The author’s argument in one line: when a foreign country puts an Indian company on a sanctions list, the damage travels through banks, insurers, ships and fuel supplies before it reaches an ordinary household — and no single office in Delhi is watching that whole journey.

• The U.S. sanctioned four India-based companies and three Indian nationals for allegedly trading in Iranian oil and petrochemicals.
• On 24 August, under Operation Economic Outcast, the U.S. widened the sanctions threat to five Iranian sectors: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping.
• On 14 September, the U.S. sanctioned Russia’s VTB Bank, which has a branch in Delhi. Any bank dealing with it now faces risk — even though dealing with it is legal in India.
• On 16 September, the U.S. Congress passed a bill allowing the President to use tariffs as a punishment. Indian exports could face duties of up to 100% because India buys Russian oil. The Government has said it is watching the situation and will work with industry to protect Indian trade.
• From the other side, Iran is using the sea. On 23 August its Persian Gulf Strait Authority listed 45 ships as “non-compliant” — including Disha (chartered by Petronet LNG, managed by the Shipping Corporation of India) and Maha Roos, an Indian-flagged ship. Such ships can be fined, detained or seized in the Strait of Hormuz. By 14 September the list had grown to 77, and insurers were warned not to cover them.
• Awkwardly for India, the U.S. has sanctioned that very Iranian authority — so even asking it for safe passage can create a sanctions problem.

Notice the shape of the squeeze. One pressure arrives instantly through bank wires. The other waits physically at a narrow sea route. India faces both at the same time, from two opposite directions.

• In the 1990s, American laws threatened foreign companies with penalties for business done outside America. Europe replied with a Blocking Statute — a law telling European firms not to obey those American sanctions.
• When U.S. sanctions on Iran returned in 2018, European companies pulled out of Iran anyway. Their own law protected them, but losing access to American banks and dollar payments was a bigger loss.
• The lesson: a protective law changes the legal position, not the business decision. If a company cannot get paid or insured, the trade stops regardless.
• After 2022, sanctions on Russia went further still — following the goods rather than stopping at the seller. They reached chip and machine-tool suppliers, and in the oil trade, tankers, insurers, ship managers and traders.

• China says the American measures have no basis in international law and no UN Security Council backing. In May, it told Chinese firms to simply ignore U.S. sanctions on five Chinese refineries.
• India’s stated position is similar — it follows UN-mandated sanctions and rejects unilateral ones.
• But China can afford open defiance: a huge market, a state-directed economy, and control over supply chains others need. India’s much deeper financial and trade links with the U.S. make the same defiance far costlier.
• The practical difference: India can object to unilateral sanctions in principle, but it cannot instruct its companies to break them — because the companies, not the government, would pay the price.

The article ends with a line worth remembering. Sovereignty is tested twice: first when Delhi takes a decision, and again when that decision meets a New York bank or the Strait of Hormuz. India cannot move those choke points — it can only make sure every decision is taken with the full picture in view.

The BRICS New Delhi Declaration criticised unilateral Western sanctions and Israel, backed UN reform and a BRICS payment system, and even mentioned the Bandung spirit. Does this mean India has gone back to non-alignment? Two experts disagree — and the disagreement itself is the useful part.

• The declaration fits India’s existing policy of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. What is new is the optics — India is no longer apologetic about standing openly in a non-Western group.
• BRICS acts as a counterweight to the G7. India is in both worlds: it is a regular invitee to the G7 along with Australia and South Korea. He suggests the G7 should expand into a ‘D10’ including these three, which would make India a bridge between East and West.
• A joint statement lets a country say what it will not say alone. Everyone knows the phrase “unilateral coercive measures” means American action — but nobody has to name the U.S. So a group document can differ from a national statement on purpose.
• On West Asia, India is trying to look balanced on both wars, and has hidden behind UN language — borrowing from UNSC Resolution 2803 (November 2025), which created an International Stabilisation Force and a Board of Peace.
• The summit was a success of diplomatic management. Next come the ASEAN–East Asia Summit in the Philippines in November, and the PM’s visits to the U.S., Canada and Brussels, where three trade agreements are possible.

• BRICS is a political platform, not a security one. Anything under the spotlight looks bigger than it is. The declaration asks for restraint and protection of civilians, but also notes each member’s own national position — so it is a shared photograph, not a shared policy.
• This is not non-alignment. Non-alignment was the strategy of a weak state in a two-bloc world. India today wants to be one of the poles in a multipolar world. The Bandung reference is nostalgia, not policy.
• Still, the optics matter: China’s President visited India after nearly seven years, and the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince sat at the same table. The photograph is the message.
• On money, India has not agreed to a permanent BRICS payment system. There is no single settlement formula that suits everyone — and if the dollar is replaced, the next big currency would realistically be the Chinese yuan. That is a good reason for India to be cautious.
• India’s diplomatic capacity is limited, so it should pick its battles. The rooms that matter are the ones writing the rules for artificial intelligence and outer space — the next world order will be decided in small quiet rooms, not at big summits.

• Ukraine was left out. Every BRICS declaration since 2022 mentioned Ukraine; this is the first that does not. One explanation is Russian resistance — last year’s Rio declaration had criticised a Ukrainian attack without criticising Russia, so this time the subject may have been dropped altogether. Bisaria calls the silence a mistake, since a major forum should at least ask the two sides to stop fighting. Jacob adds that India had little reason to push, having leaned towards Russia in this war, even if indirectly.
• The strong criticism of Israel — over civilian deaths, attacks on Lebanon and occupation of Palestinian territory — sits oddly beside the PM’s February 2026 promise in Israel to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with it. But support for a two-state solution has always been India’s position, so the text does not contradict policy. With the UAE, Egypt, Iran and Indonesia in the room, India could only soften the language so far. In practice, ties with Israel remain strong.

• Can India stay in every camp? Being in BRICS and the Quad together is cheap while rivalry is mild. It gets expensive when each side starts demanding proof of loyalty.
• Is moving away from the dollar realistic? The dollar is used because everyone else uses it and it can be freely exchanged. The yuan cannot yet, because China restricts money flows — which is why backing a permanent alternative would be a strategic choice, not just a banking one.
• How much is a joint statement worth? Group declarations are written to keep everyone happy, so they say the least that all can accept. Their value lies in signalling and in getting leaders into one room — a caution that applies to declarations India likes as much as to those it dislikes.