"Discuss the Position of the Governor in India's Federal Polity, His Power While Giving Assent to Bills, and Whether He Is Bound by Aid and Advice" — UPSC Mains 2026 GS2
A complete, examiner-standard 250-word model answer for the UPSC Mains 2026 GS Paper 2 question on the Governor — with an Article 200 options diagram, a discretion table, static core content, and the November 2025 Presidential Reference advisory opinion.
UPSC Mains 2026 GS Paper 2 asked a three-part question on the Governor's federal position, the nature of assent power, and the binding force of ministerial advice. Below is a full model answer, with a static-portion refresher and the November 2025 advisory opinion that decisively reshaped this area.
"Discuss the position of the Governor in the federal polity of India. What is the nature of his power while giving assent to a bill passed by the State Legislature? Is he bound by the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers in all his functions?" (250 words)
Model Answer
Introduction
The Governor occupies a constitutionally dual position — the constitutional head of the State executive under Article 154, yet appointed by and holding office during the pleasure of the President under Articles 155-156. This duality makes the office a recurring fault line in Indian federalism.
Part I: Position in the Federal Polity
- State constitutional head — Article 154 vests State executive power in the Governor, exercised on ministerial advice under Article 163; Article 168 makes him a component part of the State Legislature.
- Centre's representative — appointment by the President (Article 155), pleasure doctrine (Article 156), and the duty to report under Article 356 give the office a Union-linked character; the Constituent Assembly consciously rejected an elected Governor to avoid rival centres of authority.
- Friction points — government formation in hung assemblies, delay in assent, and Article 356 recommendations. S.R. Bommai (1994) subjected Article 356 proclamations to judicial review; Nabam Rebia (2016) held the Governor cannot act on his own in summoning or dissolving the House.
- Reform recommendations — Sarkaria Commission, Justice Punchhi Commission and the NCRWC have urged eminent-person appointments, consultation with the Chief Minister, and fixed tenure to insulate the office.
Part II: Nature of the Assent Power
1. Assent
Bill becomes law
2. Withhold + Return
With comments, to the Legislature (not for Money Bills)
3. Reserve
For the President's consideration (Article 201)
- April 2025 — in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, a two-judge Bench held prolonged inaction illegal, prescribed timelines using Article 142, and applied "deemed assent" to pending Bills.
- Presidential Reference (20 November 2025) — a five-judge Constitution Bench led by CJI B.R. Gavai, answering 14 questions under Article 143, held that: courts cannot impose timelines on the Governor or President; there is no concept of "deemed assent"; but "withholding simpliciter" is impermissible — withholding is inseparable from returning the Bill with comments, so only three options exist, not four.
- Judicial review preserved narrowly — prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction remains reviewable; courts may direct the Governor to act, but cannot fix a deadline or examine the merits of the decision.
- Nature of the power — thus discretionary in choosing among the three options, but not a licence for indefinite inaction; once a returned Bill is re-passed, the first proviso bars withholding assent.
Part III: Is He Bound by Aid and Advice?
| Category | Bound by Advice? | Illustrations |
|---|---|---|
| General executive functions | Yes — Article 163(1) | Ordinary administration; Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) settled that the Governor acts on advice |
| Express constitutional discretion | No | Article 239(2) as administrator of a UT; Sixth Schedule functions in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram; Articles 371A/371C special responsibilities |
| Situational discretion | No | Appointing CM in a hung House; dismissing a ministry that has lost confidence; reporting under Article 356 |
| Assent under Article 200 | No, per the 2025 advisory opinion | Discretion limited to choosing among the three options |
- Rule and exception — Article 163(1) makes ministerial advice the norm "except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions in his discretion"; Article 163(2) makes the Governor's own determination of what falls within discretion final, and Article 163(3) bars inquiry into the advice tendered.
- Judicially narrowed — Shamsher Singh (1974) and Nabam Rebia (2016) confirm that discretion is the exception, not the rule, and cannot be used to displace the elected government.
Conclusion
The Governor is neither a mere figurehead nor an independent power centre. The 2025 advisory opinion restores textual fidelity — recognising genuine discretion on assent while foreclosing the "pocket veto" — but leaves enforcement to constitutional convention rather than judicial deadlines. Sustained federal harmony will therefore depend on implementing the Sarkaria-Punchhi appointment and tenure reforms rather than on litigation.
Constitutional provisions: Article 153 (Governor for each State), 154 (executive power), 155-156 (appointment by President, pleasure doctrine, five-year term), 157-158 (qualifications, conditions), 161 (pardoning power), 163 (Council of Ministers to aid and advise, discretion exception), 164 (appointment of CM and Ministers), 165 (Advocate General), 166 (conduct of business), 167 (CM's duty to furnish information), 168 (Governor as part of the Legislature), 174 (summoning, prorogation, dissolution), 200-201 (assent to Bills), 213 (ordinances), 356 (Governor's report), 361 (personal immunity). Special responsibilities: Articles 371A (Nagaland), 371C (Manipur), 371F (Sikkim), 371H (Arunachal Pradesh), Fifth and Sixth Schedules.
Key judgments: Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) — Governor bound by advice save express discretion; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — Article 356 justiciable, floor test the test of majority; Rameshwar Prasad (2006) — dissolution on Governor's report struck down; Nabam Rebia (2016) — Article 163 discretion narrowly construed; State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025); In re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills (Special Reference No. 1 of 2025, decided 20 November 2025) — the 16th Presidential Reference. Committees: Sarkaria Commission (1988), Venkatachaliah/NCRWC (2002), Punchhi Commission (2010).
Answer Writing Tips for This Question
- This is a three-part question — federal position, assent power, aid and advice. Use visible sub-headings for each; merging them is the commonest way candidates lose marks at 15-mark length.
- The November 2025 advisory opinion is decisive and must appear. An answer citing only the April 2025 timelines judgment is now outdated — the Constitution Bench expressly described those findings as erroneous.
- State the 2025 position precisely: no judicial timelines, no deemed assent, but no withholding simpliciter either. The nuance in all three limbs is what earns marks.
- A discretion table (general functions / express discretion / situational discretion / assent) answers the third sub-question far more cleanly than prose.
- Quote Article 163(1)'s exact structure — advice is the rule, discretion the exception. Many candidates invert this and treat the Governor as broadly discretionary.
- Close on reform rather than confrontation — Sarkaria and Punchhi recommendations on appointment and tenure. Describe the Centre-State friction structurally without naming particular Governors or state governments; institutional analysis scores, political commentary does not.
