This document is UPSC exam-oriented. All analyses follow GS Paper pattern. | legacyias.com
- 1Iran-Israel War: Iran Vows Not to Attack NeighboursGS II & III
- 2Strait of Hormuz Closure & India’s ResponseGS III
- 3LPG Price Hike Amid West Asia CrisisGS III
- 4India-Canada Uranium Deal (₹2.6 Billion, Cameco)GS III
- 5Nepal Elections: Balen Shah & RSP LandslideGS II
- 6CSE State of India’s Environment Report 2026GS III
- 7Govt. Withdraws Revised Earthquake Zoning NotificationGS III
- 8India’s Navy Escort Consideration for Persian Gulf ShipsGS II & III
- 9Gurmeet Ram Rahim Acquitted in Journalist Murder CaseGS II
- 10Breast Cancer Incidence Doubles in India in 30 YearsGS II
- ★SEO-Optimised FAQs for StudentsAll GS
- On Day 8 of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict (dubbed Operation Epic Fury), Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian declared Iran would not target neighbouring countries unless attacked first.
- However, Iran vowed all U.S. and Israeli military assets in the region are “legitimate targets.” U.S. claims over 3,000 strikes on Iran in one week; Iran retaliated with 8+ missile salvos at Israel.
- Dubai Airport was temporarily closed; Arab countries faced drone/missile attacks; Lebanon saw Israeli airborne raids killing 40+.
- Iran’s Strategic Doctrine: Iran follows a doctrine of “forward defence” — supporting proxy forces (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis) to deter adversaries before conflict reaches Iranian soil.
- JCPOA (2015): Iran nuclear deal collapsed after U.S. withdrawal (2018); successive escalations led to killing of Gen. Qasem Soleimani (2020), multiple retaliations.
- Khatam al-Anbiya: Iran’s military headquarters coordinating all armed forces — Army, IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), and Basij.
- Hormuz Threat: Article 3 of the UNCLOS does not prevent Iran from threatening passage, only denying “innocent passage” in territorial waters is prohibited.
- India’s Concern: ~40% of India’s crude oil, 50% of LNG imports transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
| Dimension | Iran’s Position | U.S./Israel Position | India’s Interest |
|---|---|---|---|
| Military | Retaliation against U.S.+Israeli bases; 220 casualties claimed | 3,000+ strikes; targeting Iran’s Air Force, infrastructure | Navy escort consideration; Operation Sankalp precedent |
| Diplomatic | Won’t target neighbours; seeks regional peace narrative | Trump demands “unconditional surrender” | Jaishankar’s “humanitarian” IRIS Lavan decision at Raisina Dialogue |
| Economic | Controls Hormuz leverage; 1 in 5 ships through Strait = Iranian | Committed to keeping shipping lanes open | LPG hiked ₹60; LNG from Qatar disrupted; alt. Russian oil supply |
| Humanitarian | Water infra attacked (Qeshm Island desalination) | Denies civilian targeting | Hosted IRIS Lavan crew (young cadets) at Kochi |
- IRGC vs U.S. CENTCOM
- Hezbollah in Lebanon
- Houthi-Red Sea link
- India’s Navy role
- Strait of Hormuz blockade
- LPG/LNG supply disruption
- Brent crude below $90
- India’s Russian oil waiver
- India’s “strategic autonomy”
- Raisina Dialogue 2026
- UNCLOS obligations
- Sri Lanka: IRIS Dena
- Innocent passage rights
- Hague Convention
- Neutral state obligations
- ICRC role
- Escalation risk: Neither party signals de-escalation; Lebanon now pulled into multi-front war.
- India’s strategic tightrope: India depends on U.S. for trade deals, Russia for oil, Iran for Chabahar port access and LNG. Balancing all three simultaneously is increasingly untenable.
- Humanitarian law violations: Attacks on Qeshm Island desalination plant and civilian airports raise serious violations of customary international humanitarian law (IHL).
- India’s IRIS Dena dilemma: Allowing a ship from a warring state to dock at Kochi sets a diplomatic precedent — India must define its “neutrality” doctrine clearly.
- Iran-Iraq War (1980s): Tanker War precedent — U.S. escorted ships under Kuwaiti flag; India painted “INDIA” on SCI ships for protection (successful precedent for current crisis).
- Houthi attacks 2023–24: India’s Operation Sankalp — deployed INS Visakhapatnam and INS Chennai; boarding parties inspected vessels — a useful precedent.
- Short-term: India must operationalise Navy escorts immediately; diversify LPG supply via spot markets (U.S., Australia); invoke Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).
- Long-term: Accelerate domestic LPG production (order to refineries already issued); push renewable energy to reduce oil dependency (SDG 7 — Affordable Clean Energy).
- Diplomatic: India should use its non-permanent UNSC membership influence and G20 presidency legacy to push for ceasefire dialogue; leverage BRICS forum for regional de-escalation.
- Constitutional angle: Article 51 of Indian Constitution directs India to promote international peace and maintain just relations among nations.
- IRGC = Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Iran’s parallel military; listed as terror org by U.S. since 2019)
- Operation Epic Fury = U.S.-Israel joint military operation against Iran (2026)
- Khatam al-Anbiya = Iran’s armed forces joint headquarters
- Operation Sankalp = Indian Navy mission to ensure maritime security in Gulf of Oman
- IRIS Dena = Iranian Navy frigate sunk by U.S. submarine near Sri Lanka coast
- Raisina Dialogue = India’s flagship geopolitics conference, organized by MEA + ORF
- UNCLOS Article 19 = defines “innocent passage” in territorial waters
- Article 51 of Indian Constitution = Directive Principle for international peace
“The Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict of 2026 has placed India in a complex strategic dilemma. Analyse India’s response to the crisis from the lens of energy security, strategic autonomy, and international humanitarian obligations.” (250 words)
“How does the conflict in West Asia threaten India’s energy security? What immediate and structural measures should India adopt?” (150 words)
1. It connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman
2. Iran and Oman share sovereignty over the strait
3. Over 20% of global oil and gas shipments pass through it
4. India’s Shipping Corporation painted “INDIA” on ships during the Iran-Iraq War to avoid attacks
Select the correct answer using the code below:
- (a) 1 and 3 only
- (b) 1, 3, and 4 only
- (c) 2, 3, and 4 only
- (d) 1, 2, 3, and 4
- Since February 28, ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen by 95%; ~600 ships stranded (200 oil tankers, 50 gas carriers, 250 bulk carriers).
- Insurance premiums have surged 10–15x; 40% of India’s crude oil and 50% of its LNG pass through the strait — making this a direct national security issue for India.
- Width: Only 33 km at its narrowest (between Iran and Oman/UAE)
- Daily throughput (normal): ~21 million barrels of oil/day (~20% of global oil, 40% of global LNG trade)
- India’s dependence: 40% crude oil; Qatar = 50% of India’s LNG; 30% of India’s natural gas used for fertiliser production
- Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR): India maintains reserves at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, and Padur (total ~5.33 million metric tonnes capacity)
- Alternative chokepoints: Malacca Strait, Bab-el-Mandab (Houthi-controlled), Suez Canal, Panama Canal, Bosphorus
| Chokepoint | Location | Sovereign Control | India’s Stakes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strait of Hormuz | Persian Gulf → Gulf of Oman | International (Iran+Oman bordering) | Very High — 40% crude, 50% LNG |
| Malacca Strait | SE Asia — Singapore | Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia | High — China trade leverage |
| Bab-el-Mandab | Red Sea mouth | Yemen (Houthi influenced) | High — Suez-linked trade |
| Suez Canal | Egypt | Egypt (sovereign) | Medium — EU-India trade route |
| Panama Canal | Central America | Panama (sovereign) | Low direct impact |
- Over-dependence on single route: Despite years of energy security discourse, 40% crude still transits one 33 km chokepoint — a major strategic failure.
- Fertiliser-food nexus: 30% of India’s natural gas → fertiliser → agriculture. Disruption risks food security (SDG 2), especially in kharif season.
- Shipping insurance gap: India currently needs U.S. IDFC help for maritime insurance — revealing structural dependence on Western financial systems.
- Qatar LNG halt: Qatar shut LNG production when conflict began; India has no immediate substitute for 50% LNG import volume.
- Expand Strategic Petroleum Reserve from current 5.33 MMT to 15 MMT (IEA recommends 90 days import cover)
- Diversify LNG sourcing: U.S. LNG (Henry Hub), Australian LNG contracts, Russian pipeline alternatives
- Chabahar Port development accelerated — India can directly access Central Asian energy bypassing the strait
- Push domestic natural gas production (KG-D6 basin) and renewables to reduce import dependency (National Green Hydrogen Mission)
- Develop robust maritime insurance ecosystem — create an India-backed marine insurance facility (like Lloyd’s of London model)
- India’s SPR locations: Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh), Mangaluru, Padur (Karnataka)
- IEA mandate: Member countries must maintain 90 days’ import cover as strategic reserve
- Qatar’s LNG share: ~50% of India’s LNG imports; Qatar world’s largest LNG exporter
- Operation Sankalp: Indian Navy launched 2019 in Gulf of Oman for maritime security
- Brent crude: Global oil price benchmark (North Sea crude); Indian basket also includes Dubai/Oman grades
- Lloyds List Intelligence: Premier maritime data and insurance information provider
“The near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed critical vulnerabilities in India’s energy security architecture. Critically examine India’s energy security challenges and suggest a comprehensive roadmap to address them.” (250 words)
1. Visakhapatnam — Andhra Pradesh
2. Mangaluru — Karnataka
3. Padur — Kerala
4. Bikaner — Rajasthan
Which of the above pairs are correctly matched?
- (a) 1 and 2 only
- (b) 1, 2, and 3 only
- (c) 1 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2, and 4 only
- Domestic LPG prices hiked by ₹60/cylinder (14.2 kg); commercial cylinders up ₹114.50, taking Delhi price to ₹1,883. Total non-subsidised LPG now ₹913 in Delhi.
- The hike is driven by global price surge following disruption in tanker movement through the Strait of Hormuz. Government cites ₹1,050 break-even cost vs current ₹913 — still below cost.
- Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY): Launched 2016, provides LPG connections to BPL households; 10 crore+ beneficiaries; ₹300 subsidy on up to 12 refills/year
- LPG composition: Mixture of propane and butane; ~60% of India’s LPG comes from imports (mostly from Persian Gulf)
- Pricing mechanism: India uses a dynamic pricing model where OMCs (IOCL, BPCL, HPCL) revise prices monthly based on import parity
- Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT): Subsidy transferred directly to bank accounts; eliminated ghost beneficiaries saving ₹50,000+ crore (Pahal scheme, world’s largest DBT)
- India’s LPG import dependence: ~60%; Strait of Hormuz is critical transit route for Persian Gulf LPG exports
| Category | Before Hike | After Hike | Net Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Non-subsidised (Delhi) | ₹853 | ₹913 | +₹60 (+7%) |
| PMUY beneficiaries | After ₹300 subsidy: ₹553 | ₹613 | +₹60 (subsidy unchanged) |
| Commercial cylinder (Delhi) | ₹1,768.50 | ₹1,883 | +₹114.50 |
| Per person per day | — | ~20 paise/day (govt. claim) | Marginal per capita impact |
| Break-even cost | ₹1,050/cylinder | Still subsidised implicitly | |
- Regressive impact: While ₹20 paise/day sounds trivial, for households spending 30–40% income on food, energy costs directly affect nutrition and welfare.
- PMUY limitation: Low-income families often cannot afford full refills even with subsidy, leading to “stranded beneficiary” syndrome — connections without usage.
- Inflation spiral: LPG hike feeds into food inflation (cooking costs → restaurant prices → CPI); compounded by global crude price surge.
- Structural dependence: 60% LPG from imports with no short-term alternative — India has limited domestic LPG production capacity.
- Government invoked emergency powers to ramp up domestic LPG refinery production — proactive supply-side intervention.
- No hike in petrol/diesel announced — OMC profits from earlier months act as buffer; helps contain transport inflation.
- Subsidy architecture (PMUY + DBT) ensures most vulnerable are partially shielded.
- Scale up biogas/CBG (Compressed Biogas) as cooking fuel alternative; SATAT scheme (Sustainable Alternative Towards Affordable Transportation) targets 5,000 CBG plants
- Strengthen PMUY subsidy to cover at least 18 refills/year (currently 12) to protect poorest households
- Diversify LPG sourcing — USA, Australia, and domestic propane extraction from refineries
- Accelerate Pradhan Mantri Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana (solar rooftops) to reduce cooking energy costs for households
- Link to SDG 7 (Affordable Clean Energy) and SDG 1 (No Poverty) — India’s energy access goals must account for price volatility buffers
- LPG = Liquefied Petroleum Gas (propane + butane mixture)
- Ujjwala Yojana: Launched May 1, 2016; targets BPL women; 10 crore+ connections
- Pahal Scheme: DBTL (Direct Benefit Transfer for LPG) — world’s largest cash transfer scheme (Guinness record)
- OMCs: Oil Marketing Companies = IOCL, BPCL, HPCL
- SATAT: Sustainable Alternative Towards Affordable Transportation — biogas scheme under MoPNG
- Break-even price: ₹1,050/cylinder — government absorbs ₹137 loss per cylinder even at revised price
“Rising LPG prices disproportionately affect the poor despite subsidy architecture. Critically evaluate India’s LPG subsidy policy and suggest structural reforms to ensure energy access equity.” (150 words)
1. It was launched in 2016 to provide LPG connections to BPL women households
2. Under PMUY, a ₹300 subsidy is provided on up to 12 refills annually
3. The scheme is funded entirely by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
4. India’s Pahal scheme holds a Guinness World Record for the largest cash transfer
Which of the above statements are correct?
- (a) 1, 2, and 4 only
- (b) 1 and 3 only
- (c) 2, 3, and 4 only
- (d) 1, 2, 3, and 4
- India signed a CAD $2.6 billion deal with Cameco (Canada’s top uranium producer) for supply of ~10,000 tonnes uranium between 2027–2035.
- Deal falls under the India-Canada Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA, 2010) — India must provide “fissionable material accounts” to Canada as a condition.
- India’s nuclear programme (Three-Stage): Conceived by Dr. Homi J. Bhabha to exploit India’s thorium reserves (world’s largest — 20–25%)
- Stage I: PHWRs (Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors) using natural uranium-235 → produces plutonium-239
- Stage II: Fast Breeder Reactors using U-238 + Pu-239 → produces more fuel (PFBR at Kalpakkam — advanced commissioning)
- Stage III: Advanced Heavy Water Reactors using Pu-239 + Th-232 → unlocks India’s thorium reserves
- India-U.S. 123 Agreement (2008): Enabled India’s entry into civil nuclear trade despite not signing NPT
- NSG waiver (2008): 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group gave India a “clean waiver”
- Current capacity: 24 reactors, ~9 GW; target = 100 GW by 2047
- Domestic reserves: 4.2–4.3 lakh tonnes ore; only 76,000–92,000 tonnes extractable uranium metal (low-grade: 0.02–0.45%)
- PHWRs: U-235 fuel
- 6–7 GW capacity
- By-product: Pu-239
- ~3% of India’s electricity
- Fast Breeder Reactors
- PFBR at Kalpakkam
- U-238 + Pu-239 fuel
- Produces MORE fuel
- Advanced HWRs
- Thorium-232 fuel
- India holds 20–25% world thorium
- Expected: 2060s+
- Cameco (Canada)
- Kazatomprom (Kazakhstan)
- Russia, Uzbekistan
- 5-year fuel reserve planned
- Sovereignty concern: Canada NCA requires India to share “fissionable material accounts” — critics see this as compromising nuclear sovereignty.
- NPT non-signatory paradox: More civilian uranium imports → frees up domestic ore for weapons use — potential proliferation concern globally.
- Three-stage delays: PFBR was designed in early 2000s with initial cost ₹3,492 crore; by 2019 cost doubled to ₹6,800 crore; Stage III may be in 2060s — far behind schedule.
- Land acquisition challenges: New reactor sites face local resistance and legal hurdles; Jaitapur (Maharashtra) and Kovvada (AP) projects delayed by decades.
- Canadian high-grade ore (10–100x richer than Indian ore) reduces cost of nuclear fuel significantly
- Deal supports India’s ambitious nuclear capacity target (100 GW by 2047) — critical for clean energy transition
- Diversifies uranium sources beyond Russia/Kazakhstan — reduces geopolitical supply risk
- Union Budget 2025–26 allocated ₹20,000 crore for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) — Cameco uranium supports this
- Accelerate PFBR commercial operation — reduce “doubling time” (15–20 years currently); Stage II is the gateway to Stage III
- Fast-track NSG membership to gain access to more uranium suppliers without bilateral NCA conditions
- Strengthen domestic uranium mining (Tummalapalle mine, Andhra Pradesh — one of the world’s largest uranium deposits)
- Build 5-year strategic uranium reserve as directed; link with National Green Hydrogen Mission for long-term clean energy goals
- Aligns with SDG 7 (Clean Energy), SDG 13 (Climate Action), and India’s Net Zero 2070 commitment
- Cameco: Canadian company; world’s top 3 uranium producers by volume
- NCA (2010): India-Canada Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
- PFBR: Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu (IGCAR)
- Thorium deposits: India holds 20–25% of world’s thorium (Kerala monazite sands, Jharkhand)
- NSG: 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group — controls nuclear technology/material exports
- 123 Agreement: Named after Section 123 of U.S. Atomic Energy Act; governs civilian nuclear cooperation
- INS Arihant: India’s nuclear-powered submarine using domestic uranium
- Tummalapalle mine: Andhra Pradesh — claimed to be world’s largest uranium deposit
“India’s three-stage nuclear programme is central to its long-term energy security strategy. Examine the current status of the programme, the significance of uranium import agreements, and the challenges in achieving the 100 GW nuclear target by 2047.” (250 words)
- (a) Uranium-235
- (b) Plutonium-239
- (c) Thorium-232
- (d) Uranium-238
- Nepal’s first elections since the September 2025 Gen-Z protests (which toppled Oli government; 77 killed, 19 on day 1) resulted in a landslide for the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP).
- RSP’s Balendra “Balen” Shah — rapper-turned-politician — won Jhapa-5 (former PM Oli’s home turf) by 49,614 votes margin; RSP poised for simple majority with 59 seats won + 62 leading.
- RSP chief Rabi Lamichhane won Chitwan-2 for his third consecutive victory.
- Nepal’s political system: Federal Democratic Republic; mixed electoral system (First-Past-The-Post + Proportional Representation)
- Traditional parties: Nepali Congress (oldest democratic party) and CPN-UML (communist) have dominated since 1990s
- September 2025 protests: Youth-led uprising demanding political reform, end to corruption; Oli resigned Sept 9 after 77 deaths
- India-Nepal relations: Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950; open border; ~8 million Nepali workers in India; BIPPA, power purchase agreements (Arun-3, Upper Karnali)
- RSP (Rastriya Swatantra Party): Founded 2022 by Rabi Lamichhane; anti-establishment, youth-centric platform; “third force” in Nepali politics
| Dimension | Implication for India |
|---|---|
| Diplomatic | New RSP government may seek to rebalance Nepal’s India-China tilt; Balen’s anti-establishment stance could mean less predictable bilateralism |
| Economic | Power trade agreements (Arun-3, Upper Karnali) need to be renegotiated; RSP may push for better terms for Nepal |
| Security | Open border management; anti-India sentiment during protests (some protests targeted Indian Embassy) needs diplomatic management |
| Connectivity | India’s Raxaul-Kathmandu rail link, cross-border transmission lines at risk of renegotiation under new nationalist government |
- India should engage RSP/Balen government proactively — early outreach to establish goodwill before China makes inroads
- Review the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship which Nepal has periodically demanded revision of
- Accelerate hydropower cooperation deals — this is RSP’s key economic priority and aligns with India’s clean energy needs
- India’s “Neighbourhood First Policy” must be operationalised with concrete deliverables beyond diplomatic visits
- RSP = Rastriya Swatantra Party, founded 2022 by Rabi Lamichhane
- India-Nepal Treaty (1950): Open border, free movement, national treatment — controversial “unequal” treaty per Nepal
- BIPPA: Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (India-Nepal)
- Arun-3 project: 900 MW hydropower project in Nepal; SJVN (India) developer
- CPN-UML: Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) — KP Sharma Oli’s party
- Nepal’s capital: Kathmandu; Constitution declared Federal Democratic Republic in 2015
“Nepal’s political realignment following the 2025 Gen-Z protests presents both challenges and opportunities for India. Analyse the implications of Nepal’s new political landscape for India’s ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’.” (250 words)
1. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal was signed in 1950
2. Nepal citizens enjoy national treatment (same rights as Indian citizens) in India under the 1950 treaty
3. The Arun-3 hydropower project in Nepal is being developed by NTPC
4. India and Nepal share an open border under the 1950 treaty
- (a) 1, 2, and 4 only
- (b) 1 and 4 only
- (c) 2 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2, 3, and 4
- The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) released its annual State of India’s Environment report (published since 1982) showing a stark deterioration in 2025.
- Extreme weather events recorded on 99% of days in 2025; 4,419 deaths; 17.41 million hectares of crop area affected — a sharp spike from 2024 (88% days, 3,393 deaths).
| Year | Days with Extreme Weather | Deaths | Crop Area Affected |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 89% of days | 3,208 | 2.09 million hectares |
| 2024 | 88% of days | 3,393 | 3.61 million hectares |
| 2025 | 99% of days | 4,419 | 17.41 million hectares |
- 99% of days in 2025
- HP worst hit (267 days)
- Kerala (173 days)
- MP (162 days)
- 43 people killed (Jan–Jun 2025)
- 40% tiger territory overlaps with 60M people
- Overcrowding in reserves
- Tigers venturing outside PAs
- Only 15% population near monitors
- 85% (1.2B people) — unmonitored air
- Concentrated in state capitals
- Industrial belts — no real-time data
- Climate already shaping rivers
- Need: Pre-disaster resilience
- Nature-based solutions needed
- Wetland restoration critical
- Air quality monitoring gap: 85% of Indians breathe unmonitored air — India cannot manage what it cannot measure. This is a “structural inequality in environmental governance.”
- Post-disaster bias: India’s disaster management framework remains predominantly reactive; NDMA guidelines emphasize pre-disaster resilience but implementation is poor.
- Tiger saturation crisis: 40% of tiger territory overlaps human habitation; reserve capacities are saturated — more tigers need more space but forest land is shrinking.
- Climate attribution gap: India lacks robust attribution science infrastructure (like World Weather Attribution group) to link individual events to climate change — weakens legal and policy action.
- Expand air quality monitoring network — from 342 CAAQMS to at least 2,000 across all districts (Lancet Countdown recommendation)
- Corridors and buffer zones: Expand tiger corridors (Project Tiger); implement Eco-Sensitive Zones effectively around all tiger reserves
- Shift from NDRF deployment (post-disaster) to community-based early warning systems (pre-disaster)
- Nature-based solutions: Restore 26 million hectares by 2030 (India’s LDN commitment); rejuvenate wetlands under Ramsar Convention obligations
- Link to SDG 13 (Climate Action), SDG 15 (Life on Land), and India’s NDC 2030 targets
- CSE: Centre for Science and Environment — Delhi-based think tank; founded 1980; publishes State of India’s Environment annually since 1982
- CAAQMS: Continuous Ambient Air Quality Monitoring Stations — 342 stations under CPCB
- LDN: Land Degradation Neutrality — India committed to restore 26 million ha by 2030
- Eco-Sensitive Zones (ESZ): Notified under EP Act 1986; buffer around National Parks/Wildlife Sanctuaries
- NDMA: National Disaster Management Authority — established under DM Act 2005
- Project Tiger: Launched 1973; 54 tiger reserves; India has ~75% of world’s wild tigers
“CSE’s State of India’s Environment Report 2026 warns of extreme weather becoming the ‘new normal.’ Critically examine the state of India’s disaster preparedness and suggest a shift from reactive to resilience-based disaster management.” (250 words)
- (a) Kerala
- (b) Madhya Pradesh
- (c) Himachal Pradesh
- (d) Uttarakhand
- The Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) issued a revised earthquake zoning notification (IS 1893:2025) on November 6, 2025, significantly upgrading India’s seismic hazard map using Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA).
- However, within 4 months, the government withdrew the notification (March 3, 2026) after objections from MoHUA, Metro Rail corporations, NDSA citing potential cost escalation in infrastructure projects.
- IS 1893 standard: Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) code governing earthquake-resistant structural design of buildings in India
- India’s seismic zones (current — 2016 code): Zone II (low), III (moderate), IV (high), V (very high); ~59% of India in moderate to very high seismic risk zones
- 2025 revision would have added Zone VI — highest risk — covering Kashmir, North-East, Kutch (Gujarat)
- Seismic vulnerability in India: Major earthquakes include Bhuj 2001 (26,000+ dead), Uttarkashi 1991, Latur 1993 — all showed inadequate building standards
- PSHA methodology: Uses probabilistic models to assess likelihood of ground shaking at various intensities over specific time periods — more scientific than earlier deterministic methods
- BIS: Bureau of Indian Standards — statutory body under Ministry of Consumer Affairs; issues IS codes
(Nov 6, 2025)
(March 3, 2026)
| Aspect | 2016 Code | 2025 Revision (now withdrawn) |
|---|---|---|
| Max risk zone | Zone V (very high) | Zone VI (new highest risk) |
| Methodology | Deterministic | PSHA-based (probabilistic) |
| Coverage | ~59% in moderate-high risk | 60%+ in moderate-high risk |
| New inclusions | — | Kashmir, North-East, Kutch in Zone VI |
| Cost impact | Baseline | Significant cost increase for Metro, dams, infra |
- Safety vs. cost tradeoff: Withdrawing scientifically-upgraded seismic standards to avoid cost increase in infrastructure is prioritising short-term fiscal savings over long-term public safety — a classic governance failure.
- Learning from Bhuj 2001: The deadliest Indian earthquake in decades killed 26,000+ largely because buildings were not built to seismic standards. This withdrawal risks repeating the same mistake in high-risk zones.
- Political economy of standards: Developer lobby and Metro Rail corporations successfully reversed a scientific standard — raising serious concerns about regulatory capture.
- Stranded assets argument double-edged: Yes, upgraded standards increase construction costs, but buildings that collapse in earthquakes also become “stranded assets” — permanently.
- Form an inter-ministerial expert committee with NDMA, BIS, IITs, and industry to develop a phased implementation plan for IS 1893:2025 with transition period and cost support
- Differentiate standards: Apply Zone VI standards mandatorily for new construction in highest-risk areas (Kashmir, Kutch); grandfather existing projects with enhanced monitoring
- Create a seismic retrofitting fund for existing critical infrastructure (Metro, dams, hospitals) — budget support for compliance
- India should adopt performance-based earthquake engineering (PBEE) as global best practice (used in Japan, USA) — focuses on acceptable damage levels rather than just strength
- Japan model: All buildings must be certified earthquake-resistant; insurance incentivises compliance — India should develop similar framework
- BIS: Bureau of Indian Standards; under Ministry of Consumer Affairs; administers IS codes
- IS 1893: Indian Standard for earthquake-resistant design of structures (Part 1 for buildings)
- PSHA: Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment — considers probability of exceedance over given time periods
- NDSA: National Dam Safety Authority — statutory body under Dam Safety Act 2021
- India’s seismic zones: II (low), III (moderate), IV (high), V (very high); ~59% India in mod-high risk
- Bhuj Earthquake 2001: 7.7 magnitude; 26,000+ deaths; triggered revision of building codes
“The withdrawal of the revised IS 1893:2025 earthquake zoning notification by the Government of India reflects a fundamental tension between public safety and infrastructure costs. Critically comment.” (150 words)
- (a) National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)
- (b) Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS)
- (c) Geological Survey of India (GSI)
- (d) National Dam Safety Authority (NDSA)
- With ~10% of stranded oil tankers in Persian Gulf being Indian-flagged, India is considering deploying Indian Navy ships to escort vessels through the region — decision expected within 2 days.
- Shipping Corporation of India (SCI) ships with 8+ lakh tonne cargo capacity are among those stranded; ~20,000 seafarers (many Indian) are onboard stranded vessels according to IMO.
- Operation Sankalp (2019): Launched after Gulf of Oman attacks; Indian Navy deployed INS Vindhyagiri and Chennai; boarding parties boarded over 100 merchant vessels
- Houthi counter-piracy operations (2023–24): INS Visakhapatnam, INS Kochi deployed; INS Chennai intercepted hijacked MV Ruen (Somali pirates)
- India’s maritime doctrine: SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) — launched 2015; India as net security provider in Indian Ocean
- IMO: International Maritime Organization — UN agency for shipping safety and maritime security; estimates 20,000 seafarers stranded
- SCI: Shipping Corporation of India — state-owned; one of India’s largest ship operators; ships now stranded in Persian Gulf
- Precedent (Iran-Iraq War, 1980s): SCI painted “INDIA” in bold on hulls; ships still attacked but strategy largely succeeded; U.S. escorted Kuwaiti-flagged ships
- Pro-escort: Protects Indian assets, seafarers, and energy security; demonstrates SAGAR doctrine; builds goodwill with GCC nations; precedent from Operation Sankalp
- Against/risks: Could draw India into the conflict (Iran may target escorted ships if seen as U.S. ally activity); violates India’s traditional non-alignment principle
- Iran’s assurance: Iran has declared it won’t target neighbours’ ships — this partially reduces risk; Iranian Deputy FM confirmed not stopping Indian ships
- U.S. coordination question: If India escorts alongside U.S. forces, it loses “strategic autonomy” optics; if independently, complex command-and-control challenges arise
- Independent Naval Escort: India should follow 1980s model — neutral “INDIA”-branded ships with Indian Navy protection; coordinate with Iran for safe passage guarantees
- Leverage UNCLOS provisions — Article 58 (high seas freedoms) and Article 87 (freedom of navigation) to assert India’s right to escort its vessels
- Work through IMO for multilateral maritime security framework in Persian Gulf
- SAGAR: Security and Growth for All in the Region — PM Modi’s Indian Ocean vision (2015, Mauritius)
- Operation Sankalp: 2019 Indian Navy operation in Gulf of Oman for maritime security
- IMO: International Maritime Organization — UN specialized agency for shipping (HQ: London)
- SCI: Shipping Corporation of India — state-owned shipping company under MoPSW
- Lloyds List Intelligence: Maritime data provider citing ~600 ships stranded in Persian Gulf region
“Discuss how India’s SAGAR doctrine and strategic autonomy posture should guide its response to the Persian Gulf maritime crisis of 2026.” (150 words)
- (a) Anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden
- (b) Ensuring maritime security of Indian merchant vessels in the Gulf of Oman
- (c) Evacuation of Indian citizens from Yemen
- (d) Securing the Malacca Strait trade routes
- The Punjab and Haryana High Court acquitted Dera Sacha Sauda chief Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh in the 2002 murder case of journalist Ramchander Chhatrapati, overturning his 2019 life sentence conviction.
- He will remain in prison as his conviction in a separate rape case continues. The journalist was shot outside his home after publishing an anonymous letter by a woman follower accusing Ram Rahim of rape.
- Ramchander Chhatrapati murder (2002): Editor of Poora Sach newspaper; shot outside his home in Sirsa (Haryana); died of injuries; accused published an anonymous letter about alleged rape by Ram Rahim
- 2019 conviction: CBI special court convicted Ram Rahim + 3 others under IPC Section 302 (murder) + 120B (criminal conspiracy); life imprisonment
- Dera Sacha Sauda: A religious sect (Sirsa, Haryana) with millions of followers across Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan; politically influential
- Rape case conviction (2017): Ram Rahim convicted of rape of two disciples; 20 years sentence; his arrest triggered violent riots (38 killed in Panchkula)
- Press Freedom concern: The original case is a landmark in press freedom — journalist targeted for publishing allegations against a powerful religious figure
- Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression — includes press freedom; subject to reasonable restrictions under 19(2)
- Press freedom under threat: Journalist Chhatrapati was targeted for his journalistic work; acquittal of the accused (even on technical grounds) sends a chilling message to investigative journalists
- Religious influence on institutions: The Dera’s massive following and political patronage across multiple state elections raises questions about fair trials involving powerful religious figures
- Long trial timelines: Case took 24 years from crime (2002) to HC verdict (2026) — reflects India’s judicial backlog crisis (4.5 crore pending cases)
- Victims’ rights: Acquittal is a second blow to the Chhatrapati family after two decades — reflects systemic failure to deliver justice to victims of powerful accused
- Strengthen witness protection laws (Witness Protection Scheme 2018 needs statutory backing via legislation)
- Fast-track courts for crimes against journalists and media professionals — recommended by the Press Freedom Index bodies
- SC must examine the scope of “reasonable doubt” standard vis-à-vis circumstantial evidence in conspiracy-related cases
- IPC Section 302: Punishment for murder (life imprisonment or death)
- IPC Section 120B: Criminal conspiracy (punishment same as offence conspired)
- Article 19(1)(a): Fundamental Right — freedom of speech and expression (includes press freedom)
- Witness Protection Scheme 2018: SC-directed scheme; first systematic witness protection framework in India
- Dera Sacha Sauda: Spiritual organization based in Sirsa, Haryana; founded 1948 by Mastana Balochistani
“The murder of journalist Ramchander Chhatrapati for exposing a powerful religious figure’s alleged crimes raises profound questions about press freedom, religious accountability, and the duty of citizens in a democracy. Examine from an ethical standpoint.” (150 words)
- (a) Article 14
- (b) Article 19(1)(a)
- (c) Article 21
- (d) Article 32
- India’s breast cancer incidence has doubled from 13 per 1,00,000 women (1990) to 29.4 per 1,00,000 women (2023), experts warned at the St. Gallen International Breast Cancer Conference held in Kolkata.
- Despite rising detection rates, treatment access gaps persist — geographical, economic, and social barriers prevent adequate care for millions.
| Parameter | 1990 | 2023 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|
| Incidence (per 1L women) | 13 cases | 29.4 cases | ↑ 126% increase |
| Key Risk Factors | Sedentary lifestyle, lack of breastfeeding, alcohol, tobacco | Urban-rural convergence | |
| Gender note | Men can also get breast cancer — screening for both genders essential | Under-recognised | |
| Treatment gap | Geographic, economic, and social barriers persist | Structural inequality | |
- Screening gap: Unlike developed countries (mammography at 40+), India has no universal breast cancer screening programme — most cases detected at advanced stages
- Treatment access inequality: Tertiary cancer care concentrated in metros; Tier-2/3 cities and rural areas lack oncology infrastructure (violates SDG 3 principle of Universal Health Coverage)
- AYUSHMAN BHARAT limitation: While PM-JAY covers cancer treatment, actual claim rates for cancer remain low due to supply-side gaps (lack of hospitals, oncologists)
- Lifestyle disease transition: India undergoing rapid epidemiological transition from communicable to non-communicable diseases (NCDs); cancer now in top 5 causes of death
- Launch National Breast Cancer Screening Programme (mammography for women 40–69) under NHM — modelled on UK NHS Breast Screening Programme
- Expand NPCDCS (National Programme for Prevention and Control of Cancer, Diabetes, CVD and Stroke) to include breast cancer as a priority
- Community health workers (ASHAs, ANMs) trained for Clinical Breast Examination (CBE) — cost-effective screening for rural India
- Project Pink Army (launched at conference) — community volunteer movement for cancer awareness — should be integrated with government programmes
- Ensure essential cancer medicines listed in National Essential Medicines List (NEML) are available at all district hospitals
- SDG 3.4: Reduce premature mortality from NCDs by one-third by 2030 — breast cancer screening is directly linked
- NPCDCS: National Programme for Prevention and Control of Cancer, Diabetes, CVD and Stroke — MoH&FW flagship
- PM-JAY: Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana — ₹5 lakh health insurance for 10.74 crore poor families; covers cancer
- SDG 3.4: By 2030, reduce by one-third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases
- ASHA: Accredited Social Health Activist — front-line community health worker under NHM
- Project Pink Army: Community-driven volunteer movement for cancer awareness (launched at St. Gallen Conference, Kolkata, 2026)
- NEML: National Essential Medicines List — India’s essential medicines framework under MoH&FW
“Despite improvements in healthcare, India faces a growing burden of breast cancer with significant treatment access gaps. Critically examine the policy gaps in India’s response to non-communicable diseases like cancer and suggest a multi-pronged approach.” (150 words)
- (a) Ministry of Science and Technology
- (b) Ministry of Women and Child Development
- (c) Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
- (d) Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment
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The Hindu UPSC Analysis | March 8, 2026 | Prepared by Legacy IAS Faculty
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