A delegation of defence and intelligence chiefs from Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, the parties to the Mecca Agreement, visited Tehran in October 2026. The author reads the visit as a sign that West Asia’s security order is being renegotiated, with Iran using conflict as leverage.

• 2015: JCPOA nuclear deal concluded. In the same year, a Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen against the Houthis, who had seized Sanaʽa in 2014.
• 2018: the US withdraws from the JCPOA and reimposes sanctions.
• March 2023: Saudi Arabia and Iran restore diplomatic ties in a deal brokered in Beijing.
• Late 2023 onward: after the Gaza war, the Houthis attack Red Sea shipping near the Bab-el-Mandeb.
• June 2025: a 12-day Israel–Iran war, including US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites (Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan). September 2025: the Saudi–Pakistan defence pact is signed and UN sanctions on Iran are restored through the “snapback” mechanism.
• February 2026: per the article, the US and Israel launch strikes on Iran. Iran’s Supreme Leader is killed in an airstrike, and Iran retaliates against US assets across the Gulf.
• August 2026: the Mecca Agreement is signed. October 2026: Houthi missile strikes shut Riyadh’s airport (from 10 October), and the trilateral delegation visits Tehran.

Figure 1 — Iran and Its Neighbourhood

Iran’s geography explains its leverage. It faces the Gulf monarchies across the Persian Gulf, overlooks the Strait of Hormuz (Bandar ʽAbbas), and hosts India-linked Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman. Esfahan and Bushehr are key nuclear-related sites. Map courtesy CIA World Factbook (public domain), via Wikimedia Commons; reproduced for educational use.

• Saudi motive is narrow, not grand: behind the official language of preventing war, Riyadh mainly wants to contain its conflict with the Houthis. Air campaigns since 2015 have not defeated the Houthis, and Iran is seen as the route to influencing them.
• Who was at the table matters: the delegation was led by military and intelligence chiefs, not diplomats, including Pakistan’s Army chief, who has also mediated between Washington and Tehran. Iran was represented by the new head of its SNSC, a former IRGC commander.
• Power inside Iran: after the Supreme Leader’s death, several power centres compete. The IRGC has taken centre stage, which is consistent with its constitutional position under the Supreme Leader.
• Conflict converted into leverage: by striking Gulf neighbours, Iran raised the cost of ignoring it. It now presents itself as indispensable to any regional security conversation and favours region-led arrangements over US-led ones.
• Supporting actors: Pakistan and Türkiye use the process to strengthen their own standing in a “new West Asia”.
• The forecast: the US will not exit West Asia but may have to share space with regional arrangements. Whether a US used to hegemonic dominance accepts that remains open.

• US-anchored order: security guaranteed by US bases and partnerships since the Carter Doctrine (1980), later extended by the Abraham Accords (2020) normalising Israel–Arab ties.
• Region-led collective defence: the Mecca Agreement model, in which Muslim-majority middle powers pool deterrence. It complements rather than replaces US ties, according to its members.
• Inclusive regional dialogue: Iran’s long-standing preference for a forum including all littoral states, as in its Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE) proposal at the UN General Assembly in 2019.
• The tension: many Gulf states now see Iran as an aggressor, yet it remains a permanent geographic reality. Engaging it through the Mecca channel may divide the GCC.

• People: around 9 million Indians live and work in the Gulf, the largest diaspora concentration anywhere and a major source of remittances. Evacuation operations such as Operation Sindhu (2025) show the exposure.
• Energy and trade: a large share of India’s crude oil, LPG and LNG moves through Hormuz. Shipping to Europe depends on the Red Sea–Suez route through the Bab-el-Mandeb.
• Connectivity: Chabahar port and the INSTC (2000) run through Iran. The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC, 2023) runs through the Gulf and Israel. Both are hostage to instability.
• Strategic concern: Pakistan’s place in a collective-defence pact with Saudi Arabia, a key Indian partner, adds a new variable. India’s ties with Riyadh run through the Strategic Partnership Council (2019).
• India’s approach: strategic autonomy and de-hyphenated ties with Israel, Iran and the Arab states under the Link West / Think West outlook, favouring dialogue and diplomacy and the security of sea lanes.

• Limits of the Mecca pact: its members have divergent priorities. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan faces an economic crisis, and Saudi Arabia is focused on Yemen. A collective-defence clause untested in combat may prove declaratory.
• Limits of Iran’s leverage: coercion can win a seat at the table but also deepens distrust, and may push Gulf states back towards US protection.
• The case for engagement: history suggests that excluding Iran has not produced stability. Even sceptics accept that durable de-escalation in Yemen needs Tehran’s cooperation.

A recently launched public audit of government schools has drawn attention to leaking roofs, broken toilets and missing playgrounds. The author argues that India’s school crisis has two halves: poor infrastructure and a weak culture of active teaching. Both must be fixed together.

UDISE+ (Unified District Information System for Education Plus) reports near-universal coverage of basic facilities. The author contends that the ground picture is different: leaking roofs, clogged toilets, broken handpumps and missing playgrounds remain common.

• Availability is not functionality: UDISE+ is self-reported by schools and largely records whether a facility exists, not whether it works or is usable.
• Not just money: the author points to shoddy construction by contractors and the absence of any system for routine repair and maintenance.
• Maintenance funds: in Jharkhand, even small school-level funds for upkeep have been discontinued for two years, according to the author. Schools then struggle with tasks as basic as buying brooms.
• Scheme link: under Samagra Shiksha (2018), which merged SSA, RMSA and Teacher Education, schools receive an enrolment-linked composite school grant meant for exactly this kind of upkeep.

The author’s central claim is that teaching can improve even without better buildings. The main reason children learn little is the lack of active teaching: pupils are often left idle for hours, which later pushes them into low-paid casual work.

• The loophole: Section 27 bars non-educational duties, but “educational purposes” is elastic. Teachers are tasked with digital attendance, heavy record-keeping, opening Aadhaar-linked bank accounts for pupils, and generating APAAR IDs.
• Double burden: Aadhaar-linked processes have created parallel physical and digital records.
• Time budget: the RTE norms imply about 4 hours of classroom teaching a day in primary schools (800 hours over 200 days). Over a six-day week that is 24 hours, leaving 21 hours of the 45-hour week. After about 6 hours of preparation, roughly 15 hours remain for other education-related tasks.
• The real clash: the problem is the absence of a boundary between teaching and non-teaching time. Teachers are summoned to the Block Resource Centre or asked for “immediate” WhatsApp reports during class hours, and some do paperwork in class to avoid long workdays. Teaching time becomes the casualty.

• Sacrosanct classroom hours: clearly defined teaching time that no administrative demand may enter.
• Settle the duties dispute separately: if non-teaching work is excessive, it is for teachers and the education department to resolve. Children cannot be held hostage to that conflict.
• A package deal: protected teaching time combined with better infrastructure, fewer non-teaching duties and clerical assistance. The author expects most teachers would accept this.
• “Cart and horse”: infrastructure and work culture must move together. Neither should be used as an excuse for the other.

• NEP 2020: recommends that teachers not be engaged in non-teaching activities that affect teaching. It also proposes school complexes to share resources, including administrative support.
• NIPUN Bharat (2021): a mission for foundational literacy and numeracy by the end of Grade 3.
• APAAR (2023): the Automated Permanent Academic Account Registry, a “One Nation, One Student ID” linked to the Academic Bank of Credits.
• Learning measurement: PARAKH (NCERT’s assessment centre, which runs the national survey formerly called NAS) and the citizen-led ASER survey (Pratham, since 2005).
• Teacher absence: a widely cited 2005 multi-country study found about one in four teachers in Indian government primary schools absent on a typical day. Classroom-time loss is a long-standing problem.

• Teachers’ side: unions argue that data-entry demands have multiplied faster than support staff, and that many schools are single-teacher (over one lakh nationally). In such schools, any non-teaching task takes the only adult away from the classroom.
• System’s side: much of the reporting load is top-down, so reform must start with rationalising data demands, merging digital and paper records, and ring-fencing maintenance grants.
• Community’s side: empowered SMCs and social audits can monitor both facility functionality and teacher presence, giving the RTE’s accountability provisions real effect.
• Ethics lens (GS-IV): the piece is ultimately about public service ethos: duty, accountability and justice to children who have no voice in how school time is used.