Editorials/Opinions Analysis For UPSC 20 January 2026

  1. India’s Fiscal Federalism Under Strain
  2. India’s “White Space” Diplomacy


  • The article argues that India’s fiscal architecture has gradually shifted towards greater centralisation, where the Union government’s revenue buoyancy contrasts sharply with persistent fiscal stress faced by States.
  • Despite constitutional guarantees of fiscal federalism, Stateseffective spending autonomy has reduced, owing to constrained revenue mobilisation and rising dependence on conditional transfers from the Centre.
  • GS II – Cooperative federalism, Finance Commission, Article 270, cesses and surcharges, GST Council, Centre–State trust deficit, centrally sponsored schemes
  • GS III – Public finance, taxation system, GST reforms, FRBM constraints, fiscal deficits, public expenditure composition, capital vs revenue expenditure
  • Indias fiscal federalism is constitutionally designed but operationally centralised.” Examine this statement in light of the growing role of cesses, surcharges and centrally sponsored schemes. (250 words)
  • Constitutionally, India follows a quasi-federal fiscal structure, where expenditure responsibilities of States exceed their independent revenue-raising powers, making them structurally dependent on central transfers.
  • The intended balance through Finance Commission devolution and grants is increasingly undermined by the growing role of cesses and surcharges, which lie outside the divisible pool.
  • Over the past decade, gross tax revenues of the Union have expanded steadily, driven by income tax, GST stabilisation, and improved compliance through digitalisation.
  • However, the share of States in gross tax revenue has not risen proportionately, creating an asymmetry where revenue growth is increasingly concentrated at the Centre.
  • The editorial highlights that cesses and surcharges now form a significant portion of Union tax revenues, yet are not shared with States under Article 270.
  • This practice allows the Centre to bypass Finance Commission devolution, effectively reducing the States’ share even when headline devolution percentages appear unchanged.
  • Although the 15th Finance Commission recommended 41% devolution of divisible pool taxes, the actual fiscal benefit to States is diluted by the shrinking divisible base.
  • Consequently, States experience a gap between constitutionally promised transfers and realised fiscal resources, weakening trust in institutional mechanisms.
  • GST subsumed major State taxes, including VAT, excise, and entry taxes, significantly curtailing Statesindependent taxation powers.
  • The expiry of GST compensation in June 2022 exposed States to revenue volatility, while decision-making within the GST Council remains heavily Centre-driven.
  • The article notes that Statesfiscal deficits remain constrained, even as expenditure demands increase due to welfare obligations, infrastructure needs, and disaster management responsibilities.
  • Limited borrowing space under FRBM norms further restricts States’ ability to undertake counter-cyclical fiscal policies during economic slowdowns.
  • A large share of State budgets is absorbed by committed expenditures such as salaries, pensions, interest payments, and subsidies, leaving little room for capital investment.
  • This reduces States’ capacity to spend on growth-enhancing sectors like health, education, irrigation, and infrastructure, impacting long-term development outcomes.
  • The growing reliance on centrally sponsored schemes shifts spending priorities away from State-specific needs towards centrally determined objectives.
  • Conditional funding under CSS weakens State-level policy innovation and accountability, as expenditure choices are increasingly dictated by the Union government.
  • Programmes like MGNREGA illustrate fiscal stress, where delays in central releases force States to front-load expenditures, straining their cash balances.
  • Inadequate or delayed reimbursements disrupt scheme implementation and erode the credibility of welfare delivery at the grassroots level.
  • The article implicitly highlights a political economy where centralised fiscal control enhances political leverage, especially over opposition-ruled States.
  • Fiscal dependence reduces States’ bargaining power, potentially distorting cooperative federalism into asymmetric federal dominance.
  • Shrinking fiscal autonomy undermines competitive federalism, as States lack sufficient resources to differentiate policies, attract investment, or innovate service delivery.
  • Instead of healthy competition, States face uniform constraints, reducing incentives for reform and efficiency.
  • Concentration of fiscal power at the Centre risks sub-optimal public spending, as local preferences and regional disparities are inadequately addressed.
  • Weak State finances can also impair overall public investment, given States account for nearly two-thirds of capital expenditure in India.
  • Extensive use of off-budget borrowings, special purpose vehicles, and extra-budgetary resources reduces fiscal transparency at both Union and State levels.
  • This complicates assessment of true fiscal deficits and undermines Parliamentary and legislative oversight.
  • In mature federations like Canada and Germany, sub-national governments retain robust taxation powers, ensuring alignment between revenue authority and expenditure responsibility.
  • India’s growing centralisation diverges from these models, risking long-term federal imbalance.
  • Rationalising cesses and surcharges and bringing them under the divisible pool would restore credibility of Finance Commission transfers.
  • Strengthening GST Council federalism through greater consensus-based decision-making can enhance trust and revenue predictability for States.
  • States must be supported to improve own-tax revenue mobilisation, including property taxes, user charges, and better compliance mechanisms.
  • Relaxation of borrowing limits linked to reform performance and capital expenditure can provide States with growth-oriented fiscal flexibility.
  • The article underscores that fiscal federalism is not merely an accounting arrangement, but a democratic necessity for responsive governance and balanced development.
  • Without restoring States’ fiscal space, India risks weakening cooperative federalism, undermining development outcomes, and centralising accountability away from citizens.


  • The editorial argues that in a fragmented global order marked by rivalry and institutional paralysis, India’s diplomatic advantage lies in small, functional coalitions rather than overstretched universal forums.
  • GS IIIndias foreign policy, India–EU relations, BRICS, Quad, multilateral vs minilateral diplomacy, global governance reforms
  • GS III – Strategic partnerships, technology diplomacy, trade standards, supply-chain resilience, global public goods
  • In an era of institutional paralysis, influence flows through small coalitions rather than large multilateral forums.” Analyse Indias white spacediplomacy with reference to the EU, BRICS and the Quad. (250 words)
  • Inviting the European Unions institutional leadership, rather than a single national leader, signals India’s recognition that power and rule-making increasingly reside in supranational and regulatory blocs.
  • This choice reflects India’s understanding that future diplomacy will be shaped less by ceremonial bilateralism and more by collective entities controlling trade, technology, climate, and standards.
  • The editorial notes that India’s bilateral relationships will remain demanding due to neighbourhood instability, and persistent frictions with both Washington and Beijing across trade and security domains.
  • Such pressures constrain diplomatic bandwidth, making it harder for India to rely solely on traditional bilateral engagement to advance long-term strategic interests.
  • White spaces” are defined as gaps in global leadership, where problems demand coordination but no major power can credibly lead due to rivalry, legitimacy deficits, or domestic constraints.
  • These spaces present opportunities for India to act as a convener, bridge-builder, and rule-shaper, provided it selects priorities that match its material and diplomatic capacity.
  • Engagement with Europe is framed as a technocratic test, where India must deal primarily with the EU’s collective authority over trade, competition, climate, and data governance.
  • The long-pending India–EU Free Trade Agreement is less about tariffs and more about market access rules, regulatory alignment, sustainability standards, and digital governance norms.
  • If treated as a de-risking partnership, the India–EU agreement can strengthen India’s access to European markets, embed it in restructured value chains, and hedge against U.S. trade pressure.
  • However, the deal will raise compliance and adjustment costs for Indian firms, requiring domestic regulatory capacity and industrial upgrading to avoid exclusion.
  • The editorial emphasises urgency, noting that Europe’s interest in India is driven by its desire to reduce dependence on China and hedge against U.S. unpredictability.
  • Such strategic windows are temporary, and delayed Indian decision-making risks losing leverage as European priorities shift or alternative partners emerge.
  • BRICS in 2026 is portrayed as an expanded but internally fragmented grouping, with divergent member interests diluting coherence and slowing collective action.
  • The central question is no longer expansion, but purpose — what BRICS is meant to deliver, and whether it can move beyond rhetoric into practical outcomes.
  • Many BRICS members seek greater voice for the Global South, fairer representation in global institutions, and credible alternatives in development finance and economic governance.
  • These demands are legitimate but contested, making BRICS a forum where leadership must reconcile ambition with feasibility.
  • As chair and host in 2026, India has the opportunity to steer BRICS toward delivery-oriented outcomes, rather than ideological posturing or maximalist declarations.
  • The article suggests leveraging New Development Bank guarantees and practical toolkits to translate political intent into tangible development support.
  • The article cautions against careless signalling, especially amid U.S. tariff threats targeting countries perceived as aligning too closely with anti-Western blocs.
  • India gains little from BRICS drifting into anti-West rhetoric or aggressive de-dollarisation, which could undermine capital inflows and technology partnerships.
  • India’s strategic task is to separate reform from rejection, advocating fairer global governance without positioning itself as hostile to existing economic and financial systems.
  • This balancing reinforces India’s image as a moderating power, capable of engaging both the Global South and advanced economies.
  • The Quad is presented as a functional coalition rather than a formal alliance, with potential to deliver concrete public goods in the Indo-Pacific.
  • Hosting a Quad leaderssummit in 2026, potentially including U.S. President Donald Trump, would elevate expectations for tangible outcomes.
  • The Quad’s focus on maritime domain awareness, resilient ports, and capacity-building addresses the needs of Indian Ocean littoral states seeking security without entanglement.
  • This approach aligns with India’s preference for inclusive regionalism rather than bloc confrontation.
  • India’s Operation Sagar Bandhu during Cyclone Ditwah in Sri Lanka demonstrated the strategic value of rapidly deployable capabilities that deliver assistance without diplomatic friction.
  • Such examples strengthen India’s credibility as a first responder and net security provider in the region.
  • The success of Quad cooperation will depend partly on Washingtons ability to manage trade disputes with partners without allowing them to derail broader strategic collaboration.
  • Persistent trade frictions risk undermining trust and narrowing the scope of cooperation.
  • The editorial underscores that while the United Nations remains essential for legitimacy and norm-setting, it is increasingly ineffective for delivery amid great-power rivalry.
  • Decision-making and outcomes are therefore shifting toward smaller coalitions that can function even when universal consensus is absent.
  • The G-20, theoretically the premier forum for economic coordination, is increasingly constrained by domestic politics, agenda disputes, and geopolitical tensions.
  • The U.S. boycott of the Johannesburg G-20 in 2025 highlights the forum’s vulnerability and declining inclusiveness.
  • Efforts to narrow the G-20 agenda risk sidelining Global South concerns, weakening the forum’s legitimacy as a representative platform for global economic governance.
  • This creates further incentive for issue-specific coalitions outside traditional multilateral settings.
  • The article maps India’s 2026 priorities clearly: Europe for standards, BRICS for functionality, and the Quad for public goods, each serving a distinct strategic purpose.
  • Success depends on matching ambition with institutional capacity and diplomatic follow-through.
  • The AI Impact Summit in Delhi (February 2026) is highlighted as an opportunity for India to convene governments, firms, and researchers where interests partially overlap.
  • Such forums allow India to bridge regulatory and technological divides without being trapped in zero-sum geopolitics.
  • Proposals such as a U.S.-led Board of Peace and India’s potential inclusion in Pax Silica illustrate how rapidly new, issue-specific coalitions are emerging.
  • This proliferation requires India to be selective, avoiding overstretch while maximising strategic returns.
  • In a divided world, influence increasingly accrues not from hosting the largest forums, but from making smaller, focused tables deliver results.
  • India’s comparative advantage lies in convening, balancing, and operationalising coalitions rather than dominating them.
  • The editorial concludes that India’s success in 2026 will depend on its ability to convert diplomatic white spaces into working arrangements, aligning national interests with global public goods.
  • By prioritising functionality over form, India can enhance its global influence despite systemic uncertainty and great-power rivalry.

January 2026
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