The third edition of Sagarmanthan: The Great Oceans Dialogue opened in New Delhi with the Prime Minister calling for a “free, open, secure and rules-based maritime order”. The phrase rests on three foundations worth knowing from the ground up: international law of the sea, India’s maritime geography, and a decade of maritime policy-building.

• India sits astride the Indian Ocean’s main east–west sea lanes, between the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb to the west and the Strait of Malacca to the east.
• Major ports are governed by the Major Port Authorities Act, 2021, which replaced the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. Vadhavan (Palghar, Maharashtra), approved in 2024, is being built as a deep-draft, all-weather port.

• Lothal (Gujarat): a Harappan site (c. 2400 BCE) with a brick basin identified by excavator S.R. Rao as one of the world’s earliest dockyards. Some archaeologists still debate that reading. A National Maritime Heritage Complex is being built at the site.
• The Cholas: Rajendra Chola I’s naval expedition against Srivijaya (c. 1025 CE) marks the peak of Indian naval reach into Southeast Asia.
• Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj: raised a standing Maratha navy and sea forts such as Sindhudurg (1664–67) and Vijaydurg. The Indian Navy’s ensign (2022) draws on his royal seal.
• Prelims hook: Maratha Military Landscapes — 12 forts, including Sindhudurg, Vijaydurg, Suvarnadurg and Khanderi — were inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in July 2025.

• SAGAR — Security and Growth for All in the Region (2015): set out in Mauritius; India as a net security provider and development partner in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
• Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI, 2019): launched at the East Asia Summit, Bangkok, with seven pillars — maritime security; maritime ecology; maritime resources; capacity-building and resource-sharing; disaster risk reduction; science, technology and academic cooperation; and trade connectivity and maritime transport.
• MAHASAGAR — Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (2025): announced in Mauritius in March 2025, widening SAGAR’s logic to the Global South.
• Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), Gurugram (2018): the Navy-run hub for maritime domain awareness, hosting liaison officers from partner navies.

• Sagarmala Programme (2015): Cabinet-approved port-led development on four pillars — port modernisation, port connectivity, port-led industrialisation and coastal community development.
• Maritime India Vision 2030 (2021) → Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 (2023): the longer roadmap, which the Government estimates needs about ₹80 lakh crore of investment. It aims to place India among the top five shipbuilding nations by 2047 (government target).
• PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan (2021): a GIS-based platform that integrates rail, road, port and inland-waterway planning.
• New-generation maritime laws (2025): the Bills of Lading Act (replacing an 1856 law), the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (replacing 1925), the Merchant Shipping Act (replacing 1958), the Indian Ports Act (replacing 1908) and a new Coastal Shipping Act.
• Shipbuilding and maritime package (September 2025): a ₹69,725 crore package, including a Maritime Development Fund and extended shipbuilding financial assistance.

• India–EU Green Shipping Corridor: pairs India’s potential to produce green ammonia and methanol with European fuel demand. After a 2025 pre-feasibility study, an industry coalition was formally launched, with RMI as the associated partner.
• India–Republic of Korea: a review of the Comprehensive Framework for Partnership in Shipbuilding, Shipping and Maritime Logistics after the April 2026 summit, within the Special Strategic Partnership (2015).
• IMEC governance: a curtain-raiser on turning the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor — announced at the G20 New Delhi Summit (September 2023) — from vision into working institutions.
• Measuring the blue economy: the OECD Blue Economy Scoreboards as a benchmark for evidence-based ocean policy.
• Africa’s maritime corridors: routes such as the Lobito Corridor, linking Angola’s Atlantic port to the mineral belts of the DRC and Zambia, as alternatives to chokepoint-exposed routes.

• Trade dependence: by government estimates, around 95% of India’s trade by volume and about 70% by value moves by sea. Chokepoint shocks, such as the Red Sea attacks since late 2023, feed directly into freight costs and prices.
• Rules as leverage: a middle power gains more from UNCLOS-based predictability than from contests of naval tonnage. India’s acceptance of the 2014 India–Bangladesh maritime boundary award, which went largely against it, is cited as evidence that it practises the rule it preaches.
• Green transition: the IMO 2023 Revised GHG Strategy targets net-zero shipping by or around 2050. Green corridors are how fuel producers like India hope to capture that market, linked to the National Green Hydrogen Mission (2023).
• Convening power: a Track-1.5 dialogue lets India shape agendas on IMEC, African corridors and Indo-Pacific connectivity without the commitments of a treaty forum.

• Shipbuilding gap: India’s share of global shipbuilding remains below 1%, against the dominance of China, South Korea and Japan. Partnership rhetoric runs ahead of yard capacity.
• Flag and fleet: much of India’s EXIM cargo still moves on foreign-flagged ships, so freight earnings flow abroad — the core problem the 2025 package is meant to address.
• Green fuels are not yet commercial: green ammonia and methanol cost far more than fossil bunker fuel, and adoption of the IMO Net-Zero Framework was deferred in October 2025, weakening the demand signal.
• Coastal communities: large projects such as Vadhavan have drawn objections from fishing communities over livelihoods and ecology; balancing expansion with Coastal Regulation Zone norms remains contested.
• Framing vs delivery: labels such as maritime “Vishwaguru”, used in the Ministry’s framing, may sit uneasily with partners. Credibility rests on delivery — capacity-building, hydrography, disaster response.

• Samudra manthan: the Puranic churning of the ocean that yielded amrit, the source of the dialogue’s name and of the “amrit for the world” framing.
• UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD): est. 1964, Geneva; publishes the annual Review of Maritime Transport.
• Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): headquartered in Beijing, operational since 2016; India is its second-largest shareholder.
• Observer Research Foundation (ORF): New Delhi think-tank; co-organiser of Sagarmanthan and the Raisina Dialogue.

The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) has released its second roadmap for environmental-economic accounting, widening coverage to forests, minerals, soil, land, water and carbon stock. The aim is to measure what GDP leaves out: the drawing-down of natural capital.

• UN Statistical Commission (UNSC): est. 1947, a functional commission of ECOSOC; the apex body that sets global statistical standards.
• System of National Accounts (SNA): the global standard for GDP, with editions in 1953, 1968, 1993, 2008 and 2025. The 2025 SNA, adopted in March 2025, records the depletion of natural resources as a cost of production in net measures — the shift the MoSPI release refers to.
• SEEA Central Framework (SEEA-CF): adopted in 2012 as the first international statistical standard for environmental-economic accounting.
• SEEA Ecosystem Accounting (SEEA-EA): adopted in 2021; measures ecosystem extent, condition and services, with guidance on monetary valuation.
• Thematic extensions: SEEA-Water, SEEA-Energy and SEEA-Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (SEEA-AFF).

• Expert Group on Green National Accounts (2011–13): constituted by MoSPI under economist Sir Partha Dasgupta. Its report, “Green National Accounts in India: A Framework” (2013), recommended a phased, SEEA-aligned build-up and still guides MoSPI’s choice of subjects.
• NCAVES project (2017–2021): Natural Capital Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services, funded by the EU and run by UNSD and UNEP in five countries — Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa.
• EnviStats India (since 2018): the annual publication carrying India’s SEEA-based environmental accounts.
• National Statistics Office (NSO): formed in 2019 by merging the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO).
• Strategy 2022–2026: the first roadmap, prioritising Material Flow Accounts, Ocean Accounts, Energy Accounts and thematic accounts for biodiversity and urban areas.

• A truer growth picture: depletion-adjusted measures show whether growth is drawing down the asset base — vital for an economy that leans on minerals and groundwater.
• Fiscal federalism already prices nature: the 14th Finance Commission gave 7.5% weight to forest cover, and the 15th gave 10% to forest and ecology in tax devolution. Better accounts make such formulae more defensible.
• Climate accounting: carbon-stock accounts connect to India’s NDC target of an additional 2.5–3 billion tonnes CO₂e sink by 2030. The ISFR 2023 puts forest carbon stock at 7,285.5 million tonnes and forest-plus-tree cover at 25.17% of geographical area.
• Global commitments: Target 14 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (2022) asks countries to integrate biodiversity values into national accounting; SDG indicator 15.9.1(b) tracks SEEA implementation.

• Satellite, not core: the accounts sit beside GDP, not inside the headline number. Without a link to budgets and project appraisal, they risk remaining an academic exercise.
• Valuation disputes: pricing ecosystem services such as pollination or cultural value relies on contested methods, and critics warn that monetising nature can make it appear tradeable.
• Fragmented data: inputs come from many agencies — the Forest Survey of India, Central Ground Water Board, Indian Bureau of Mines, CPCB — on different cycles (the ISFR is biennial) and definitions.
• Uneven State capacity: the strategy is advisory, and few State statistical bureaus are equipped for SEEA work. Ecosystems also cross the administrative boundaries along which policy is made.

• Inclusive wealth: produced + human + natural capital — the measure championed by the Dasgupta Review (UK, 2021), The Economics of Biodiversity.
• Domestic Material Consumption (DMC): domestic extraction plus imports minus exports of materials — a core circular-economy indicator.
• Ocean accounts: SEEA-based accounts of marine ecosystems and the blue economy.

At the Pre-COP31 ministerial meeting in Fiji, India argued that the climate regime’s goals are already settled. COP31 at Antalya, Türkiye (November 2026), it said, should be judged by how far it closes gaps in the means of implementation — finance, technology and capacity.

• Adopted at COP21 (December 2015), in force from 4 November 2016; India ratified on 2 October 2016.
• Article 2: hold warming well below 2°C and pursue efforts toward 1.5°C. Article 2.2 reaffirms CBDR-RC “in the light of different national circumstances”.
• Article 4: Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) every five years, each a progression on the last.
• Article 7.5: adaptation guided by science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge and knowledge of indigenous peoples — the legal peg for India’s “science vs traditional knowledge” gap.
• Articles 9, 10 and 11 — “Means of Implementation”: finance (developed countries “shall provide” financial resources, Art. 9.1), technology transfer and capacity-building.
• Article 13: the Enhanced Transparency Framework. Article 14: the Global Stocktake (GST) every five years; the first concluded at COP28, Dubai (2023), the second falls in 2028.

• Consensus: agreement on long-term goals already exists. COP31 should build consensus on gaps in understanding — between science and traditional/community knowledge, between practice and ethics, and between available resources and felt needs.
• Decision-making: the key decision is for Parties to fulfil existing commitments “in true letter and spirit”, and to enable every Party to do so.
• Implementation: target gaps where need is greatest and impact visible to most people; expand capacity-building; showcase each year concrete cases of high-impact mitigation, large-scale adaptation and delivered means of implementation.
• Yardstick for Antalya: success should be judged not by new targets or declarations but by faster implementation, support reaching those in need and existing solutions scaled up.

• USD 100 billion goal: pledged at Copenhagen (2009) for 2020 and formalised at Cancún (2010). The OECD reports it was first met only in 2022, largely through loans.
• New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), COP29 Baku (2024): at least USD 300 billion a year by 2035, with developed countries “taking the lead”, and a call to scale all flows to USD 1.3 trillion a year by 2035. India formally objected to its adoption, calling the sum inadequate.
• Loss and damage: the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage was operationalised at COP28 (2023).
• Adaptation: COP30 (Belém) called for at least tripling adaptation finance by 2035 and adopted indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation.

• Tuvalu: a Pacific nation of nine islands, most of its land only a few metres above sea level. Under the Falepili Union treaty (2023), up to 280 Tuvaluans a year may migrate to Australia — an early model of climate mobility.
• Fiji: the first country to ratify the Paris Agreement (2016); it presided over COP23 (2017, held in Bonn), which launched the Talanoa Dialogue.
• SIDS and AOSIS: Small Island Developing States and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS, 1990) pushed 1.5°C into the Paris text. India’s tribute to Tuvalu signals Global South solidarity, even as island states press all large emitters, India included, on ambition.

• Shifts the burden of proof: judging success by delivery keeps attention on developed countries’ Article 9 obligations rather than on fresh demands on developing countries’ NDCs.
• Equity in the numbers: India points out that it is home to about 17% of humanity but accounts for under 4% of cumulative historical emissions.
• Coalitions: India negotiates within BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China; formed 2009) and the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC).
• Road to 2028: India has offered to host COP33 in 2028, the year of the second Global Stocktake — so implementation metrics are of direct national interest.

• The ambition gap: small island states and the EU argue that implementation without higher ambition cannot keep 1.5°C in reach; UNEP’s annual Emissions Gap Reports show current NDCs fall well short.
• Eroding commitments: the United States’ second withdrawal from the Paris Agreement took effect in January 2026, shrinking the finance pool India wants honoured.
• Rising legal pressure: the ICJ’s advisory opinion (July 2025), sought at Vanuatu’s initiative, held that states have binding obligations under international law to act on climate change. Those duties apply to all states, though differentiated by CBDR-RC.
• “Gaps in understanding” is open-ended: without metrics, the call can become a reason to defer decisions; as a likely COP33 host, India will need to define what success looks like.
• Domestic delivery: non-fossil capacity has crossed 50%, but coal still dominates electricity generation.

• Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB): created at COP21 (2015) to address capacity gaps in developing countries.
• Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP): the UNFCCC platform for traditional knowledge, established at COP21.
• Talanoa Dialogue: the Fiji-led, story-sharing dialogue (2018) that fed into raising NDC ambition.
• Falepili Union: the Australia–Tuvalu treaty on climate mobility and security.