India–China Relations | GS Paper II

India–China Relations | GS Paper II | Legacy IAS
GS Paper II • International Relations

India–China Relations

Cooperation, Competition, Conflict & the Way Forward
Comprehensive Mains-Ready Module • Updated Till 2025
PYQ Heat Map • Answer Frameworks • Prelims MCQs • FAQs

1. Executive Summary

India–China relations represent one of the most consequential bilateral relationships of the 21st century. As two nuclear-armed civilisational states with 3,488 km of contested border, their equation shapes not just Asian but global geopolitics. The relationship oscillates between managed competition and periodic crises, underpinned by a growing trade relationship coexisting with deep strategic mistrust.

Five Key Takeaways

  • The unresolved LAC dispute remains the single biggest irritant; post-2020 border dynamics have created a ‘new normal’ of enhanced military deployments on both sides.
  • Trade deficit exceeding $85 billion (2023–24) reflects structural asymmetry in manufacturing competitiveness, making economic decoupling a live policy question.
  • China–Pakistan nexus, especially CPEC through PoK, creates a two-front strategic challenge and raises sovereignty concerns for India.
  • Indo-Pacific strategy, Quad, and maritime domain awareness have emerged as India’s key counterbalancing tools against China’s expanding Indian Ocean presence.
  • Despite rivalry, cooperation continues through BRICS, SCO, climate negotiations, and shared Global South concerns—reflecting the dual character of the relationship.

UPSC Keywords

  • LAC • CBMs • BRI/CPEC • Quad • Indo-Pacific • Trade Deficit • Strategic Autonomy
  • UNCLOS • Neighbourhood First • String of Pearls • SAGAR • Panchsheel • Salami Slicing
  • De-escalation • Disengagement • Multi-alignment • Debt Diplomacy • Critical Minerals

2. Historical Evolution of India–China Relations (1950–Today)

The trajectory of India–China relations can be mapped across distinct phases—from early bonhomie through conflict to the current era of complex engagement. On 1 April 1950, India became the first non-socialist bloc country to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

Timeline of Key Milestones

Year/PeriodEventSignificance
1950India recognises PRCFirst non-communist country to do so; Nehru’s Asia solidarity vision
1954Panchsheel Agreement signedFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ era
1959Dalai Lama seeks refuge in IndiaFirst serious diplomatic strain; Tibet becomes a permanent irritant
1962Sino-Indian Border WarMilitary defeat for India; destroyed trust; reshaped India’s defence posture
1976Ambassadors restoredGradual normalisation after Cultural Revolution period
1988PM Rajiv Gandhi visits ChinaFirst PM visit in 34 years; began a reset in bilateral engagement
1993Peace & Tranquillity Agreement (PM Rao)First CBM on LAC; framework for border management
1996Agreement on CBMs in Military FieldStrengthened confidence-building along LAC
2003Special Representatives (SR) MechanismAppointed SRs for boundary question; 22+ rounds completed
2005Agreement on Political ParametersFramework for eventual boundary settlement
2017Doklam Standoff (73 days)India’s strategic resistance at Bhutan tri-junction; resolved diplomatically
2018Wuhan Informal SummitReset after Doklam; leader-level ‘strategic communication’ channel
2019Mamallapuram Informal SummitContinued momentum; agreed on trade facilitation
2020Galwan Valley ClashFirst fatal military clash in 45 years; 20 Indian soldiers martyred; watershed moment
2020–23Phased disengagementPartial pullback at Pangong Tso, Gogra-Hot Springs; trust severely eroded
2024–25Border agreement; diplomatic resetRestoration of patrolling; cautious re-engagement underway

How History Shapes Present Mistrust

  • The 1962 war created a generational trust deficit that continues to colour Indian strategic thinking and public opinion.
  • China’s consistent refusal to clarify LAC perceptions perpetuates ambiguity that enables salami-slicing tactics.
  • Despite multiple agreements and summits, the gap between diplomatic assurances and ground realities has widened—especially post-2020.

3. Structural Drivers of the Relationship

Even in the absence of immediate border crises, the India–China relationship is structurally prone to tension. Several deep-rooted factors ensure that competition remains the default mode of interaction.

Mindmap: Structural Drivers

                         INDIA–CHINA: STRUCTURAL DRIVERS
                                     │
          ┌─────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────┐
          │             │             │             │             │
     GEOGRAPHY     POWER         NATIONALISM   ECONOMY      EXTERNAL
     • Himalayas   ASYMMETRY     • Domestic    • Trade       ACTORS
     • Maritime    • GDP gap      pressure     deficit     • US-China
       chokepoints • Military    • Historical  • Supply       rivalry
     • Shared      • Tech gap     memory       chain       • Pak factor
       rivers                   • Status       dependence  • Russia
                                  competition              • Japan/Quad
  • Geography: The Himalayas create a contested 3,488 km frontier. India’s Andaman & Nicobar Islands sit astride the Malacca Strait—China’s most critical energy chokepoint. Shared rivers (Brahmaputra) add a hydro-political dimension.
  • Asymmetry & Ambition: China’s GDP is roughly five times India’s; its defence budget roughly four times larger. Both aspire to great-power status, creating inevitable friction over influence in Asia and global institutions.
  • Nationalism & Domestic Politics: The 1962 war legacy shapes Indian public opinion; Chinese ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy and narratives around territorial integrity (Tibet, Arunachal) fuel mutual suspicion.
  • Economic Interdependence with Strategic Mistrust: Despite bilateral trade exceeding $136 billion, Indian concerns about Chinese dumping, data security, and critical supply-chain dependence coexist with economic engagement.

4. Key Flashpoints / Areas of Conflict

4(a) Tibet & Dalai Lama

Tibet remains China’s most sensitive ‘core interest’ in the bilateral context. The Dalai Lama’s presence in India since 1959 and the functioning of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in Dharamsala have been a permanent diplomatic irritant for Beijing.

  • China’s position: Tibet is a non-negotiable internal matter; any interaction with the Dalai Lama is viewed as interference in sovereignty.
  • India’s position: India extended humanitarian refuge; does not use Tibet as a ‘card’ but has not formally endorsed China’s ‘One China’ policy in a comprehensive joint statement.
  • UPSC angle: Tibet connects to border legitimacy (McMahon Line), cultural identity, and how rising powers manage sovereignty sensitivities.

4(b) Border Dispute: Aksai Chin & Arunachal Pradesh

The India–China border dispute has two principal theatres. The western sector involves Aksai Chin (~38,000 sq km), controlled by China but claimed by India. The eastern sector involves Arunachal Pradesh (~90,000 sq km), administered by India but claimed by China as ‘South Tibet.’

IssueChina’s ConcernIndia’s ConcernCurrent StatusUPSC Angle
Aksai ChinStrategic road (G219) linking Tibet to XinjiangSovereignty over territory in LadakhControlled by China since 1950sCPEC/PoK link; infra race
Arunachal Pradesh‘South Tibet’ claim; Tawang’s Buddhist significanceIntegral part of India; McMahon Line validityAdministered by India; China issues stapled visasAct East connectivity; identity politics
LAC AmbiguityPrefers status quo; avoids map exchangeWants LAC clarification via map exchangeNo agreed LAC; different perceptions at 20+ pointsCBMs vs code of conduct debate
Infrastructure RaceRapid development in Tibet (rail, roads, airbases)BRO acceleration; Atal Tunnel; DSDBO roadBoth sides building rapidly near LACMilitary logistics; escalation risk

Why LAC Ambiguity Matters

Unlike the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the LAC has never been formally delineated on a map accepted by both sides. This creates ‘grey zones’ where patrol routes overlap, leading to face-offs, infrastructure contestation, and the possibility of escalation from tactical incidents to strategic crises.

5. Border Management Architecture

India and China have built a layered framework of agreements and CBMs to manage the unsettled border. However, the architecture has shown significant limitations when tested by large-scale transgressions.

Key Agreements & CBMs

YearAgreement/MechanismKey Provision
1993Peace and Tranquillity AgreementNeither side to use/threaten force; maintain status quo
1996CBMs in Military Field along LACLimits on exercises, weapons, aircraft near LAC; flag meetings
2003Special Representatives MechanismPolitical-level boundary negotiations; strategic dialogue
2005Political Parameters & Guiding PrinciplesFramework principles for eventual boundary settlement
2012WMCC (Working Mechanism for Consultation)Diplomatic hotline; regular meetings for border incidents
2013Border Defence Cooperation AgreementNo tailing of patrols; flag meetings within 48 hours

Flowchart: Border Management Logic

Agreement Framework → CBMs/Hotlines → Patrol Protocols → Friction Points Emerge
     ↓                                                          ↓
Trust Building                                          Escalation Risk
     ↓                                                          ↓
Disengagement/De-escalation ←←←←←←← Crisis Management ←←←←←←←┘

Why Mechanisms Fail

  • Trust deficit: Post-2020 events showed agreements do not prevent transgressions when one side alters status quo.
  • Verification gap: No joint patrolling maps; CBMs rely on goodwill rather than enforcement.
  • New tactics: Civilian militia, rapid infrastructure, dual-use villages challenge existing protocols.
  • Infrastructure asymmetry: China’s superior logistics in Tibet enabled faster mobilisation.

6. Contemporary Border Situation & Lessons (Till 2025)

The Galwan Valley clash of June 2020 marked a watershed in India–China border dynamics. It was the first fatal military confrontation in 45 years, resulting in 20 Indian soldiers being martyred. This fundamentally altered the security calculus on both sides.

Post-2020 ‘New Normal’

  • Phased Disengagement: Pullback achieved at Pangong Tso (North & South banks), Gogra-Hot Springs, and other friction points through Corps Commander-level talks.
  • Buffer Zones: Disengagement created buffer zones where neither side patrols—effectively shrinking India’s patrolling territory in some areas.
  • Militarisation: Both sides maintain forward-deployed forces at much higher levels than pre-2020; de-escalation lags behind disengagement.
  • 2024–25 Developments: Border agreement restoring patrolling at some points; cautious diplomatic re-engagement; trust remains fragile.

UPSC Value Addition: Conclusion for Border Questions

  • Acknowledge complexity—purely military or diplomatic solutions are insufficient.
  • Stress comprehensive approach: surveillance + logistics + diplomacy + crisis protocols.
  • Mention India’s infrastructure acceleration (Atal Tunnel, DSDBO road, ALGs) as long-term deterrence.
  • Conclude: ‘Peace through strength, engagement through clarity, deterrence without escalation.’

7. China–Pakistan Axis & Implications for India

The China–Pakistan relationship, described as ‘all-weather’ and ‘iron brotherhood,’ is central to India’s strategic calculus. CPEC, passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, directly challenges India’s sovereignty claims.

DimensionWhat China GainsWhat Pakistan GainsIndia’s ChallengeIndia’s Response
StrategicAccess to Arabian Sea; encirclement of IndiaNuclear/missile tech; UNSC veto shieldTwo-front pressure; PoK sovereigntyQuad; defence modernisation
EconomicCPEC corridor ($62 bn+); energy routeInfrastructure; employment; energyLegitimisation of PoK occupationChabahar, INSTC, IMEC
MilitaryNaval base potential (Gwadar); arms salesAdvanced weapons (JF-17, frigates)Force posture on two frontsMountain Strike Corps; theatre commands
DiplomaticPakistan as vote bank (OIC, UNGA)Backing on Kashmir at UNSCBlocking UNSC/NSG bidsMulti-alignment; Gulf/ASEAN ties
LimitsPakistan instability; BLA attacks; debtChinese conditionality; debt trapExploit contradictions prudently

8. Indian Ocean & Maritime Competition

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has emerged as a primary theatre of India–China strategic competition. China’s expanding naval footprint—through port access, logistics facilities, and dual-use infrastructure—directly challenges India’s traditional maritime primacy.

String of Pearls: China’s IOR Footprint

  CHINA's IOR STRATEGY (Selected Facilities)
  ────────────────────────────────────────────
  • Gwadar (Pakistan)      → Port + potential naval base
  • Hambantota (Sri Lanka)  → 99-year lease; dual-use concerns
  • Chittagong (Bangladesh) → Port modernisation; submarine sales
  • Kyaukpyu (Myanmar)      → Deep-sea port + oil/gas pipeline
  • Djibouti (Horn of Africa) → China's first overseas military base
  • Maldives, Seychelles    → Periodic engagement; monitoring stations

India’s Response: SAGAR & Beyond

  • SAGAR: PM Modi’s 2015 doctrine for cooperative maritime security in the IOR.
  • Andaman & Nicobar: Tri-service command upgrade; forward base near Malacca Strait.
  • Maritime Domain Awareness: IFC-IOR in Gurugram; coastal radar network.
  • Partnerships: Quad maritime exercises; agreements with France, US (LEMOA, BECA), Japan (ACSA), Australia (MLSA).

9. Water & Environmental Security

The Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) is the primary flashpoint. China’s dam-building on the upper Brahmaputra, combined with sporadic data-sharing and climate change impacts on Himalayan glaciers, has created a multi-dimensional security challenge.

Risk Matrix

IssueRisk LevelKey ConcernPossible CBM
Dam construction on BrahmaputraHIGHFlow diversion; downstream impact on NE India, BangladeshInstitutionalised data-sharing; joint monitoring
Hydrological data sharingMEDIUMSuspended during tensions; critical for flood warningYear-round automated exchange; third-party verification
Himalayan glacier meltHIGHGlacial retreat; GLOFs (glacial lake outburst floods)Joint scientific research; early warning systems
Water as strategic leverageMEDIUMPotential weaponisation during crisesWater-sharing treaty (Indus Waters model)

10. Trade & Economic Relations

Bilateral trade crossed $136 billion in FY 2023–24. However, India’s trade deficit with China—exceeding $85 billion—is its largest with any single country, reflecting deep structural asymmetries.

Trade Deficit: Causes and Responses

Deficit DriverWhy It PersistsIndia’s Response
Manufacturing gapChina’s scale, subsidies, ecosystem in electronics, machineryPLI schemes; Make in India 2.0; semiconductor mission
Raw materials vs finished goodsIndia exports iron ore, cotton; imports high-value electronicsValue addition push; export diversification
Market access barriersNon-tariff barriers; limited access for Indian IT, pharmaWTO disputes; bilateral negotiations
Supply chain dependence70% APIs; critical electronics from ChinaAPI parks; electronics clusters; China+1
Currency dynamicsRenminbi management; rupee depreciationLocal currency trade; rupee internationalisation

Flowchart: From Dependence to Resilience

Dependence on Chinese imports → Vulnerability (supply disruptions, price shocks)
         ↓
  Policy Response: PLI + API parks + semiconductor mission + China+1
         ↓
  Diversification (Vietnam, Taiwan, domestic) → Medium-term resilience
         ↓
  Long-term goal: Strategic autonomy in critical sectors

11. Technology & Security

Technology has emerged as a new frontier in India–China competition, ranging from telecom infrastructure to data sovereignty, critical minerals, and digital standards.

  • Telecom & Data Security: India banned 300+ Chinese apps post-2020; restricted Chinese participation in 5G trials; concerns over data routing.
  • Critical Minerals: China controls 60–70% of global rare earth processing. India’s KABIL seeks diversification through Australia, Argentina, Chile partnerships.
  • Manufacturing Ecosystem: Chinese dominance in solar panels, Li-ion batteries, electronics creates vulnerability. PLI and semiconductor policies aim to build alternatives.
  • Cyber Security: Both sides engage in cyber reconnaissance; India’s National Cyber Security Strategy seeks resilience.

12. South China Sea & India’s Position

The SCS dispute involves China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. Nearly 55% of India’s trade with the Asia-Pacific transits through the SCS.

  • UNCLOS & International Law: India supports freedom of navigation as per UNCLOS; backed the 2016 PCA ruling rejecting China’s nine-dash line claims.
  • India–Vietnam Cooperation: ONGC Videsh has oil exploration blocks in Vietnam’s EEZ; India provides defence training and equipment.
  • Strategic Significance: SCS connects to Act East Policy, Quad engagement, and Indo-Pacific vision.

UPSC-Ready Stance on SCS

  • India supports freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution under UNCLOS, and ASEAN centrality. India does not take sides on sovereignty claims but upholds the rules-based maritime order. India has legitimate commercial interests (oil exploration with Vietnam) and strategic interests (trade route security) in the SCS.

13. OBOR/BRI & India’s Response

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013, is China’s signature foreign policy project—comprising the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Over 140 countries have signed cooperation agreements.

BRI: Promise vs Risks

BRI PromiseBRI Risk
Infrastructure for connectivity-starved regionsDebt trap—Hambantota, Zambia, Laos examples
Trade facilitation across EurasiaLack of transparency; no competitive bidding
Energy corridor diversificationEnvironmental concerns; community displacement
Financial architecture (AIIB, Silk Road Fund)Dual-use military implications of ports
South-South cooperation narrativeSovereignty erosion through CPEC (PoK)

India’s Core Objection & Alternatives

  • Sovereignty: CPEC through PoK—India’s non-negotiable objection.
  • Transparency: Concerns about opaque processes in BRI projects.
  • India’s Alternatives: Chabahar Port; INSTC; IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe); AAGC (with Japan); Kaladan, MVA corridors.

14. Multilateral & Regional Platforms

PlatformCooperationCompetition
BRICSNDB lending; IMF/WB reform; BRICS+ expansionChina’s dominance in agenda-setting
SCOCounter-terrorism; connectivity; energyPakistan’s membership; China-Russia alignment
AIIBIndia is 2nd-largest shareholderChinese leadership; project priorities
G20Global South voice; climate financeUNSC reform; trade rules
UNGA/UNSCClimate, development alignmentChina blocks India’s UNSC/NSG bids

15. Areas of Cooperation

  • Climate Negotiations: Both advocate CBDR; joint resistance to premature net-zero for developing nations; BASIC group cooperation.
  • Global South Issues: Shared positions on tech transfer, IPR flexibility, vaccine equity, financial institution reform.
  • Trade: Bilateral trade exceeds $136 billion; complementarities in manufacturing-services.
  • People-to-People: 23,000+ Indian students pre-COVID; Buddhist heritage tourism; Yoga promotion in China.

16. Competition Zones

  • Neighbourhood: Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Maldives—China’s investment and influence have grown across India’s traditional sphere.
  • Africa: Both compete for resources, markets, and diplomatic support. India leverages diaspora and ITEC; China uses infrastructure investment.
  • Global Institutions: UNSC reform, NSG membership, norm-setting in cyber/space/AI—frequently on opposing sides.

17. Role of External Powers

  • United States: US-China rivalry is the defining geopolitical contest. India benefits from tech partnerships, Quad, and defence deals but maintains ‘multi-alignment.’
  • Russia: Close to both. Russia-China ‘no limits’ partnership complicates India’s balancing; defence/energy dependence is a tightrope.
  • Japan: India’s most natural partner. 2+2 dialogue, bullet train, supply chain initiative, Quad alignment.
  • ASEAN: ASEAN centrality in Indo-Pacific; Act East partners seek diversification through India.
  • Multi-Alignment: India avoids rigid blocs, engaging with both Quad and SCO/BRICS simultaneously.

18. Possible Future Scenarios

Scenario 1: Managed Competition (Most Likely)

  • Triggers: Continued LAC stability; diplomatic engagement; economic pragmatism.
  • Indicators: Regular SR/FM-level talks; partial trade normalisation; issue-based cooperation.
  • India’s Best Response: Maintain military deterrence + selective engagement; build alternative supply chains; deepen Quad without antagonising.

Scenario 2: Border Stabilisation + Economic Re-engagement

  • Triggers: Comprehensive disengagement + de-escalation; leadership-level political will.
  • Indicators: Full restoration of pre-2020 patrolling; cultural exchange resumption.
  • India’s Best Response: Negotiate from strength; secure border protocols before economic concessions.

Scenario 3: Crisis Escalation (Low Probability, High Impact)

  • Triggers: LAC incident escalating beyond control; Taiwan crisis spillover; nationalist pressure.
  • Indicators: Military buildup beyond current levels; diplomatic channel breakdown.
  • India’s Best Response: Crisis communication protocols; coalition-building; rapid mobilisation capacity.

19. Way Forward: A Balanced India Strategy

India’s approach to China must be comprehensive, calibrated, and rooted in national interest rather than emotion.

7-Point Way Forward Framework

  • 1. BORDER: Maintain credible deterrence; accelerate infrastructure; establish crisis protocols; insist on LAC clarification.
  • 2. ECONOMY: Reduce critical dependence through PLI, domestic manufacturing, and diversification; pursue targeted engagement where beneficial.
  • 3. DIPLOMACY: Institutionalise leader-level dialogue; rebuild CBMs; maintain red lines on sovereignty (PoK/CPEC).
  • 4. REGIONAL: Strengthen Neighbourhood First; offer credible alternatives to BRI; invest in BIMSTEC, IOR connectivity.
  • 5. MARITIME: Build naval capability; expand Quad cooperation; enhance IOR surveillance; leverage Andaman & Nicobar.
  • 6. TECHNOLOGY: Invest in indigenous AI, semiconductors, cyber; diversify critical minerals; strengthen data sovereignty.
  • 7. NARRATIVE: Avoid complacency and alarmism; project India as responsible stakeholder; build coalitions on rules-based order.

20. UPSC PYQs on India–China Relations

A. Mains PYQs (from GS Paper II PYQ Analysis)

The following questions are drawn from the attached GS2 PYQ Analysis document. Questions directly or substantially related to India–China relations:

YearQuestion (Summary)Theme
2013What do you understand by ‘The String of Pearls’? How does it impact India? Briefly outline steps taken by India to counter this.Indian Ocean / Maritime
2014With respect to the South China Sea, maritime territorial disputes and rising tension affirm the need for safeguarding maritime security. Discuss bilateral issues between India and China.SCS / Maritime Security
2017‘China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia.’ Discuss its impact on India.Trade / Security Nexus
2019‘The long sustained image of India as a leader of the oppressed nations has disappeared on account of its new found role in the emerging global order.’ Elaborate.India’s World Role
2020Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) is transforming itself into a trade bloc from a military alliance. Discuss.Quad / Indo-Pacific
2020Significance of Indo-US deals over Indo-Russian defence deals with reference to Indo-Pacific stability.Indo-Pacific Balance
2021‘The USA is facing an existential threat in the form of China more challenging than the erstwhile Soviet Union.’ Explain.US–China / Global Order
2021Critically examine aims and objectives of SCO. What importance does it hold for India?SCO / Multilateral
2021The newly tri-nation partnership AUKUS is aimed at countering China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Discuss.AUKUS / Indo-Pacific
2022BIMSTEC as parallel organisation to SAARC? Similarities and dissimilarities.Regional / Neighbourhood
2022‘India is an age-old friend of Sri Lanka.’ Discuss India’s role in recent Sri Lanka crisis.Neighbourhood / China factor
2022‘Clean energy is the order of the day.’ India’s climate policy in geopolitics context.Climate / Geopolitics
2023Indian diaspora has scaled new heights in the West. Economic and political benefits for India.Soft Power
2023‘Sea is an important component of the cosmos.’ Role of IMO in maritime safety.Maritime / UNCLOS
2023‘Virus of conflict affecting SCO functioning.’ India’s role in mitigating problems.SCO / China-India
2024‘The West is fostering India as alternative to reduce dependence on China’s supply chain.’ Explain with examples.Supply Chain / China+1
2024Geopolitical importance of Maldives for India with focus on trade, energy, maritime security.IOR / Neighbourhood
2024‘Terrorism as threat to global peace.’ Effectiveness of UNSC Counter Terrorism Committee.UNSC / Global Security
2024India’s evolving relations with Central Asian Republics—diplomatic, economic, strategic significance.Central Asia / SCO

B. PYQ Heat Map

ThemeFrequencyTypical DemandKey Years
Border / LAC / BoundaryMEDIUMAnalyse border management; CBMs; LAC dynamicsIndirect: 2017, 2024
Indo-Pacific / Quad / AUKUSHIGHEvaluate strategic significance; India’s role2020, 2021
Trade Deficit / EconomicHIGHTrade as strategic tool; supply chain diversification2017, 2024
Neighbourhood / CPEC / PakistanHIGHChina-Pak axis; neighbourhood policy2013, 2015, 2022, 2024
Multilateral (SCO/BRICS/AIIB)HIGHIndia’s balancing role2014, 2021, 2023, 2024
SCS / UNCLOS / MaritimeMEDIUMIndia’s stance; freedom of navigation2014, 2023
BRI / OBOR / ConnectivityMEDIUMIndia’s objection; alternativesIndirect: 2024
US-China / Global OrderMEDIUMImpact on India; multi-alignment2019, 2020, 2021
Climate / Global SouthLOW–MEDIndia-China cooperation areas2022

21. Mains Practice Questions & Answer Frameworks

10-Mark Questions

Q1. ‘Managed competition, not confrontation, defines the current India–China relationship.’ Examine. (10 Marks, 150 words)
Intro: Define managed competition—coexistence of rivalry with selective engagement. Body: (a) Evidence of competition: LAC tensions, Quad, trade deficit, neighbourhood rivalry. (b) Evidence of management: SR mechanism, leader-level summits, SCO/BRICS cooperation, 2024 border agreement. (c) Structural constraints against confrontation: nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence, global pressure. Way Forward: Maintain deterrence while institutionalising dialogue. Conclusion: The relationship is neither friendship nor enmity but a strategic equilibrium requiring constant calibration.
Q2. Why have border agreements between India and China proven insufficient in preventing LAC tensions? Analyse. (10 Marks, 150 words)
Intro: Despite 5+ agreements since 1993, LAC incidents persist. Body: (a) No agreed LAC; different perception maps. (b) Verification deficit: CBMs lack enforcement. (c) Changed tactics: infrastructure race, civilian militia. (d) Trust deficit post-2020 Galwan. Way Forward: LAC clarification via map exchange; satellite-based verification; stronger crisis protocols. Conclusion: Agreements are necessary but insufficient without political will, transparency, and verification.
Q3. Analyse India’s trade dependence on China as a strategic vulnerability. (10 Marks, 150 words)
Intro: India’s deficit exceeds $85 billion; dependence in critical sectors. Body: (a) Key dependencies: APIs (70%), electronics, solar, rare earths. (b) Strategic risk: supply disruptions; leverage potential. (c) Structural causes: manufacturing gap, scale, subsidies. (d) Responses: PLI, API parks, semiconductor mission, China+1. Way Forward: Diversify sourcing; build domestic capacity; some trade engagement is inevitable and beneficial. Conclusion: Strategic vulnerability demands calibrated de-risking, not wholesale decoupling.
Q4. Critically evaluate India’s position on BRI/CPEC. (10 Marks, 150 words)
Intro: India is the most prominent non-participant in BRI; CPEC is the primary objection. Body: (a) Sovereignty: CPEC through PoK. (b) Transparency: opaque terms; debt sustainability. (c) Geopolitical implications: BRI as influence tool. (d) India’s alternatives: Chabahar, INSTC, IMEC, AAGC. Way Forward: Continue principled opposition to CPEC; build credible alternatives. Conclusion: India’s position is principled but must be backed by viable alternative connectivity offerings.
Q5. How does the Indo-Pacific strategy reshape India–China dynamics? (10 Marks, 150 words)
Intro: Indo-Pacific concept—Pacific to Africa—places India at the strategic centre. Body: (a) Quad as institutional expression: maritime security, tech, vaccines. (b) China’s opposition: views Quad as ‘Asian NATO.’ (c) India’s positioning: SAGAR + Act East + Quad, avoiding anti-China framing. (d) Impact: raises India’s profile; creates leverage; builds partnerships. Way Forward: Deepen Quad substance without reducing to anti-China posture. Conclusion: Indo-Pacific is India’s most significant geopolitical reframing—balancing engagement with hedging.
Q6. Discuss the role of SCO in India–China bilateral engagement. (10 Marks, 150 words)
Intro: India joined SCO in 2017; includes both rivals (China, Pakistan). Body: (a) Cooperation: counter-terrorism, connectivity, energy. (b) Challenges: China-Russia dominance; Pakistan’s role. (c) India’s approach: engagement; prevent anti-India consensus. (d) Recent trends: India hosted 2023 virtual summit. Way Forward: Leverage SCO for Central Asia engagement; maintain independent positions. Conclusion: SCO is complex but necessary for India’s multi-alignment strategy.

15-Mark Questions

Q1. ‘India–China relations are characterised by simultaneous cooperation and competition across multiple domains.’ Analyse with contemporary examples. (15 Marks, 250 words)
Intro: Define ‘dual character’—competitors in geopolitics, cooperators on global governance. Hook: Post-2020 tensions coexist with $136 bn trade. Body: (1) Competition: (a) Border/LAC—Galwan, infrastructure race. (b) IOR—String of Pearls vs SAGAR. (c) Neighbourhood—Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives. (d) Global institutions—UNSC, NSG. (2) Cooperation: (a) BRICS/SCO/NDB—multipolar order. (b) Climate—CBDR, BASIC. (c) Trade—$136 bn; complementarities. (d) Global South—WTO, pandemic. (3) Why both coexist: Nuclear deterrence; economic interdependence; shared interest in countering Western institutional dominance. Way Forward: Issue-based engagement; compartmentalise differences. Conclusion: India must develop strategic maturity to compete and cooperate simultaneously—this is statecraft, not contradiction.
Q2. Critically examine the effectiveness of India–China border management agreements in maintaining peace along the LAC. (15 Marks, 250 words)
Intro: Five major agreements since 1993; Galwan 2020 exposed limitations. Body: (1) Architecture: 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012, 2013—progressive on paper. (2) Successes: prevented escalation for decades; diplomatic channels; reduced accidental confrontation. (3) Failures: (a) No agreed LAC map—root cause. (b) No enforcement for violations. (c) 2020 showed agreements can’t prevent unilateral changes. (d) Tactics evolution outpaced provisions. (4) Structural reasons: asymmetric infrastructure; China’s logistics superiority. Way Forward: LAC clarification through map exchange; satellite monitoring; crisis hotlines at multiple levels; lessons from LoC management. Conclusion: Agreements are necessary but not sufficient—must be supplemented by deterrence, verification, and political will.
Q3. ‘India’s dependence on Chinese imports in critical sectors constitutes a strategic vulnerability.’ Discuss dimensions and policy responses. (15 Marks, 250 words)
Intro: $85+ bn deficit; 70% APIs; electronics/solar/rare earth dependence. Body: (1) Dimensions: (a) Pharma—API dependency = drug security risk. (b) Electronics—smartphones, components. (c) Clean energy—solar, batteries. (d) Critical minerals—60-70% rare earth processing. (2) Strategic implications: supply disruption risk; leverage; manufacturing hollowing; data security. (3) Policy responses: (a) PLI across 14 sectors. (b) API parks. (c) Semiconductor mission—$10 bn+. (d) China+1 strategy. (e) KABIL for minerals. (f) FDI restrictions from land-border countries. (4) Challenges: time lag; cost competitiveness; scale disadvantage. Way Forward: Phased de-risking not decoupling; build capacity in 5-10 critical sectors; diversify through Vietnam, Taiwan, Korea. Conclusion: Strategic vulnerability demands calibrated, patient industrial policy response.
Q4. Analyse how CPEC and BRI challenge India’s sovereignty and strategic interests. What alternatives has India developed? (15 Marks, 250 words)
Intro: BRI is China’s flagship initiative; CPEC ($62 bn+) through PoK. Body: (1) Sovereignty: CPEC through Gilgit-Baltistan undermines territorial claims; legitimises PoK occupation. (2) Strategic: (a) Dual-use ports. (b) Debt diplomacy in neighbourhood. (c) BRI as influence tool. (d) Alternative governance norms. (3) India’s alternatives: (a) Chabahar—Afghanistan/Central Asia access. (b) INSTC—India-Iran-Russia. (c) IMEC—announced at G20 2023. (d) AAGC with Japan. (e) Kaladan, MVA corridors. (4) Effectiveness: credible but smaller; need sustained financing; IMEC promising but needs regional stability. Way Forward: Scale alternatives; leverage G20 momentum; coalition on transparent infrastructure financing. Conclusion: Must match principled objection with practical alternatives—credibility lies in delivery.
Q5. How does China’s growing presence in the IOR affect India’s maritime security? Discuss India’s response. (15 Marks, 250 words)
Intro: IOR—India’s primary strategic space—witnesses unprecedented Chinese naval expansion. Body: (1) China’s presence: (a) Djibouti base. (b) Gwadar, Hambantota, Chittagong, Kyaukpyu. (c) Anti-piracy patrols. (d) Research vessels. (2) Impact: (a) Challenge to maritime primacy. (b) Surveillance concerns. (c) Chokepoint potential. (d) Influence over island nations. (3) India’s response: (a) SAGAR doctrine. (b) Quad maritime domain awareness. (c) Andaman & Nicobar enhancement. (d) IFC-IOR. (e) Logistics agreements—LEMOA, BECA, ACSA, MLSA. (f) Indigenous carrier, submarine programme. (4) Neighbourhood maritime engagement: Mauritius, Seychelles, Maldives capacity building. Way Forward: Accelerate naval capability; deepen Quad cooperation; maintain first-responder status; island development. Conclusion: India’s maritime response must combine capability, partnerships, and regional goodwill.
Q6. ‘India’s neighbourhood policy is increasingly shaped by the China factor.’ Critically analyse with reference to South Asia. (15 Marks, 250 words)
Intro: China’s deepening engagement has transformed India’s neighbourhood calculus. Body: (1) China’s footprint: (a) Nepal—BRI, connectivity, political influence. (b) Sri Lanka—Hambantota, debt. (c) Bangladesh—submarines, Padma Bridge. (d) Myanmar—Kyaukpyu. (e) Maldives—’India Out’ dynamics. (2) India’s challenges: smaller resources; delays; ‘big brother’ perception; China’s no-strings offer. (3) India’s response: (a) Neighbourhood First—SAARC satellite, COVID vaccines. (b) BIMSTEC, Kaladan, MVA. (c) Credit lines, capacity building. (d) Quad outreach. (4) Assessment: India recalibrated but delivery gaps remain; execution speed is key. Way Forward: Faster execution; respect autonomy; match Chinese economic offers; cultural/democratic soft power. Conclusion: China factor has galvanised India’s neighbourhood policy—sustained, respectful, delivery-focused engagement is key.

22. Prelims-Style MCQs

Q1. The Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC was signed in:
(a) 1988
(b) 1993
(c) 1996
(d) 2005
Answer: (b) 1993 — Signed during PM Narasimha Rao’s visit to China.
Q2. Which of the following is NOT a component of the Belt and Road Initiative?
(a) Silk Road Economic Belt
(b) 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
(c) International North-South Transport Corridor
(d) China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Answer: (c) INSTC is an India-Iran-Russia initiative, not part of BRI.
Q3. The ‘String of Pearls’ concept refers to China’s:
(a) Network of trade agreements in Africa
(b) Chain of port facilities and maritime infrastructure in the IOR
(c) Series of border posts along the LAC
(d) Cultural exchange centres in Southeast Asia
Answer: (b) — Refers to China’s ports from South China Sea to the Horn of Africa.
Q4. The PCA’s 2016 ruling on the South China Sea:
(a) Upheld China’s nine-dash line claim
(b) Rejected China’s historical rights as having no legal basis under UNCLOS
(c) Divided the SCS equally among claimant states
(d) Established a joint management authority
Answer: (b) — Philippines v. China found no legal basis for nine-dash line claims.
Q5. SAGAR stands for:
(a) Security and Governance for Asian Region
(b) Security and Growth for All in the Region
(c) Strategic Alliance for Global Advancement and Reform
(d) South Asian Governance and Resilience
Answer: (b) — Announced by PM Modi in 2015; India’s IOR vision.
Q6. The Special Representatives mechanism for boundary negotiations was established in:
(a) 1996
(b) 2003
(c) 2005
(d) 2012
Answer: (b) 2003 — Following PM Vajpayee’s visit to China.
Q7. Consider: 1. CPEC connects Kashgar to Gwadar. 2. India supports CPEC for connectivity. 3. CPEC passes through PoK. Correct statements:
(a) 1 and 2 only
(b) 1 and 3 only
(c) 2 and 3 only
(d) 1, 2, and 3
Answer: (b) — India opposes CPEC because it passes through PoK.
Q8. The IFC-IOR (Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region) is located in:
(a) Port Blair
(b) Visakhapatnam
(c) Gurugram
(d) Kochi
Answer: (c) Gurugram — Established in 2018 for maritime domain awareness.
Q9. The 2005 Agreement introduced ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles’ for:
(a) Trade normalisation
(b) India-China boundary settlement
(c) Maritime cooperation
(d) Nuclear confidence-building
Answer: (c) 2005 — Set framework principles for eventual boundary settlement.
Q10. Aksai Chin is strategically important for China primarily because:
(a) It contains major oil reserves
(b) It hosts the G219 highway connecting Tibet to Xinjiang
(c) It borders Afghanistan
(d) It provides access to the Indian Ocean
Answer: (b) — G219 is a critical logistics link for China.
Q11. India’s response initiative to BRI in the maritime/Africa domain:
(a) AAGC (Asia-Africa Growth Corridor)
(b) CPEC
(c) SCO Connectivity Plan
(d) Digital Silk Road
Answer: (a) — AAGC, jointly with Japan; Chabahar and IMEC are other responses.
Q12. The Panchsheel Agreement (1954) was based on:
(a) Three Principles of People’s Welfare
(b) Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
(c) Four Pillars of Asian Solidarity
(d) Seven Principles of Non-Alignment
Answer: (b) — Mutual respect, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, peaceful coexistence.
Q13. About UNCLOS: 1. Defines EEZ at 200 nm. 2. Provides dispute resolution mechanisms. 3. China has ratified UNCLOS. Correct?
(a) 1 only
(b) 1 and 2 only
(c) 1, 2, and 3
(d) 2 and 3 only
Answer: (c) — All correct. China ratified in 1996 but disputes PCA ruling.
Q14. The Wuhan Informal Summit (2018) was significant because:
(a) It resolved the Aksai Chin dispute
(b) It established a new border agreement
(c) It was a diplomatic reset after Doklam
(d) It led to India joining BRI
Answer: (c) — Established leader-level ‘strategic communication’ channel after Doklam.
Q15. KABIL (Khanij Bidesh India Limited) was established to:
(a) Promote Indian mining companies abroad
(b) Secure critical and strategic minerals from overseas
(c) Regulate mineral exports
(d) Manage coal production
Answer: (b) — JV of NALCO, HCL, MECL to acquire strategic mineral assets overseas.

23. Frequently Asked Questions

Q1. Why is the LAC not the same as an international border?

The LAC is a de facto ceasefire line that has never been jointly delineated on a map. Unlike the LoC with Pakistan (which follows a specific ceasefire line), the LAC is based on differing perceptions of both sides, leading to overlapping claims at over 20 points. It is not a legally recognised international boundary.

Q2. Why does CPEC matter to India?

CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan in PoK—territory India claims as its own. India views CPEC as a violation of sovereignty and a strategic move to legitimise Pakistan’s occupation. Additionally, Gwadar port has dual-use military implications.

Q3. What is India’s official stance on the South China Sea?

India supports freedom of navigation and overflight per UNCLOS, peaceful resolution, and ASEAN centrality. India does not take sides on sovereignty claims but upholds the rules-based maritime order and has commercial interests (oil exploration with Vietnam) in the region.

Q4. What is the strategic importance of Arunachal Pradesh?

Arunachal is India’s northeastern frontier bordering Tibet. China claims it as ‘South Tibet.’ Tawang monastery has Tibetan Buddhist significance. Strategically, control affects Brahmaputra valley access, NE India connectivity, and the Siliguri Corridor.

Q5. Can India and China cooperate despite rivalry?

Yes—and they do. Both cooperate in BRICS, SCO, climate negotiations (BASIC), WTO, and Global South issues. The key is compartmentalisation: maintain security preparedness while pursuing engagement where interests align.

Q6. What is the difference between disengagement and de-escalation?

Disengagement = physical pullback of troops from friction points to agreed positions. De-escalation = broader reduction of forces to pre-crisis levels along the entire border. Post-2020, disengagement has progressed at some points, but de-escalation lags significantly.

Q7. What is India’s multi-alignment strategy?

Multi-alignment means engaging with multiple powers and groupings without rigid alliances. India participates in both Quad (US, Japan, Australia) and SCO/BRICS (China, Russia), maintaining strategic autonomy to pursue national interest.

Q8. What is the Quad and how does it relate to China?

The Quad brings together India, US, Japan, and Australia for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ covering maritime security, tech, health, and climate. Widely seen as a counterbalance to China’s assertiveness, though India avoids anti-China framing.

Q9. Why is the Brahmaputra a potential flashpoint?

China’s dam-building on the upper Brahmaputra raises concerns about water diversion, flood control, and downstream impact on NE India and Bangladesh. Data-sharing has been sporadic and suspended during tensions.

Q10. What is the significance of Doklam (2017)?

Doklam was a 73-day standoff at the Bhutan-India-China tri-junction. India intervened to prevent Chinese road construction in territory claimed by Bhutan. It demonstrated India’s willingness to physically resist unilateral action.

Q11. How does the US-China rivalry affect India?

It creates both opportunities (tech partnerships, defence deals, supply chain diversification) and challenges (pressure to choose sides, Russia ties impact, secondary sanctions risk). India navigates through multi-alignment.

Q12. What is debt-trap diplomacy and is it relevant to India?

Extending excessive loans for infrastructure that recipients can’t repay, leading to strategic concessions (e.g., Hambantota). Relevant because it occurs in India’s neighbourhood—Sri Lanka, Maldives—creating Chinese influence.

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