Content
- A path to progress that is paved with gold
- It’s time for Maoists to lay down arms
A path to progress that is paved with gold
Context and Why in News ?
- The editorial emphasizes Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) as a philosophy beyond economics, calling for financial self-reliance through domestic capital mobilization, especially gold monetisation.
- Context:
- Global FDI and project finance declined in 2024 (FDI -11%, project finance -27%).
- Rising global interest rates and deglobalisation increase vulnerability of external capital dependence.
- India holds $2.4 trillion worth of household gold (25,000 tonnes) — untapped domestic wealth.
Relevance:
- GS2 (Governance & Economic Policy)
- Financial self-reliance, gold monetisation schemes, domestic resource mobilisation.
- GS3 (Economy & Macro-finance)
- Balance of Payments (gold imports vs domestic holdings).
- Impact on Current Account Deficit (CAD) and external borrowing.
Practice Question:
- Discuss the paradox of India’s gold holdings and imports. How does it impact India’s macroeconomic stability?(250 Words)
Meaning and Evolution of Atmanirbharta
- Etymology: “Atmanirbharta” = self-reliance; “Atma” (self) + “Nirbharta” (dependence).
- Philosophical meaning: Inner strength leading to global confidence.
- Economic meaning: Building domestic capacity to reduce external dependence and enhance resilience.
Historical Phases of Indian Self-Reliance
| Phase | Crisis | Self-Reliance Response | Outcome |
| 1960s | Food crisis | Green Revolution | Food self-sufficiency |
| 1990s | Tech transition | IT & digital revolution | Global digital hub |
| 2020 | COVID pandemic | Indigenous vaccines & pharma | Vaccine self-reliance |
| 2020s | Defence dependence | Indigenisation under Make in India | Towards strategic autonomy |
| 2025 (current) | Capital dependency | Financial Atmanirbharta | Mobilising domestic wealth |
Problem Statement: External Capital Dependence
- FDI inflows since 2000: > $1 trillion (gross).
- But: External capital is volatile and cyclical, influenced by global liquidity and geopolitics.
- India’s future growth (target: $5 trillion economy) cannot hinge on foreign savings alone.
- Hence, need to tap India’s own household and institutional wealth.
India’s Gold Paradox
1. Scale of Wealth
- Gold holdings: ~25,000 tonnes (world’s largest private reserve).
- Value: ~$2.4 trillion = 55% of India’s GDP (FY26 est.).
- Comparison: Exceeds total bank credit outstanding in India.
2. Paradox of Import Dependence
- 87% of demand met via imports.
- Gold imports = 8% of total import bill; contributed ~33% of trade deficit (2010–13).
- Thus, despite huge domestic reserves, India continues to import gold, worsening CAD.
The Case for Gold Monetisation
Why Monetisation Matters
- Unlock idle household gold → formal financial capital → domestic credit expansion.
- Reduces gold imports → improves current account balance.
- Creates a low-cost fund source (4.5–6.5%) compared to external borrowing costs (~8–9%).
- Aligns with financial inclusion, Make in India, and National Infrastructure Pipeline (NIP) funding goals.
Challenges with Past Schemes
| Issue | Description |
| Trust deficit | Fear of purity mismatch, bureaucratic scrutiny, and taxation deterred depositors. |
| Infrastructure gaps | Limited hallmarking and purity testing centres. |
| Complex procedures | Gold Monetisation Scheme (GMS, 2015) suffered from low awareness and complicated documentation. |
| Low institutional capacity | Banks lacked expertise in physical gold logistics. |
Proposed Framework for a Reimagined Gold Monetisation Model
1. Infrastructure Expansion
- Scale hallmarking and purity testing centres under BIS.
- Network of collection & assaying centres nationwide.
- As of 2025, BIS-registered centres have doubled, but coverage remains urban-centric.
2. Logistics Framework
- Banks: Manage fund flows.
- Certified agencies: Handle gold movement, storage, and security transparently.
- Use of insured, digitally tracked channels.
3. Digitalisation & Transparency
- Each depositor should access metal balance digitally, akin to a savings account.
- Use of mobile apps, digital ledgers, and blockchain to track gold flow and prevent fraud.
4. Policy & Trust Enablers
- Remove GST/customs scrutiny for deposited gold.
- Simplify KYC: “No questions asked” assurance for household deposits.
- Assured returns and transparency in redemption value.
Economic Impact Estimate
| Impact Area | Mechanism | Expected Outcome |
| External sector | Reduction in gold imports | Improves CAD stability |
| Banking sector | Low-cost fund mobilisation | Expands credit for infra & MSMEs |
| Monetary policy | Enhances domestic liquidity | Reduces external vulnerability |
| Investment cycle | Domestic wealth recycling | Boosts private capital formation |
| Employment | Growth in hallmarking, logistics, fintech | Creates new skill-based jobs |
Philosophical and Civilisational Angle
- Gold monetisation isn’t just financial — it’s civilisational self-trust.
- Echoes India’s ethos of self-sufficiency through shared participation, not coercion.
- Reinforces the Atmanirbhar spirit: “Bharat can fund Bharat.”
Way Forward
- Public awareness campaigns to build trust and participation.
- PPP model for hallmarking & logistics infrastructure.
- Digital gold exchange under SEBI for transparency.
- Integration with UPI & Jan Dhan to reach rural households.
- Financial literacy drive linking gold to productive savings.
- Periodic audit & publication of gold mobilisation data.
Conclusion
- Atmanirbharta 2.0 = Financial Sovereignty.
- Mobilising India’s domestic gold wealth represents the next major self-reliance revolution — akin to the Green and Digital Revolutions.
- Success depends on trust, technology, and transparency — turning cultural assets into developmental capital.
- The goal: India financing India, ensuring sustainable, sovereign, and inclusive growth.
It’s time for Maoists to lay down arms
Why in News
- Union Home Minister ruled out talks with Maoists, urging them to surrender under the government’s rehabilitation policy.
- Government aims for complete Maoist eradication by next year (2026).
- Editorial argues that the CPI (Maoist) is at its weakest point in history, both militarily and ideologically.
Relevance
- GS2 (Governance & Internal Security)
- Counter-insurgency policies: SAMADHAN doctrine, DRG, CoBRA deployment.
- GS3 (Internal Security & Defence)
- Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) as an internal security challenge.
Practice Questions
- Analyse the factors leading to the decline of the Maoist movement in India. How can governance and development interventions consolidate this success? (250 Words)
Understanding Left-Wing Extremism (LWE)
- Definition: A violent movement seeking to overthrow the democratic State through armed struggle, based on Maoist ideology.
- Main group:Communist Party of India (Maoist) — formed in 2004 through the merger of:
- CPI (Marxist–Leninist) People’s War Group (PWG)
- Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI)
- Core Ideology: Inspired by Mao Zedong’s “Protracted People’s War” — to capture rural areas, encircle cities, and seize state power.
- Peak Influence: Around 2009–2011, LWE affected over 200 districts across 20 states (“Red Corridor”).
The Present Context — A Movement in Decline
Organisational Weakness
| Year | Central Committee Members | Politburo Members | Cadre Strength |
| 2004 | 42 | 25 | ~10,000 |
| 2025 | 13 | 7–8 | <2,000 |
- Most top leaders are over 60, ailing, and fatigued.
- The Central Committee has shrunk drastically; no fresh intellectual leadership has emerged.
- Internal divisions and leadership crisis following the death of General Secretary Nambala Keshava Rao (Basavaraju).
Geographic Decline
- Once-dominant in Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and Chhattisgarh.
- After police modernization in Andhra and Odisha, they were pushed into Chhattisgarh’s dense forests.
- Even their “Liberated Zone” in South Bastar (Sukma, Dantewada, Bijapur, Narayanpur) is now fragmented.
- Maoist influence in Jharkhand and Bihar also significantly reduced due to coordinated inter-State operations.
Turning Point in Counter-Insurgency
1. Security Reforms
- Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) – specialized CRPF unit trained in jungle warfare.
- District Reserve Guard (DRG):
- Comprised of surrendered Maoists and ex-Salwa Judum members.
- Highly effective due to local terrain familiarity.
- Crucial in Operation Black Forest — destroyed Maoist HQ at Karregutta hills.
2. Operational Outcomes (2024–25)
- Maoists killed: ~430 (including 5 Central Committee members and 45 women cadres).
- Surrenders: ~1,450 Maoists.
- Arrests: ~1,460.
- Leadership elimination: 5 senior-most commanders, including General Secretary Basavaraju.
Internal Crisis: Ideological and Social Faultlines
1. Leadership vs. Cadre Divide
- Leaders: Predominantly upper-caste, from Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
- Cadres: Primarily tribal, especially Gonds of Chhattisgarh.
- Emerging identity friction between ideological leadership and ground-level fighters.
2. Shift in Motivation
- Tribal recruits joined not from ideology but due to cultural mobilisation — songs, plays, and propaganda by Maoist cultural wings.
- Ideological conviction diluted; tribal participation increasingly coerced or survival-driven.
3. Intellectual Decline
- In early decades, supported by urban intellectuals and students (e.g., post-Naxalbari 1967 phase).
- Today, no urban sympathy networks, weak political articulation, and loss of ideological legitimacy.
Role of State Response
1. Effective Counter-Insurgency Model
- Multi-pronged: Security + Development + Governance.
- Enhanced coordination between State Police and Central Forces under SAMADHAN doctrine (Smart Leadership, Aggressive Strategy, Motivation, etc.).
- Improved Intelligence sharing and use of drones, GIS mapping, and satellite data for real-time tracking.
- Rehabilitation & Surrender Policy: Monetary incentives, housing, skill training, and employment opportunities for surrendered Maoists.
2. Development Push
- Aspirational District Programme, Road Connectivity (PMGSY), Eklavya Model Schools, and Jan Dhan–Aadhaar–Mobile (JAM) architecture reducing isolation of tribal regions.
- Integrated Tribal Development Projects addressing the socioeconomic roots of insurgency.
Chhattisgarh – A Unique Case Study
- Unlike Andhra or Bengal, Maoism in Chhattisgarh was imported, not indigenous.
- Served as a strategic retreat zone after losses elsewhere.
- Salwa Judum (2005–07): State-sponsored militia movement —
- Initially aimed to counter Maoists but led to atrocities against tribals.
- Many displaced tribals later joined Maoists — backfiring effect.
- Now, DRG (District Reserve Guard) — formed from reformed Judum cadres — has reversed that narrative effectively.
Causes of Maoist Decline
- Leadership vacuum after deaths/arrests of key figures.
- Technological edge of security forces.
- Erosion of urban-intellectual support.
- Improved tribal welfare schemes reducing alienation.
- Diminished ideological appeal in the era of democratic empowerment.
- Internal ethnic and caste divides.
- Rise of local governance institutions (PESA, Gram Sabhas) empowering tribals directly.
- Infiltration of surrendered cadres (DRG) into Maoist structures disrupting operational secrecy.
Lessons and Way Forward
1. Security Consolidation
- Maintain high-intensity operations until complete dismantling of Maoist bases.
- Focus on border coordination among affected states.
- Deploy technology-driven policing (AI surveillance, drones, satellite tracking).
2. Governance Continuity
- Prevent re-emergence by filling the governance vacuum post-clearance.
- Prioritise land rights, forest livelihoods, and tribal inclusion.
- Implement PESA & FRA in spirit to empower Gram Sabhas.
3. Rehabilitation & Reintegration
- Strengthen surrender and rehabilitation schemes — skill training, psychological counselling, and employment.
- Showcase success stories of reformed cadres to build trust.
4. Preventing Ideological Resurgence
- Promote democratic activism and civil society participation for grievance redress.
- Encourage peaceful, rights-based movements like Niyamgiri and Sompeta, which achieved results without violence.
Broader Message
- Violence-based movements are unsustainable in democratic societies.
- The Maoist decline shows the success of India’s democratic resilience, security modernisation, and developmental governance.
- True empowerment of tribal and backward areas must come from participatory governance, not armed rebellion.
Conclusion
- The Maoist movement, once India’s gravest internal security threat, is now at its lowest ebb.
- Sustained reforms in security capacity, development outreach, and political inclusion have reversed the insurgency.
- The message is clear:
“Where democratic development delivers, extremism declines.” - The final step is ensuring that post-conflict zones remain peace zones, through justice, inclusion, and dignity for tribal communities — the true meaning of mainstreaming.
