Editorials & Explained — 21 November 2026
After Shenzhen: How India Can Forge a "Fourth Pole" in an Emerging World Order
The first-ever trilateral summit of the leaders of the United States, China and Russia, held at Shenzhen on 19 November 2026, suggests that the three powers now regard one another as the only actors that matter. The author contends that a genuinely multipolar order will not emerge automatically, and that India should help build a "fourth pole" constituted not by one state but by a collective of nations.
- No automatic pole status: India's population, civilisational legacy and growth make it a deserving claimant to great-power status, but such status must be achieved, not presumed. India should aim to be the friend whom others are willing to follow, rather than a self-declared Vishwaguru.
- Structural constraints: low per capita income, deepening inequality and incomplete self-reliance in arms manufacturing limit India's claim to be an economic or military pole in the near term.
- A creative pathway: just as India once shaped non-alignment, it can lead a coalition of sovereignty-minded states — from Tokyo to Brasília — that seek strategic autonomy without joining any bloc.
- Five pillars: a collective pole, a "diplomacy of conscience", a rebuilt multilateral system, a defence of international law, and common rules on nuclear arsenals.
- Polarity: the distribution of power in the international system. A unipolar order has one dominant power (the US after 1991); a bipolar order has two (the Cold War); a multipolar order has several centres of power.
- "Tri-polar" order: the author's term for a world in which only the US, China and Russia shape the rules — what he cautions against.
- Strategic autonomy: a state's capacity to take independent foreign-policy decisions on the basis of its own interests, without being bound to any alliance. It is the conceptual successor to non-alignment in Indian thinking.
- Multilateralism: cooperation among many states through common rules and institutions (the UN system), as opposed to minilateralism (small groupings such as the Quad) and transactionalism (deal-by-deal bargaining).
- Middle powers: states with significant, but not dominant, capabilities that shape outcomes mainly through coalitions and institutions.
- Panchsheel (1954): the five principles of peaceful coexistence, first set out in the India–China agreement on Tibet.
- Bandung Conference (1955): the Asian–African conference in Indonesia that laid the ground for Third World solidarity.
- Non-Aligned Movement (1961): founded at Belgrade by leaders of India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Indonesia and Ghana; it now has 120 members, making it the largest grouping of states after the UN.
- UN Security Council: 15 members — 5 permanent members with the veto and 10 elected members serving two-year terms, elected by the General Assembly with a two-thirds majority. India has served eight elected terms, most recently in 2021–22.
- UN Secretary-General: appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council (Article 97, UN Charter); the post informally rotates among regions.
- Nuclear order: the NPT (1968) recognises five nuclear-weapon states (US, Russia, UK, France, China). India is not a party; its 2003 nuclear doctrine rests on credible minimum deterrence and No First Use.
1. A collective pole. The proposed coalition would neither tolerate expansionism nor bind members to decisions taken without consulting them.
Such a grouping would draw on states as diverse as Japan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, Germany, Cameroon, the Philippines, Denmark and Brazil, united by a shared wish to preserve sovereignty.
2. A "diplomacy of conscience". Armed conflicts have, in the author's estimate, consumed nearly half a million lives in five years and disrupted supply chains and capital markets.
India should oppose mass atrocities — ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity — and make civilian protection central to any mediation, including on Ukraine, Sudan and Yemen.
- Fact-check note: the op-ed refers to "the 2024 ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh". The mass exodus of the region's ethnic Armenian population followed Azerbaijan's military offensive of September 2023; use 2023 in answers.
3. A rebuilt multilateral system. Groupings such as the G20 and BRICS help build networks of trust but cannot replace the legitimacy of universal UN forums. India could host more UN agencies and make visible sacrifices for long-term goodwill.
- UNSC 2028–29: India launched its campaign in July 2026 and faces Tajikistan, which has never served on the Council, for the single Asia-Pacific seat; the vote is due in June 2027. The author suggests India could withdraw in Tajikistan's favour to earn standing in the Global South.
- Next Secretary-General: with the incumbent's term ending on 31 December 2026 and Latin America widely seen as next in the regional rotation, India could help rally elected Council members behind a Latin American candidate.
4. Defending international law. The fourth pole should resist the "cynical transactionalism" of the present order. India could lead by ratifying core instruments: it signed the Convention Against Torture in 1997 but has not ratified it, and it is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol.
5. Standing firm on nuclear order. India cannot accept a world in which the three "foremost nuclear-armed powers" become sole arbiters of global security. The author suggests like-minded nuclear states devise common rules on strategic arsenal growth, possibly even a joint nuclear umbrella.
- Cohesion problem: the states named have sharply divergent interests and alignments — several are treaty allies of the US — so a durable "collective pole" may be easier to declare than to sustain.
- Costs of the gestures: ceding the UNSC race forgoes a rare platform after the 2021–22 term, and goodwill gained may not translate into support for India's permanent-membership claim.
- Sovereignty concerns: India's reluctance to join the Refugee Convention reflects worries about porous borders and resource burdens; ratifying the CAT would require domestic anti-torture legislation, recommended by the Law Commission (273rd Report, 2017).
- Nuclear tension: a "joint nuclear umbrella" sits uneasily with India's doctrine of an independent minimum deterrent and its No First Use pledge; extended deterrence implies alliance-like commitments India has long avoided.
- Strength of the argument: it rightly stresses that influence flows from legitimacy and coalition-building, not only from material power — consistent with India's G20 presidency (2023), when it championed the African Union's admission as a permanent member.
- Article 97, UN Charter: the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the Security Council's recommendation.
- Elected UNSC members: 10, two-year terms, 5 elected each year, not eligible for immediate re-election.
- India: signed CAT (1997), not ratified; not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol.
- NAM founded at Belgrade, 1961; Bandung Conference, 1955; Panchsheel, 1954.
"India need not wait for others to recognise its worth; it can lead in building a collective 'fourth pole' in world politics." Critically examine this view in the context of the emerging great-power order and India's tradition of strategic autonomy. 15 marks · 250 words
The Green Transition Is a Strategic Frontier: Reducing India's Clean-Energy Dependence on China
Indian strategic debate has long focused on troops, fighter jets and naval power. The author argues that an equally consequential shift is under way: the transition to clean energy is creating new centres of industrial and strategic power, with China at the forefront — and India's dependence on Chinese supply chains is now a security vulnerability.
- Two recent signals: the 10 November 2026 ban on exports of lithium-ion battery black mass, and the ₹2,814 crore scheme for domestic lithium and nickel processing, show that power will lie with those who can turn critical minerals into materials.
- China's dominance across solar, battery and mineral-processing chains is the product of decades of state-directed industrial policy, and can be used for economic coercion.
- India's gap: PLI schemes have expanded assembly, but India remains structurally dependent on Chinese cells, wafers, components and processed minerals.
- Diplomacy is not enough: neither Quad cooperation nor security ties with the US can substitute for domestic technological and manufacturing capability.
- Prescription: a proactive, state-backed industrial strategy — not autarky, but capability in critical segments and diversified supply.
- Clean-tech value chain (solar): polysilicon → ingots and wafers → cells → modules. Module assembly is the simplest step; wafers and cells require advanced technology and capital.
- Black mass: the powder produced by shredding spent lithium-ion batteries and battery-manufacturing scrap; it contains recoverable lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese but needs chemical processing (hydrometallurgy) to extract them.
- Mid-stream processing: converting ores or intermediates into high-purity compounds (e.g., lithium hydroxide, nickel sulphate) used to make battery cathodes — the stage where China's lead is greatest.
- Economic coercion / weaponised interdependence: using control over a vital supply chain — through export curbs or licensing — to exert political pressure on other states.
- Resource nationalism: efforts by mineral-rich states to capture more value at home, e.g., Indonesia's ban on nickel-ore exports (2020), Zimbabwe's ban on raw lithium-ore exports (2022) and Chile's National Lithium Strategy (2023).
- Black-mass export ban: DGFT Notification No. 49/2026-27 of 10 November 2026 moved lithium-ion battery black mass (ITC(HS) 85491400) from "Free" to "Prohibited", to retain feedstock for domestic recyclers. It complements the ₹1,500 crore critical-mineral recycling incentive scheme (September 2025).
- Capex Support Scheme to Promote Critical Mineral Processing (Cabinet, 4 November 2026): outlay ₹2,814 crore for FY 2026-27 to 2030-31; a 30% capital subsidy for four plants — two lithium units (at least 30 kt each) and two nickel units (at least 50 kt each), with cobalt recovered as a by-product of nickel processing.
- Support caps: ₹500 crore per lithium beneficiary and ₹900 crore per nickel beneficiary, released in three milestone-linked tranches; beneficiaries chosen by technical qualification followed by bidding on the lowest capital support sought.
- PLI for high-efficiency solar PV modules (₹24,000 crore across two tranches, 2021–22) — aims at integrated manufacturing from polysilicon to modules.
- PLI for Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) battery storage (May 2021, ₹18,100 crore, 50 GWh target).
- ALMM (Approved List of Models and Manufacturers): List-I for modules, and a List-II for cells to curb reliance on imported cells in government-backed projects.
- National Green Hydrogen Mission (January 2023, ₹19,744 crore, 5 MMT a year by 2030).
- KABIL (2019) — a JV of NALCO, HCL and MECL; in January 2024 it signed an agreement for five lithium brine blocks in Catamarca, Argentina, still at the exploration stage.
- National Critical Mineral Mission (January 2025) — ₹34,300 crore over seven years across the value chain. (See the 20 November editorial analysis for details.)
- Partnerships: Mineral Security Partnership (India joined 2023) and the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative (2025).
- 1. Close upstream gaps: PLI schemes are commendable but insufficient; upstream production and domestic value addition need sustained investment in chemistry, metallurgy and materials science. The new capex scheme's success will depend on timely commissioning, mineral feedstock and domestic expertise.
- 2. Partner, not just extract: Indian missions in the Global South must pursue long-term mineral partnerships. Resource-rich states — Chile, Argentina, the DRC, Indonesia, Zambia, Zimbabwe — increasingly want more value at home, so India should partner in processing and manufacturing, not simply import raw materials.
- 3. "Technological multi-alignment": develop next-generation alternatives — sodium-ion and solid-state batteries, green hydrogen — alongside lithium-based technologies, and translate research into production through patient capital, industry–academia links and public procurement.
- 4. Scale recycling: recover critical minerals from batteries, solar panels and e-waste, and build domestic refining capacity.
- 5. Cooperate on standards: work with technologically advanced partners on research, manufacturing and common standards for green technologies.
The Ukraine crisis showed how pipelines that once brought prosperity to Western Europe — cheap Russian gas — became sources of vulnerability.
Without a resilient clean-tech base, India risks trading its dependence on West Asian oil for a deeper dependence on Chinese supply chains. In the author's framing, sovereignty in the 21st century will not rest on military power alone.
- Cost trade-off: Chinese components are cheap; replacing them raises the cost of solar and storage in the short run, which could slow India's 500 GW non-fossil target.
- Feedstock risk: the export ban secures black mass, but domestic recyclers still need the technology and scale to process it efficiently; low-grade black mass may yield little.
- Technology access: China has proposed curbs on exporting advanced PV technology and equipment, so India may need to develop or license wafer and cell know-how from other partners.
- Not autarky: the author explicitly rejects making every component at home; the aim is de-risking through capability in critical segments plus diversified sources — a balanced position.
- Links to other policy: the argument complements the National Critical Mineral Mission and the case for material security made in the 20 November editorial on critical minerals.
- The DGFT (Ministry of Commerce & Industry) changes export policy items from "Free" to "Restricted" or "Prohibited".
- The Lithium Triangle = Argentina, Bolivia, Chile; Salar de Uyuni (Bolivia) is the world's largest salt flat.
- Sodium-ion batteries use abundant sodium instead of lithium and need no cobalt or nickel, reducing mineral dependence.
- Capex scheme: 30% capital subsidy · 2 lithium + 2 nickel plants · FY27–FY31.
"The clean-energy transition is creating new centres of industrial and strategic power." In this context, examine India's dependence on Chinese clean-technology supply chains and suggest a strategy that balances energy-transition goals with strategic autonomy. 15 marks · 250 words


