1. Introduction: What is the Election Commission of India?

The Election Commission of India (ECI) is a permanent, independent constitutional body established under Article 324 of the Constitution. It superintends, directs, and controls the entire process of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice President of India.

Established on 25 January 1950 — one day before India became a Republic — the ECI has, over seven decades, transformed from a skeletal one-man office into the world's largest election management body. During a Lok Sabha election it becomes the single largest organisation on earth, deploying over one million personnel.

Foundational Prelims Facts

• Established: 25 January 1950 (one day before India became a Republic)
• Headquarters: Nirvachan Sadan, New Delhi
• Constitutional Provision: Part XV of the Constitution (Articles 324–329)
• First CEC: Sukumar Sen — conducted the first general elections of 1951–52
• National Voters' Day: 25 January, celebrating the ECI's foundation day
• Current CEC (2026): Gyanesh Kumar, the 26th CEC, who assumed office on 19 February 2025 and is the first CEC appointed under the 2023 Act
• Current Election Commissioners: Dr Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Dr Vivek Joshi

Why the ECI Matters in a Democracy

• It is the operational pillar of India's electoral democracy — the guarantor of free, fair, and credible elections
• It acts as a constitutional watchdog against the misuse of state power during elections
• It upholds political equality — one person, one vote, one value
• It is recognised globally as a model for conducting elections at massive scale, with over 90 crore electors across 28 States and 8 Union Territories
• In a marker of that recognition, India assumed the Chairship of the Council of Member States of International IDEA for 2026, with CEC Gyanesh Kumar taking the chair in December 2025

Institutional autonomy requires not merely legal independence, but perceived independence. A body that is structurally protected yet behaviourally cautious cannot deliver electoral integrity. — Legacy IAS Faculty

2. Constitutional Articles Related to Elections

Aspirants routinely lose Prelims marks by confusing Article 324 with 243K, or 326 with 325. Memorise this table cold — the article-number matching question is a recurring UPSC favourite.

Article 324 — The Core Provision

Article 324 vests the ECI with superintendence, direction, and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections. The framers deliberately used broad, open-textured language to give the ECI plenary powers — enabling it to fill gaps in law where Parliament has not legislated.

3. Composition: From a Single-Member to a Multi-Member Body

The Constitution does not fix the number of Election Commissioners. Article 324(2) leaves the composition entirely to the President — which is why the ECI's size has changed with political circumstance rather than constitutional amendment. This is the single most tested "evolution" storyline in the Polity syllabus.

Current Structure

• Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) — the head of the Commission
• Election Commissioners (ECs) — currently two, making it a three-member body
• Decision-making under the 2023 Act: the Commission should transact its business unanimously wherever possible; in case of a difference of opinion, the majority view prevails
• Assisting the Commission are Deputy Election Commissioners (from the civil services) and, at the state level, Chief Electoral Officers, District Election Officers, Returning Officers, and Electoral Registration Officers

Evolution: Single-Member → Multi-Member

Why the Shift Happened — and Why It Was Contested

The expansion to a three-member body was driven partly by genuine workload considerations and partly by political calculation. The T.N. Seshan era (1990–96) saw a powerful CEC assert the ECI's authority in unprecedented ways — enforcing expenditure ceilings, introducing voter ID cards, and postponing elections over law-and-order concerns — but also raised concerns about unchecked individual discretion. The multi-member structure balances authority with collegiate decision-making.

In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the multi-member Commission and held that the CEC is not a "superior" authority over the ECs. The CEC is the chairman with a coordinating role, but the ECs enjoy coequal status in decision-making — the CEC's recommendation power over ECs is not an instrument of dominance.

4. Appointment Process: Earlier vs Now

This is the most dynamic section of the topic and the most likely Mains hook. The appointment mechanism has moved through three distinct regimes in three years — pure executive discretion, a judicially-crafted interim collegium, and now a parliamentary statute currently under challenge.

A. Pre-2023 Position (1950 – March 2023)

• Article 324(2) simply states that the CEC and ECs are appointed by the President
• In practice, appointments were made on the advice of the Council of Ministers — effectively the Prime Minister's recommendation routed through the Law Ministry
• Seniority convention: the senior-most EC was typically elevated as CEC
• No independent selection committee existed — the process was opaque and executive-dominated for 73 years
• Article 324(5) empowered Parliament to legislate on conditions of service, but Parliament did not enact such a law for over seven decades

B. Supreme Court Judgment 2023 — Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India

• Case: Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, decided 2 March 2023
• Bench: 5-judge Constitution Bench led by Justice K.M. Joseph — a unanimous verdict
• The Court held that the absence of an independent appointment mechanism threatens the ECI's independence and creates a structural conflict of interest, since the executive appoints the very body that must referee the executive's own elections
• It directed the formation of a 3-member selection committee: (i) the Prime Minister as Chairperson, (ii) the Leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha (or the leader of the single largest opposition party), and (iii) the Chief Justice of India
• The template was borrowed from the CBI Director and Central Vigilance Commissioner appointment models
• Crucially, the Court said this norm would operate only until Parliament enacted a law under Article 324(5) — it ended a 73-year practice but expressly acknowledged Parliament's legislative prerogative

C. The Parliamentary Law: CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023

Parliament responded within months. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 was passed by Rajya Sabha in December 2023, by Lok Sabha on 21 December 2023, received the President's assent on 29 December 2023, and came into effect from 2 January 2024.

Machinery Created by the Act

1. Search Committee — headed by the Cabinet Secretary, with two other members not below the rank of Secretary to the Government of India. It prepares a panel of five names for the Selection Committee's consideration.
2. Selection Committee — comprising the Prime Minister (Chairperson), a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha. Where no recognised Leader of Opposition exists, the leader of the single largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha fills that seat.
3. Discretion clause: the Selection Committee may also consider persons not on the Search Committee's panel — which significantly dilutes the filtering value of the search stage.
4. Appointment: the recommendation goes to the President of India, who issues the appointment warrant.
5. Validity clause: an appointment cannot be invalidated merely because of a vacancy in, or defect in the constitution of, the Selection Committee.

Comparison: Pre-2023 vs SC Direction vs the 2023 Act

The Controversy over the 2023 Act

• Exclusion of the CJI reversed the Supreme Court's direction and, critics argue, hollowed out the judgment's spirit while formally complying with its letter
• The Selection Committee now carries a built-in 2:1 government majority — the government can outvote the opposition member in every case
• The Act also downgraded the salary and service conditions from Supreme Court Judge equivalence to Cabinet Secretary equivalence, a symbolic dilution of status
• Petitions by Jaya Thakur, the Association for Democratic Reforms (through Advocate Prashant Bhushan), and Advocate Gopal Singh challenge Section 7 of the Act as violative of Articles 14, 21, 50 and 324 and of the basic structure principle of free and fair elections
• The Supreme Court declined to stay the Act in February 2024 and again before the February 2025 appointment; CEC Gyanesh Kumar was appointed under this Act on 17–19 February 2025, along with EC Vivek Joshi
• In extended hearings during 2026, the Court probed whether "independence" is a procedural requirement demanding a neutral member, or whether any validly enacted parliamentary law satisfies the constitutional mandate. The bench observed that a direction issued to fill a vacuum cannot bind Parliament once the vacuum is filled. Reports indicate the bench reserved its judgment after the May 2026 hearings; aspirants must track the final verdict
• Separately, in January 2026 the Supreme Court issued notice to the Centre and the ECI on a plea by the NGO Lok Prahari challenging Section 16 of the 2023 Act, which grants the CEC and ECs blanket civil and criminal immunity for acts done in official capacity — described in the petition as "unbridled" protection even against alleged misuse of office

5. Eligibility & Qualifications

Constitutional Position

The Constitution is silent on the qualifications required for the CEC and ECs. Article 324 prescribes no educational, professional, or age criterion. That silence lasted 73 years — until the 2023 Act codified eligibility for the first time.

Codified Criteria under the 2023 Act

• Must be persons of integrity
• Must have knowledge of and experience in the management and conduct of elections
• Must be, or have been, a Secretary to the Government of India or equivalent — i.e., a serving or retired bureaucrat of that rank

Convention & Practice (Pre-2023)

• Traditionally, retired or senior IAS officers — often former Chief Secretaries or Union Secretaries — have been appointed
• A few ECs have come from judicial, legal, or diplomatic backgrounds
• The current CEC, Gyanesh Kumar, is a 1988-batch IAS officer of the Kerala cadre who served as Secretary in the Ministries of Parliamentary Affairs and Cooperation before joining the Commission as EC in March 2024

Remaining Issues

• Eligibility is now confined to Secretary-rank bureaucrats — excluding the judiciary, academia, constitutional law experts, and civil society
• The criterion of "knowledge in the management of elections" is broad and subjective, creating room for cherry-picking
• Critics argue the criteria still allow the executive to select from a pool of officers who have served under it
• The Second ARC and the Law Commission had recommended broader and more transparent criteria than a bureaucratic monopoly

6. Tenure & Conditions of Service

• Term: 6 years or until attaining the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier
• Reappointment: not eligible for reappointment
• EC elevated to CEC: the total combined tenure as EC plus CEC cannot exceed 6 years. This is why CEC tenures are often short — Gyanesh Kumar, born 27 January 1964, holds office until 26 January 2029, whereas his predecessor Rajiv Kumar served as CEC for 2 years and 279 days
• Salary: under the 2023 Act, equivalent to the Cabinet Secretary — downgraded from the earlier equivalence with a Judge of the Supreme Court
• Pension option: the CEC and ECs may draw pension and other retirement benefits from their previous service

Safeguards for Independence

• Security of tenure — the CEC cannot be removed arbitrarily
• Service conditions cannot be varied to their disadvantage after appointment
• Salary charged to the Consolidated Fund of India — insulated from an annual vote of Parliament
• Bar on reappointment reduces the incentive to please the appointing authority during service

7. Removal Process

Removal of the CEC

• Can be removed only in the same manner and on the same grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court
• Requires an address by both Houses of Parliament, each passed by a special majority — a majority of the total membership of the House plus a two-thirds majority of members present and voting
• Grounds: proved misbehaviour or incapacity
• The address is then presented to the President in the same session
• This is the highest form of constitutional protection available in Indian public office

Removal of Election Commissioners

• An EC (and a Regional Commissioner) can be removed by the President only on the recommendation of the CEC
• No parliamentary impeachment process is required
• This is a markedly weaker protection than that enjoyed by the CEC

Comparison of Removal Procedures

Critical Analysis: The Asymmetry Problem

• The asymmetry creates an implicit hierarchy inside a body that is meant to be collegiate — ECs are structurally less secure than the CEC
• An EC who dissents risks removal on the CEC's recommendation, producing a potential chilling effect on independent decision-making within the Commission
• In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995), the Supreme Court held that the CEC's recommendation power is not absolute or arbitrary, that it exists to protect ECs from executive pressure rather than to subordinate them to the CEC, and that ECs enjoy coequal status in decision-making
• The structural vulnerability nevertheless remains on paper, and the standard reform demand is to extend parliamentary removal protection to the ECs as well

8. Powers of the Election Commission

A. Administrative Powers

• Prepare, revise and maintain electoral rolls, and delimit polling areas
• Notify the election schedule and set poll dates
• Deploy central armed police forces and appoint observers, returning officers, and electoral registration officers
• Issue and enforce the Model Code of Conduct
• Register political parties and grant recognition as national or state parties
• Allot election symbols
• Advise on and supervise election expenditure monitoring
• Transfer officials engaged in election duty where impartiality is in doubt

B. Advisory Powers

• Advise the President or Governor on the disqualification of sitting members under Articles 103 and 192 — and this opinion is binding
• Advise on matters connected with post-election disqualification, including office of profit and corrupt practices
• Recommend to the President the imposition of President's Rule where free and fair elections cannot be held in a State

C. Quasi-Judicial Powers

• Settle disputes over election symbols under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968
• Adjudicate on splits and mergers of recognised political parties — as in the Shiv Sena dispute (2022–23) and the NCP dispute (2023)
• De-recognise political parties for failure to meet the vote-share or seat criteria, or for violation of undertakings and election law
• Cancel a poll or order re-poll in cases of booth capturing, rigging, or violence
• Disqualify candidates for failure to lodge election expense accounts

The Scope of Article 324 — "A Reservoir of Power"

In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978), the Supreme Court held that Article 324 is a reservoir of power: where the law is silent, the ECI may exercise residual powers to ensure a free and fair election, subject to the rule of law, natural justice, and the limits of enacted legislation. This is what allows the ECI to issue the MCC, order re-polls, and act in situations Parliament never anticipated.

In Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002), the Court derived the voter's right to know the criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities and educational qualifications of candidates from Article 19(1)(a), and directed the ECI to mandate candidate affidavits — the foundation of today's disclosure regime.

In PUCL v. Union of India (2013), the Court read the right to reject as part of free expression and directed the introduction of NOTA on EVMs and ballot papers.

9. Functions of the Election Commission

Elections the ECI Conducts

• Lok Sabha — general elections and bye-elections
• Rajya Sabha — biennial and bye-elections by the elected members of State Assemblies
• State Legislative Assemblies (Vidhan Sabha)
• State Legislative Councils (Vidhan Parishad), where they exist
• President of India — under Articles 54 and 55
• Vice President of India — under Article 66

Key Operational Functions

• Electoral rolls: preparation, periodic revision, summary revision, intensive revision, and maintenance of voter lists
• Political party registration: under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
• Symbol allotment: under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968
• Election expenditure monitoring: candidate expenditure ceilings, expenditure observers, shadow registers, and flying squads. There is no ceiling on party expenditure — a persistent loophole
• NOTA: introduced by the ECI in 2013 following the Supreme Court's PUCL judgment
• EVMs and VVPATs: procurement, first-level checks, randomisation, storage, deployment, and mandatory VVPAT slip counting in five randomly selected booths per assembly segment
• Voter education: the SVEEP programme (Systematic Voters' Education and Electoral Participation)
• Technology platforms: cVIGIL for citizen reporting of MCC violations, Voter Helpline 1950, Suvidha for permissions, KYC/Know Your Candidate, and since January 2026 the unified ECINET platform

10. Model Code of Conduct (MCC)

Nature and Origin

• Non-statutory — it is not backed by any specific legislation
• Evolved through consensus among political parties, tracing back to 1960, when it was first used in the Kerala Assembly elections
• Enforced by the ECI through its plenary powers under Article 324, an approach upheld in Union of India v. Harbans Singh Jalal and the Common Cause line of cases

Period of Operation

The MCC comes into force from the date of announcement of the election schedule and remains in operation until the completion of the election process, i.e., the declaration of results.

Key Provisions

• General conduct: no speeches inciting communal or caste tensions; no appeals on grounds of religion, caste, or language; no bribery or intimidation of voters
• Meetings and processions: prior permission from local authorities is required
• Polling day: no campaigning within the 48-hour silence period before the close of poll
• Party in power: cannot use government machinery, official vehicles, officials, or public resources for campaigning; ministers cannot combine official tours with electioneering
• No new schemes, grants, foundation stones, or ad-hoc appointments may be announced after the election is announced
• Government advertisements at public expense showcasing achievements are barred during the MCC period

Limitations of the MCC

• No statutory backing — the ECI can issue notices, censures, and advisories, but cannot itself prosecute
• Slow enforcement — notices are often issued after the political damage is already done
• Hate speech and communal appeals continue despite the MCC's clear prohibitions
• Perceived reluctance to act firmly against senior leaders weakens the Commission's credibility
• A parliamentary Standing Committee recommended giving the MCC statutory status; the ECI itself has opposed this, arguing that statutory status would make every MCC action justiciable and slow enforcement to the pace of litigation

11. Global Comparison: India vs USA vs UK

The single most important insight for Mains: India's ECI administers elections, whereas its American and British counterparts largely regulate them. Comparing them as like-for-like bodies is a common answer-writing error.

11.1 USA — The Federal Election Commission in Depth

Institutional Design

The FEC was created by amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1974–75, in the aftermath of Watergate. It is a statutory independent agency, not a constitutional body — a critical distinction from the ECI, since Congress can restructure or defund it by ordinary legislation.

• Six commissioners appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; no more than three may belong to the same political party
• Six-year staggered terms; commissioners may lawfully continue in holdover status after their terms expire until a successor is confirmed — which is why several have served far beyond six years
• The chairmanship rotates annually among the commissioners, so no single figure accumulates Seshan-style authority
• Four affirmative votes are required for every substantive action — opening an investigation, issuing a rule, imposing a penalty, or issuing an advisory opinion

What the FEC Does — and Does Not Do

• Does: administer and civilly enforce campaign finance law, ensure public disclosure of fundraising and spending, issue advisory opinions, and administer the public funding of presidential elections
• Does not: conduct elections, prepare voter rolls, allot symbols, enforce a code of conduct, or decide disqualifications. Elections are administered by states and roughly 10,000 local jurisdictions, producing wide variation in registration rules, ballot design, and machine standards
• A separate body, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), 2002, sets the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, accredits testing laboratories, certifies voting machines, and maintains the federal mail voter registration form. It has four commissioners and needs three for a quorum
• Criminal campaign finance enforcement rests with the Department of Justice, not the FEC

The Structural Flaw: Deadlock by Design

The even-numbered, evenly-split composition was intended to prevent partisan capture. In practice it produced the opposite pathology — 3–3 deadlock on politically salient enforcement matters, with complaints dismissed not on merit but for want of four votes. Where India's problem is an appointment panel with a government majority, America's is a commission engineered so that no majority is possible at all. Both failures are structural; only one is deliberate.

Recent Developments — the 2025–26 Quorum Collapse

• January 2025: Commissioner Sean Cooksey resigned to serve as counsel to the Vice President, leaving five commissioners — quorum intact
• February 2025: the President purported to remove Chair Ellen Weintraub. She and several members of Congress argued the dismissal was impermissible; the FEC website nonetheless recorded two vacancies. The dispute over removability of independent-agency members mirrors, in reverse, India's own debate on tenure protection
• 30 April 2025: Commissioner Allen Dickerson's resignation took effect, dropping the commission to three members and destroying the four-vote quorum — only the fourth such loss in the agency's fifty-year history
• 3 October 2025: Commissioner James "Trey" Trainor resigned, leaving just two commissioners — Chair Shana Broussard and Dara Lindenbaum. The FEC cancelled its remaining public meetings; the Chair publicly described the agency as "hobbled"
• Consequence: without a quorum the FEC cannot hold hearings, make rules, enforce the law, or issue advisory opinions. The statutes remain in force and may be enforced once a quorum returns, and DOJ criminal enforcement is unaffected — but the civil regulator was effectively dormant through the entire run-up to the 2026 midterm cycle
• 11 February 2026: the President nominated Ashley Stow and Andrew Woodson to the two Republican seats. If confirmed by the Senate with no further departures, the commission would be restored to a bare four-member quorum
• Election Assistance Commission, 2026: Commissioner Donald Palmer resigned on 30 April 2026, and on 9 July 2026 the remaining three commissioners were removed — leaving the EAC without a quorum for the third time since 2003, and freezing action on a March 2025 executive order directing it to update voting system guidelines and require documentary proof of citizenship on the federal registration form

The Judicial Dismantling of Campaign Finance Limits

Even when the FEC functions, its regulatory space keeps shrinking under First Amendment jurisprudence:

1. Buckley v. Valeo (1976): upheld contribution limits but struck down expenditure limits, establishing that spending money on political speech is protected expression
2. Citizens United v. FEC (2010): struck down restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations and unions, holding that truly independent spending cannot corrupt — the origin of the Super PAC
3. McCutcheon v. FEC (2014): invalidated aggregate contribution limits, narrowing the anti-corruption rationale to quid pro quo corruption alone
4. NRSC v. FEC (30 June 2026): in a 6–3 ruling authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court struck down FECA's limits on coordinated party expenditures as violating the First Amendment, expressly overruling Colorado II (2001). Parties may now spend without limit in coordination with their own candidates. The Court reasoned that keeping the limits would consign political parties to "second-tier status" against unregulated outside groups. Contribution limits to parties and candidates, earmarking rules, disclosure requirements, and the bar on super PAC coordination all survive

11.2 UK — The Electoral Commission in Depth

Institutional Design

• Established in 2001 under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000 (PPERA) — a statutory, not constitutional, body
• Commissioners are appointed by the Crown on an address from the House of Commons, following a process overseen by the Speaker's Committee on the Electoral Commission — a cross-party committee chaired by the Speaker of the House of Commons
• The membership deliberately blends nominated Commissioners put forward by the larger political parties with a majority of independent Commissioners, so that parties are represented but cannot control
• The Commission is accountable to, and funded through, the UK Parliament rather than the government of the day — and is separately accountable to and part-funded by the Scottish Parliament and Senedd Cymru for devolved elections
• Its independence rests on parliamentary accountability, whereas India's rests on constitutional entrenchment — a genuinely different design philosophy worth naming in a Mains answer

Functions

• Registers political parties, third-party campaigners and referendum participants
• Regulates political finance — donations, loans, campaign spending returns — and publishes the data
• Sets performance standards for Returning Officers and Electoral Registration Officers, and reports publicly on the conduct of every election and referendum
• Runs public awareness and registration campaigns
• Does not conduct the poll: elections are delivered by local authority Returning Officers, and the electoral register is compiled locally by Electoral Registration Officers — the mirror image of the ECI's centralised roll ownership
• Enforcement is civil, through sanctions and fines; serious criminal matters are referred to the police and prosecutors

The Independence Controversy: The Strategy and Policy Statement

The most instructive recent episode for Indian aspirants concerns not appointments but direction.

• Section 16 of the Elections Act, 2022 inserted new sections 4A–4E into PPERA, empowering the Secretary of State to draft and designate a Strategy and Policy Statement setting out the government's electoral priorities, to which the Commission must "have regard" — and against which it must report annually to the Speaker's Committee
• The first such Statement was designated on 29 February 2024
• The Commission itself objected that a government guiding the work of the elections regulator "is inconsistent with the role that an independent electoral commission plays in a healthy democracy." Its Chief Executive framed the principle sharply: a government depends on winning an election, and so should not be able to instruct the people refereeing that election
• The Speaker's Committee found the draft statement "not fit for purpose and inconsistent with the Commission's role as an independent regulator"; the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee and academic commentators raised similar objections, noting the arrangement had no precedent in comparable democracies such as Canada, Australia or New Zealand, and sat awkwardly with the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters
• 2 March 2026: during the second reading of the new elections bill, the Government announced it would "repeal in full" the power to impose a Strategy and Policy Statement on the Commission — a notable reversal, to be effected by amendment during the bill's passage

Voter ID and Turnout

• The Elections Act, 2022 introduced mandatory photo voter ID in Great Britain, first used at scale in the 2023 local elections and the 2024 general election
• The Electoral Commission estimated that roughly 750,000 people did not vote in the 2024 general election because they lacked accepted ID
• Turnout at the 2024 general election was 59.7% — the lowest in more than two decades
• The current reform package therefore expands rather than abolishes ID, adding UK-issued bank cards to the list of accepted documents

Recent Developments — The Representation of the People Bill

• July 2025: the Government published the strategy paper "Restoring Trust in our Democracy", promising votes at 16, automated voter registration, wider voter ID, digital campaigning safeguards, protection for candidates, and action against foreign interference
• December 2025: an independent review into foreign financial interference in UK politics was commissioned under Philip Rycroft; it reported on 25 March 2026
• 12 February 2026: the Representation of the People Bill was introduced in the House of Commons; second reading on 2 March 2026; committee stage across nine sittings from 18 March to 16 April 2026. The 2024–26 parliamentary session ended on 29 April 2026 without the bill completing its passage

11.3 USA — Beyond the FEC: Who Actually Runs American Elections

A frequent error in Mains answers is to treat the FEC as America's ECI. It is not. The United States has no national election-conducting authority at all — a constitutional design choice, not an oversight.

• Elections Clause, Article I, Section 4: the times, places and manner of congressional elections are prescribed by State legislatures, subject to Congress's power to make or alter such regulations. The Electors Clause, Article II, similarly leaves presidential elector selection to the states
• The practical result: roughly 10,000 local jurisdictions administer elections, with 50 different registration regimes, ballot designs, early-voting rules, and machine standards. There is no national electoral roll and no national voter ID
• Buckley v. Valeo (1976) also struck down the FEC's original composition on Appointments Clause grounds, because Congress had given itself the power to appoint some commissioners. The agency had to be reconstituted with presidential appointment and Senate confirmation — an early signal that the FEC's independence would always be contested territory
• Redistricting is handled by state legislatures or independent state commissions, not by any federal election body — unlike India, where a statutory Delimitation Commission under Article 82 draws boundaries and its orders cannot be questioned in court
• The Election Assistance Commission is the nearest thing to a technical standards regulator, but its guidelines are voluntary, and states choose whether to adopt them
• A March 2025 executive order directed the EAC to update voting system guidelines and to require documentary proof of citizenship on the federal mail voter registration form — steps now frozen by the commission's loss of quorum in July 2026

Trump v. Slaughter (29 June 2026) — The Removal Protection Earthquake

This is the single most useful American case for an Indian polity answer on institutional independence, because it addresses precisely what Article 324(5) protects.

• In a 6–3 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court held that statutory "for-cause" removal protections for Federal Trade Commission members violate the separation of powers, expressly overruling Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935) after ninety-one years
• Justice Gorsuch concurred; Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson
• The ruling endorses the unitary executive theory — that all executive power is vested in the President — and extends to the leaders of roughly two dozen multi-member "independent" agencies, including the NLRB, FCC, EEOC and CPSC
• In the companion case Trump v. Cook, decided the same day by 5–4, the Court carved out the Federal Reserve as constitutionally unique, preserving its governors' removal protections
• Direct electoral consequence: when the three remaining Election Assistance Commission members were removed on 9 July 2026, the White House expressly cited the Slaughter decision as the authority for doing so

11.4 UK — Beyond the Commission: The May 2026 Electoral Cycle

Britain's system is deliberately fragmented, and 2026 showcased that fragmentation vividly. On 7 May 2026, three distinct sets of elections ran simultaneously under three different franchises and two different voting systems.

Senedd Cymru — The Most Radical Reform

• Under the Senedd Cymru (Members and Elections) Act 2024, the Welsh Parliament expanded from 60 to 96 Members
• The 40 constituencies and 5 regions were replaced by 16 new constituencies, each electing six Members, formed by pairing Wales's 32 UK parliamentary seats
• The mixed system gave way to closed-list proportional representation — voters cast a single vote for a party rather than two votes, and parties control the ordering of candidates
• The Senedd's term was shortened from five years to four
• Turnout was 51.6%, up around five percentage points; Plaid Cymru emerged victorious
• Criticism: the Electoral Reform Society, the Committee on Senedd Electoral Reform and the Expert Panel had all recommended the Single Transferable Vote instead, arguing closed lists hand candidate selection to party machines and weaken the voter's ability to hold individual members accountable. Opposition parties objected that such a fundamental change was made without a referendum

Scotland and England

• The Scottish Parliament election filled all 129 seats under the Additional Member System — the first contest on new boundaries from the Second Periodic Review. The SNP remained the largest party while falling short of a majority
• English local elections ran the same day. Controversially, some had been postponed to accommodate local government reorganisation, affecting 4.6 million voters and extending certain councillors' terms to seven years. Following a legal challenge by Reform UK, the Government reversed the postponements on 16 February 2026 and announced a £63 million fund to help councils organise polls at short notice

The Franchise and ID Asymmetry

A single citizen may therefore face different voting ages, different ID rules and different ballot systems depending on which body is being elected. The Law Commission has described UK electoral law as "increasingly complex and fragmented", spread across 17 statutes and around 30 sets of regulations. India's single, uniform franchise under Articles 325 and 326 — one general electoral roll, one voting age, one system — looks considerably more coherent by comparison.

Other Bodies the Commission Does Not Control

• Boundary Commissions for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland conduct constituency reviews — separate from the Electoral Commission, much as India's Delimitation Commission is separate from the ECI
• The Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland runs both registration and polls there, unlike the local-authority model in Great Britain
• Local authority Returning Officers remain personally and legally responsible for the conduct of the poll in their area

11.5 Three-Way Synthesis: What the Comparison Actually Teaches

Timeline: 2025–26 at a Glance

India entrusts one body with running the election; Britain entrusts Parliament with protecting the referee; America entrusts the Constitution with protecting the spender. Each choice explains that country's characteristic electoral pathology. — Legacy IAS Faculty

12. Recent Developments (2024–2026)

A. Appointments and Institutional Change

• Gyanesh Kumar appointed 26th CEC — recommended on 17 February 2025 by the Selection Committee chaired by the Prime Minister and comprising Union Home Minister Amit Shah and Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi, who recorded a dissent note. He assumed charge on 19 February 2025, succeeding Rajiv Kumar, and is the first CEC appointed under the 2023 Act. His term runs to 26 January 2029
• Vivek Joshi, former Registrar General of India and Census Commissioner, was appointed Election Commissioner alongside; Sukhbir Singh Sandhu continues as the third member
• India chairs International IDEA for 2026 — CEC Gyanesh Kumar assumed the Chairship of the Council of Member States on 3 December 2025, with Mauritius and Mexico as Vice-Chairs. International IDEA comprises 35 member states with observers including the USA and Japan
• IICDEM 2026 — the India International Conference on Democracy and Election Management was hosted at Bharat Mandapam in January 2026, with participation from foreign Election Management Bodies including the UK Electoral Commission
• International Election Visitors' Programme 2026 — 43 delegates from 23 countries observed the Assam, Kerala, Puducherry, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu elections in April 2026

B. Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Electoral Rolls — The Defining Controversy

• What it is: a de novo verification and revision of electoral rolls through house-to-house enumeration, pre-filled forms, and verification against earlier voter data — aimed at removing deceased, permanently shifted, duplicate, and ineligible entries while ensuring eligible citizens are not excluded
• Phase 1 — Bihar: announced on 24 June 2025 and conducted between June and September 2025 ahead of the Bihar Assembly elections. Draft roll published 1 August 2025; final roll 30 September 2025. Roughly 47 lakh electors — about 5–6% of the state's electorate — were deleted
• Litigation: in Association for Democratic Reforms v. ECI, the Supreme Court on 10 July 2025 urged the ECI to accept Aadhaar, ration card and EPIC as valid documents, and on 14 August 2025 permitted any excluded voter to use Aadhaar to contest omission. By its order of 9 September 2025, Aadhaar was added as the 12th indicative document
• Phase 2: extended to 12 States and Union Territories — enumeration from November to 4 December 2025, draft rolls on 9 December 2025, claims and objections until 8 January 2026, and final rolls published on 7 February 2026
• Supreme Court verdict, 27 May 2026: a bench headed by Chief Justice Surya Kant, with Justices Joymalya Bagchi and Vipul Pancholi, upheld the SIR as constitutionally valid. The Court held that the ECI acted within its authority under Article 324 read with Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, that accurate electoral rolls are central to free and fair elections, and that the SIR cannot be struck down as ultra vires merely because it differs from the ordinary periodic revision. The Court described the exercise as one that "breathes life into the Constitution"
• The unresolved debate: petitioners had argued that the drive risked large-scale disenfranchisement of the poor, migrants, and the undocumented, and that Article 324 was being used to reshape the very definition of the electorate. Even after the verdict, the Court emphasised procedural fairness, inclusivity, and reasoned orders at the field level — the compliance burden now sits with EROs and BLOs

C. Technology: The ECINET Platform

• Launched on 22 January 2026 at IICDEM by CEC Gyanesh Kumar with ECs Sandhu and Joshi
• A unified digital platform integrating over 40 ECI apps and web portals — including Voter Helpline, cVIGIL, Suvidha, and Know Your Candidate — into a single federated system, available in all 22 scheduled languages plus English
• Before the 2026 polls it had processed over 100 million registration forms and digitised more than 1.5 billion documents
• The Know Your Candidate module lets voters access candidates' criminal antecedents, assets and liabilities, educational qualifications, and download full affidavits
• Stress test: after a trial run during the Bihar elections of November 2025 and the SIR, ECINET sustained around 3 crore hits per minute on counting day, 4 May 2026, and repelled roughly 68 lakh cyberattacks during the five-state Assembly elections

D. The 2026 Assembly Election Cycle

• Elections to Assam, Kerala, Puducherry, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal were conducted between April and early May 2026, with counting on 4 May 2026
• The ECI deployed over 25 lakh officials — roughly 15 lakh polling personnel, 8.5 lakh security personnel, and 40,000 counting personnel
• 1,111 Central Observers were appointed: 557 General, 188 Police, and 366 Expenditure Observers
• The full Commission held pre-poll preparedness reviews with political parties, enforcement agencies, CEOs, DEOs and police officers in each poll-bound state

E. Judicial and Legal Developments

• Electoral Bonds struck down (February 2024): in ADR v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench held the Electoral Bond Scheme unconstitutional for violating the voter's right to information under Article 19(1)(a); SBI was directed to stop issuance and disclose donor data, and the ECI to publish it
• EVM–VVPAT petition (April 2024): the Supreme Court dismissed the plea for 100% VVPAT slip verification and for a return to ballot papers, upholding the existing 5-booths-per-segment system while permitting candidates placed second and third to seek verification of burnt memory in 5% of EVMs on payment of costs
• CEC Act challenge: heard at length through 2026; the bench examined whether a judicial direction issued to fill a legislative vacuum can survive the enactment of a valid law. Judgment is reported to have been reserved after the May 2026 hearings
• Section 16 immunity challenge (January 2026): the Supreme Court issued notice to the Centre and the ECI on Lok Prahari's plea against blanket civil and criminal immunity for Commissioners, while declining to stay the provision

13. Challenges & Issues

• Allegations of bias: opposition parties have repeatedly alleged that the ECI favours the ruling party through delayed MCC action and the timing of election announcements
• Appointment opacity: pre-2023 there was no transparent mechanism at all; post-2023 the exclusion of the CJI and the 2:1 government majority raise fresh concerns
• Electoral roll integrity: the SIR controversy has made roll accuracy versus inclusion the central electoral fault line — every deletion is contested as disenfranchisement and every retention as duplication
• Money power: despite candidate expenditure ceilings, there is no ceiling on party expenditure, and unaccounted money circulates freely; the ECI's enforcement capacity is limited
• Muscle power: booth capturing and intimidation persist in pockets, and the ECI depends on state police and central forces it does not command
• Hate speech: the Commission has been criticised as soft on senior leaders making communally divisive appeals
• EVM trust deficit: allegations of tampering are technically rebutted and judicially rejected, but public trust in the instrument remains a political battleground
• Criminalisation of politics: the ECI can compel disclosure of criminal antecedents but cannot disqualify candidates merely charged with serious offences — that requires legislation
• No independent secretariat: the ECI relies on officers on deputation from the very governments it regulates, creating a structural loyalty problem
• Post-retirement appointments: several former Commissioners have accepted government positions after demitting office
• Enforcement dependency: the ECI has no police force, no independent prosecuting arm, and no contempt power of its own

14. Reforms & Recommendations

Law Commission of India

• 170th Report (1999): recommended a collegium-like system for appointing the CEC and ECs, and suggested including the CJI or a retired Supreme Court judge in the appointment committee
• 255th Report (2015): recommended state funding of elections, tighter regulation of opinion polls and paid news, and disqualification of candidates against whom charges have been framed for serious offences

Second Administrative Reforms Commission

• Recommended a more transparent and independent appointment process through a collegium headed by the Prime Minister with the Speaker, Leader of Opposition, Law Minister, and Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha
• Suggested specifying qualifications for ECI appointments in law — since implemented in narrower form by the 2023 Act
• Advocated an independent secretariat for the ECI, on the model of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha secretariats

Other Committees

• Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990): recommended appointment of the CEC in consultation with the CJI and the Leader of Opposition, and of ECs in consultation with the CJI, LoP and the CEC
• Tarkunde Committee (1975): proposed a three-member committee of the PM, Lok Sabha Speaker, and Leader of Opposition
• Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998): endorsed partial state funding of elections in kind

Key Reform Suggestions

• Collegium system: a genuinely balanced appointment panel with a neutral member, whether the CJI or another non-executive constitutional functionary
• Independent secretariat: the ECI's own permanent cadre, ending dependence on deputation
• Statutory MCC: legal teeth with defined penalties — balanced against the ECI's own concern about justiciability delaying enforcement
• Equal removal protection: extend the parliamentary impeachment safeguard to the ECs
• Restore salary parity with a Supreme Court Judge as a marker of status and insulation
• Cooling-off period: bar post-retirement government appointments for two to three years
• State funding of elections and a ceiling on party expenditure, not just candidate expenditure
• Codified, broader eligibility extending beyond Secretary-rank bureaucrats
• Statutory framework for roll revision — a defined, published procedure with appeal timelines to depoliticise exercises like the SIR

15. PYQ-Based Insights

Frequently Tested Prelims Points

• Article 324 — the exact triad of "superintendence, direction and control"
• The ECI does not conduct Panchayat or municipal elections
• The salary of the CEC is charged to the Consolidated Fund of India
• CEC removal is in the same manner as a Supreme Court Judge; EC removal is on the CEC's recommendation
• NOTA was introduced in 2013 pursuant to the PUCL judgment
• National Voters' Day is 25 January; the first CEC was Sukumar Sen
• Voting age was reduced from 21 to 18 by the 61st Constitutional Amendment, 1988
• The ECI's opinion on disqualification under Articles 103 and 192 is binding on the President or Governor

Previous Year Questions

1. UPSC Prelims 2017: Consider the following statements about the Election Commission of India — (1) It is a single-member body. (2) The salary of the Chief Election Commissioner is charged to the Consolidated Fund of India.
2. UPSC Mains GS-II 2022: "The Election Commission of India has been transformed from a one-man show to a multi-member body." Discuss the significance of this transformation and the challenges it poses to institutional independence.
3. UPSC Mains GS-II 2019: Discuss the role of the Election Commission of India in the context of the Model Code of Conduct. What are its limitations?
4. UPSC Mains GS-II 2017: "The expansion of the Election Commission to a three-member body raises as many questions as it answers." Critically examine.
5. UPSC Mains GS-II 2015: Examine the scope of Article 324 with reference to the Election Commission's power in filling the vacuum when the law is silent.

Important Themes for Mains

• Institutional autonomy versus executive control in constitutional appointments
• Electoral integrity, roll accuracy, and democratic legitimacy
• Constitutional silence and convention as instruments of governance
• Separation of powers in the design of appointment mechanisms
• Criminalisation of politics and the limits of the ECI's mandate
• The MCC as an exercise of soft power in democratic governance
• Technology in election management — efficiency gains versus trust and security risks

16. Mains Answer Framework

Universal structure: Introduction → Body → Conclusion. Open with the constitutional provision plus a one-line context; build three to four thematic paragraphs with sub-headings, data, cases and examples; close with a balanced way forward.

Sample Question 1

"The Election Commission of India's independence is more structural than substantive." Critically examine this statement in the light of recent developments.

Introduction

The ECI, established under Article 324, is constitutionally mandated to ensure free and fair elections — the bedrock of India's democracy. While it enjoys several structural safeguards, recent developments raise questions about its substantive independence.

Structural Safeguards

Security of tenure of six years or age 65, salary charged to the Consolidated Fund of India, the CEC's removal only through parliamentary impeachment, and a bar on reappointment provide formal independence.

Concerns about Substantive Independence

The 2023 Act excluded the CJI from the selection panel and produced a 2:1 government majority. Salary equivalence was downgraded from a Supreme Court Judge to the Cabinet Secretary. Post-retirement appointments of former Commissioners raise conflict-of-interest concerns. Alleged delays in MCC enforcement against ruling-party leaders and the asymmetric removal protection for ECs further erode substantive autonomy.

The Counter-View

The Supreme Court's May 2026 verdict upholding the SIR affirmed that the ECI acted within its constitutional and statutory mandate, and the Commission's operational record — a five-state election in 2026 with 25 lakh officials and the ECINET rollout — demonstrates real institutional capacity. Independence must be assessed by outcomes as well as by design.

Conclusion

Bridging the gap requires a balanced appointment panel, a statutory framework for roll revision, a cooling-off period for post-retirement positions, and an independent secretariat — converting structural protection into genuine institutional autonomy.

Sample Question 2

Examine the powers of the Election Commission of India under Article 324. How has the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of these powers?

Introduction

Article 324 vests the ECI with superintendence, direction and control over elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice President — a deliberately broad mandate.

Scope of Powers

Administrative (scheduling, rolls, EVMs, force deployment), advisory (disqualification opinions binding on the President and Governor), and quasi-judicial (symbol disputes, de-recognition, re-poll orders). These are supported by the Election Symbols Order, 1968 and the Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951.

Supreme Court Interpretation

In Mohinder Singh Gill (1978) the Court held Article 324 to be a reservoir of power, permitting the ECI to act in legal vacuums. In T.N. Seshan (1995) it upheld the multi-member structure and the coequal status of ECs. In ADR (2002) it derived the voter's right to know. In PUCL (2013) it mandated NOTA. In ADR v. ECI (2026) it upheld the SIR under Article 324 read with Section 21(3) of the RP Act, 1950.

Limitations

The ECI cannot override enacted law, its powers are subject to natural justice and judicial review, the MCC lacks statutory enforceability, and it depends on state machinery for execution.

Conclusion

The expansive judicial reading of Article 324 reflects deep institutional trust; codifying key powers by statute would enhance both clarity and electoral integrity.

17. Conclusion & Way Forward

The Election Commission of India stands as one of the most vital constitutional pillars of the Republic. Over seven decades it has managed elections at a scale unparalleled in world history — transforming from a skeletal one-man body into an institution capable of conducting multi-phase national elections for over 90 crore voters, and now chairing International IDEA on the global stage.

Yet a democracy is only as strong as the institutions that sustain it. The controversies over the appointment law, MCC enforcement, and the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls all point to the same underlying task: moving the ECI from structural independence to substantive independence.

Way Forward

• A transparent, multi-stakeholder appointment process with a genuinely neutral member on the panel
• Equal removal protection for all Commissioners, ending the internal asymmetry
• An independent secretariat with the ECI's own permanent cadre
• A statutory, time-bound framework for intensive roll revision with clear appeal rights
• Statutory backing for the MCC with defined penalties and expedited adjudication
• A cooling-off period for post-retirement government appointments
• Greater transparency in election expenditure and political funding after the electoral bonds verdict
• Sustained public trust through consistent, courageous and visibly non-partisan action

Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment; it has to be cultivated. Strengthening the Election Commission's independence is not merely an institutional reform — it is an investment in the very idea of self-governance. — Legacy IAS Faculty

18. Frequently Asked Questions

Is the Election Commission of India truly independent?

Partially, with significant caveats. The ECI has real structural safeguards — constitutional status under Article 324, security of tenure, salary charged to the Consolidated Fund of India, and impeachment-level protection for the CEC. But substantive independence is questioned because appointments are effectively controlled by an executive-majority selection committee, ECs enjoy weaker removal protection than the CEC, post-retirement government appointments remain permissible, and MCC enforcement against ruling-party leaders is often perceived as delayed. Genuine independence requires both structural protection and behavioural impartiality.

What is the difference between removal of the CEC and removal of ECs?

The CEC can be removed only by an address of both Houses of Parliament, each passed by a special majority, on grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity — exactly like a Supreme Court Judge. An EC can be removed by the President on the recommendation of the CEC, with no parliamentary process required. The Supreme Court in T.N. Seshan (1995) held that ECs enjoy equal status in decision-making and that the CEC's recommendation power is not arbitrary, but the structural asymmetry remains.

Is the Model Code of Conduct legally enforceable?

No — the MCC is non-statutory. It cannot itself be the basis for criminal prosecution. The ECI enforces it through plenary powers under Article 324 — issuing notices, censures, campaign bans, withdrawal of star campaigner status, and in extreme cases action against candidature. Where an MCC violation also breaches the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or the penal law, ordinary legal action follows.

Should ECI appointments be made through a collegium?

This is the central reform debate. Proponents argue a panel including a neutral member reduces executive monopoly, mirrors the Lokpal and CVC models, and was what the Supreme Court itself directed in Anoop Baranwal. Critics counter that appointing officials is an executive function, that judicial participation blurs separation of powers and compromises the CJI in later litigation, and that no mechanism is fully insulated from politics. At minimum, most experts agree the Leader of Opposition must have a meaningful rather than nominal role.

What elections does the ECI NOT conduct?

The ECI does not conduct elections to Panchayati Raj Institutions (Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti, Zila Parishad) or to urban local bodies (Municipalities and Municipal Corporations). These are conducted by State Election Commissions under Articles 243K and 243ZA, inserted by the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments of 1992. It also does not conduct elections to co-operative societies or trade unions.

What is the significance of the Anoop Baranwal judgment (2023)?

The five-judge Constitution Bench judgment of 2 March 2023 acknowledged for the first time that the absence of an independent appointment mechanism was a constitutional lacuna, directed an interim three-member selection committee of the PM, Leader of Opposition and CJI until Parliament legislated, and affirmed that the ECI's independence is essential to democracy. Parliament responded with the 2023 Act, which filled the structural gap but excluded the CJI — a compromise now before the Supreme Court.

What is the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) and why is it controversial?

The SIR is a de novo, house-to-house verification of electoral rolls designed to remove deceased, shifted, duplicate and ineligible entries. Launched in Bihar in June 2025, it resulted in roughly 47 lakh deletions, and was later extended to 12 more States and Union Territories with final rolls published on 7 February 2026. It was controversial because petitioners feared mass disenfranchisement of the poor, migrants and the undocumented. On 27 May 2026, the Supreme Court upheld the exercise as valid under Article 324 read with Section 21(3) of the RP Act, 1950, while stressing procedural fairness and inclusivity in implementation.

How does the ECI compare with the US FEC and the UK Electoral Commission?

The comparison is one of function, not just structure. The ECI administers elections end to end for over 90 crore voters. The FEC is a statutory agency that only regulates campaign finance — elections are run by states and around 10,000 local jurisdictions, while voting technology standards sit with the separate Election Assistance Commission. The UK Electoral Commission registers parties, regulates political finance and reports on elections, but local Returning Officers deliver the poll and local Electoral Registration Officers compile the register. On independence, India relies on constitutional entrenchment, the US on statutory status and a bipartisan six-member design that frequently deadlocks, and the UK on accountability to Parliament through the Speaker's Committee rather than to ministers.

What are the latest changes in the US and UK election bodies?

In the United States, the FEC lost its four-vote quorum on 30 April 2025 after a series of resignations and a disputed presidential removal, falling to just two commissioners by October 2025 and suspending rulemaking, enforcement and advisory opinions; two nominations were sent to the Senate on 11 February 2026 to restore quorum. On 30 June 2026, the Supreme Court in NRSC v. FEC struck down limits on coordinated party expenditures by 6–3, overruling Colorado II (2001). The Election Assistance Commission separately lost its quorum on 9 July 2026. In the United Kingdom, the Representation of the People Bill introduced on 12 February 2026 proposes votes at 16 for around 1.7 million young people, automated voter registration, bank cards as voter ID, tighter donor rules, a rise in the maximum fine from £20,000 to £500,000, and the full repeal of the government's power to impose a Strategy and Policy Statement on the Commission.

Why is Article 324 called a "reservoir of power"?

In Mohinder Singh Gill v. CEC (1978), the Supreme Court described Article 324 as a reservoir of power, meaning the ECI may exercise residual powers beyond the express text of statutes wherever Parliament or a State Legislature has not legislated. This allows it to issue the MCC, order re-polls, direct force deployment, and act on unanticipated threats to a free and fair election — subject always to the rule of law and natural justice.