Current Affairs 30 January 2026

  1. Will removing curbs on Chinese FDI help India?
  2. Space spinoffs and healthcare: how space research improves life on Earth
  3. Digital addiction among children: a growing public health concern
  4. Economic Survey 2025–26: bright India, darker world
  5. Has health spending by the Centre increased?
  6. Gandhi’s Gram Swaraj ideal and why true devolution of power remains out of reach
  7. Living alone, loneliness, and social change in India


  • India is considering selective easing of restrictions on Chinese foreign direct investment, reviving debate on balancing economic recovery, supply-chain integration, national security, and strategic autonomy.

Relevance

  • GS 2 (Governance/Polity): Indias FDI policy, national security considerations, and executive discretion over strategic sector investment rules.
  • GS 3 (Economy/IR/Industry): Foreign investment, supply-chain integration, Make in India, manufacturing competitiveness, and balancing economic growth with geopolitical risk.
Origin of curbs
  • In 2020, India imposed prior-approval requirements on FDI from neighbouring countries, primarily China, citing national security concerns after border tensions.
  • The policy aimed to prevent opportunistic takeovers of Indian firms during the COVID-19 economic slowdown.
Current status
  • Chinese FDI is not banned but subject to government approval, making inflows slower, uncertain, and concentrated in limited sectors.
Manufacturing and supply chains
  • India seeks to expand manufacturing capacity, exports, and employment, especially in electronics, batteries, renewables, and critical components.
  • Many global supply chains remain China-centric, creating a dilemma between diversification and economic efficiency.
Industrial capacity and exports
  • Chinese investment can accelerate scale, technology transfer, and cost competitiveness, particularly in electronics assembly and component manufacturing.
  • Greater Chinese participation could help India integrate into regional and global value chains, boosting exports rather than import dependence.
Supply-chain resilience
  • Allowing controlled Chinese FDI may reduce reliance on imports by localising component production, supporting “Make in India” objectives pragmatically.
National security risks
  • Chinese investments raise concerns over data security, critical infrastructure, surveillance, and strategic leverage, especially in digital, telecom, and defence-linked sectors.
  • Economic dependence can translate into political and strategic vulnerabilities, limiting India’s policy autonomy.
Limited developmental spillovers
  • Past experience shows Chinese firms may prefer import-heavy assembly models, limiting deep technology diffusion and domestic value addition.
Low-risk manufacturing sectors
  • Easing curbs in non-sensitive sectors such as consumer electronics components, EV parts, and solar equipment could enhance domestic manufacturing without strategic exposure.
  • Strict conditions on local sourcing, exports, and ownership caps can mitigate risks.
Strategic and sensitive sectors
  • Sectors like telecom, fintech, digital platforms, defence, and critical infrastructure warrant continued restrictions due to high security externalities.
  • The global economy is moving towards friend-shoring and strategic industrial policy, not pure openness.
  • India must signal predictable investment rules while retaining the flexibility to protect national interests in a fragmented global order.
  • Removing curbs alone will not automatically attract Chinese capital; policy certainty, market access, and export orientation matter equally.
  • India must avoid becoming merely an assembly hub, without upstream capability and innovation depth.
  • Adopt a case-by-case, sector-specific approach to Chinese FDI, linking approvals to technology transfer, export commitments, and domestic value addition.
  • Strengthen regulatory capacity, data protection, and competition policy to manage risks rather than rely on blanket restrictions.
  • Parallelly, deepen ties with alternative investment partners to prevent excessive dependence on any single country.


  • Recent analyses highlight how space programme spinoffs, especially from ISRO and NASA, have generated significant healthcare innovations, strengthening diagnostics, devices, telemedicine, and public health delivery on Earth.

Relevance

  • GS 3 (Science & Technology/Economy): Application of space spinoffs in healthcare, diagnostics, telemedicine, and affordable technology diffusion; science & society linkage.
Definition and scope
  • Space spinoffs are technologies, processes, or products developed for space missions that later find civilian applications, particularly in healthcare, electronics, materials, and environmental management.
  • They arise from extreme space requirements such as miniaturisation, precision, durability, radiation resistance, and reliability, which later translate into cost-effective terrestrial solutions.
ISRO and NASA technology transfer
  • Under its Technology Transfer Programme, ISRO has transferred over 350 technologies to Indian industries, including implants, medical electronics, sensors, and diagnostic devices.
  • NASA’s spinoff programme has generated over 2,000 documented spinoffs since 1976, many applied in medical imaging, monitoring, and rehabilitation technologies.
Imaging advancements
  • Space research contributed to advanced digital image processing, improving MRI and CT scan clarity through better noise reduction, contrast enhancement, and image fusion techniques.
  • These technologies originated from satellite imaging and planetary data analysis, later adapted for clinical diagnostics and radiology workflows.
Portable diagnostics
  • Miniaturisation for spacecraft led to compact blood analysers and lab-on-chip devices, enabling rapid testing in ambulances, remote clinics, and disaster zones.
  • Such diagnostics reduce dependence on large laboratories, improving access in rural and underserved regions.
Life-support and implants
  • Technologies developed for astronaut health monitoring enabled low-power ventricular assist devices, pacemakers, and rhythm management systems, improving cardiac care outcomes.
  • Advanced biomaterials originally designed for spacecraft components are now used in prosthetics, orthopaedic implants, and artificial limbs.
Surgical and assistive tools
  • Precision engineering from space missions contributed to robot-assisted surgery tools, lightweight surgical instruments, and rehabilitation devices for mobility-impaired patients.
Continuous health monitoring
  • Sensors developed for astronauts evolved into wearables tracking ECG, oxygen saturation, motion, and sleep, supporting preventive and home-based healthcare.
  • These devices enable early detection of chronic conditions, reducing hospitalisation and long-term treatment costs.
Remote healthcare delivery
  • Satellite communication systems initially developed for space missions underpin telemedicine networks, especially where terrestrial connectivity is unreliable.
  • Satellite-based logistics support medical supply delivery, emergency response coordination, and disease surveillance during disasters and outbreaks.
Water and air purification
  • Space-grade filtration technologies such as HEPA and activated filters are widely used in hospitals for infection control, safe drinking water, and air quality management.
  • These systems were originally designed to sustain astronauts in closed spacecraft environments.
  • Space spinoffs reduce healthcare costs by enabling low-cost, portable, and scalable medical technologies, especially critical for developing economies with resource constraints.
  • India’s relatively low space budget delivers high social returns, maximising public investment impact beyond strategic and scientific domains.
  • Emerging economies benefit disproportionately as space-derived technologies bridge healthcare access gaps, improve rural service delivery, and strengthen public health resilience.
  • India’s space–health linkage supports goals of universal health coverage, affordable care, and technological self-reliance.
  • Strengthening industryspace agency collaboration, faster commercialisation pathways, and integration with public health missions can amplify benefits of space spinoffs.
  • Greater awareness and funding for civilian applications can convert strategic space investments into everyday health gains.


  • A recent national survey flagged digital addiction as a major health worry, urging restrictions on children’s access to screens, stronger platform accountability, and promotion of offline alternatives for healthy childhood development.

Relevance

  • GS 1 (Society): Changing social behaviour patterns among youth, mental health implications, family structures, and digital lifestyles.
  • GS 2 (Governance/Policy): Need for regulatory mechanisms for online platforms, child protection policies, digital governance, and age-appropriate safeguards.
  • GS 3 (Health & Public Policy): Public health dimension of screen addiction, lifestyle disorders, behavioural health, and preventive strategies.
Definition and scope
  • Digital addiction refers to compulsive and excessive use of digital devices and platforms, including social media, gaming, and streaming, leading to impaired mental health, behaviour, and daily functioning.
  • It increasingly affects children and adolescents, whose cognitive, emotional, and social development remains highly sensitive to screen exposure.
Near-universal access
  • Rapid smartphone penetration and cheap data have made screen access nearly universal, transforming childhood leisure, learning, and social interaction patterns across urban and rural India.
  • The challenge today is not connectivity, but safe, age-appropriate, and moderated use of digital technologies.
Mental health and behaviour
  • Excessive screen use is linked with anxiety, depression, sleep disruption, reduced attention span, and declining academic performance among children and young adults.
  • Digital overuse correlates with aggressive behaviour, social withdrawal, and cyberbullying, particularly in the 15–24 age group.
Platform design risks
  • Features such as auto-play, infinite scrolling, gaming rewards, and targeted advertising increase addictive potential, especially for young users with limited self-regulation.
Lifestyle convergence
  • The survey identifies ultra-processed foods (UPFs) as a parallel lifestyle risk, driven by aggressive marketing, convenience, and preference-shaping among children.
  • Both digital addiction and UPF consumption reinforce sedentary behaviour, obesity, and long-term non-communicable disease risks.
  • Countries like Australia, China, and South Korea have imposed curbs on children’s access to social media and online gaming through time limits and age-based restrictions.
  • These examples indicate a global shift towards state intervention in digital childhood environments.
Platform accountability
  • The survey calls for mandatory age verification, default age-appropriate settings, and limits on targeted advertising for children.
  • Online platforms are urged to share responsibility for protecting child mental health, not merely user engagement metrics.
Role of families and schools
  • Families are advised to enforce screen-time limits, device-free hours, and shared offline activities, supported by parental awareness programmes.
  • Schools are encouraged to adopt digital wellness curricula, moderated online learning spaces, and mandatory physical activity.
  • Digital addiction raises ethical questions about corporate responsibility, child autonomy, consent, and data exploitation in platform-driven ecosystems.
  • It reflects a deeper tension between technological convenience and child well-being.
  • Digital addiction should be recognised as a public health and child rights issue, not merely a parental responsibility.
  • Integrated policies are needed across health, education, consumer protection, and digital governance domains.
  • Policymaking must shift from unrestricted access to safe-by-designdigital ecosystems, prioritising child development over profit-driven engagement.
  • Technology should augment learning and creativity, not replace physical activity, social bonding, and emotional resilience.


  • Economic Survey 2025–26, tabled in Parliament, projects a stronger medium-term growth outlook for India while warning of rising global macroeconomic, technological, and geopolitical risks.

Relevance

  • GS 3 (Economy): Macroeconomic outlook, growth projections, risk scenarios, AI-led financial excesses, capital flow uncertainty, and export–import dynamics.
  • GS 2 (International Relations/Economy): Global economic risks, multipolar fragmentation, trade disruptions, and resilience of open economies.
Purpose and nature
  • The Economic Survey is an annual policy document prepared by the Chief Economic Adviser, providing macroeconomic assessment, risk analysis, and reform priorities ahead of the Union Budget.
  • It is not legally binding, but guides fiscal policy, market expectations, and medium-term reform direction.
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Medium-term growth projection
  • The Survey raises India’s medium-term growth potential to around 7%, from the earlier estimate of 6.5%, citing capital formation, labour participation, and productivity improvements.
  • For FY27, real GDP growth is projected in a range of 6.8%–7.2%, subject to reform continuity and external stability.
Drivers of domestic resilience
  • Growth momentum is supported by public investment in physical and digital infrastructure, manufacturing-linked incentives, logistics reforms, and improving corporate balance sheets.
  • Rising formalisation, tax administration efficiency, and MSME credit access are highlighted as structural enablers of sustained growth.
Three global scenarios for 2026
  • The Survey outlines three probabilistic global scenarios, emphasising that risks may interact rather than remain isolated, amplifying macroeconomic stress.
Scenario 1: Best case
  • Assigned a 40%–45% probability, where 2025 global conditions continue into 2026, albeit with higher volatility, policy uncertainty, and need for occasional government intervention.
Scenario 2: Multipolar breakdown
  • Also assigned a 40%–45% probability, involving intensified strategic rivalry, unresolved Russia–Ukraine conflict, trade fragmentation, sanctions proliferation, and weakening collective security arrangements.
Scenario 3: Worst case
  • Assigned a 10%–20% probability, where financial, technological, and geopolitical shocks reinforce each other, triggering sharp risk aversion and contraction in global liquidity.
Nature of the risk
  • The Survey flags highly leveraged investments in artificial intelligence as a new systemic risk, driven by optimistic timelines, narrow customer bases, and long-duration capital commitments.
  • A correction in AI investments may not halt technology adoption, but could tighten global financial conditions and spill over into capital markets.
Potential spillovers
  • If combined with geopolitical escalation or trade disruption, AI-led corrections could cause capital flow reversals, currency volatility, and defensive economic responses across regions.
Comparison with past crises
  • The Survey warns that under the worst-case scenario, macroeconomic consequences could exceed the 2008 global financial crisis, due to synchronized shocks and weaker multilateral coordination.
Capital flows and currency pressure
  • Across all scenarios, the primary common risk for India is disruption of capital flows, with implications for the rupee, external financing, and monetary stability.
  • The impact could be persistent rather than short-lived, depending on duration of global stress.
External sector challenge
  • The Survey notes that rising incomes will inevitably raise imports, making it essential for India to boost export earnings and sustain investor confidence in foreign currency.
  • India must leverage its relative stability to attract long-term capital, expand export competitiveness, and maintain macroeconomic credibility amid global uncertainty.
  • Domestic strength alone is insufficient; external resilience and risk preparedness are critical in a fragmented global economy.


  • Recent RBI and Budget data show post-pandemic decline in Union government health spending, reviving debate on unmet National Health Policy targets and Centre–State imbalance in public health financing.

Relevance

  • GS 2 (Governance/Policy): Federal fiscal relations, UnionState fiscal transfers, cooperative federalism, and budgetary priorities.
  • GS 3 (Health & Development): Public health financing, National Health Policy goals, State expenditure trends, and international comparison of health investment.
Constitutional and fiscal context
  • Health is a State subject under the Seventh Schedule, but the Union plays a critical role through financing, national programmes, and Centrally Sponsored Schemes.
  • Public health outcomes depend on combined spending of Centre and States, not Union allocations alone
Stated commitments
  • The NHP 2017 committed to raising public health expenditure to 2.5% of GDP by 2025, from about 1.15% at the time of formulation.
  • It also envisaged the Union government contributing 40% of total public health spending, requiring a sharp scale-up in central allocations.
Status of targets
  • By 2025–26, these targets remain far from achievement, primarily due to stagnation and decline in Union health spending post-pandemic.
State-level spending
  • As per RBI data, health and family welfare spending by States and UTs increased from 0.67% of GDP in 201718 to 1.1% in 202526 (BE).
  • Health’s share in total State budgets rose from 5% to 5.6%, showing sustained post-COVID prioritisation by States.
Union government spending
  • Union health expenditure rose modestly during COVID-19 but declined sharply in real terms after the pandemic.
  • Between 2020–21 and 2023–24, Union health allocations fell by 22.5% in real terms, indicating fiscal retrenchment.
  • India’s per capita public health spending remains among the lowest globally.
  • In 2021, Bhutan spent 2.5 times, Sri Lanka three times, and other BRICS countries 1415 times more per capita than India.
  • Thailand and Malaysia also spent nearly 10 times more per capita, highlighting India’s structural underinvestment.
Decline in transfers to States
  • In 2014–15, about 75.9% of Union health spending was transferred to States through schemes like the National Health Mission.
  • By 202425 (BE), this share declined to 43%, insufficient to sustain basic public health services at the State level.
Implications
  • This reflects hyper-centralisation of resources, despite States bearing the primary responsibility for service delivery.
National Health Mission (NHM)
  • Launched in 2005, NHM is the backbone of rural and urban public healthcare delivery.
  • NHM spending grew at 7.4% annually during FY14FY19, but declined by 5.5% annually in real terms during the NDA’s second tenure.
Other critical schemes
  • Pradhan Mantri Swasthya Suraksha Yojana, nutrition programmes, and health research schemes have faced significant cuts, despite proven performance during crises.
  • Introduced in 2018–19 as a 4% cess, the Health and Education Cess was intended to supplement public health spending, especially for poor and rural populations.
  • However, there is no clear evidence of proportional enhancement in Union health allocations, weakening fiscal credibility.
  • Reduced central transfers strain State capacities, widening inter-State inequalities in healthcare access and quality.
  • The trend undermines cooperative federalism, as States are expected to deliver without commensurate fiscal support.
  • Persistent low public spending pushes households towards out-of-pocket expenditure, increasing poverty, inequality, and delayed care-seeking.
  • Underfunded primary healthcare weakens preparedness for future pandemics and demographic ageing.
  • The Union government must progressively scale health spending towards 1% of GDP, as envisaged under NHP 2017.
  • Restore and expand transfers for NHM and public health infrastructure, with predictable, untied funding for States.
  • Align the Health and Education Cess transparently with measurable increases in health allocations.


  • In January 2026, the Union Government renamed MGNREGA to PM-GRAM (Pradhan Mantri Garib Rozgar Aur Maan), reviving debate on Mahatma Gandhi’s Gram Swaraj vision and grassroots self-rule.
  • The renaming triggered political and constitutional discussions on decentralisation, federalism, and weakening of local self-governance institutions, central to Gandhi’s village-centric democratic philosophy.

Relevance

  • GS 2 (Polity/Constitution): Decentralisation, 73rd Constitutional Amendment, Panchayati Raj system, cooperative federalism, and institutional capacity.
  • GS 3 (Governance/Development): Local governance efficacy, fiscal decentralisation, public service delivery, and grassroots democracy.
Gandhian conception
  • Gram Swaraj envisioned villages as self-reliant, self-governing republics, managing economic, social, and political affairs locally, with minimal dependence on distant central authority.
  • Gandhi viewed villages not as backward units but as foundations of participatory democracy, ethical governance, and dignified livelihoods.
Core principles
  • Political decentralisation through empowered Gram Sabhas
  • Economic self-sufficiency via local production and employment
  • Social justice through inclusivity and moral leadership
  • Accountability through direct citizen participation
Constitutional mandate
  • The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 institutionalised Panchayati Raj, recognising Panchayats as institutions of self-government under Part IX of the Constitution.
  • The 11th Schedule lists 29 subjects intended for devolution to Panchayats, including agriculture, health, education, poverty alleviation, and rural development.
Gram Sabha’s legal role
  • Gram Sabha is constitutionally recognised as the foundation of village democracy, empowered to approve plans, identify beneficiaries, and conduct social audits.
Incomplete “3Fs” devolution
  • Despite constitutional backing, functions, finances, and functionaries remain inadequately devolved, with States retaining significant administrative and fiscal control.
  • As per multiple Finance Commission reports, Panchayats receive limited untied funds, constraining autonomous decision-making.
Fiscal dependence
  • Own-source revenue of Panchayats remains below 57% of their total expenditure in most States, leading to dependence on State and Union transfers.
  • Delays in fund release and tied grants further weaken local planning capacity.
Bureaucratic dominance
  • Key development schemes are designed centrally, with Panchayats acting as implementing agencies rather than decision-makers.
  • Line departments often bypass elected local bodies, undermining democratic accountability at the village level.
Scheme-centric governance
  • Flagship programmes increasingly follow top-down templates, limiting flexibility for local innovation and context-specific solutions, contrary to Gram Swaraj ideals.
Original intent
  • MGNREGA was conceived as a demand-driven, rights-based programme, anchored in Gram Sabha decision-making for work selection and social audits.
  • It aligned closely with Gram Swaraj by promoting local employment, asset creation, and participatory planning.
Contemporary dilution
  • Renaming and central branding raise concerns about political centralisation and weakening of community ownership over a grassroots entitlement.
  • India has over 2.6 lakh Panchayats, but effective devolution varies sharply across States.
  • Studies show only a fraction of 29 subjects are fully transferred in most States, often without corresponding staff or finances.
  • India’s local government expenditure remains below 3% of GDP, compared to 8–15% in many OECD countries, indicating weak fiscal decentralisation.
Elite capture and capacity gaps
  • Local elites often dominate Panchayats, limiting inclusiveness and accountability, especially for women, Dalits, and marginal farmers.
  • Capacity deficits in planning, accounting, and technical expertise weaken Panchayat effectiveness.
Centralised political incentives
  • Political leadership increasingly favours central visibility and control, reducing incentives to empower autonomous local institutions.
  • Decentralisation has been procedural rather than substantive, focusing on elections rather than real transfer of power.
  • Economic centralisation, administrative control, and scheme-driven governance conflict with Gandhi’s vision of moral, participatory village republics.
Institutional reforms
  • Full devolution of 3Fs, with clear activity mapping and accountability frameworks.
  • Strengthening Gram Sabhas through mandatory quorum, regular meetings, and enforceable decisions.
Fiscal empowerment
  • Enhancing Panchayat own-source revenue through property tax, user charges, and predictable fiscal transfers.
  • Increasing untied grants to allow local prioritisation of development needs.
Democratic deepening
  • Capacity building of elected representatives, especially women and marginalised groups.
  • Leveraging digital tools for transparency without replacing face-to-face deliberation.


  • Media reports on people dying unnoticed and discussions around China’s Are You Dead?app have triggered debate on loneliness, single-person households, and adequacy of social safety nets in India.

Relevance

  • GS 1 (Society): Changing family structures, urbanisation, demographic behaviour, social isolation, and community norms.
  • GS 2 (Governance/Policy): Social welfare gaps, ageing population policy, informal safety nets, and emerging social policy imperatives.
Rise of people living alone
  • India is witnessing a gradual rise in single-person households, driven by urban migration, nuclear families, delayed marriage, and longer working hours weakening everyday social contact.
  • UN data shows single-person households in India increased from about 3% in 1992 to nearly 5% today, a small share but socially significant trend.
Traditional social security model
  • Indian society historically relied on joint families, close-knit neighbourhoods, and informal social monitoring, ensuring emotional support, elder care, and rapid response during crises.
  • Family obedience and co-residence acted as substitutes for formal welfare institutions, limiting visible loneliness despite economic hardship.
Structural disruptions
  • Migration, urban anonymity, rising aspirations for independence, and shrinking community spaces have eroded informal check-in” mechanisms, even as population density remains high.
What the app does ?
  • China’s Are You Dead?app prompts users to periodically confirm they are alive; failure to respond triggers alerts to emergency contacts, reflecting anxiety around solitary living.
  • The app is popular among singles and elderly people, highlighting technology substituting for absent social networks, not just medical emergencies.
Analytical significance
  • The app symbolises a shift from community-based care to algorithmic surveillance, where safety depends on digital confirmation rather than human presence.
  • Its popularity underscores how loneliness can exist even in densely populated societies when social bonds weaken.
Informal substitutes for technology
  • In many Indian households, WhatsApp good morningmessages in family or neighbourhood groups act as informal wellbeing checks, alerting others when messages stop.
  • Such systems are low-cost but uneven, exclusionary, and dependent on digital literacy and social capital.
Limits of informal systems
  • When informal networks fail, cases emerge where individuals are found dead after days or weeks, exposing gaps in urban governance and social care frameworks.
  • Some Indian cities have initiated police welfare check-ins, senior citizen registries, and municipal outreach, indicating state recognition of loneliness-related risks.
  • However, responses remain fragmented, reactive, and urban-centric, lacking a comprehensive social policy framework.
  • The rise of apps like “Are You Dead?” raises ethical concerns about dignity, privacy, and dependence on surveillance for basic human security.
  • It also reflects a deeper contradiction: greater independence coexisting with deeper isolation, especially among the elderly and migrants.
  • Loneliness intersects with mental health, ageing, urban planning, housing, and digital inclusion, demanding multi-sectoral policy responses rather than isolated welfare schemes.
  • Without intervention, loneliness risks becoming a silent public health and governance challenge, not merely a personal problem.
  • India must strengthen community institutions, urban commons, and local care networks, ensuring independence does not translate into abandonment.
  • Technology should complement, not replace, human relationships, with policy emphasis on rebuilding everyday social connections.

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