On 23 September 2026, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court split on whether the challenge to the 2023 law on appointing the CEC and Election Commissioners should go to a Constitution Bench. The writer — who argued for the petitioners — reads the outcome as a costly delay; the episode raises enduring questions on institutional independence and judicial propriety.

• Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2 March 2023): a five-judge Constitution Bench held that, until Parliament enacts a law, the CEC and ECs shall be appointed on the advice of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha (or leader of the largest opposition party) and the Chief Justice of India.
• The CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023: replaced the Election Commission (Conditions of Service of Election Commissioners and Transaction of Business) Act, 1991.
• Section 7 — Selection Committee: the Prime Minister (Chairperson), the Leader of Opposition/leader of the largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha, and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister — the CJI is not a member.
• Section 6 — Search Committee: headed by the Minister of Law and Justice with two Secretary-level officers, prepares a panel of five names; under Section 8(2) the Selection Committee may also consider persons outside that panel.
• Section 16: protects the CEC and ECs from civil or criminal proceedings for acts or words in the discharge of official duties — the writer calls this “lifelong immunity”.
• Interim relief refused: the Court declined to stay the Act in January and March 2024; appointments were made under it.

• Justice Dipankar Datta: declined the Union's plea for a reference. Since Baranwal had already settled the principle — a body with executive predominance cannot select neutral umpires — the 2023 Act could be tested against it directly. He described the Opposition leader's role in a 2:1 committee as largely ornamental.
• Justice Satish Chandra Sharma: held that the validity of the 2023 Act had never been authoritatively decided and raised a substantial question of constitutional interpretation, warranting a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3).
• Common order: both judges asked that the matter be heard expeditiously; under Supreme Court practice, a divided two-judge Bench sends the case to the CJI, who constitutes a larger Bench.

• Delay as outcome: a reference extends the life of a statute the writer considers contrary to Baranwal; he calls the reference an implicit institutional admission that the Court did not act in time.
• Systemic, not personal, remedy: replacing an individual office-holder does not cure a structural flaw. He proposes repealing the 2023 Act and enacting a law with a neutral selection body, and revisiting the recent revision of electoral rolls.
• Ambedkar's warning: Justice Datta quoted Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's 1951 speech cautioning that if government servants influence elections, parliamentary democracy itself is endangered.
• Propriety question: it has been reported, and a curative petition alleges, that a close family member of one judge on the Bench has been empanelled counsel for the ECI before a High Court, and that this was not disclosed. The writer argues this undermines the reference order.
• Beyond the courtroom: he notes that laws once upheld by courts have later been undone politically — and argues that peaceful public pressure can achieve what litigation does not.

• Parliament's competence: Article 324(2) expressly leaves the method to a law made by Parliament, and Baranwal itself framed its committee as a stop-gap. Whether the Constitution requires a judicial member is precisely the open question.
• Separation of powers: some argue that placing the CJI on executive selection panels draws the judiciary into appointments it may later have to review.
• Presumption of constitutionality: a statute is presumed valid; a larger Bench gives a more authoritative and durable answer than a two-judge Bench setting aside an Act of Parliament.
• Article 145(3): a substantial question of constitutional interpretation is, by design, a matter for at least five judges.
• Balancing view: independence is not secured by selection alone — security of tenure, protection from removal for ECs (currently only on the CEC's recommendation), transparent criteria and post-retirement restrictions matter as much.

Drawing on 50 interviews with executives and policymakers, the writers argue that global firms do not choose “India” — they choose a State, and with it its land, power, approvals, workers and suppliers. India's best China+1 models, they suggest, are not in Vietnam or Mexico but on the outskirts of Chennai and Bengaluru.

• Tamil Nadu — the long build: decades of investment in technical education, an automobile and components cluster around Chennai, supplier depth and administrative experience. Foxconn's large iPhone assembly at Sriperumbudur and Tata Electronics at Hosur; ECMS approvals in January 2026 included component projects in the State.
• Karnataka — talent first: Bengaluru's base was software and engineering talent, not autos. Foxconn's 300-acre campus at Devanahalli targets around 50,000 jobs with a reportedly ~80% women workforce; Tata Electronics took over Wistron's plant at Narsapura (deal agreed late 2023).
• Common thread: neither ecosystem began with China+1. As one respondent put it, Tamil Nadu's base took four to five decades — no single industrial park or subsidy round can replicate it.
• Policy continuity: investors stress that commitments must survive changes of government — a test Tamil Nadu now faces after its May 2026 transition.

• Thin backward linkages: executives describe heavy reliance on China for major components; one firm reached about $600 million of a $1 billion local-sourcing target after two to three years.
• Low domestic value addition: exports were described as “assembled products” with around a fifth of inputs sourced in India.
• Incentives work — at the margin: one manufacturer explained that a tariff wall combined with a PLI payment makes imports uncompetitive. The PLI for Large-Scale Electronics Manufacturing ended on 31 March 2026; a successor was approved in July 2026.
• Regional concentration: growth is concentrated in the south and west, not in populous Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. The Centre describes the January 2026 ECMS approvals (22 proposals, ₹41,863 crore, about 33,791 direct jobs across eight States) as geographically balanced.
• Limits even in leaders: Tamil Nadu faces constraints of land, power and labour, and depends on migrant workers from northern and central States.

• Replicable quickly: land banks and plug-and-play parks (e.g. the Centre's new BHAVYA scheme), single-window approvals, reliable power, and predictable State policy.
• Replicable only slowly: technical education pipelines, supplier networks, and an administration experienced in handling large investors.
• Federal design question: spreading central subsidies thinly across States may not create ecosystems; directing them to clusters with credible State readiness may work better — but risks widening regional inequality.
• Social dimension: high women's employment at Devanahalli-type campuses can raise female labour force participation, provided housing, safety and labour standards keep pace.

Responding to ongoing street protests, the writer argues that a new language of citizenship is emerging, in which the Constitution is held in common by citizens and is defended in public spaces as much as in courts. The piece is a strong, value-laden argument; its exam value lies in the constitutional questions it raises about protest, public order and personal liberty.

• New constitutional language: the writer argues that citizens are articulating a constitutional vocabulary of dignity, autonomy and solidarity through street protest — what she calls a “constitutional jurisprudence from the streets”.
• Constitution-as-commons: the Constitution is described as a shared resource — a normative framework of citizenship that belongs to the people, not only to courts and Parliament.
• Critique of courts: she argues that courts have read “lawful protest” and “judicial discipline” too narrowly, including in bail matters involving long-incarcerated undertrials.
• Satyagraha: she calls for peaceful protest as a birthright, invoking Gandhi's talisman and Ambedkar's Preamble.

• Where the argument is strong: peaceful assembly is a core democratic freedom, and long pre-trial detention under special laws raises genuine Article 21 concerns that the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged.
• Where it is contested: Ambedkar's view was that in a constitutional democracy grievances should go through constitutional channels — courts, legislatures, elections and the press. Protest that obstructs others' rights or turns violent loses constitutional protection.
• State's duties: the police must facilitate peaceful protest as well as maintain order; proportionate force and accountability for excess are both constitutional obligations.
• The middle path: courts have generally tried to protect protest while regulating its time, place and manner — the approach in MKSS (2018) and Amit Sahni (2020).

The piece argues that the label “unskilled” is not a neutral description of ability but a classification the system sustains — one that lowers wages, justifies withholding benefits and training, and exposes workers to greater risk of injury.

• Injury risk: according to the Safe in India Foundation, automotive-sector workers earning under ₹8,000 a month lost on average 2.27 fingers per accident in 2024, against 1.54 for skilled workers earning above ₹20,000. The report links this to untrained workers being assigned to power presses.
• Wage theft: the International Institute of Migration and Development (Thiruvananthapuram) estimates that “unskilled” migrant workers in Keralam's construction and hospitality sectors faced about 40% more wage theft than skilled workers.
• Wage-setting: after worker protests over stagnant wages in Noida and New Delhi, Uttar Pradesh set interim monthly rates of ₹13,690 for unskilled and ₹16,868 for skilled workers, although both groups face the same inflation.
• Denial of benefits: the label is used to justify withholding annual increments, health benefits, safety training and personal protective equipment, and to exclude sanitation workers from hazard protocols.

• Skill as social construction: many “unskilled” jobs demand real competence; without formal certification, experience does not translate into a higher wage category. This disproportionately affects migrants, women and Dalit and Adivasi workers.
• Safety is not optional by grade: the OSH Code obliges employers to provide a safe workplace and training regardless of category; assigning hazardous machines to untrained workers is a compliance failure, not a skill problem.
• Enforcement gap: wage theft and denial of protective equipment persist because contract and migrant workers rarely have access to grievance mechanisms.
• Policy options: recognition of prior learning under NSQF, a credible national floor wage, inflation-indexed minimum wages, stronger inspections, and portable social security for inter-State migrants.