Editorials & Explained — 29 August 2026
A Shared Disaster, Beyond Borders and Geopolitics
A catastrophic glacial collapse on the Nepal-China border on 26 August 2026 — the worst natural disaster in Nepal's recorded history — has swept away villages, killed hundreds and cut across geopolitical fault lines to devastate India, Nepal and China simultaneously, making the case for institutionalised trilateral disaster cooperation.
At 8:44 a.m.
Nepal time on 26 August 2026, what was initially read as a 4.4-magnitude earthquake near the Nepal-China border was later confirmed by the USGS to be a glacial collapse — an enormous glacial slab that plunged a kilometre to the valley floor, triggering devastating flash floods.
The collapse itself registered as the equivalent of a 5.2-magnitude seismic event.
- Casualties: 579 confirmed dead in Nepal; nearly 2,000 missing, many of them foreigners
- Infrastructure loss: Bridges, hydropower stations and entire villages obliterated; 475 MW of generating capacity wiped from Nepal's electricity grid
- Assessment: Author describes it as potentially the most devastating natural disaster Nepal has ever witnessed
- Seismological note: The USGS initially categorised the seismic signal as a tectonic earthquake (4.4); upgraded to 5.2 equivalent after confirming the source was the glacial mass movement itself — a GLOF (Glacial Lake Outburst Flood) precursor event
- Gyirong Port — the largest land trade port in the Tibet Autonomous Region and the primary Nepal-China gateway — effectively buried under heavy sediment and debris
- Gyirong Port was upgraded in August 2017 at a cost of $175.8 million, transforming it from a bilateral crossing to a fully recognised international gateway
- Access roads on the Chinese side to the Nepal border, power supplies and local communication links — all severed or severely damaged
- Fatalities and missing persons reported in Tibet's Gyirong County, including foreign nationals
India's losses were both human and infrastructural. The MEA confirmed Indian nationals — mostly pilgrims en route to Kailash Mansarovar via Gyirong — are missing or untraced. The downstream flood threat to Indian states was severe.
- Rivers affected: Gandak, Kosi and Ganga in Bihar surged; authorities in Patna went on maximum alert; Valmikinagar Barrage under close watch
- UP alert: State Relief Commissioner tracked developments in real time; border districts Maharajganj and Kushinagar deployed emergency personnel
- NDRF: Teams deployed across the Bihar-UP border zone
- Indian Air Force: Dispatched 47.5 tonnes of emergency relief to Nepal — medical supplies, rations, tents
- India activated its Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) framework
The author — a Nepali scholar and founder of the Nepal Institute of International and Strategic Studies — argues that this event demonstrates the physical interconnection of India, Nepal and China in ways that geopolitical calculations cannot address.
- Political boundaries do not stop floodwaters; the same rivers that drain the Tibetan Plateau flow through Nepal and then into India's most populous plains
- The three countries are simultaneously victims — a rare forcing moment for diplomatic imagination beyond bilateral rivalries
- The author's organisation launched the first Nepal-India-China Trilateral Track II Dialogue in 2014 — this event renews the case for a Track I (official) equivalent
- The call is to find ways to "compartmentalise" the harder political dynamics (border disputes, BRI, strategic competition) and create a functional cooperation framework for cross-border natural events
- Such events are likely to recur: Himalayan glaciers are destabilising rapidly; GLOF frequency is increasing; all three countries share drainage basins
- GLOF (Glacial Lake Outburst Flood): A sudden release of water from a glacial lake; often triggered by seismic activity, ice-dam failure or rapid ice-melt; a growing Himalayan threat
- Gyirong Port: Only land port between Nepal and China (Tibet); also the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra route for Indian pilgrims since 2015 (via Lipulekh or Gyirong); upgraded to international-standard port in 2017
- Kailash Mansarovar Yatra: Administered by MEA; two routes — Lipulekh Pass (Uttarakhand) and Nathu La (Sikkim); Gyirong route opened as an alternative; all routes pass through Chinese-controlled Tibet
- Gandak, Kosi, Ganga: Trans-boundary rivers originating in Nepal/Tibet that flow into Bihar; subject to the 1954 Kosi Agreement and 1959 Gandak Agreement between India and Nepal
- NDRF: National Disaster Response Force — constituted under the Disaster Management Act, 2005; 16 battalions; can be deployed by central or state governments
- HADR: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief — India's framework for using military/civil assets for disaster response in neighbourhood; part of India's Neighbourhood First Policy operationalisation
- Track II Diplomacy: Unofficial dialogue between academics, former officials and civil society from different countries; complements but does not replace Track I (official government-to-government) diplomacy
- India-Nepal-China triangle: Nepal is constitutionally a "landlocked country sandwiched between two giants"; both India and China compete for influence through infrastructure, aid and connectivity projects; the BRI's Trans-Himalayan Connectivity is China's primary instrument
The 2026 Nepal glacial disaster simultaneously affected India, Nepal and China, exposing the inadequacy of bilateral disaster-management frameworks in the Himalayan region. Critically examine the prospects and challenges of institutionalising a trilateral disaster cooperation framework among these three countries, given their complex geopolitical relationships. 15 marks · 250 words
The Problem with Ethanol Blending Isn't Sugar — It's Reliance on Grains
India's Ethanol Blended Petrol programme, designed to aid sugarcane farmers, has quietly morphed into a grain-based fuel enterprise that now competes with food security — and the correction will not be painless.
The EBP programme was launched primarily to create an additional revenue stream for sugar mills, enabling them to pay cane farmers on time. Until 2017–18, all ethanol supplied to OMCs came exclusively from C-heavy molasses — the non-recoverable final byproduct of cane-juice crystallisation after three rounds of boiling.
- C-heavy molasses: The dark, thick residue after all economically recoverable sugar has been extracted; using it for ethanol does not divert any sugar from the market
- B-heavy molasses: An intermediate-stage byproduct; diverting it to ethanol means less sucrose enters the crystallisation stage — this reduces sugar output ("diversion")
- Direct cane juice/syrup: The highest-diversion route — sucrose goes directly to fermentation instead of crystallisation
- From 2018–19, the Modi government paid higher prices for ethanol from B-heavy and direct juice routes, incentivising mills to divert more sucrose to ethanol
- 2013–14 → 2018–19: Supply grew from 38 to 190 crore litres; blending from 1.6% to 4.9%
The real structural shift came when cereal grains entered as feedstock. The process: grain → flour milling → starch extraction → hydrolysis to simple sugars → fermentation → distillation → 99.9% anhydrous ethanol suitable for blending.
- Initially, multi-feedstock distilleries attached to sugar mills used grains only in the off-season (May–October) when cane was unavailable
- Standalone grain-based distilleries then emerged nationally, using maize and surplus/broken FCI rice
- 2023–24: Total supply 673 crore litres; blending 14.6%; grain share — 402 crore litres (59.7%)
- 2025–26 (allocated): Total 1,048 crore litres (E20); grain share — 759.8 crore litres (72.5%); sugarcane — only 288.5 crore litres (27.5%)
- Even in 2021–22 — when blending first crossed 10% — sugarcane provided over 83% of ethanol; the reversal has been swift and dramatic
With sugar diversion now unlikely in 2026–27 (high prices, 17-year-low September stocks) and maize supplies possibly tightening under El Niño, the only way to sustain E20 at 1,050 crore litres is further FCI rice allocation — a proposition that is hard to justify.
- 2025–26 FCI rice allocation: Initially 5.2 mt, raised to 7.2 mt in July 2026
- Ethanol yield: 450–460 litres/tonne rice → 7.2 mt gives 325–330 crore litres
- Price anomaly: FCI sells rice to distilleries at ₹23.2/kg; auction reserve for 100%-broken rice — ₹21/kg
- Market price: Normal rice ₹40/kg; broken rice ₹30/kg (Dept. of Consumer Affairs) — distilleries buy at nearly half the market rate
- FCI rice is procured at MSP (a government cost), stored (another cost), then sold below market to private distillers — a double fiscal burden with no corresponding farmer benefit
- Rice is among the most water-intensive crops; diverting public food stocks to fuel deepens both food security and environmental contradictions
- Original cane farmer benefit: Still valid through C-heavy molasses, but B-heavy/juice diversion will be curtailed in 2026–27
- Maize farmer success: Ethanol demand lifted wholesale maize prices from ₹13.8–17.8/kg (2021) to ₹22.1–24.5/kg (2024) — a genuine benefit that the programme delivered
- Rice distortion: FCI rice procurement cost is borne by taxpayers; storage cost by FCI; price discount to distillers is a further subsidy — farmers gain nothing extra
- Sugar diversion data: 2.2 mt (2020–21) → peak 4.3 mt (2022–23) → 3 mt in 2025–26 (~10% of India's gross sugar output of 30.9 mt) — now set to collapse to near-zero
- Capacity overhang driving policy: Aggregate ethanol production capacity ~2,000 crore litres vs OMC offtake of ~1,050 crore litres — nearly double; distillery lobby is pushing for E22→E30 to justify capacity, not energy logic
- E20: Requires ~1,050 crore litres/year; achieved via allocations in 2025–26
- Ethanol capacity built (2014 → 2026): 421 crore litres → ~2,000 crore litres (~5× growth)
- Bajra & jowar starch content: 58–62% recoverable starch; ethanol yield 380–400 L/tonne — comparable to maize (also ~400 L/t); far less water-intensive
- CEA V. Anantha Nageswaran publicly suggested reverting to E10 — an implicit acknowledgement of feedstock stress at the highest advisory level
- Blending standards notified: E10, E20, E22, E25, E27, E30 — government has moved far ahead of actual feedstock availability
- 1. Curtail standalone grain distilleries reliant on FCI rice; shift to alternative crops — bajra and jowar offer similar ethanol yields, lower water footprints, and would extend the farmer-benefit rationale to millet growers
- 2. Abandon target-fetishism: EBP was successful at 10–15% blending; the race to E20+ is driven by overcapacity and lobby pressure, not agricultural or energy necessity; consider reverting to E10 as the CEA suggested
- National Policy on Biofuels 2018 (amended 2022): Categorises feedstocks into 1G (food crops), 2G (non-food biomass/agri-waste), 3G (algae); EBP uses 1G; policy allows 2G for advanced blending
- FCI's mandate: Buffer-stocking, price-support operations, distributing under NFSA — using FCI stocks for industrial fuel raises equity and food security questions under Art. 21 and DPSP provisions
- MSP linkage: Rice MSP for common grade ₹2,300/quintal (2025–26); FCI sale to distilleries at ₹2,100/quintal for broken rice — government takes a loss on every tonne, funded by taxpayers
- OMCs (Oil Marketing Companies): Indian Oil, BPCL, HPCL — procure ethanol via tenders, blend at depots before retail distribution
- El Niño and kharif crops: El Niño suppresses Indian monsoon; maize is a kharif crop highly sensitive to rainfall deficit — links climate variability directly to energy feedstock security
- Millet Mission: Government's Shree Anna programme promotes millets under India's G20 presidency legacy; aligning EBP feedstock with millets would integrate two policy goals
India's Ethanol Blended Petrol programme has progressively shifted from sugarcane-based to grain-based feedstocks, with surplus FCI rice now serving as a primary input. Critically examine the food security, fiscal and agricultural equity implications of this shift, and suggest a more sustainable feedstock strategy for the programme. 15 marks · 250 words
