News Analysis — 18–21 October 2026
Supreme Court: Internet Access Is a Fundamental Right — and Children Are Entitled to It Too
On 15 October 2026, a Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran held that the right to access and use the Internet is a fundamental right of every individual under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) — and that children, irrespective of age, share it. It rejected blanket bans on children’s online access as “unproven measures of proven disproportionality”.
The ruling came while the Court was monitoring compliance with its 2024 judgment in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, where a Bench of CJI D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice Pardiwala held that viewing, possessing and not reporting child sexual exploitation material are offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 and the IT Act, 2000, even without further sharing.
- That judgment overturned a Madras High Court order and urged replacing “child pornography” with Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Material (CSEAM).
- In later orders the Court noted platforms’ lapses in compliance and reports of paid promotion of CSEAM through direct links.
- It then examined the global trend of restricting children’s social-media access “in the name of their safety” — and “consciously” declined to endorse it.
- Secretary, Ministry of I&B v. Cricket Association of Bengal (1995): Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to receive and impart information.
- Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020): speech and trade carried on through the Internet are protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g); indefinite Internet suspension is impermissible.
- Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala (Kerala HC, 2019): Internet access is part of the right to education and privacy.
- Pragya Prasun v. Union of India (2025): excluding persons with disabilities from digital KYC violates Article 21; digital access is intrinsic to the right to life.
- K.S. Puttaswamy (2017): the proportionality framework for testing any restriction on rights.
- Children are rights-holders: denying them access would imply that below a certain age a person has no conscience worth protecting or speech worth expressing.
- Safety and freedom are not opposed: “Our children are entitled to both.”
- Target the harm, not the child: measures must be directed at harmful material and those responsible; keeping children offline would “mistake the victim for the problem”.
- Bans backfire: children keep using the Internet secretly, migrate to less regulated platforms, and stop reporting abuse to parents — defeating the object of POCSO.
- Surveillance risk: age-verification that requires identification and continuous data collection creates a disproportionate risk of misuse and surveillance.
- Not anti-safeguard: age-based restrictions and content moderation are permissible if proportionate.
- Child-safe design: a framework stressing parental consent, guidance and supervision, and a “child mode” — accounts private by default, limits on contact from unknown adults, moderated ads and content; modalities left to the Union.
- Content curbs allowed: the Union may block categories inherently harmful to children, such as adult content websites.
- National Hash and URL List Database for CSEAM; each entry confirmed by at least three trained human analysts.
- Timelines: removals reported within two hours; complaints acknowledged within 24 hours.
- Deterrence: consider exemplary fines; forfeit and disgorge revenue from paywalled CSEAM.
- Next step: frame guidelines, amend the IT Rules where needed and file an affidavit before the hearing on 10 December 2026.
- States legislating screen-time curbs for minors must stay within constitutional limits.
- Diverges from a global trend: Australia’s under-16 social-media ban (in force December 2025) and similar moves elsewhere favour age bans; India’s apex court prefers design-based safety.
- Equity: for many children in remote areas, the Internet is the only source of learning and information.
- Interlinks: the DPDP Act, 2023 (Section 9) already requires verifiable parental consent for children’s data and bars tracking and targeted advertising aimed at them.
- Rights without delivery: an expanding list of fundamental rights can outpace the State’s ability to provide the infrastructure they presuppose.
- Compliance record: the Anuradha Bhasin guidelines on Internet shutdowns are still routinely breached.
- Separation of powers: detailed directions on platform design edge into policy-making.
- Implementation: “child mode” still needs some form of age assurance — the very privacy risk the Court flagged.
“Any measure for the safety of children must be directed at the harmful material and those responsible, not at the children themselves.” In the light of the Supreme Court’s recognition of Internet access as a fundamental right of children, critically examine the effectiveness of age-based bans versus platform-accountability measures for online child safety. 15 marks · 250 words
Conversion and Reservation: SC Upholds Invalidation of Tamil Nadu’s BC Muslim Certificate Order
On 15 October 2026, in The Secretary to Government v. Sameer Ahamed N., the Supreme Court upheld the Madras High Court’s invalidation of Tamil Nadu’s Government Order of 9 March 2024, which let converts to Islam from BC, MBC, DNC and SC categories obtain Backward Class Muslim certificates and use the State’s 3.5% BC Muslim quota.
- The case: a person born Hindu converted to Islam and sought a certificate as a Lebbai.
- Tamil Nadu’s seven notified BC Muslim communities: Ansar, Dekkani Muslims, Dudekula, Labbais (including Rowthar and Marakayar), Mapilla, Sheik and Syed.
- The GO’s origin: a 6 February 2024 letter from the Tamil Nadu Backward Classes Commission; one member had noted the need for quantifiable data, but no empirical study was done.
- Conversion is not membership: a convert does not become a Lebbai, Rowther or Dekkani Muslim merely by converting; a Jamath may attest conversion but cannot decide statutory eligibility.
- A certificate records status; it cannot create it.
- Arbitrary grouping: the GO lumped together SC, BC, MBC and DNC converts without showing any common social characteristic linking them to the seven communities.
- Means, not motive: the State’s concern — that converts should not lose all benefits — is understandable, but the test is whether the method is constitutionally permissible.
- What the ruling does not say: it does not hold that Muslims, or converts, can never be identified as backward.
- Second Backward Classes (Mandal) Commission (report 1980): 11 indicators — social (3 points each), educational (2), economic (1) — maximum score 22; upheld with a 50% ceiling and creamy layer in Indra Sawhney (1992).
- Sachar Committee (constituted 2005; report 2006): documented Muslims’ disadvantage in education, employment and credit.
- Ranganath Misra Commission (NCRLM, report 2007): recommended delinking SC status from religion by deleting Para 3 of the 1950 Order.
- Justice K.G. Balakrishnan Commission (October 2022): examining whether SC status can extend to converts with historical SC origins.
- Article 342A: inserted by the 102nd Amendment (2018); the 105th Amendment (2021) restored States’ power to keep their own SEBC lists.
- Evidence first: Tamil Nadu could commission its Backward Classes Commission to study converts’ education, public employment and social acceptance.
- No homogenising: converts from different BC, MBC, DNC and SC backgrounds may face different disadvantages; any new class must be defined and justified.
- Larger issue: caste-based exclusion may persist after conversion — but this must be demonstrated, not presumed in either direction.
Distinguish between the constitutional frameworks governing Scheduled Caste status and backward class identification. In this context, discuss whether caste-based disadvantage survives religious conversion, and how the State should address it. 15 marks · 250 words
Separation of Powers and Judicial Propriety: Why the CJI Declined to Meet the Leaders of Opposition
On 12 October 2026, the Chief Justice of India declined a request from the Leaders of Opposition in both Houses to receive a memorandum on allegations against the Chief Election Commissioner over the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls and on protest-related restrictions in Delhi, citing separation of powers, sub judice matters and judicial propriety.
- 10 October: the two Leaders of Opposition sought an appointment to submit a memorandum on the CEC and the Election Commission, following detentions of protesters and closure of Metro stations and trains in Delhi.
- 11 October: a second representation asked that it be treated as a letter petition, seeking disclosure of SIR records, an independent committee headed by a retired SC judge to audit voter deletions, and interim suspension of the SIR.
- Selection angle: the LoP in the Lok Sabha sits on the selection committee under Section 7 of the CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, and had recorded dissent on the CEC’s selection (17 February 2025).
- Related litigation: a Bench led by the CJI had, in May 2026, upheld the ECI’s power to conduct the SIR; petitions on the CEC’s decisions were pending.
- Sub judice: the issues were already before the Court; discussing them at a meeting would “wholly contravene” separation of powers, a facet of the basic structure.
- No administrative remedy: the Constitution does not give the Supreme Court administrative powers over such issues; its remedies are judicial.
- Doors open on the judicial side: citizens may seek enforcement of rights “at all hours”; a petition would be heard at the earliest. A writ petition by the LoP and 12 other Opposition leaders was subsequently filed.
- Consistency: supporters note the same standard applied when a JPC on One Nation, One Election proposed meeting SC judges while the Bill was pending.
- A counter-view: some commentators argue that propriety alone justified the refusal, and that invoking the basic structure stretched the doctrine further than needed.
- Separation of powers: not expressly stated in the Constitution; Article 50 (DPSP) directs separation of the judiciary from the executive; recognised as basic structure in Kesavananda Bharati (1973) and Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975); Ram Jawaya Kapur (1955) held India has no rigid separation.
- Letter petitions: the Court’s epistolary jurisdiction grew from PIL cases such as S.P. Gupta (1981) and Sunil Batra; Article 32 is itself a fundamental right.
- CEC appointment: Anoop Baranwal (2023) set an interim panel of PM, LoP and CJI; the 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister. The CEC is removable like an SC judge (Article 324(5)).
- Judicial ethics: Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997); Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) — independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, competence and diligence.
- Insulating appointments: the 1973 supersession of three senior judges prompted their resignations; the Second (1993) and Third (1998) Judges cases built the collegium; the NJAC was struck down in 2015.
“Disputes must be settled in open court, not in chambers.” Discuss the significance of judicial propriety and the separation of powers in preserving public confidence in the judiciary, with reference to recent instances. 10 marks · 150 words
Kolkata Puja Pandal Stampede: Why Crowd Crushes Recur and How They Can Be Prevented
At least 17 people (later reports said 19), mostly women and children, died and 25 were injured in a crowd crush at the Chorbagan Sarbojanin Durgotsab pandal in Girish Park, north Kolkata, around 7.40 p.m. on Saturday, 17 October 2026.
- Trigger: a brief spell of rain sent waiting crowds rushing into the pandal; the State Government attributes the surge to a misleading announcement by organisers and the blowing of whistles.
- Site conditions: a narrow location; access blocked by festival stalls; eyewitnesses reported thin police presence; the crush occurred at the exit gate.
- Response: organisers detained, pandal closed, inquiry ordered; local residents joined rescue efforts.
Most deaths in such events are not from trampling by a fleeing crowd but from compressive asphyxia — people packed so tightly they cannot breathe. Once density passes a critical level (often cited as about five people per square metre), individuals lose control of their movement and the crowd behaves like a fluid.
- Guide: the NDMA’s “Managing Crowds at Events and Venues of Mass Gathering” (2014) notes that most crowd disasters in India occur at religious places.
- Demand vs capacity: estimate demand (past attendance, arrival times, special days), then calculate the capacity of the venue and every bottleneck — a lane, staircase or gate.
- Input control: where demand exceeds capacity, restrict or stagger entry — as with registration at Vaishno Devi and Sabarimala.
- Flow design: separate entry and exit, one-way routes, holding areas away from the venue, real-time density monitoring, early temporary closure.
- Behaviour and communication: announcements can set off mass movement unless carefully worded and paired with managed exits; force-based control can collide opposing flows.
- Mandhardevi (Wai, Satara), January 2005: about 293 deaths during the Kalubai yatra; the Justice Rajan Kochar inquiry cited wrong crowd estimates, a narrow slippery path, illegal vendors with gas cylinders, and no watchtowers or PA system.
- Nashik Kumbh, August 2003: the inquiry flagged pressure at barricades, reverse movement of pilgrims and processions sharing routes.
- Recent: Hathras (July 2024), Prayagraj Maha Kumbh (January 2025), New Delhi railway station (February 2025) and the Bengaluru stadium celebration (June 2025).
- Governance: public order and police are State List subjects (Entries 1 and 2); the Disaster Management Act, 2005 sets up NDMA, SDMAs and DDMAs.
- Urban festivals are hard to regulate: there are no tickets or time slots, and visitors move from pandal to pandal.
- Accountability is diffused among organisers, police and municipal bodies; inquiry findings are rarely implemented.
- Encroachment tolerated: stalls on access routes are a known risk, yet routinely permitted during festivals.
Crowd disasters in India are rarely caused by a single factor. Analyse the structural and managerial causes of recurrent stampedes at mass gatherings and suggest a framework for preventing them, drawing on NDMA guidelines. 15 marks · 250 words
Why Central Banks May Turn Hawkish Again — and Why Rising U.S. Treasury Yields Matter for India
Conflict in West Asia, elevated crude oil prices, rising U.S. Treasury yields and sticky inflation are shrinking central banks’ room to keep cutting rates — and may force some back towards tightening. For an oil importer like India, the transmission runs through the import bill, the rupee and capital flows.
- 2022 vs now: in 2022 the U.S. Federal Reserve and the ECB tightened from zero or negative rates; India’s repo rate stood at 4% when the RBI began hiking (May 2022), and rose by 250 basis points to 6.5% by February 2023.
- Today: borrowing costs are already restrictive in many economies, so further hikes would bite harder on consumption, investment and jobs.
- Outlook: the World Bank projects global growth slowing to 2.6% in 2026 from 2.9% in 2025; the IMF describes the economy as resilient but exposed to prolonged energy shocks, tariff uncertainty, high public debt and an AI investment boom.
- Price–yield inverse: when existing bond prices fall, their yields rise.
- Drivers: expectations of rates staying “higher for longer”, inflation uncertainty, a higher term premium on long-term debt, and heavy government borrowing.
- AI capex: technology firms’ borrowing for data centres competes with other borrowers for capital.
- Global benchmark: U.S. Treasuries anchor pricing of corporate bonds, mortgages and emerging-market debt worldwide.
- Oil dependence: India imports the bulk (roughly 85%) of its crude; prices feed into transport, manufacturing and food costs.
- Double hit: a weaker rupee makes dollar-priced oil dearer, compounding the price shock and widening the current account deficit.
- Tighter integration: since Indian government bonds joined the J.P. Morgan GBI-EM index (June 2024), foreign debt flows are more sensitive to global yields.
- Policy bind: under flexible inflation targeting — CPI 4% ± 2%, set by the six-member Monetary Policy Committee (Section 45ZB, RBI Act, 1934) — the RBI may have to delay easing even as growth slows.
- Monetary: a data-dependent pause; forex intervention to curb rupee volatility using reserves.
- Fiscal: calibrated excise duty on fuel to cushion pass-through; maintain the consolidation path to limit borrowing pressure.
- Structural: diversify crude sources, build strategic petroleum reserves, and accelerate electrification of transport.
How do rising U.S. Treasury yields and elevated crude oil prices constrain the Reserve Bank of India’s monetary policy? Suggest measures to insulate India’s macroeconomic stability from such external shocks. 15 marks · 250 words
Female Labour Force Participation: The North-East Leads, but the National Average Hides Wide Gaps
The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 2025 shows rural FLFPR rising from 33% (2019–20) to 45.9%, and urban FLFPR from 23.3% to 27.7%. A State-level look shows the North-Eastern States improving fastest — while Delhi and Lakshadweep went backwards.
- FLFPR: the share of women aged 15+ who are working or seeking work (usual status).
- PLFS: conducted by the National Statistics Office (MoSPI) since 2017–18.
- AAPP (Average Annual Percentage Point change): measures the pace of change. All-India rural AAPP is 2.58 pp a year; urban is 0.88 — a gap of 1.7 pp.
- Arunachal Pradesh leads in both: 8.28 pp a year in rural areas (more than three times the national pace) and 5.24 pp in urban areas.
- Rural spread: from +8.28 (Arunachal) to −2.34 (Lakshadweep) — over 10 pp; Delhi also fell (−2.08).
- Urban decliners: Puducherry, Ladakh, Delhi and Lakshadweep.
- Catching up: Arunachal, Assam, Manipur and Tripura started below the national rural baseline but improved faster.
- Pulling ahead: Nagaland, Meghalaya, A&N and J&K started above the baseline and still improved faster — rapid gains are not limited to low starters.
- Social structure: higher female mobility and work norms in many NE societies — including matrilineal communities such as the Khasi and Garo of Meghalaya — support participation.
- Quality question: much of the national rise is in self-employment and unpaid family work in agriculture; economists debate whether this is empowerment or distress.
- Urban lag: lack of safe transport, childcare and flexible jobs keeps urban women out of the workforce.
- Policy levers: DAY-NRLM self-help groups, the Lakhpati Didi initiative, creches under labour codes, and skilling.
The rise in India’s female labour force participation since 2019–20 has been uneven across regions and between rural and urban areas. Examine the factors behind this pattern and assess whether the increase reflects improved quality of employment for women. 15 marks · 250 words
Two Years of the PM Internship Scheme: Revamp Draws More Youth, but Completion and Quality Lag
After extending the PM Internship Scheme (PMIS) to MSMEs and sunrise sectors, nearly doubling the stipend to about ₹9,000, easing age and education criteria and cutting tenure to 6–9 months, youth joining rose by 67–100% in Rounds II and III. Yet fewer than half of those who join complete the internship.
- Announced: Union Budget 2024–25, as part of the PM’s package for employment and skilling; pilot launched in October 2024.
- Target: 1 crore internships in the top 500 companies over five years.
- Original terms: 12 months; age 21–24; stipend ₹5,000/month (₹4,500 from the Centre via DBT + ₹500 from the company’s CSR funds) and a one-time grant of ₹6,000.
- Nodal ministry: Ministry of Corporate Affairs; Round III opened in April 2026 and ends in December.
- Mismatched tasks: interns report being used for field sales or loan recovery instead of skill-relevant work.
- No structured training: little on-the-job learning in some sectors; experiences in manufacturing and IT were markedly better, with some interns absorbed into jobs.
- Better options: some left for full-time jobs — a sign that the stipend competes poorly with paid work.
- Learning contracts: mandatory training plans and mentors per intern, with NSQF-aligned certification.
- Monitoring: intern feedback and penalties or exclusion for firms that misuse interns.
- Convergence: link with the National Apprenticeship Promotion Scheme (under the Apprentices Act, 1961) to avoid parallel, overlapping programmes.
Internship schemes can bridge the gap between education and employment only if they deliver real skills. Evaluate the PM Internship Scheme in this light and suggest reforms to improve completion rates and learning outcomes. 10 marks · 150 words
Aditya-L1’s VELC Produces Doppler Velocity Images of the Solar Corona
Scientists at the Indian Institute of Astrophysics (IIA), Bengaluru have generated Doppler velocity images of the solar corona using the Visible Emission Line Coronagraph (VELC) on Aditya-L1 — information that can help tell whether a coronal mass ejection (CME) is heading towards Earth.
- India’s first solar mission: launched on 2 September 2023 by PSLV-C57; placed in a halo orbit around Lagrange point L1 (about 1.5 million km from Earth) on 6 January 2024.
- Seven payloads: four remote-sensing — VELC, SUIT, SoLEXS, HEL1OS; three in-situ — ASPEX, PAPA, MAG.
- VELC (built by IIA) is the largest payload, observing the corona in visible and near-infrared light.
- Space-weather forecasting: Earth-directed CMEs trigger geomagnetic storms that can disrupt satellites, GNSS/NavIC, HF communication and power grids.
- A unique capability: the scientists say only VELC can currently produce such images, owing to its spectroscopic capability in the visible range.
- Open science: processed images will be shared with the global community; methods were peer-reviewed in the Astrophysical Journal.
Discuss the significance of Aditya-L1 for understanding solar dynamics and for protecting India’s space-based and terrestrial infrastructure from space weather. 10 marks · 150 words
Japan’s Martian Moons Exploration (MMX) Mission Heads for Phobos
The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) launched the Martian Moons Exploration (MMX) mission on 20 October 2026. It aims to bring back at least 10 grams of material from Phobos by 2031 — which would make Japan the first country to return samples from a moon of Mars.
- Phobos and Deimos (“fear” and “dread”, sons of Ares) were discovered by Asaph Hall in 1877.
- Phobos is the larger and closer moon; it orbits faster than Mars rotates and is slowly spiralling inward.
- Origin debate: (i) captured asteroids — suggested by irregular shapes and surfaces; or (ii) debris from a giant impact on Mars that re-accreted — in which case their composition carries clues about Mars itself.
- Timeline: reach Mars around August 2027; return samples by 2031.
- Orbit: a quasi-satellite orbit around Phobos to map it and pick a landing site.
- Payload: 13 instruments; the IDEFIX rover built jointly by CNES (France) and DLR (Germany).
- Modules: propulsion, exploration and sample return; a Deimos flyby is also planned.
- Partners: NASA, ESA, CNES, DLR and the Australian Space Agency.
- Low gravity, lower cost: landing and lifting off from Phobos needs a fraction of the fuel required on Mars — useful for testing autonomous navigation and landing in very weak gravity.
- A staging post? MMX will help assess whether Phobos could serve future crewed Mars missions.
- Japan’s niche: builds on Hayabusa (Itokawa, returned 2010) and Hayabusa2 (Ryugu, returned 2020); NASA’s own Mars Sample Return was scrapped this year through budget action.
- India’s context: after the Mars Orbiter Mission (2013), sample return and planetary landing remain capability gaps for ISRO.
Sample-return missions are becoming markers of technological leadership in space. Discuss their scientific value and the lessons India can draw for its own planetary exploration programme. 10 marks · 150 words
Canopy Bridges Help Hoolock Gibbons Cross Railways — and the Wider Problem of Linear Infrastructure
The Hoolock gibbon — India’s only ape — has lost an estimated 90% of its population in recent decades, mainly because roads and railways fragment the continuous canopy it needs. In Assam, planted canopy bridges over a rail line now let gibbons swing across.
- Species: Western hoolock (Hoolock hoolock, IUCN Endangered) and Eastern hoolock (Hoolock leuconedys, IUCN Vulnerable); both in Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.
- Range: Northeast India, mostly south of the Brahmaputra.
- Biology: about 3 feet tall with 5-foot arms; strictly arboreal, moving by brachiation; awkward on the ground and exposed to dholes and leopards; pairs mate for life and defend territories.
- Hoollongapar Gibbon Sanctuary (Jorhat, Assam) — India’s only sanctuary named for the gibbon — holds about 130 western hoolocks; it is a forest fragment cut by a railway line laid in eastern Assam from 1887.
- Natural canopy bridge: dense planting on both sides of the track (led by groups such as Aranyak) let crowns meet after about 15 years; gantry bridges served in the interim.
- Lion-tailed macaque (Macaca silenus): habitat around Valparai (Anamalai Hills, Tamil Nadu) is split by tea and coffee estates and roads.
- Rope bridges for the Indian giant squirrel (Ratufa indica, state animal of Maharashtra) in Melghat Tiger Reserve, and for the grizzled giant squirrel at Srivilliputhur (Tamil Nadu).
- Global: the Netherlands has an animal overpass nearly 1 km long spanning a highway, rail yard and golf course; slow lorises (Indonesia) and three-toed sloths (Central America) face similar threats.
- Isolation → inbreeding: small fragments support few animals; gene flow stops and populations decline.
- Edge effects and higher road-kill and predation risk.
- Scale of the threat: India’s rapid expansion of highways and railways runs through many wildlife corridors.
- WII guidelines (2016): “Eco-friendly Measures to Mitigate Impacts of Linear Infrastructure on Wildlife” — underpasses, overpasses, canopy bridges and realignment.
- Integrate early: plan crossings at the design stage through PM Gati Shakti layers and environmental clearance, not as retrofits.
Linear infrastructure is essential for development but is a leading driver of habitat fragmentation. With examples from India, discuss mitigation measures that can reconcile infrastructure expansion with wildlife conservation. 15 marks · 250 words
Andhra Pradesh HC Orders CBI Probe into Custodial Death, Calls Torture “a Calculated Assault on Human Dignity”
A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ordered a CBI probe into the death of Gade Sai Krishna (25), allegedly tortured by police after being picked up from Markapuram in May 2026.
It held that the State must ensure an impartial inquiry against anyone accused of a cognisable offence, including its own officers, and must protect witnesses.
- Prelims hooks: D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) laid down arrest and custody guidelines; Paramvir Singh Saini (2020) mandated CCTV in police stations; a judicial magistrate’s inquiry into custodial death is required under Section 196 of the BNSS (earlier Section 176(1A) CrPC); India signed the UN Convention against Torture in 1997 but has not ratified it.
From Heat Waves to “Heat Storms”: Naming Planet-Scale Heat Events
A Reuters analysis of hourly global temperatures since 1960, developed with about two dozen climate researchers, proposes the term “heat storm” for vast, long-lasting heat events.
The largest on record, “Vera”, lasted 367 days (2023–24) over nearly 85% of the globe; the current one, “Raimundo”, began on 28 February 2026 and has touched almost three-quarters of the planet’s surface.
- Prelims hooks: back-to-back events are called a “heat cascade”; typical duration grew from about 2 months (1960s) to 9 months (early 2000s); heat kills roughly half a million people a year. In India, the IMD declares a heat wave when maximum temperature reaches at least 40°C in the plains (37°C coastal, 30°C hills) and departs from normal by 4.5°C or more (severe: 6.5°C or more), or when it touches 45°C regardless.
