Parliamentary Legislative Procedure & Types of Bills

Parliamentary Legislative Procedure & Types of Bills – UPSC GS-II Comprehensive Notes
UPSC GS-II · Polity

Parliamentary Legislative Procedure & Types of Bills

Joint Sitting, Money Bill, Financial Bills, Amendment Bills, Public & Private Member Bills — Comprehensive Notes

01

Joint Sitting of Parliament — Article 108

Meaning & Constitutional Basis

Article 108 empowers the President to summon a joint sitting of both Houses when a legislative deadlock occurs on an Ordinary Bill. The joint sitting is the Constitution’s mechanism for resolving inter-House disagreements — ensuring that the will of the numerically larger Lok Sabha prevails when the two chambers cannot agree. The joint sitting is presided over by the Speaker of Lok Sabha. In the Speaker’s absence, the Deputy Speaker presides; if neither is available, the Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha presides.

When Can It Be Called?

A joint sitting may be summoned under three deadlock conditions:

  • Bill rejected by the other House (the House to which it was transmitted).
  • Houses disagree on amendments — the originating House does not accept the amendments proposed by the other House.
  • More than six months elapse from the date of receipt by the other House without the bill being passed.

The decision to summon a joint sitting rests with the President, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers. It is not automatic — the President (i.e., the executive) exercises discretion on whether to invoke this mechanism. The bill is decided by a simple majority of the total number of members of both Houses present and voting.

Why It Is a Lok Sabha-Dominant Mechanism

In a joint sitting, the numerical strength of Lok Sabha (545 members) far exceeds that of Rajya Sabha (245 members). This means that even if Rajya Sabha unanimously opposes a bill, Lok Sabha’s majority is sufficient to secure passage. The joint sitting is thus structurally designed to break deadlocks in favour of Lok Sabha. This is consistent with the constitutional principle that the directly elected chamber should have the final word on ordinary legislation.

When Joint Sitting CANNOT Be Used

  • Money Bill (Art. 110): No joint sitting — LS has overriding power; RS has 14-day advisory role only.
  • Constitutional Amendment Bill (Art. 368): No joint sitting — both Houses must individually pass by special majority. Deadlock means the amendment fails.
  • Bill passed by both Houses: Joint sitting is only for inter-House disagreement, not for other disputes.
📋 Historical Examples of Joint Sittings
YearBillDeadlock ReasonOutcome
1961Dowry Prohibition Bill, 1959RS proposed amendments not accepted by LSBill passed in joint sitting
1978Banking Service Commission (Repeal) Bill, 1977RS rejected the BillBill passed in joint sitting
2002Prevention of Terrorism Bill (POTA), 2002RS rejected the BillBill passed in joint sitting; contentious national security legislation

Only three joint sittings have occurred in India’s parliamentary history — indicating that the provision serves more as a constitutional deterrent than a routine mechanism. The mere possibility of a joint sitting incentivises Rajya Sabha to negotiate rather than block legislation outright.

📌 Special Rule — Article 108(5)

If a bill is pending at the time of dissolution of Lok Sabha and the President has already notified a joint sitting, the bill does NOT lapse. The joint sitting can be held even after the new Lok Sabha is constituted. This is one of the few exceptions to the general rule that bills pending in LS lapse on dissolution.

📝 Mains Angle — Cooperative Bicameralism or Majoritarianism?

The joint sitting mechanism raises a fundamental question: does it serve cooperative bicameralism (enabling dialogue and resolution) or does it institutionalise Lok Sabha’s dominance (majoritarianism)? Proponents argue that the joint sitting is a democratic safety valve — preventing an indirectly elected Upper House from indefinitely blocking the will of the directly elected Lower House. Critics counter that it undermines the revisory function of Rajya Sabha and converts bicameralism into a formality. The rarity of joint sittings (only three in 75+ years) suggests that the threat itself serves the purpose — Rajya Sabha negotiates because it knows the ultimate consequence. The POTA joint sitting (2002) remains the most controversial, as it was used to push through security legislation that a majority of Rajya Sabha members opposed — raising concerns about executive overreach through procedural devices.

02

Money Bill — Article 110

Definition

Article 110(1) defines a Money Bill as a bill that contains only provisions dealing with one or more of the following matters:

  • Imposition, abolition, remission, alteration, or regulation of any tax.
  • Regulation of the borrowing of money by the Government of India.
  • Custody of the Consolidated Fund or Contingency Fund of India; payment into or withdrawal from these funds.
  • Appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India.
  • Declaring any expenditure as charged on the Consolidated Fund.
  • Receipt of money on account of the Consolidated Fund or Public Account, or custody/issue of such money, or audit of accounts of the Union or States.
  • Any matter incidental to any of the above matters.

The word “only” is constitutionally critical. A bill that contains even one provision beyond these matters ceases to be a Money Bill — it becomes a Financial Bill (Category I) or an Ordinary Bill, depending on its content. This “only” test is the source of the most significant constitutional controversies regarding Money Bill classification.

Speaker’s Certification

Under Article 110(3), the Speaker of Lok Sabha certifies whether a bill is a Money Bill. This decision is final and conclusive — the Constitution explicitly provides that no court or House shall question the Speaker’s certification. This makes the Speaker the sole arbiter of one of the most consequential procedural questions in Indian legislative practice — whether Rajya Sabha will have substantive or merely advisory power over a particular piece of legislation.

Judicial Review Debate

The finality of the Speaker’s certification has been challenged constitutionally. In the Aadhaar case (K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2018), the majority (4:1) upheld the Speaker’s certification of the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill. However, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s dissent argued that limited judicial review should be available where the certification is manifestly erroneous or involves a patent misclassification. The dissent characterised the misuse of Money Bill certification as a “fraud on the Constitution” that renders Rajya Sabha irrelevant. A larger bench reference on this issue was pending (as of the last available update — verify from current affairs for latest status).

Passage Procedure

Money Bill — Legislative Flowchart
FM introduces in LS LS passes the Bill Transmitted to RS
RS: 14 days to recommend LS accepts / rejects recommendations President’s Assent
If RS does not return within 14 days → deemed passed
📋 Examples of Money Bills
  • Appropriation Bill — authorises withdrawal from Consolidated Fund (Art. 114). Classic Money Bill.
  • Finance Bill — gives effect to Budget taxation proposals. Certified as Money Bill by Speaker.
  • Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery) Act, 2016 — certified as Money Bill; deeply controversial. Justice Chandrachud called it a “fraud on the Constitution” in dissent.
  • Finance Act, 2017 — included provisions restructuring tribunals. Challenged as beyond Money Bill scope. (Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank, 2019 — SC struck down tribunal provisions inserted via Money Bill route.)
⚠️ Prelims Traps — Money Bill
  • Money Bill ≠ Finance Bill. The Finance Bill introduced after the Budget is typically certified as a Money Bill — but the term “Financial Bill” under Art. 117 is a separate, broader category. Do not conflate them.
  • RS has 14 days — not 30 days, not “one session.” After 14 days, bill is deemed passed.
  • RS can recommend amendments; it cannot amend or reject a Money Bill.
  • The Speaker certifies a Money Bill; the President’s prior recommendation is needed for introduction (Art. 110(1)).
  • No joint sitting for Money Bill. Ever. This is a frequently tested negative fact.
  • The President cannot return a Money Bill for reconsideration (Art. 111 proviso).
03

Financial Bills — Article 117

A. Financial Bill Category I — Article 117(1)

A Financial Bill Category I contains provisions dealing with any of the matters specified in Article 110 (taxation, borrowing, Consolidated Fund, etc.) but also contains other matters that fall outside the Money Bill definition. The key distinction from a Money Bill is the word “only” — a Money Bill deals only with Art. 110 matters; a Financial Bill Category I deals with Art. 110 matters plus additional matters.

Procedure

  • Can be introduced only in Lok Sabha (like a Money Bill).
  • Requires the President’s recommendation for introduction.
  • BUT — Rajya Sabha has full powers to amend or reject (unlike a Money Bill).
  • If there is a deadlock, a joint sitting under Art. 108 is possible.
  • The President can return the bill for reconsideration.
📋 Examples — Financial Bill Category I
  • A bill that imposes a new tax (Art. 110 matter) and creates a regulatory authority (non-Art. 110 matter) — e.g., a bill establishing a goods-and-services tax council with regulatory powers alongside the tax provisions.
  • A bill providing for withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund and establishing a new public institution — the financial and non-financial provisions are combined.

B. Financial Bill Category II — Article 117(3)

A Financial Bill Category II is a bill that involves expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India but does not contain any of the matters listed in Article 110. It does not deal with taxation, borrowing, or the Consolidated Fund mechanisms — it merely creates a charge or expenditure obligation that would need to be met from the Consolidated Fund.

Procedure

  • Can be introduced in either House (unlike Money Bill and Financial Bill I).
  • Requires the President’s recommendation before the bill can be considered (not for introduction — a subtle but crucial distinction from Financial Bill I).
  • Rajya Sabha has full powers — can amend or reject.
  • Joint sitting under Art. 108 is possible.
  • Follows the procedure of an ordinary bill in all respects.
📋 Examples — Financial Bill Category II
  • A bill establishing a new commission (e.g., a National Human Rights Commission bill) that would involve expenditure from the Consolidated Fund for salaries and infrastructure — but does not deal with taxation or borrowing.
  • A bill creating a new government scheme (e.g., a rural employment guarantee scheme) where the expenditure is charged or voted from the Consolidated Fund, but the bill itself does not amend any tax law.
⚠️ Key Distinction for Prelims

Financial Bill I: President’s recommendation needed for introduction.
Financial Bill II: President’s recommendation needed for consideration (not introduction). This is a classic UPSC trap. The difference in timing (introduction vs consideration) determines whether the bill can even be tabled without executive consent or can be tabled but not proceeded with.

04

Comparative Table — Money Bill vs Financial Bill I vs Financial Bill II

FeatureMoney Bill (Art. 110)Financial Bill I (Art. 117(1))Financial Bill II (Art. 117(3))
Constitutional ArticleArticle 110Article 117(1)Article 117(3)
Content ScopeOnly Art. 110 matters (tax, borrowing, Consolidated Fund, etc.)Art. 110 matters plus other provisionsDoes NOT contain Art. 110 matters; involves expenditure from Consolidated Fund
IntroductionOnly in Lok SabhaOnly in Lok SabhaEither House
President’s RecommendationRequired for introductionRequired for introductionRequired for consideration (not introduction)
Rajya Sabha PowersRecommend only; 14-day limitFull powers — can amend/rejectFull powers — can amend/reject
Joint Sitting (Art. 108)?NoYesYes
Speaker Certification?Yes — mandatory, final, conclusiveNoNo
President Can Return?No (must assent or withhold)YesYes
Typical ExamplesAppropriation Bill, Finance BillBill with tax + regulatory provisions combinedBill creating an institution involving Consolidated Fund expenditure
Key UPSC Trap“All Finance Bills are Money Bills” — FALSEConfused with Money Bill due to LS-only introductionConfused with Financial Bill I; note “consideration” vs “introduction”
📌 Critical Conceptual Clarity

The “Finance Bill” introduced after the Budget (the annual taxation legislation) is typically certified as a Money Bill by the Speaker. But the constitutional category “Financial Bill” under Art. 117 is a distinct classification. Do not equate the annual “Finance Bill” with “Financial Bill.” They overlap in name but differ fundamentally in constitutional treatment.

05

Constitutional Amendment Bill — Article 368

Purpose & Special Procedure

Article 368 vests Parliament with constituent power — the power to amend the Constitution itself. This power is distinguished from ordinary legislative power by a higher procedural threshold, reflecting the constitutional principle that the fundamental law of the land should not be as easily alterable as ordinary legislation.

Types of Amendments

A. Simple Majority (Outside Article 368)

Certain constitutional provisions can be amended by a simple majority of members present and voting — the same majority required for ordinary legislation. These are not technically amendments under Art. 368 but are alterations permitted by specific constitutional provisions. This is a frequently misunderstood point in UPSC. Examples include:

  • Admission or establishment of new states (Art. 2)
  • Formation of new states, alteration of boundaries, names (Art. 3)
  • Citizenship provisions (Art. 11)
  • Creation/abolition of Legislative Councils in states (Art. 169)
  • Quorum in Parliament (Art. 100)
  • Salaries and allowances of MPs (Art. 106)
  • Use of official languages (Art. 343, 346)
  • Fifth and Sixth Schedule (administration of Scheduled Areas and Tribal Areas)

B. Special Majority (Art. 368)

The standard Art. 368 amendment requires passage in each House by a special majority: a majority of the total membership of that House and a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting. This dual requirement is more stringent than either a simple majority or an absolute majority alone. Most constitutional amendments fall in this category.

Example: Fundamental Rights amendments, DPSP amendments, most structural changes to constitutional institutions (e.g., 42nd Amendment, 44th Amendment, 52nd Amendment inserting the Tenth Schedule).

C. Special Majority + Ratification by Half the States

The most rigorous procedure applies to amendments that affect the federal structure. In addition to the special majority in both Houses, ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the states (by simple majority in each state legislature) is required. Provisions requiring this procedure include:

  • Election of the President (Art. 54, 55)
  • Extent of executive power of the Union and States (Art. 73, 162)
  • Supreme Court and High Courts (Art. 124–147, Art. 214–231)
  • Distribution of legislative powers (Seventh Schedule lists)
  • Representation of states in Parliament
  • Article 368 itself

Example: The 101st Constitutional Amendment (GST) required state ratification because it altered the distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and States. The 73rd and 74th Amendments (Panchayati Raj and Municipalities) also required ratification.

Procedure — Key Points

  • Can be introduced in either House (Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha).
  • Can be introduced by a Minister or a Private Member — no prior Presidential recommendation required.
  • No joint sitting — if either House fails to pass by special majority, the amendment fails. There is no mechanism to resolve a deadlock on constitutional amendments.
  • President’s assent: Under the 24th Amendment (1971), the President must give assent to a Constitutional Amendment Bill — cannot withhold it or return it for reconsideration.
📌 Basic Structure Doctrine — Kesavananda Bharati (1973)

The Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) held that Parliament’s amending power under Art. 368 is subject to the Basic Structure limitation — Parliament cannot amend the Constitution to destroy its basic structure. The Basic Structure includes: supremacy of the Constitution, republican and democratic form of government, secular character, separation of powers, federal character, judicial review, fundamental rights (core), and rule of law. This doctrine was reaffirmed in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) and I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007). The Basic Structure doctrine gives the judiciary the final word on the limits of amending power — a unique Indian contribution to constitutional jurisprudence.

📝 Mains Value Add

The constitutional amendment procedure embodies a deliberate balancing act between rigidity and flexibility. The three-tier structure (simple majority, special majority, special majority + ratification) ensures that routine matters can be updated easily while fundamental structural changes require broader consensus. The absence of a joint sitting mechanism for amendment bills protects Rajya Sabha’s veto — reflecting the federal principle that constitutional changes affecting states should not be railroaded by the Lower House alone. Critics argue the procedure is too rigid for a developing nation, while defenders (invoking Kesavananda Bharati) argue that rigidity is the price of constitutional supremacy. For GS-II, this tension between flexibility and constitutional sanctity is a recurring analytical theme.

06

Public Bill vs Private Member Bill

FeaturePublic Bill (Government Bill)Private Member Bill
Introduced byA Minister on behalf of the governmentAny MP who is not a Minister
DraftingDrafted by the Law Ministry / concerned departmentDrafted by the individual MP (or with assistance from legislative staff)
Notice Period7 days1 month
Agenda TimeAny day of the weekOnly on Fridays (2:30 PM onwards) — limited time
Government SupportFull government backing; whip enforcedNo government backing; often no whip (may even be opposed)
Success RateVery high — almost all passExtremely rare; only 14 private member bills have been passed since 1952
Political RealityExecutive controls legislative calendar; passage virtually guaranteedSignalling device; raises issues; rarely progresses beyond introduction

Significance of Private Member Bills

Despite their near-zero success rate, private member bills serve essential democratic functions. They allow individual MPs to place issues on the legislative agenda that the government may neglect, signal public opinion on emerging concerns, provoke public debate, and sometimes catalyse government action — the government may introduce its own version of a policy originally proposed through a private member bill. They also test the independence of MPs vis-à-vis party discipline.

Historical Examples

  • The last private member bill passed in Lok Sabha was the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Bill, 1968 — over five decades ago.
  • In Rajya Sabha, the Rights of Transgender Persons Bill, 2014 (introduced by Tiruchi Siva) was passed — a rare instance. The government subsequently introduced its own version.
  • Numerous private member bills on issues like Uniform Civil Code, population control, anti-corruption, and electoral reforms have been introduced but never passed. (Verify from current affairs for latest private member bills introduced.)
🔁 Comparative — Private Member Bills
FeatureIndiaUKUSA
Success RateNegligible (14 passed in 70+ years)Low but measurable; some pass each session via ballot, ten-minute rule, or presentationHigh by comparison; members drive legislation; executive separate
Party Discipline ImpactTenth Schedule makes crossing party lines near-impossibleStrong whip but no anti-defection law; free votes possibleWeak party discipline; members vote independently
Executive ControlDominant — controls agenda, whip, business scheduleSignificant but conventions allow private members’ timeMinimal — Congress sets its own agenda
Committee RoleLimited for private member billsCommittees may adopt and advance PMBsCommittees are gatekeepers; can advance or kill bills

The Indian Parliament’s executive dominance — reinforced by the anti-defection law — makes the private member bill the weakest legislative instrument. In the US, individual members drive legislation through powerful committees. In the UK, a more balanced middle ground exists. India’s reform path lies in strengthening committee systems and allocating more floor time for private member discussions.

07

UPSC Orientation — Prelims Quick Revision

One-Line Definitions

Bill TypeCore DefinitionKey Article
Ordinary BillAny bill that is not a Money, Financial, or Amendment BillArt. 107–111
Money BillBill dealing ONLY with taxation, borrowing, Consolidated Fund mattersArt. 110
Financial Bill IContains Art. 110 matters + other provisionsArt. 117(1)
Financial Bill IIInvolves Consolidated Fund expenditure but NOT Art. 110 mattersArt. 117(3)
Constitutional Amendment BillBill to amend any provision of the ConstitutionArt. 368

Joint Sitting Applicability Matrix

Bill TypeJoint Sitting (Art. 108)?Reason
Ordinary Bill✅ YesStandard deadlock resolution
Money Bill❌ NoLS has overriding power; no deadlock possible
Financial Bill I✅ YesRS has full powers; deadlock possible
Financial Bill II✅ YesRS has full powers; deadlock possible
Constitutional Amendment Bill❌ NoBoth Houses must individually pass by special majority

Rajya Sabha Powers — Quick Matrix

Bill TypeRS Can Amend?RS Can Reject?Time Limit for RS?
Ordinary Bill✅ Yes✅ Yes (triggers joint sitting possibility)6 months (Art. 108 trigger)
Money Bill❌ Recommend only❌ No14 days
Financial Bill I✅ Yes✅ YesNo specific limit
Financial Bill II✅ Yes✅ YesNo specific limit
Constitutional Amendment Bill✅ Yes (must pass by special majority)✅ Yes (kills the bill)No limit
08

PYQ Heat Map — Trend-Based Analysis

TopicFrequencyWhy UPSC Asks It
Money Bill — Definition, RS powers, Speaker certificationHIGHTests constitutional literacy; multiple trap options possible; Aadhaar controversy gave it current affairs angle
Joint Sitting — When possible/not possibleHIGHNegative facts (when NOT possible) are classic traps; tests bicameralism understanding
Financial Bill I vs II distinctionMEDIUMTests precision; introduction vs consideration distinction is nuanced
Constitutional Amendment typesHIGHSimple vs special vs ratification — tests knowledge of specific articles and examples
Basic Structure DoctrineHIGHRegularly tested in both Prelims (factual) and Mains (analytical)
Private Member BillsLOWOccasionally tested; more Mains-relevant for essays on parliamentary decline
Ordinary Bill passage procedureMEDIUMTests step-by-step procedural knowledge; combined with joint sitting questions
Money Bill vs Financial Bill comparisonHIGHUPSC loves comparison-based questions with tabular trap options
09

UPSC Mains Questions

15 Marks Analytical

Q1. “The Money Bill route has been increasingly used to bypass Rajya Sabha’s revisory function.” Critically examine with reference to recent controversies. (250 words)

10 Marks Conceptual

Q2. Distinguish between Money Bill, Financial Bill Category I, and Financial Bill Category II with respect to their constitutional provisions and Rajya Sabha’s role. (150 words)

15 Marks Analytical

Q3. Is the joint sitting mechanism under Article 108 a tool for cooperative bicameralism or for institutionalising Lok Sabha’s dominance? Discuss. (250 words)

10 Marks Procedural

Q4. Explain the procedure for amendment of the Constitution under Article 368. Why does the Constitution provide for different types of majorities? (150 words)

15 Marks Analytical

Q5. “The Speaker’s certification of a Money Bill is final and beyond judicial review.” Examine the constitutional basis and the arguments for introducing limited judicial review. (250 words)

15 Marks Analytical

Q6. “The Basic Structure doctrine is the judiciary’s contribution to Indian constitutionalism.” Discuss its evolution and significance for the amending power of Parliament. (250 words)

10 Marks Conceptual

Q7. What is the significance of private member bills in Indian parliamentary democracy? Why do they rarely succeed? (150 words)

15 Marks Analytical

Q8. “The anti-defection law has converted Parliament from a deliberative body into a voting machine.” Discuss in the context of private member bills, cut motions, and financial legislation. (250 words)

10 Marks Procedural

Q9. Under what circumstances can a joint sitting of Parliament be called? Why is it not available for Money Bills and Constitutional Amendment Bills? (150 words)

15 Marks Analytical

Q10. “Rajya Sabha’s role in the legislative process ranges from co-equal to advisory depending on the nature of the bill.” Examine this statement with constitutional references. (250 words)

15 Marks Dynamic

Q11. Evaluate the implications of the Supreme Court’s observations in the Aadhaar case regarding the misuse of the Money Bill route. Should Article 110 be amended? (250 words)

10 Marks Conceptual

Q12. Explain the three categories of constitutional amendments in India with examples. Why is no joint sitting permitted for constitutional amendment bills? (150 words)

10

Answer Writing Frameworks

Framework — Q1: Money Bill Route Bypassing Rajya Sabha
Introduction: Article 110 defines a Money Bill as dealing “only” with specified financial matters. The Speaker’s certification is final (Art. 110(3)). However, concerns have mounted that Bills containing significant non-financial provisions are being certified as Money Bills to circumvent Rajya Sabha’s revisory function.
Body 1 — Constitutional Design: The “only” test was deliberate — ensuring that bills with mixed content receive full bicameral scrutiny. The Money Bill route was designed for purely financial legislation, not as a vehicle for policy reform.
Body 2 — Controversies: Aadhaar Act (2016) — biometric ID law certified as Money Bill despite provisions on surveillance, data protection, and institutional architecture. Finance Act, 2017 — restructured tribunals through Money Bill route; SC struck down tribunal provisions in Rojer Mathew (2019). Justice Chandrachud’s dissent: “fraud on the Constitution.”
Body 3 — Implications: Renders Rajya Sabha irrelevant on critical policy legislation. Undermines bicameralism. Converts a procedural safeguard into a tool for executive convenience. Creates constitutional uncertainty about the scope of Art. 110.
Way Forward: Limited judicial review of Speaker’s certification on grounds of manifest error. Clarify Art. 110 through a constitutional amendment defining “incidental” matters more precisely. Strengthen inter-House conferences as an alternative to bypassing.
Conclusion: The Money Bill route, designed to streamline fiscal legislation, must not become a constitutional shortcut. Rajya Sabha’s revisory role is integral to India’s bicameral design — its erosion weakens democratic deliberation.
Framework — Q3: Joint Sitting — Cooperative Bicameralism or Majoritarianism?
Introduction: Article 108 empowers the President to summon a joint sitting when inter-House deadlock persists. Only three joint sittings have occurred in Indian parliamentary history — 1961 (Dowry Prohibition), 1978 (Banking Service Commission Repeal), and 2002 (POTA).
Body 1 — Cooperative Bicameralism Argument: The joint sitting is a last resort, not a routine tool. Its rarity proves that the threat itself promotes negotiation. RS has negotiated amendments on numerous bills to avoid triggering Art. 108. The mechanism incentivises compromise.
Body 2 — Majoritarianism Argument: LS (545) always outnumbers RS (245). The outcome of any joint sitting is structurally predetermined — LS prevails. The POTA joint sitting (2002) demonstrated this — RS had rejected the bill, but LS’s majority carried it through. This reduces RS to a speed breaker, not a genuine check.
Body 3 — Comparative: UK resolved the Lords-Commons conflict through the Parliament Acts (1911, 1949) — no joint sitting, Lords simply lose after delay. US has no equivalent — each chamber has absolute veto. India’s joint sitting falls between these models.
Conclusion: The joint sitting serves both functions — it is cooperative in practice (rarity promotes negotiation) but majoritarian in design (LS always wins). The democratic legitimacy of this mechanism depends on how sparingly it is used and whether the executive invokes it responsibly.
Framework — Q5: Speaker’s Money Bill Certification & Judicial Review
Introduction: Article 110(3) declares the Speaker’s Money Bill certification “final” — no court or House may question it. This constitutional ouster of judicial review has become increasingly controversial as the Money Bill route is used for non-financial legislation.
Body 1 — Constitutional Text: Art. 110(3) and Art. 122(1) (proceedings of Parliament not questionable on procedural irregularity) together create a strong constitutional shield around the Speaker’s certification. The Constituent Assembly trusted the Speaker’s impartiality.
Body 2 — Arguments for Judicial Review: Justice Chandrachud’s Aadhaar dissent: manifest misclassification = fraud on Constitution. If Speaker certifies a bill regulating surveillance as a “Money Bill,” the constitutional definition of Art. 110 becomes meaningless. Basic Structure doctrine implies that the separation of powers (including RS’s role) cannot be subverted through procedural misclassification.
Body 3 — Arguments Against: Art. 110(3) is unambiguous — “shall not be called in question.” Parliamentary sovereignty over its own proceedings is a fundamental principle. Judicial review of Speaker’s decisions risks politicising the judiciary. The remedy lies in political accountability, not judicial intervention.
Conclusion: A balanced approach — limited judicial review confined to manifest patent errors (not policy disagreements) — would protect bicameralism without undermining parliamentary sovereignty. The larger bench hearing (if/when scheduled) will determine the constitutional trajectory of this vital question.
Framework — Q6: Basic Structure Doctrine
Introduction: The Basic Structure doctrine, established in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), holds that Parliament’s amending power under Art. 368 is subject to an implied limitation — the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be altered.
Body 1 — Evolution: Shankari Prasad (1951) — Parliament’s amending power unlimited. Golaknath (1967) — Parliament cannot amend Fundamental Rights. 24th Amendment (1971) — response to Golaknath. Kesavananda Bharati (1973) — the decisive case: amending power exists but cannot destroy basic structure. Minerva Mills (1980) — limited amending power is itself part of basic structure. I.R. Coelho (2007) — Ninth Schedule laws subject to basic structure review.
Body 2 — Significance: Created an unwritten constitutional boundary on the written constitution. Made judiciary the guardian of constitutional identity. Prevented majoritarian capture of the Constitution. Ensured that no future Parliament could convert India into an authoritarian state through constitutional amendment.
Body 3 — Criticisms: Basic Structure is not defined in the Constitution — judicial overreach. No fixed list of basic features — evolves case by case. Counter-majoritarian — unelected judges can override elected Parliament’s constituent power. Tension with democratic theory.
Conclusion: The Basic Structure doctrine is India’s most significant judicial innovation — balancing constitutional supremacy with democratic flexibility. It has been adopted/cited by courts in Bangladesh, Kenya, and Belize. Its legitimacy rests on judicial restraint — the doctrine must protect fundamentals without becoming a tool for judicial expansionism.
Framework — Q10: Rajya Sabha’s Variable Role
Introduction: The Constitution calibrates Rajya Sabha’s legislative role based on the nature of the bill — ranging from co-equal on ordinary and constitutional amendment bills to advisory on Money Bills. This variable architecture reflects the tension between bicameralism and the primacy of the directly elected chamber.
Body 1 — Co-Equal Role: On ordinary bills, RS can amend or reject (Art. 107-108). On constitutional amendment bills, RS must individually pass by special majority — RS has an absolute veto. On Financial Bills I and II, RS has full amending and rejecting power.
Body 2 — Advisory Role: On Money Bills, RS is limited to 14-day recommendations (Art. 109). LS is not bound. If RS does not return within 14 days, bill is deemed passed. RS’s voice is heard but not decisive.
Body 3 — Erosion: Money Bill route increasingly used for non-financial legislation. Joint sitting mechanism structurally favours LS. Declining sitting days reduce RS’s deliberative capacity. The gap between constitutional design and political practice widens.
Conclusion: Rajya Sabha’s variable role was constitutionally intentional — but its effective exclusion through Money Bill misclassification threatens the bicameral design. Preserving RS’s revisory function requires institutional safeguards: judicial review of Money Bill certification and stricter adherence to Art. 110’s “only” test.
Framework — Q7: Private Member Bills — Significance
Introduction: Private member bills are introduced by MPs who are not Ministers, typically discussed on Fridays with limited time. Only 14 such bills have been passed in Indian parliamentary history — making their legislative success rate near-zero.
Body 1 — Democratic Significance: They serve as a signalling mechanism, allowing MPs to raise issues the government may ignore. They demonstrate legislative initiative beyond party mandates. They contribute to public discourse and can catalyse government action — e.g., the Rights of Transgender Persons Bill (2014, RS) prompted government legislation.
Body 2 — Why They Fail: Executive controls the legislative calendar. Anti-defection law prevents cross-party support. Limited Friday afternoon time means most bills are never discussed. Government bills take priority. No committee pathway for private member bills to gain traction.
Body 3 — Comparative: UK has structured routes for PMBs (ballot, ten-minute rule). US members drive legislation through powerful committees. India’s executive dominance makes the private member bill structurally disadvantaged.
Conclusion: Private member bills embody the democratic ideal that every elected representative can shape legislation. Reforms — more floor time, committee referral mechanism, weakening anti-defection for non-confidence matters — would give private member bills a fighting chance.
11

Prelims MCQs — With Answers & Explanations

Question 1

A joint sitting under Article 108 can be called for:

  1. An Ordinary Bill only
  2. An Ordinary Bill and Financial Bill I
  3. An Ordinary Bill, Financial Bill I, and Financial Bill II
  4. All types of Bills including Constitutional Amendment Bills
Show Answer
Answer: (c). Joint sitting is available for Ordinary Bills, Financial Bill I, and Financial Bill II — all bills where RS has full amending/rejecting power and deadlock is possible. It is NOT available for Money Bills (LS has overriding power) or Constitutional Amendment Bills (each House must pass independently).
Question 2

With respect to a Money Bill, Rajya Sabha can:

  1. Amend and return it to Lok Sabha
  2. Reject it outright
  3. Recommend amendments within 14 days
  4. Hold it indefinitely
Show Answer
Answer: (c). Under Art. 109, RS can only recommend amendments within 14 days. It cannot amend, reject, or hold a Money Bill indefinitely. If RS does not return it within 14 days, the bill is deemed passed by both Houses.
Question 3

Consider the following statements about Financial Bill Category I:
1. It can be introduced in either House.
2. The President’s recommendation is required for its introduction.
3. Rajya Sabha has full powers to amend or reject it.
Which of the above is/are correct?

  1. 1 and 3 only
  2. 2 and 3 only
  3. 1, 2, and 3
  4. 3 only
Show Answer
Answer: (b) 2 and 3 only. Financial Bill Category I can be introduced only in Lok Sabha (like a Money Bill) — Statement 1 is wrong. President’s recommendation is needed for introduction — Statement 2 is correct. RS has full powers — Statement 3 is correct. The trap is that Financial Bill II can be introduced in either House, not Category I.
Question 4

Which of the following amendments to the Constitution require ratification by legislatures of not less than half the states?
1. Amendment to Article 368 itself
2. Amendment to the Seventh Schedule
3. Amendment to Article 19 (Fundamental Rights)

  1. 1 and 2 only
  2. 2 and 3 only
  3. 1, 2, and 3
  4. 1 only
Show Answer
Answer: (a) 1 and 2 only. Art. 368 itself and the Seventh Schedule (distribution of powers between Centre and States) require ratification — they affect the federal structure. Art. 19 (Fundamental Rights) requires only special majority in both Houses, not state ratification. Common trap: students assume all Fundamental Rights amendments need ratification.
Question 5

The Speaker’s certification of a Money Bill under Article 110:

  1. Can be challenged in the Supreme Court
  2. Is subject to approval by the President
  3. Is final and cannot be questioned in any court or by either House
  4. Requires endorsement by the Deputy Speaker
Show Answer
Answer: (c). Article 110(3) explicitly provides that the Speaker’s decision is final and “shall not be called in question in any court.” While there is an ongoing judicial debate about limited review (per Chandrachud J.’s dissent in the Aadhaar case), the constitutional text as it stands makes the certification conclusive.
Question 6

A Constitutional Amendment Bill can be introduced:

  1. Only in Lok Sabha
  2. Only in Rajya Sabha
  3. In either House of Parliament
  4. Only by a Minister with prior Presidential recommendation
Show Answer
Answer: (c). A Constitutional Amendment Bill can be introduced in either House, by a Minister or a private member, without requiring the President’s prior recommendation. This is a key distinguishing feature from Money Bills and Financial Bills.
Question 7

How many joint sittings of Parliament have been held in India?

  1. One
  2. Two
  3. Three
  4. Five
Show Answer
Answer: (c) Three. Joint sittings were held in 1961 (Dowry Prohibition Bill), 1978 (Banking Service Commission Repeal Bill), and 2002 (Prevention of Terrorism Bill/POTA). Their rarity indicates the mechanism serves as a constitutional deterrent rather than a routine tool.
Question 8

The key difference between Financial Bill Category I and Category II regarding President’s recommendation is:

  1. Category I needs it for introduction; Category II needs it for consideration
  2. Category I needs it for consideration; Category II needs it for introduction
  3. Both need it for introduction
  4. Neither requires President’s recommendation
Show Answer
Answer: (a). Financial Bill Category I (Art. 117(1)) requires President’s recommendation for introduction. Financial Bill Category II (Art. 117(3)) requires President’s recommendation for consideration (not introduction). This means a Category II bill can be introduced without Presidential recommendation but cannot proceed further without it.
Question 9

Consider the following statements:
1. The President can return a Money Bill for reconsideration.
2. The President must give assent to a Constitutional Amendment Bill passed by both Houses.
Which is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Show Answer
Answer: (b) 2 only. The President cannot return a Money Bill for reconsideration — can only assent or withhold assent (Art. 111 proviso). After the 24th Amendment (1971), the President must give assent to a Constitutional Amendment Bill duly passed by Parliament — cannot withhold or return it.
Question 10

Who presides over a joint sitting of Parliament under Article 108?

  1. Chairman of Rajya Sabha
  2. Speaker of Lok Sabha
  3. The senior-most member of Parliament
  4. A person nominated by the President
Show Answer
Answer: (b) Speaker of Lok Sabha. Article 118(4) provides that the Speaker presides over joint sittings. In the Speaker’s absence, the Deputy Speaker presides. If neither is available, the Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha presides. The Chairman of Rajya Sabha does NOT preside — a classic UPSC trap.
12

Frequently Asked Questions

Can Rajya Sabha stop a Money Bill?

No. Rajya Sabha has no power to amend, reject, or block a Money Bill. Under Article 109, RS can only recommend amendments within 14 days. If it fails to return the bill within 14 days, the bill is deemed passed by both Houses in the form in which it was passed by Lok Sabha. Lok Sabha is free to accept or reject any recommendations made by RS. The Money Bill procedure is the clearest expression of Lok Sabha’s financial supremacy.

Can a joint sitting be called for a Constitutional Amendment Bill?

No. Article 108 specifically excludes Constitutional Amendment Bills from the joint sitting mechanism. If either House fails to pass a Constitutional Amendment Bill by the required special majority, the amendment simply fails. There is no deadlock resolution mechanism — this is by constitutional design. The requirement that both Houses independently approve amendments by special majority protects the federal structure and prevents Lok Sabha from overriding Rajya Sabha on fundamental constitutional changes.

Is the Speaker’s decision on Money Bill classification final?

As per the constitutional text (Article 110(3)), yes — the Speaker’s certification is “final” and “shall not be called in question in any court.” However, the judicial debate has evolved. Justice Chandrachud’s dissent in the Aadhaar case (2018) argued for limited judicial review where the Speaker’s certification is “manifestly erroneous.” A larger bench reference on this question was pending as of the last update. The constitutional text remains clear, but the academic and judicial consensus is shifting toward some form of limited review to prevent abuse of the Money Bill route. (Verify from current affairs for latest bench status.)

What is the difference between Financial Bill Category I and Category II?

Financial Bill I (Art. 117(1)): Contains Art. 110 matters (taxation, Consolidated Fund, etc.) PLUS other non-financial provisions. Introduced only in Lok Sabha. President’s recommendation needed for introduction. RS has full powers. Joint sitting possible.

Financial Bill II (Art. 117(3)): Does NOT contain Art. 110 matters but involves expenditure from the Consolidated Fund. Can be introduced in either House. President’s recommendation needed for consideration (not introduction). RS has full powers. Joint sitting possible.

The critical distinction: Category I = Art. 110 matters + extras (LS-only introduction); Category II = No Art. 110 matters, just Consolidated Fund expenditure (either House introduction). Also, recommendation timing differs: introduction vs consideration.

Can a private member bill become law?

Yes, constitutionally there is no bar — a private member bill follows the same legislative procedure as a government bill. However, in practice, it is extraordinarily rare. Only 14 private member bills have been passed in Indian parliamentary history since 1952. The last one in Lok Sabha was in 1970. Executive control of the legislative calendar, party discipline under the Tenth Schedule, limited Friday afternoon time, and the absence of a committee pathway for private member bills all contribute to their near-zero success rate. Their significance lies more in signalling and agenda-setting than in actual legislative outcomes.

Why can’t the President return a Money Bill for reconsideration?

Under Article 111, the President can return a bill for reconsideration — but the proviso to Article 111 specifically excludes Money Bills from this power. The President can either assent to or withhold assent from a Money Bill. Since the Money Bill is introduced on the President’s own recommendation (acting on ministerial advice under Art. 74), returning it would be constitutionally contradictory. The practical effect: once a Money Bill is passed by Lok Sabha (and transmitted through RS), Presidential assent is virtually automatic.

What happens if a bill is pending when Lok Sabha is dissolved, but a joint sitting has been notified?

Under Article 108(5), if the President has notified a joint sitting before the dissolution of Lok Sabha, the bill does NOT lapse. The joint sitting can proceed with the newly constituted Lok Sabha and the continuing Rajya Sabha. This is an important exception to the general rule that bills pending in Lok Sabha lapse upon dissolution. However, if no joint sitting notification has been issued before dissolution, the bill lapses.

Does the “simple majority” category of constitutional amendment actually use Article 368?

No — and this is a critical conceptual clarification. Amendments that require only a simple majority (like creation of new states under Art. 3, or citizenship provisions under Art. 11) are not amendments under Article 368. They are alterations permitted by the specific constitutional provisions themselves. Article 368 governs only amendments requiring special majority (with or without state ratification). The Constituent Assembly deliberately placed certain provisions outside Art. 368’s ambit to allow flexibility for routine administrative and territorial changes. UPSC frequently tests this distinction.

Who certifies a Financial Bill as Category I or Category II?

There is no formal certification process for Financial Bills analogous to the Speaker’s Money Bill certification under Art. 110(3). The classification depends on the bill’s content — if it contains Art. 110 matters plus other matters, it is Category I; if it involves Consolidated Fund expenditure without Art. 110 matters, it is Category II. The Speaker may make a ruling on classification if challenged, but there is no constitutionally mandated certification. This distinguishes Financial Bills from Money Bills, where Speaker certification is a formal constitutional requirement.

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