCPMP), 2024 restricts inducements, but enforcement remains a concern.
• Information asymmetry: patients, especially cancer patients, cannot compare prices or delay purchase.

• The caution: a uniform 16% cap could affect the viability of distribution in low-volume rural markets and discourage new launches. Price caps have occasionally led to supply withdrawals.
• Extend trade margin rationalisation to more high-value therapeutic groups, beyond anti-cancer drugs.
• Transparency: mandatory disclosure of PTR alongside MRP and a public price database.
• Public alternatives: scale up Jan Aushadhi Kendras (PMBJP) and procurement for public hospitals, since medicines form a major part of out-of-pocket health spending.

Addressing the 81st UN General Assembly, Japan’s Prime Minister called for removing the “enemy state” references from the UN Charter and for expanding both permanent and non-permanent seats on the Security Council. China responded that the clauses remain relevant as safeguards against militarism.

• GA Resolution 50/52 (1995): adopted 155–0–3 (China voting in favour), declaring the intention to begin the Article 108 amendment procedure to delete the clauses.
• 2005 World Summit Outcome: adopted without a vote, it decided that references to “enemy states” in Articles 53, 77 and 107 should be deleted.
• Outcome: no amendment was ever ratified. Most international lawyers regard the clauses as obsolete, but they remain in the text.

• Japan’s view: after eight decades of peaceful conduct and major contributions to UN peacekeeping and development assistance, the clauses are an outdated reminder of defeat. Removing them would recognise Japan as a “normal” member state.
• China’s view: the clauses reflect historical memory of wartime aggression in Asia. China argues that Japan’s conduct and defence build-up matter more than its words.
• Wider context: deteriorating Sino-Japanese ties and tensions with Russia have revived a largely symbolic legal issue.

• G4 partner: Japan and India, along with Brazil and Germany, seek permanent seats. The enemy-state debate shows that the Charter’s 1945 architecture is the core obstacle to reform.
• Reformed multilateralism: India’s position that the Security Council should reflect present realities rests on the same argument.
• Indo-Pacific balance: a more assertive Japan fits India’s interest in a multipolar Asia, though India avoids taking sides on history disputes.

After a deficient and erratic monsoon, Maharashtra has declared drought in 265 of its 358 talukas (about 74%), mostly in Marathwada and Vidarbha. It is the second State to do so this year, after Karnataka (177 of 240 taluks).

• Declaration: a Government Resolution dated 25 September identified talukas using rainfall deficits and other drought indicators since June. Yavatmal has the most talukas (16), followed by Jalgaon (15) and Nanded, Amravati and Nagpur (14 each).
• Rainfall: several Marathwada districts received only about half to a little over half of normal rainfall. Long dry spells depleted soil moisture at critical crop stages.
• Crops hit: soybean, maize, cotton and onion, particularly in Latur, Dharashiv and Solapur.
• National picture: the India Drought Monitor (IIT-Gandhinagar) showed 51.2% of India’s land area under dry or drought conditions as of 23 September, and 84.1% in Maharashtra.
• Relief so far: crop-loan restructuring, electricity-bill concessions and expanded employment-guarantee works. Crop-loss compensation awaits field surveys — panchnamas, photographs and GPS-tagged records.
• Climate driver: a strengthening El Niño (see Also in News).

• Relief over resilience: response is still dominated by post-facto relief rather than reducing risk before the monsoon fails.
• Delays: surveys, memoranda and central team visits can take months, and insurance claim settlement is often slow.
• Water-intensive cropping: sugarcane in a drought-prone region and groundwater over-extraction deepen hydrological drought.
• Climate risk: longer dry spells within a season can cause crop failure even when total rainfall is near normal. Cumulative rainfall alone is therefore a poor guide.

• Early warning: integrate forecasts, soil-moisture data and drought monitors so that contingency crop plans are triggered early.
• Water security: watershed development, farm ponds, micro-irrigation (Per Drop More Crop) and groundwater regulation.
• Crop diversification towards millets and pulses in rain-shadow regions.
• Faster compensation using technology-based yield estimation and direct benefit transfer.

At the 70th meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC-70) in Hobart, Australia (28 September–2 October 2026), India called for science-based conservation, cooperation among range countries, and practical local measures against threats to cetaceans. The meeting marks the 80th anniversary of the whaling convention.

Figure 5 — Types of Cetaceans

Taxonomically there are two parvorders — Mysticeti and Odontoceti. Dolphins and porpoises are toothed cetaceans, grouped separately here for ease of comparison. Reference infographic; reproduced for educational use.

• Legal protection: cetaceans in Indian waters are listed in Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the highest level of protection.
• Project Dolphin (announced 2020): a holistic programme for riverine and marine cetaceans and their habitats. The first range-wide estimate (2025) counted about 6,327 river dolphins.
• Gangetic river dolphin: National Aquatic Animal (2009); National Dolphin Day is on 5 October. The Indus river dolphin, found in the Beas, is Punjab’s State aquatic animal. Chilika Lake has an important Irrawaddy dolphin population.
• Arabian Sea humpback whale: a genetically isolated, non-migratory population — unlike other humpbacks, which migrate between polar and tropical waters. It is Endangered on the IUCN Red List and among India’s 25 species identified for focused conservation.
• Marine Protected Areas: e.g., Gulf of Mannar and Gulf of Kachchh Marine National Parks, and India’s first Dugong Conservation Reserve in Palk Bay (2022).

• Main threats: bycatch and entanglement in fishing gear, ship strikes, underwater noise from shipping and seismic surveys, plastics and pollution, and climate change. River dolphins also face dams and barrages, low flows and sand mining.
• Weak enforcement: the IWC has no enforcement power. Objections and reservations allow members to opt out of binding decisions.
• Polarisation: the split between whaling and anti-whaling blocs has led to exits (Japan, 2019) and weakened consensus.
• India’s gaps: limited population data for marine species, weak stranding-response networks, and poor monitoring of bycatch in gillnet fisheries.

The Union Ministry of Home Affairs has extended the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 in parts of Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh for six months from 1 October 2026. In Manipur, the whole State is now a “disturbed area” except 13 police stations in five Valley districts.

• Shift in who notifies: for decades, Manipur’s own government issued the disturbed-area notifications. After the May 2023 violence, the MHA took over.
• Disagreement: when the MHA reimposed AFSPA in six police station areas on 14 November 2024, the State Cabinet recommended a review and withdrawal the very next day — an unusual Centre–State divergence.
• Nagaland: continuation is linked to armed groups and the unresolved Naga political issue — talks with the NSCN-IM (Framework Agreement, 2015) and the Naga National Political Groups.
• Arunachal: concentrated in districts affected by insurgent movement and areas adjoining Assam and Myanmar.

• Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1997): a Constitution Bench upheld AFSPA, but held that a declaration must be for a limited period with review every six months, and that the Army’s Do’s and Don’ts are binding.
• EEVFAM v. Union of India (2016): no absolute immunity. Excessive or retaliatory force is not permitted even in disturbed areas, and every such death must be inquired into.
• Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee (2005): recommended repeal, with necessary provisions moved into the UAPA; endorsed by the Second ARC (Fifth Report, 2007).
• Justice Santosh Hegde Commission (2013) examined alleged fake encounters in Manipur. The Justice Verma Committee (2013) recommended that sexual offences by security personnel be tried under ordinary criminal law.

• The security case: the Army is not a police force and needs legal cover for counter-insurgency. Manipur’s armed ethnic groups, looted weapons and the porous India–Myanmar border sustain the threat.
• The rights case: prosecution sanction is rarely granted. Incidents such as the killing of civilians at Oting (Nagaland, 2021) have deepened alienation.
• Governance deficit: prolonged reliance on AFSPA reflects a failure of civil administration and political settlement.
• Way forward: genuine six-monthly reviews, a transparent sanction process, independent inquiries, and political dialogue alongside security operations.

Cybercrime cases rose 17.9% to 1,01,928 in 2024, even as overall registered crime fell by 6% (NCRB). The Status of Policing in India Report (SPIR) 2026, based on a survey of 8,306 citizens in 16 States, shows who is targeted and how victims seek redress.

• Common scams: calls about undelivered parcels (33%), high-return investments (31%), fake bank officials (27%), a phone “linked to illegal activity” (23%), “friends” urgently needing money (23%), and fake police or authority figures (20%). Roughly half to three-fifths of respondents had never received such calls.
• Connectivity and risk: among heavy internet users, 46% reported moderate or high scam exposure, against 19% of non-users.
• Methods: fraudsters rely less on technical skill than on exploiting trust — in e-commerce, banks and relationships — and fear of authority, as in “digital arrest” scams.

Figure 8 — Fraud Attempts and Online Exposure (Tables 1–2)

The more time people spend online, the more often they are targeted. Image courtesy The Hindu (data: Lokniti-CSDS & Common Cause, SPIR 2026); reproduced with credit for educational use.

• Victimisation: 13% of respondents were direct victims in the past two to three years. Of these, 54% faced financial fraud, 13% device hacking, 11% data theft, 7% cyberbullying and 4% online sexual harassment.
• An unexpected profile: financial fraud rises with wealth and education — 57% among the rich against 47% among the poor, and 59% among graduates against 40% among the non-literate.
• Losses: over eight in ten victims lost money, and 23% lost more than ₹20,000.
• Takeaway: fraud now tracks digital participation and resources. It works less as a penalty on carelessness than as a cost of being connected.

Figure 9 — Nature of Crimes, Victim Profile and Losses (Tables 3–5)

Better-off and more educated respondents report more financial fraud — reflecting greater exposure, not less awareness. Image courtesy The Hindu (data: Lokniti-CSDS & Common Cause, SPIR 2026); reproduced with credit for educational use.

• Reporting: 49% of victims complained to the police, 9% approached them but did not follow up, and 39% did not complain at all.
• Paying to be heard: 27% of complainants paid the police. The share was higher among women (35%) than men (22%), in rural areas (36%) than urban (24%), and among the poor (51%) than the affluent (12%).
• Using contacts: 37% approached senior officials or local leaders. The share was highest among the poor (55%).
• Informal routes “worked”: full recovery was 41% for those who paid against 12% for those who did not; and 32% for those who used contacts against 13% for those who did not.

• A two-tier justice system: those with the fewest formal options — women, the rural population and the poor — are pushed most often into informal channels.
• Correlation, not causation: the recovery data are self-reported and may reflect case characteristics, such as early reporting. They still point to discretion in police response.
• Structural gaps: under-reporting, reluctance to register FIRs, weak bank–police coordination within the “golden hour”, inter-State jurisdiction problems, and shortages of trained cyber personnel.
• Police accountability: the Prakash Singh (2006) directions, including Police Complaints Authorities, remain unevenly implemented.

• Enforceable procedure: time-bound, mandatory FIR/e-FIR registration for cyber fraud, with an audit trail for each complaint.
• Standard bank–police protocol for freezing and returning money, with timelines and public reporting on recovery.
• Upstream prevention: action against mule accounts, stricter SIM verification, and platform liability for scam advertisements.
• Capacity and awareness: dedicated cyber police stations, trained investigators, and targeted awareness for high-exposure users — not only the digitally inexperienced.