Content
- The ‘impartiality’ of a nominated Governor
- India’s disaster response: a slippery slope for federalism
The ‘impartiality’ of a nominated Governor
Why is in News?
- Supreme Court’s latest rulings (2024–25) on Governor’s delay in granting assent to Bills and the meaning of “as soon as possible,” after disputes in Punjab, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu.
- The 16th Presidential Reference sought constitutional clarification on whether Governors can withhold/ delay assent without reasons, triggering national debate.
- Constitution Day discussions revived the Constituent Assembly’s original intent about a non-partisan Governor, contrasting sharply with present confrontations in Opposition-ruled States.
Relevance:
GS 2 – Polity & Constitution
- Governor’s constitutional position: Articles 153–161, 163, 200–201.
- Federal friction: Bill assent delays, misuse of discretionary powers.
- Supreme Court interventions redefining constitutional morality, executive accountability.
- Centre–State relations and cooperative federalism.
- Constitutional design vs political practice: role of Governor, tenure, neutrality.
- Checks & balances: Judicial review of Governor’s actions.
GS 2 – Governance
- Institutional integrity of constitutional offices.
- Administrative accountability and delays in policy implementation.
- Good governance principles: neutrality, transparency, time-bound decision-making.
- Impact of Governor–State friction on legislative functioning & service delivery.
Practice Question
- The framers envisioned the Governor as a “purely constitutional” head with limited discretion, yet contemporary political practices have often turned this office into a source of friction in the federal structure. Critically examine in light of recent Supreme Court interventions. (15 marks)
Role of the Governor (Constitutional Position)
- Part VI (Articles 153–162): Governor is the constitutional head of the State.
- Nominal Executive: Performs functions on aid & advice of the Council of Ministers (Article 163, 164).
- Discretionary powers (very limited):
- Choosing a CM when no clear majority (constitutional discretion).
- Reserving Bills for President only in specific situations (Article 200/201).
- Sending report to President under Article 356.
- No parallel authority: Governor is not a rival power centre; acts to make parliamentary government work.
Key framers’ vision: Governor is “purely constitutional, not an interfering authority” (Ambedkar).
Constituent Assembly Debates
On Nomination & Impartiality
- Concerns: Governor may become “remote–controlled”, like British-era Governors under GOI Act 1935.
- Ambedkar’s rebuttal:
- Governor must act on advice of Ministers, not the Centre.
- Not intended as an “agent” of Union Government.
- Purpose is to make parliamentary system work, not rival elected ministry.
On Discretionary Powers
- Fear: Only a step away from 1935 Act’s overriding powers.
- Ambedkar clarified:
- Discretion is very limited and express, not implied.
- No “general overriding powers”.
- Limited to: CM appointment in hung Assembly, explicit constitutional situations.
On Withholding Assent / Reserving Bills (Article 200/201)
- Members feared disguised discretionary power contradicting democracy.
- Ambedkar’s clarification:
- Governor cannot sit in judgment over Bills.
- Must follow advice, except where Constitution mandates discretion.
- Reservation only for Bills:
- Endangering Union’s powers.
- Violating constitutional provisions.
- No power to delay intentionally.
On Role During Emergencies
- Even in constitutional crisis, Governor has no independent power; must follow State cabinet advice.
Ambedkar’s sharp summary
- Governor’s role is “limited, nominal, ornamental”.
- “No one would contest elections if Governors were elected, because the role is minimal.”
Original Intent vs Present Scenario
Present-day issues
- Delaying assent to Bills for months/years.
- Withholding Bills without reasons.
- Engaging in political messaging.
- Interference in university appointments.
- Use of Article 356 reports in partisan ways.
- Using discretionary powers beyond text.
These contradict Ambedkar’s design of a non-partisan constitutional Governor.
Supreme Court’s recent Interventions (2023-24)
SC judgment on Governor’s role (Punjab, Kerala, Tamil Nadu cases)
- SC held:
- Governor cannot delay assent indefinitely.
- Must give reasons for withholding.
- “As soon as possible” cannot mean “as late as possible”.
- Governors cannot act as political actors.
16th Presidential Reference – Constitution Bench advisory
- Sought clarification on:
- Whether Governors/Presidents can withhold assent without reasons.
- Meaning of “as soon as possible”.
- SC indicated constitutional function must be time-bound, not manipulated.
Critical Analysis
Constitutional Morality vs. Political Practice
- The framers imagined neutral arbiters, not political appointees.
- Misuse occurs due to appointment mechanism (executive discretion, no tenure security).
- Centre–State friction escalates in bipolar politics.
Judicial role
- Courts have often corrected extreme abuses (Nabam Rebia; Kejriwal case; TN Bill-delay case).
- Yet, lack of clear timelines creates ambiguity.
- Judicial reluctance to “read in” timelines causes executive misuse.
Recommendations of Major Committees
- Punchhi Commission (2010):
- Fixed tenure.
- No parallel political activity.
- Time-bound assent decisions.
- Sarkaria Commission (1988):
- Governor should be eminent, non-partisan, apolitical, not connected with ruling party.
Conclusion
- The framers designed the Governor as a non-interfering constitutional head, not a parallel power centre or political actor.
- Current patterns of delayed assent and expanded discretion reflect individual and systemic failures, not constitutional design.
- Clear judicial timelines, transparent reasoning, and adherence to constitutional morality are essential to restore federal balance and Ambedkar’s original vision.
India’s disaster response: a slippery slope for federalism
Why is in News?
- Wayanad landslides (July 2024) caused ~300 deaths and losses of ₹2,200 crore.
- The Centre released only ₹260 crore (~11%), triggering a federalism debate.
- Reflects a widening asymmetry between assessed State needs and Union disbursements under India’s disaster-financing architecture.
- Raises concerns of India drifting from cooperative federalism to conditional & centralised fiscal control in disaster response.
Relevance:
GS 3 – Disaster Management
- Disaster Management Act 2005: institutional and financial architecture.
- SDRF and NDRF: structure, limitations, funding ratios.
- Classification of “severe disaster,” outdated relief norms, procedural delays.
- Climate-change induced extreme events → fiscal stress on States.
- Best practices from FEMA, FONDEN, parametric insurance models.
GS 2 – Federalism
- Centre–State fiscal relations in disaster response.
- Vertical & horizontal fiscal imbalances.
- Cooperative vs conditional federalism: erosion of trust, discretionary approvals.
- Finance Commission allocations: need for vulnerability-based formula.
Practice Question
- “India’s current disaster financing structure reflects a shift from cooperative to conditional federalism.” Discuss with reference to recent events.(250 Words)
India’s Disaster Financing Structure
Constitutional & Legal Basis
- Disaster management under Entry 23, Concurrent List → shared responsibility.
- Disaster Management Act, 2005 provides statutory basis.
- Institutional architecture:
- NDMA at the national level
- SDMAs at State level
Funding Architecture
A. State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF)
- First-line funding for immediate relief: food, medicine, shelter, compensation.
- Financing pattern:
- 75:25 → General States
- 90:10 → Himalayan & NE States
- Cannot be used for reconstruction or long-term recovery.
B. National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF)
- 100% Union-funded.
- Used only when a disaster is classified as “severe”.
The Drift:The System is becoming more centralised
Outdated Relief Norms
- Compensation ceilings unchanged for ~10 years.
- ₹4 lakh for death.
- ₹1.2 lakh for fully damaged house.
- Do not reflect inflation, reconstruction costs.
Ambiguity in Classification of “Severe”
- Act does not define a severe disaster.
- Allows discretion, making NDRF access inconsistent across States.
Aid Releases Are Procedural, Not Automatic
- Multi-layered process:
- State memorandum → Central Team assessment → High Level Committee approval.
- Leads to delays, problematic during climate-driven extreme events.
Finance Commission Criteria are Technically Weak
- Allocations based on:
- Population
- Geographical area
- Poverty as proxy for vulnerability
- Ignores:
- Actual hazard exposure
- Climate-risk indicators
- Satellite-based vulnerability metrics
- Results in underfunding of high-risk States.
The Wayanad case : Kerala 2024
- Loss: ₹2,200 crore
- Centre approved: ₹260 crore
- Cited:
- Kerala’s unspent SDRF balance of ₹780 crore
- ₹529 crore interest-free loan under Capital Investment Scheme
- But:
- SDRF balances reflect committed works, not idle money.
- SDRF norms restrict use → States must maintain liquidity.
Delay in Classification
- Wayanad landslides not immediately declared “severe”.
- Limited Kerala’s NDRF access.
Comparable Cases
- Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Assam received larger packages for similar disasters.
- Earlier mismatches:
- Tamil Nadu (Cyclone Gaja, 2018)
- Karnataka (2019 floods)
Pattern
- Losses increasing vs. aid stagnating → widening fiscal stress.
- Disaster relief turning into negotiation rather than solidarity.
Global Best Practices
United States (FEMA)
- Federal aid triggered by per capita loss thresholds.
Mexico (FONDEN)
- Automated releases when rainfall/wind thresholds exceeded.
Philippines
- Quick-response funds triggered by rainfall + fatality indices.
African/Caribbean Risk Pools (ARC/CCRIF)
- Parametric insurance: uses satellite data → payouts within days.
Australia
- Federal assistance linked to State spending as proportion of revenue.
Common Thread
- Objective, transparent, rule-based triggers → reduce delays, eliminate discretion.
Federalism Implications
1. Horizontal Inequality
- High-risk States are underfunded relative to exposure.
2. Vertical Fiscal Imbalance Worsening
- States bear disproportionate burden despite climate-driven risk increasing.
3. Cooperative Federalism → Conditional Federalism
- Disaster relief becoming contingent on:
- State’s fiscal behaviour
- Unspent balances
- Central interpretations
- Weakens State autonomy & constitutional balance.
What India needs
Update Relief Norms
- Reflect current reconstruction costs, inflation, climate realities.
Define “Severe Disaster”
- Use objective criteria:
- Rainfall Intensity Index
- Fatalities per million
- Loss-to-GSDP threshold
- Satellite-based hazard exposure
Automatic Triggers for NDRF
- Shift from procedural approvals to rules-based releases.
Reform Finance Commission Formula
- Build a scientific vulnerability index using:
- IMD hazard maps
- NDMA risk data
- IPCC climate vulnerability indicators
- Socio-economic fragility metrics
Ensure Aid is Grant-Based, Not Loan-Based
- Avoid debt-financing of recovery.
Enhance State Control Over Funds
- Union oversight should be post-audit, not pre-approval.
