The ninth edition of IBSAMAR — the only naval exercise that brings together the navies of India, Brazil and South Africa — ended at Simon’s Town, South Africa, on 20 October 2026, giving maritime substance to a grouping that is better known as a diplomatic forum of the Global South.

• Ocean junction: the waters off the Cape of Good Hope link the Indian Ocean with the South Atlantic. Note the Prelims trap — the official boundary between the two oceans (per the International Hydrographic Organization) is drawn at Cape Agulhas, Africa’s southernmost point, not at the Cape of Good Hope.
• The Cape route: it gained fresh importance when attacks on shipping in the Red Sea from late 2023 forced many carriers to bypass the Suez Canal and sail around Africa.
• Three littorals: India anchors the Indian Ocean; Brazil guards a vast South Atlantic zone it calls the “Blue Amazon” (Amazônia Azul); South Africa sits at the hinge of both.

Figure 2 — Closing ceremony of IBSAMAR IX at Simon’s Town

Exchange of mementos between Indian and South African naval officers; the backdrop carries the crests of all three navies. Image courtesy PIB / Indian Navy; reproduced with credit for educational use.

• Defence diplomacy beyond the neighbourhood: extends India’s naval footprint to Africa’s southern tip and the South Atlantic, consistent with the MAHASAGAR vision (2025), the successor to SAGAR (2015).
• South–South security cooperation: gives the Global South a maritime format that does not depend on any great-power framework.
• Africa outreach: complements India’s other engagements with African navies, such as AIKEYME (Africa–India Key Maritime Engagement, 2025).
• Shared non-traditional threats: piracy, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, maritime trafficking and disaster response.

• Limited scale and frequency: IBSAMAR is held only roughly every two years, with gaps — nine editions in 18 years — and involves a handful of ships, which caps the depth of interoperability.
• IBSA’s relevance question: since the expansion of BRICS (from 2024), IBSA’s distinct identity as a democracies-only caucus is sometimes seen as overshadowed.
• Partners’ wider ties: South Africa has also exercised with the Chinese and Russian navies (Exercise Mosi, 2019 and 2023), a reminder that IBSA partners pursue multi-alignment, as does India.

The 33rd edition of SIMBEX, one of the Indian Navy’s longest-running bilateral exercises, opened at Visakhapatnam on 21 October 2026 with the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) — a partnership that has grown in step with India’s eastward strategic turn.

Figure 3 — Opening of SIMBEX-2026 on board an Indian warship

Officers of both navies at the opening ceremony, Visakhapatnam, 21 Oct 2026. Image courtesy PIB / Indian Navy; reproduced with credit for educational use.

• Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): detecting, tracking and neutralising submarines using sonar, helicopters and torpedoes — the most demanding naval skill, given that sound, not light, is the primary sensor underwater.
• Anti-Air Warfare (AAW): defending a force against aircraft, drones and missiles.
• Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW): engaging enemy ships, typically with anti-ship missiles and guns.
• Interoperability: the ability of two forces to operate together using common procedures, signals and communications — the core aim of every such exercise.

• Chokepoint security: a large share of India’s trade with East Asia passes through the Malacca–Singapore Straits; cooperation with the RSN supports safe transit.
• Bay of Bengal focus: the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal form the western approaches to the Strait of Malacca, where India’s Andaman & Nicobar Command (India’s first tri-service command, 2001) is positioned.
• Indo-Pacific stability: both navies back a rules-based maritime order and freedom of navigation under UNCLOS (1982).
• Wider defence web: bilateral exercises on land and in the air, plus the trilateral SITMEX, deepen the relationship beyond the sea.

• Partnership, not alliance: Singapore balances its ties with all major powers; SIMBEX builds interoperability without implying shared commitments in a crisis.
• Capacity gap in the IOR: India’s role as a preferred security partner depends on fleet strength, shipbuilding timelines and maintenance cycles, not exercises alone.
• Underwater domain awareness: rising activity of extra-regional survey and research vessels in the Indian Ocean makes ASW and information sharing more — not less — important.

India is hosting the 7th AgriVoltaics World Conference (AWC 2026) at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi (21–23 October) — the first time the series is held in the Global South — and the Government has announced a large agrivoltaic programme under the next phase of PM-KUSUM.

• Photovoltaic effect: first observed by Edmond Becquerel in 1839; light falling on a semiconductor (usually silicon) frees electrons and produces direct current, which an inverter converts to AC.
• Light saturation point: beyond a certain light intensity, photosynthesis does not rise further. Many C3 crops (leafy vegetables, potato, several pulses, spices) tolerate partial shade; sun-loving C4 crops such as maize and sugarcane are less suited.
• Microclimate effect: shade lowers leaf and soil temperature and cuts evapotranspiration, saving water and protecting crops from heat stress.
• Mutual benefit: PV output falls as cells heat up (roughly 0.4–0.5% per °C above 25 °C); transpiration from crops below keeps panels cooler and slightly more efficient.

• Land is the binding constraint: ground-mounted solar needs roughly 4–5 acres per MW. With 86% of holdings small and marginal (Agriculture Census 2015–16), diverting farmland to solar parks is neither feasible nor desirable at scale.
• Farmer incomes: a second, steady income stream (lease rent or power sales) hedges against price and weather shocks.
• Water and climate resilience: field studies cited by the Government suggest 10–20% yield gains for some crops and about 30% lower water use in suitable systems — results that are crop- and site-specific.
• Energy transition: India’s non-fossil installed capacity stands at 308.03 GW, over 55% of about 560 GW. Decentralised, farm-level generation reduces transmission losses and diesel use in irrigation.
• Rural jobs: a CSTEP AgriPV manual estimates 1.10–3.32 lakh full-time-equivalent jobs (installation, operation and maintenance) (estimate).

• PM-KUSUM (2019): Component A — small grid-connected plants on barren, fallow or cultivable land (on stilts where crops continue below); Component B — standalone solar pumps; Component C — solarisation of grid-connected pumps, including feeder-level solarisation. About 25 lakh pumps solarised so far, as per MNRE.
• What changes: agrivoltaics moves from an optional design within Component A to a dedicated programme, with support to offset the higher cost of elevated structures.
• PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana (2024): rooftop solar for households; decentralised solar added 16.3 GW last year — 7.6 GW via PM-KUSUM and 8.7 GW via rooftop.
• Convergence ideas: siting projects near mandis, warehouses and cold chains using maps from PMGSY (7.70 lakh geo-tagged facilities) and PM Kisan SAMPADA Yojana (400+ cold-chain projects).

• Germany: support is tied to continued farming and minimum crop-yield requirements; the DIN SPEC 91434 (2021) standard defines what counts as agrivoltaics.
• Japan: all categories of farmland opened to agrivoltaics; small systems supported through preferential tariffs.
• Italy: a €1.7 billion funding programme for farmers, developers and research institutions.
• Global scale: installed agrivoltaic capacity crossed 18.4 GW in 2025.

• Agriculture (Entry 14) and Land (Entry 18) are in the State List; Electricity is in the Concurrent List (Entry 38) — so land-use rules and power purchase are largely State decisions.
• Electricity Act, 2003; tariffs set by CERC and State Electricity Regulatory Commissions.
• International Solar Alliance (ISA), IWMI (a CGIAR centre), TERI and CSTEP — names to recognise in Prelims.

• Cost premium: elevated, tilted structures cost 25–30% more than ground-mounted plants; viability depends on subsidy design and long-term power purchase agreements.
• Small-plot mismatch: with average holdings near 1 hectare, single-farmer projects are hard; aggregation through FPOs or cooperatives is essential.
• Risk of “solar first, crops second”: without a legal definition and yield thresholds, projects may keep only token cultivation — which is why Germany ties support to crop output.
• Tenancy and equity: much tenancy in India is informal; lease income may go to landowners while tenant cultivators bear shade-related yield risk.
• DISCOM finances and grid: loss-making distribution companies and weak rural grids can delay payments and power evacuation.
• Evidence base: yield and water benefits vary by crop and climate; Indian trials (for example at ICAR-CAZRI, Jodhpur) are still limited in number.
• Panel end-of-life: solar modules fall under the E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2022; scaling up adds to future PV waste.

• A clear national definition of agrivoltaics with minimum land-use and crop-yield conditions.
• Crop–climate zone matching, using tools such as the new Climate-Zone Technical Framework.
• Farmer-owned models through FPOs and cooperatives, with protection for tenant cultivators.
• Standard procurement models with DISCOMs and State energy departments, and simpler land-use conversion rules.