Article 25, Freedom of Religion and India's Anti-Conversion Laws
Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. But the word "propagate" has carried the heaviest litigation load of any word in Part III. In Rev. Stainislaus (1977) the Supreme Court held that the right to propagate does not include a right to convert — and that single holding underpins the state anti-conversion laws now in force in thirteen States, a batch of challenges to which is pending before the Supreme Court.
The Text of Article 25
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. — Article 25(1), Constitution of India
Article 25 sits at the head of the Right to Freedom of Religion group — Articles 25 to 28 — and is the individual's guarantee. It applies to all persons, citizens and non-citizens alike.
The four limitations on Article 25(1)
The Article opens with "subject to" — and what follows is the whole architecture of its regulation.
- Public order
- Morality
- Health
- "and to the other provisions of this Part"
- Article 25 must operate consistently with every other Fundamental Right — Articles 14, 15, 17, 19 and 21
- This is why conflicts between religious practice and equality, dignity or liberty are decided as constitutional questions, not treated as an untouchable religious sphere
Article 25 is the individual's right — conscience, profession, practice, propagation. Article 26 is the religious denomination's right — to establish and maintain institutions, manage its own affairs in matters of religion, own and acquire property, and administer that property. Note the asymmetry in their qualifiers: Article 25 is subject to public order, morality, health and other Part III rights; Article 26 is subject only to public order, morality and health. In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1958), the Court resolved a clash between Article 25(2)(b) and Article 26(b) by harmonious construction, holding that the State's power to throw open Hindu temples prevails.
Article 25(2) — The State's Regulatory Power
Article 25 protects religious practice, but the Court has held that only practices essential or integral to the religion attract protection. The doctrine originates in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954), where the Court said what constitutes an essential part of a religion is to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. Applied since in Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta (1984, tandava dance not essential to Ananda Margis), M. Ismail Faruqui (1994, a mosque is not an essential part of Islam for the purpose of State acquisition), and Shayara Bano (2017, instant triple talaq not essential to Islam). The doctrine is heavily criticised — it asks judges to make theological determinations, and it protects only what the Court deems essential rather than what the believer holds sacred. That critique is a ready Mains paragraph.
The Propagation Question and Rev. Stainislaus
The word "propagate" was not in the original draft. It was inserted in the Constituent Assembly after sustained argument, on the understanding — pressed by K. M. Munshi and accepted by the House — that it protected the right to transmit one's beliefs, not a right to secure conversions by inducement.
• The right to "propagate" means the right to transmit or spread one's tenets by exposition. It does not grant a right to convert another person to one's own religion.
• Conversion by force, fraud or allurement would impinge on the "freedom of conscience" guaranteed to all persons alike — the convert's conscience is itself constitutionally protected.
• Such laws are referable to public order, a State subject under Entry 1 of the State List, and are therefore within State legislative competence.
Both statutes were upheld. This remains the governing precedent, and every subsequent State law traces its constitutional pedigree to it.
What Article 25(1) grants is not a right to convert another person to one's own religion, but to transmit or spread one's religion by an exposition of its tenets — for the freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all citizens alike, and not merely to the propagator. — The reasoning in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977), paraphrased
Anti-Conversion Laws in India: The Landscape
These statutes are almost always titled "Freedom of Religion" or "Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion" Acts. There is no central anti-conversion law; the subject is legislated by States under the public-order entry.
| State | Legislation |
|---|---|
| Odisha | Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 — the first such law; upheld in Rev. Stainislaus |
| Madhya Pradesh | Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam, 1968; replaced by the MP Freedom of Religion Act, 2021 |
| Arunachal Pradesh | Arunachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 1978 |
| Chhattisgarh | Inherited the MP 1968 Act on State formation in 2000 |
| Gujarat | Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003, amended 2021 |
| Himachal Pradesh | HP Freedom of Religion Act, 2006, replaced by the 2019 Act and amended in 2022 |
| Jharkhand | Jharkhand Freedom of Religion Act, 2017 |
| Uttarakhand | Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act, 2018, amended 2022 |
| Uttar Pradesh | UP Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, enacted as the 2021 Act; substantially amended in 2024 |
| Karnataka | Karnataka Protection of Right to Freedom of Religion Act, 2022, notified with retrospective effect from 17 May 2022 |
| Haryana | Haryana Prevention of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2022 |
| Rajasthan | Rajasthan Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2025 — among the most stringent, with confiscation and demolition provisions |
| Maharashtra | Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Act, 2026 — passed by the Assembly on 16 March and the Council on 17 March 2026, reserved by the Governor for the President, and given Presidential assent on 31 July 2026. It comes into force on State notification, making Maharashtra the 13th State with such a law. |
(1) Tamil Nadu is the counter-example. It enacted the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Act in 2002 and repealed it in 2004 — the only State to have reversed course, which makes it useful for a balanced answer.
(2) The Maharashtra Bill was reserved for the President. The Governor did not assent himself but reserved the Bill for the President's consideration under Article 200, with assent granted under Article 201. Bills are typically reserved where they touch a Concurrent List field and may be repugnant to central law. The route itself is a Prelims-worthy detail.
What these laws typically contain
- Prohibited means. Conversion by force, misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence, coercion, allurement or inducement — with "allurement" defined broadly enough to include gifts, gratification, employment or free education.
- Marriage nexus. Marriage entered into for the sole purpose of conversion may be declared void, and conversion for the sole purpose of marriage is penalised.
- Prior declaration. A person intending to convert must give advance notice to the District Magistrate — typically 30 to 60 days — and the religious converter must give notice too, followed by a police inquiry.
- Reversal of burden of proof. The burden of proving that a conversion was not unlawful lies on the person who caused it — a departure from the ordinary presumption of innocence.
- Aggravated penalties where the convert is a woman, minor, or a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, and for mass conversion.
- Cognizable and non-bailable offences, with some States importing twin bail conditions of the kind found in the PMLA.
- Third-party complaints. Several statutes allow any aggrieved person, or a relative — and in some formulations any person — to lodge a complaint, rather than only the alleged convert.
- "Reconversion" carve-out. Several Acts provide that a person reverting to their immediate previous religion shall not be deemed to have converted — a provision critics describe as facially unequal.
The Constitutional Debate — Both Sides
- Rev. Stainislaus (1977) squarely holds that Article 25 confers no right to convert another
- Fraudulent or coerced conversion violates the convert's own freedom of conscience
- Public order is a legitimate ground under Article 25(1) and a State subject under Entry 1, List II
- Protects vulnerable groups — women, minors, SC/ST communities — from exploitative inducement
- Analogous safeguards exist in other liberal democracies against undue influence over belief
- Vagueness. "Allurement", "inducement" and "undue influence" are undefined enough to criminalise charity, education and healthcare
- Prior notice to the DM converts a private act of conscience into a public, surveilled one — struck down in HP (2012) as violating privacy
- Reversed burden of proof sits uneasily with Article 21's due-process guarantee
- Third-party complaints enable vigilantism against interfaith couples
- Post-Puttaswamy (2017), the choice of faith is part of decisional privacy under Article 21 — a doctrinal development that post-dates Stainislaus
- The reconversion exemption arguably offends Article 14 and Article 15
Landmark Cases on Conversion and Choice
| Case | Holding |
|---|---|
| Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977) | The foundational case. "Propagate" does not include a right to convert. Conversion by force, fraud or allurement impinges on the freedom of conscience of all. The MP and Orissa Acts upheld as laws relating to public order. |
| Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995) and Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) | A Hindu husband who converts to Islam does not thereby dissolve his first marriage. A second marriage during the subsistence of the first is void and attracts the offence of bigamy. Conversion cannot be used as an instrument to evade personal-law obligations. |
| Evangelical Fellowship of India v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2012) Himachal Pradesh High Court |
Struck down the provision requiring 30 days' prior notice to the District Magistrate before conversion, and the corresponding rule, as violating the right to privacy under Article 21. The Court reasoned that a person's belief is nobody's concern but their own, and that compelled disclosure exposes the convert to hostility. This is the single most important precedent against the prior-declaration model now used in almost every State law. |
| K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) | A nine-judge Bench held privacy to be a fundamental right, expressly including decisional autonomy over intimate choices — belief, faith and personal relationships. This materially changes the doctrinal ground on which Stainislaus was decided in 1977. |
| Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K. M. (2018) The Hadiya case |
The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order annulling the marriage of an adult woman who had converted and married a man of her choice. The right to choose one's faith and one's partner is intrinsic to Article 21 and Article 25, and neither the State nor the courts nor parents may substitute their view for an adult's decision. |
| Salamat Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) Allahabad High Court |
Held that the right of two adults to live together, irrespective of religion, is part of Articles 19 and 21, and that courts must see them "as individuals, not as Hindu or Muslim". It expressly declined to follow earlier single-judge rulings which had treated conversion solely for marriage as unacceptable. |
| Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) Sabarimala |
By 4:1, held the exclusion of women of menstruating age unconstitutional, reading Article 25(1) with Articles 14, 15 and 17. Review petitions led in 2019–2020 to a reference of larger questions on the interplay of Articles 25 and 26 to a nine-judge Bench, which remains pending. |
| S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) | Held secularism to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution — the frame within which every Article 25 dispute is ultimately resolved. |
Current Affairs: Where the Litigation Stands
The specific grounds now before the Court
- Vagueness and over-breadth of "allurement", "inducement", "coercion", "misinformation" and, in the Rajasthan Act, "online solicitation".
- Prior declaration to the District Magistrate — challenged as an unconstitutional prior restraint on conscience and a breach of informational privacy, relying on the Himachal Pradesh High Court's 2012 ruling and on Puttaswamy.
- Reversal of the burden of proof and the import of twin bail conditions, said to render bail illusory for an offence touching belief.
- Third-party complaints, said to institutionalise vigilante surveillance of interfaith couples and congregations.
- Confiscation and demolition powers in the Rajasthan Act, said to conflict with the Supreme Court's 2024 ruling against extrajudicial demolitions, which required notice, hearing and judicial oversight.
- Disproportionate punishment — sentences of twenty years to life for an offence defined by contested mental states.
This is a live and politically contested matter before the Supreme Court. A high-scoring answer does not pick a side and campaign. It sets out the constitutional text (Article 25's four limbs and its four limitations), the governing precedent (Stainislaus, 1977), the doctrinal developments since (Puttaswamy 2017 and Shafin Jahan 2018), the competing arguments, and concludes on the test the Court is likely to apply — proportionality: is the restriction backed by law, for a legitimate aim, rationally connected, the least restrictive means, and proportionate in effect?
Article 25 at a Glance — Mind Map
Prelims Traps to Guard Against
- Article 25 applies to "all persons" — citizens and non-citizens.
- Article 25 is subject to other Fundamental Rights; Article 26 is not. Article 26's only qualifiers are public order, morality and health.
- Explanation II operates only for Article 25(2)(b) — it does not make Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists "Hindus" for all constitutional purposes.
- Explanation I on the kirpan attaches to "profession" of the Sikh religion.
- Rev. Stainislaus (1977) was a five-judge Constitution Bench and upheld the MP and Orissa Acts; it did not strike them down.
- Anti-conversion laws are State laws — there is no central legislation on the subject. They rest on public order, Entry 1 of the State List.
- Odisha (1967) came before Madhya Pradesh (1968) — Odisha's is the first such statute.
- Tamil Nadu enacted such a law in 2002 and repealed it in 2004 — the only State to have done so.
- The Himachal Pradesh High Court struck down the 30-day prior-notice requirement in 2012, not the whole Act.
- Sabarimala was 4:1, and the larger questions stand referred to a nine-judge Bench that has not yet decided.
Mains Angle
Question (GS-II, 15 marks, 250 words): "State anti-conversion legislation rests on a 1977 precedent that pre-dates the constitutional recognition of privacy and decisional autonomy." Critically examine the constitutional validity of these laws in the light of Article 25 and subsequent judicial development.
Structure the answer around three pivots:
- The constitutional and precedential basis.
Article 25(1)'s four guarantees, qualified by public order, morality, health and other Part III rights.
Rev. Stainislaus (1977): propagation ≠ conversion; forced conversion violates the convert's own freedom of conscience; competence traced to public order, Entry 1, List II. - The doctrinal shift after 1977.
Puttaswamy (2017) locating decisional privacy over belief within Article 21.
Shafin Jahan (2018) and Salamat Ansari (2020) affirming an adult's right to choose faith and partner.
Evangelical Fellowship of India (2012) striking down the prior-notice requirement as a privacy violation. - The specific features under challenge, and the test.
Contested provisions: vague definitions of allurement and inducement; prior declaration to the DM; reversed burden of proof; third-party complaints; twin bail conditions; property confiscation; the reconversion carve-out.
The likely test: proportionality — legality, legitimate aim, rational connection, necessity or least-restrictive means, and balance.
Balance: the State's genuine interest in preventing coerced or fraudulent conversion, especially of minors and vulnerable groups.
Conclusion: the constitutional question is not whether the State may prohibit coerced conversion — it plainly may — but whether the procedural architecture of these statutes is narrowly tailored to that aim, or whether it burdens voluntary conversion as well. The batch of petitions listed before the Supreme Court on 12 August 2026 is expected to settle precisely this.
Key Takeaways
- Article 25(1) guarantees freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion to all persons — subject to public order, morality, health and the other provisions of Part III. That last qualifier, absent from Article 26, is the exam distinction.
- Article 25(2) lets the State regulate secular activity associated with religion, legislate for social welfare and reform, and throw open Hindu religious institutions of a public character. Explanation I protects the kirpan; Explanation II includes Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists within "Hindus" for clause (2)(b) only.
- Rev. Stainislaus (1977), a five-judge Bench, held that the right to propagate does not include a right to convert, and upheld the Orissa (1967) and Madhya Pradesh (1968) Acts as laws relating to public order.
- Thirteen States now have anti-conversion laws. There is no central law. Maharashtra is the latest, its 2026 Act receiving Presidential assent on 31 July 2026; Tamil Nadu is the only State to have enacted (2002) and then repealed (2004) such a law.
- Common features under challenge: vague definitions of allurement, prior declaration to the District Magistrate, reversed burden of proof, third-party complaints, twin bail conditions, and in Rajasthan, confiscation and demolition of property.
- The doctrinal ground has shifted since 1977: Evangelical Fellowship of India v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2012) struck down the prior-notice rule on privacy grounds, and Puttaswamy (2017) and Shafin Jahan (2018) located the choice of faith and partner within Article 21. The consolidated challenges are next listed on 12 August 2026.
