Why is it in News?
- December 2025: Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant disclosed that retired High Court judges are reluctant to return as ad hoc judges mainly due to institutional and personal discomfort—being “embarrassed” to sit as junior judges with younger serving judges.
- Comes after the Supreme Court (January 2025) activated Article 224A to tackle massive criminal case pendency in High Courts.
- Despite the ruling, many High Courts have not proposed names, leading to poor uptake.
Relevance
GS II – Polity & Constitution
- Judiciary and constitutional provisions (Article 224A)
- Separation of powers
- Judicial independence and accountability
GS II – Governance
- Pendency of cases and access to justice
- Institutional reforms in higher judiciary
Scale of the Problem (Data)
- Pending criminal cases in High Courts: 18,98,833 (25 HCs).
- Cases pending >1 year: 68.27% (≈ 12,96,374).
- Sanctioned HC judge strength: 1,122.
- Vacancies (as of 15 Dec 2025): 298 (~26.6%).
- Worst-affected HCs noted: Allahabad, Punjab & Haryana, Patna.
Constitutional Basics: Article 224A
- Provision: Appointment of retired High Court judges as ad hoc judges.
- Authority:
- Initiated by Chief Justice of the High Court.
- Requires consent of the retired judge.
- President appoints after consultation.
- Purpose: Temporary augmentation to clear arrears, especially criminal appeals.
- Status: Not a substitute for regular appointments; a stop-gap measure.
Supreme Court’s Intervention
- January 2025 judgment (building on April 2021 ruling):
- Reactivated Article 224A.
- Urged HCs to use ad hoc judges selectively for criminal backlogs.
- Emphasised structured deployment and time-bound mandates.
Why Is the Uptake Poor?
1. Hierarchy & Bench Dynamics
- Criminal appeals typically heard by Division Benches.
- Retired judges feel discomfort sitting as junior members under younger judges.
- Serving judges question sitting with a retired judge heading the Bench.
- Result: Mutual hesitation disrupts bench formation.
2. Institutional Culture
- Strong seniority norms in Indian judiciary.
- Lack of clear protocols on bench composition involving ad hoc judges.
- Perceived dilution of institutional authority.
3. Administrative Inertia
- Several HCs have not forwarded names to the Supreme Court.
- Absence of:
- Incentive structures
- Clear tenure/role clarity
- Dedicated case allocation mechanisms.
Critical Assessment of Article 224A as a Solution
Strengths
- Quick augmentation without long appointment cycles.
- Utilises experienced judicial capital.
- Focused relief for criminal appeals.
Limitations
- Not scalable without cultural acceptance.
- Risks creating a parallel, temporary judiciary.
- Does not address root causes:
- Chronic vacancies
- Appointment delays
- Procedural inefficiencies.
Structural Causes of High Court Pendency
- Persistent vacancies due to:
- Delayed collegium recommendations
- Executive–judiciary friction
- Rising criminalisation and complex litigation.
- Limited judge-to-population ratio.
- Inadequate case management and listing practices.
Way Forward
1. Normalize Article 224A Usage
- Clear guidelines on:
- Bench composition
- Seniority protocol
- Role clarity for ad hoc judges
- Fixed-term, outcome-linked assignments.
2. Fix the Core Deficit
- Fill sanctioned vacancies on priority.
- Time-bound appointment processes.
- Consider raising sanctioned strength in high-load HCs.
3. Procedural & Managerial Reforms
- Dedicated criminal appeal benches.
- Enhanced case-flow management.
- Technology-driven listing and prioritisation.
4. Alternative Capacity Measures
- Strengthen evening courts / special benches.
- Expand judicial clerkship and research support.
- Promote plea bargaining and ADR where appropriate.
