The Article 25–28 Group, Mapped

Article 26 — Freedom to Manage Religious Affairs

Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right —
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law. — Article 26, Constitution of India

The clause-by-clause architecture

What is a "religious denomination"? The S. P. Mittal test

Article 26 protects a "religious denomination or any section thereof" — so the threshold question in every case is whether the claimant qualifies. In S. P. Mittal v. Union of India (1983), the Auroville case, the Court laid down a three-part test.

Applying this, the Court held that the Sri Aurobindo Society was not a religious denomination, and that Aurobindo's teachings constituted a philosophy rather than a religion — so the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act was not hit by Article 26.

Who has and has not qualified

Article 25 vs Article 26 — the comparison examiners want

Landmark cases under Article 26

Article 27 — Freedom from Taxation for Promotion of a Religion

No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. — Article 27, Constitution of India

Article 27 is short, and every word in it is load-bearing. It is the fiscal expression of Indian secularism: the State may not use its coercive power of taxation to bankroll a faith.

The four conditions that must all be satisfied

1. The levy must be a tax — not a fee.
2. The proceeds must be specifically appropriated — earmarked, not merged into the Consolidated Fund and spent generally.
3. The appropriation must be for the promotion or maintenance of religion — not for regulating or administering it.
4. It must be for a particular religion or denomination — a levy benefiting all religions equally is outside the bar.

Tax versus fee — the distinction that decides these cases

Landmark cases under Article 27

Article 28 — Religious Instruction in Educational Institutions

The four-fold classification — the exam table

Article 28 has three clauses but yields four categories of institution. Fixing this grid is the single most efficient way to answer any question on the Article.

"Religious instruction" versus "study of religion"

The prohibition in Article 28(1) attaches to religious instruction — the inculcation of a faith — not to the academic study of religion, comparative religion, philosophy or moral values. Two cases settle this.

The line Article 28 draws is not between religion and the classroom. It is between teaching a faith and teaching about faiths. The first is instruction; the second is education. — Legacy IAS Faculty

Where the Litigation Stands

Articles 26–28 at a Glance — Mind Map

Prelims Traps to Guard Against

• Article 26 is not subject to other Fundamental Rights — only to public order, morality and health. Article 25 alone carries the "other provisions of this Part" qualifier.
• Only Article 26(d) carries "in accordance with law". Clause (b) does not — which is why the State can regulate property administration but not religious doctrine.
• Article 26 protects a "denomination or any section thereof", not an individual. The individual's right is Article 25.
• The Sri Aurobindo Society was held not to be a religious denomination (S. P. Mittal, 1983); the Ramakrishna Mission was held to be a denomination within Hinduism (1995).
• Article 27 bars a tax, not a fee. Contributions levied to meet the cost of secular administration of endowments are fees and are valid.
• Article 27 requires the proceeds to be "specifically appropriated". Spending general revenue is not barred — the basis of Prafull Goradia (2011).
• Article 27 targets a "particular" religion. Equal treatment of all religions falls outside the prohibition.
• Article 28 has three clauses but four categories of institution — and only the wholly State-funded category faces a total prohibition.
• Under Article 28(2), religious instruction is permitted without any consent requirement — the trust's stipulation governs even though the State administers the institution.
• Academic study of religion is not "religious instruction" — D. A. V. College (1971) and Aruna Roy (2002).
• Bijoe Emmanuel (1986) was decided under Articles 19(1)(a) and 25(1), not Article 28.

Mains Angle

Question (GS-II, 15 marks, 250 words): "Articles 26 to 28 make Indian secularism a regime of principled State engagement with religion rather than strict separation." Examine this statement with reference to judicial interpretation of denominational autonomy, religious taxation and religious instruction.

Structure the answer around three pivots:

1. Engagement, not separation — the textual evidence.
   Article 26(d)'s "in accordance with law" permits State regulation of denominational property; Article 25(2)(a) permits regulation of secular activity; Article 28(2) and (3) accommodate religious instruction rather than banishing it.
   Contrast with the American "wall of separation" model, where State funding of religious administration would be far harder to sustain.
2. How the judiciary drew the boundaries.
   Shirur Mutt (1954): "matters of religion" versus secular administration, and the essential religious practices doctrine.
   S. P. Mittal (1983): the three-part denomination test.
   Devaru (1958): harmonious construction where Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) collide.
   Shirur Mutt and Jagannath Ramanuj Das (1954): the tax–fee distinction sustaining State administration of endowments.
   Aruna Roy (2002): study of religions ≠ religious instruction.
3. The unresolved tensions.
   The essential practices doctrine requires judges to make theological findings — a persistent criticism.
   The Sabarimala nine-judge reference on the Article 25–26 interplay remains undecided.
   The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 litigation squarely raises how far the State may go in restructuring a denomination's own management bodies under Article 26(b) and (d).
   Asymmetry of State control across faiths — extensive statutory administration of Hindu endowments and waqfs, comparatively little for others.

Conclusion: Indian secularism under Articles 26–28 is best described as principled distance — the State may intervene in religion for reform, equality and administration, but the legitimacy of each intervention depends on whether it stays on the secular side of the line the Court drew in 1954.