Editorials/Opinions Analysis For UPSC 20 February 2026

  1. Tehran reenters the global geopolitical spotlight
  2. Privacy, transparency


Source : The Hindu

  • In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed between Iran and the P5+1 (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China + Germany) to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief.
  • In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, reinstating sanctions and triggering renewed tensions in West Asia’s strategic landscape.
  • In 2025–26, following U.S.–Israel strikes on Iranian nuclear and air defence sites, Washington simultaneously escalates military deployment while reopening diplomatic talks via Oman mediation.
  • The evolving crisis carries implications for global oil markets, Gulf security architecture, and India’s energy and connectivity interests, particularly Chabahar Port and Central Asian access.

Relevance

  • GS 2 (International Relations / Global Governance):
    JCPOA breakdown, NPT regime stress, U.S.–Iran diplomacy, Israel security doctrine, India’s strategic autonomy, Chabahar & INSTC connectivity.
  • GS 3 (Economy / Security / Energy):
    Oil price volatility (Hormuz ~20% global oil trade), India’s 85% crude import dependence, nuclear proliferation risks, Gulf security architecture.
  • JCPOA (2015) capped Iran’s uranium enrichment at 3.67%, limited centrifuges to 5,060 IR-1 machines, and reduced enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg for 15 years.
  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified Iranian compliance until U.S. withdrawal in 2018; sanctions reimposed under “maximum pressure campaign”.
  • Iran has since reportedly enriched uranium up to 60% purity, close to weapons-grade threshold of 90%, significantly reducing “breakout time”.
  • West Asia accounts for ~30% of global oil supply; Hormuz Strait handles ~20% of global oil trade, making escalation a global economic risk.
1. Geopolitical / Security Dimension
  • U.S.–Israel strikes reflect doctrine of preventive deterrence, aiming to degrade Iran’s nuclear and air defence capacity before weaponisation threshold is crossed.
  • Israel views nuclear-capable Iran as existential threat; Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu consistently opposed JCPOA, advocating hardline containment.
  • Gulf Arab states, despite rivalry with Iran, oppose escalation due to vulnerability of U.S. bases and energy infrastructure within missile reach.
  • Russian and Chinese positions complex: strategic partners of Iran but wary of destabilised oil markets or nuclear proliferation in West Asia.
2. Legal / Nuclear Governance Dimension
  • Iran remains signatory to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but has reduced compliance with Additional Protocol inspections post-2018 sanctions.
  • JCPOA was political agreement, not ratified treaty under U.S. Senate, making withdrawal legally easier yet diplomatically destabilising.
  • Collapse of JCPOA weakens global non-proliferation regime credibility, especially after North Korea precedent.
3. Economic Dimension
  • Post-2018 sanctions reduced Iran’s oil exports from ~2.5 million barrels/day (2017) to below 500,000 barrels/day (2020 peak sanctions).
  • Oil price volatility directly impacts India, which imports ~85% of crude oil requirements; price spikes widen Current Account Deficit.
  • Gulf states have pledged hundreds of billions in U.S. investments, increasing their leverage in de-escalation diplomacy.
4. Domestic Iranian Political Dimension
  • Internal protests (2022–24) exposed socio-economic stress under sanctions; inflation reportedly exceeded 40%, eroding domestic legitimacy.
  • Moderates” weakened; conservative-nationalist consolidation occurred post-U.S. strikes, strengthening hardline narrative against Western pressure.
  • Domestic power balance between Supreme Leader establishment and elected institutions influences negotiation flexibility.
1. Energy Security
  • Iran was once among India’s top two oil suppliers, providing over 10% of crude imports pre-2018; sanctions forced diversification toward U.S. and Gulf sources.
  • Resumption of sanctions relief could stabilise oil prices and diversify India’s supply basket, reducing overdependence on few Gulf producers.
2. Connectivity & Chabahar
  • Chabahar Port is India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan; sanctions uncertainty complicates long-term investment viability.
  • INSTC (International North–South Transport Corridor) relies on Iranian transit; instability delays multimodal connectivity integration.
3. Strategic Balancing
  • Iran’s fractious ties with Pakistan and pragmatic engagement with Taliban create geopolitical leverage points relevant to India’s regional calculus.
  • India must balance relations with U.S., Israel, Gulf monarchies and Iran simultaneously, maintaining strategic autonomy doctrine.
  • U.S. credibility weakened by unilateral JCPOA exit; future agreements may lack durability without bipartisan backing or treaty ratification.
  • Military strikes risk pushing Iran toward overt weaponisation rather than compliance, shortening breakout time further.
  • Gulf anxiety stems less from Iranian intent than unpredictability of U.S. policy oscillation between coercion and diplomacy.
  • Multipolar global disorder reduces effectiveness of coordinated sanctions compared to 2015 multilateral consensus.
  • Revive JCPOA 2.0 with stronger verification, phased sanctions relief, and sunset clause modifications to ensure long-term compliance credibility.
  • Institutionalise mediation via Oman and EU channels, reducing unilateral decision-making volatility.
  • India should pursue calibrated engagement: protect Chabahar investments, maintain energy diversification, and leverage diplomatic neutrality.
  • Strengthen global non-proliferation regime through reaffirmed NPT commitments and enhanced IAEA inspection access.
Prelims Pointers
  • JCPOA signed: 2015; U.S. withdrawal: 2018.
  • Uranium enrichment: 3.67% limit (JCPOA); 90% = weapons-grade.
  • Hormuz Strait: ~20% global oil trade passes through.
  • Iran oil exports pre-sanctions: ~2.5 mbpd.
Practice Question (15 Marks)
  • “The collapse and potential revival of the JCPOA reflects the fragility of global non-proliferation architecture in a multipolar world.”
    Examine implications for West Asian stability and India’s strategic interests.


  • In 2026, the Supreme Court of India referred challenges to amendment of Section 8(1)(j), RTI Act, 2005, via Section 44(3), DPDP Act, 2023, to a Constitution Bench, citing “constitutional sensitivity”.
  • Original RTI Section 8(1)(j) allowed denial of personal information only when unrelated to public interest or causing unwarranted privacy invasion, subject to “public interest override”.
  • The DPDP amendment removes this override, creating a blanket prohibition on disclosure of personal information, potentially restricting access to procurement, audit and public expenditure data.
  • Raises core question: Can privacy protection override transparency to the extent of reversing two decades of RTI-led democratic accountability?

Relevance

  • GS 2 (Polity / Governance / Judiciary):
    Article 19(1)(a) vs Article 21 balancing, RTI Section 8(1)(j) amendment, DPDP Act 2023, proportionality doctrine, constitutional bench review.
  • GS 3 (Governance / Digital Economy):
    Impact on transparency ecosystem (60 lakh+ RTIs annually), compliance penalties (250 crore), media accountability, digital governance framework.
  • Right to Information Act, 2005 operationalises Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) through statutory right to information.
  • Over 60 lakh RTI applications annually (DoPT data), making India one of the world’s largest transparency regimes.
  • Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 establishes data fiduciary framework; penalties up to ₹250 crore for significant non-compliance.
  • In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (2017), Supreme Court declared privacy a fundamental right under Article 21, requiring proportional balancing with other rights.
  • In CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019), Court held personal information can be disclosed if larger public interest outweighs privacy concerns.
1. Constitutional Dimension
  • RTI derives from Article 19(1)(a); privacy from Article 21 — amendment triggers horizontal balancing of fundamental rights.
  • Removal of public interest override may violate proportionality doctrine, which requires restriction to be necessary, least restrictive and balanced.
  • Blanket ban risks undermining constitutional morality of transparency, integral to democratic accountability.
  • Constitution Bench likely to clarify definition of “personal information” to prevent overbroad executive interpretation.
2. Governance / Administrative Dimension
  • RTI significantly reduced state–citizen information asymmetry, enabling exposure of irregularities in welfare schemes, procurement and recruitment processes.
  • Amendment may allow rejection of RTI queries concerning official assets, disciplinary proceedings, audit reports, weakening administrative scrutiny.
  • Creates paradox: Section 7 DPDP permits state processing of personal data without consent, yet citizens face stricter barriers seeking similar data.
  • Could reverse gains in transparency rankings and citizen trust accumulated over 20 years of RTI implementation.
3. Media & Democratic Accountability
  • Investigative journalists may be treated as “data fiduciaries”, exposing them to penalties up to ₹250 crore, creating potential chilling effect on free press.
  • Absence of explicit journalistic exemption contrasts with General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which balances privacy with press freedom.
  • Fear of compliance penalties may discourage investigative reporting on corruption, defence procurement or public spending.
  • Undermines watchdog role of media under Article 19(1)(a) and constitutional democracy framework.
4. Social / Ethical Dimension
  • RTI empowered marginalised citizens to access ration records, MGNREGA muster rolls and pension lists, enhancing distributive justice.
  • Blanket privacy shield may disproportionately affect poor and rural citizens, who rely on RTI for grievance redressal.
  • Ethical governance requires symmetry: if state monitors citizens via data systems, citizens must retain oversight over public authorities.
  • Risks shifting equilibrium toward surveillance state model rather than participatory democracy.
5. Comparative / Global Perspective
  • GDPR recognises “legitimate interest and public interest exemptions”, ensuring privacy does not override transparency entirely.
  • Mature democracies maintain calibrated disclosure standards, not absolute prohibitions, preserving accountability while protecting sensitive personal data.
  • India’s move may signal regression from global best practices in balancing privacy and openness.
  • Amendment appears overbroad and disproportionate, failing to distinguish between sensitive private data and information related to public duties.
  • Risk of executive misuse by classifying routine governance data as “personal information” to avoid scrutiny.
  • Weakens RTI’s deterrent effect against corruption; empirical studies show RTI exposure reduced leakages in welfare schemes.
  • However, legitimate privacy concerns exist in digital era; mass disclosure without safeguards may violate dignity and data protection principles.
  • Restore public interest override with clear statutory definition aligned with proportionality test.
  • Introduce graded disclosure framework distinguishing personal data unrelated to public duty from information tied to official functions.
  • Provide explicit journalistic exemption clause, harmonising DPDP with constitutional free speech guarantees.
  • Establish independent Data Protection Board oversight guidelines ensuring RTI transparency is not undermined by executive discretion.
  • Codify balancing principles from CPIO (2019) judgment into statutory text to prevent ambiguity.
Prelims Pointers
  • RTI Act, 2005 – Section 8(1)(j) – public interest override originally present.
  • DPDP Act, 2023 – penalties up to ₹250 crore.
  • Privacy recognised as fundamental right in Puttaswamy (2017).
  • CPIO (2019) affirmed disclosure if larger public interest exists.
Practice Question (15 Marks)
  • “The right to privacy and the right to information are not antagonistic but complementary in a constitutional democracy.”
    Discuss in the context of the amendment to Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act through the DPDP Act, 2023.

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