For educational use only.
- 1West Asia Crisis – Iran Attacks Shipping, Global Energy Concerns MountGS-II / GS-III
- 2SC Upholds Right to Die with Dignity – Harish Rana PVS CaseGS-II / GS-IV
- 3India’s LPG Storage Deficit – Why India is Staring at an LPG CrisisGS-III
- 4Nepal RSP Election Landslide – Implications for India’s Neighbourhood PolicyGS-II
- 5Women in Agriculture – Underpaid and UndercountedGS-I / GS-III
- 6NCERT Textbook Row – SC Unhappy with ‘Rewritten’ ChapterGS-II / GS-IV
- 7Anti-Depredation Squads Linked to Elephant DeathsGS-III
- ❓SEO-Optimised FAQs for UPSC AspirantsAll GS
- Iran attacked commercial ships across the Persian Gulf and targeted Dubai International Airport, escalating the US-Israel-Iran war into a full-scale energy crisis.
- The India-bound Thai cargo ship Mayuree Naree was set ablaze in the Strait of Hormuz; three crew members reported missing; MEA deplored attacks on commercial shipping.
- Iran warned of targeting financial institutions; IEA announced the largest-ever oil reserve release of 400 million barrels; Brent crude remained above $90/barrel; Indian rupee at ₹92/$.
- Strait of Hormuz: Narrow waterway between Iran and Oman; ~20% of global oil trade transits here; closed by Iran since March 1, 2026. Critical for India as 85%+ of LPG imports are routed through it.
- IEA (International Energy Agency): Founded 1974; maintains 90-day strategic reserve mandate for members; India has Association member status (not full member).
- India’s import dependence: ~90% of crude oil imported; 60% of LPG imported; 85%+ of LPG imports routed through Hormuz.
- UNCLOS (1982): Guarantees freedom of navigation; attacks on commercial shipping violate international maritime law.
- Strategic Petroleum Reserves: India has SPR at Vishakhapatnam, Mangaluru, Padur (~9.5 days crude consumption). LPG reserves: only 1.4 lakh MT (less than 2 days).
- IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — Iran’s elite military force responsible for naval operations in the Gulf; designated Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US.
| Dimension | India’s Exposure | Immediate Impact (March 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Energy | 90% oil import dependent; 85% LPG via Hormuz | LPG shortage; ₹60/cylinder hike; Brent at $90–120 |
| Diaspora & Seafarers | 9M+ Indians in Gulf; 778 seafarers in Hormuz zone | Safety concerns; diplomatic pressure on MEA |
| Trade | UAE = India’s top trade partner (~$85B/year) | Shipping disruption; cargo insurance costs spike |
| Financial Markets | Rupee pressure; current account deficit widens | Rupee at ₹92/$; Nifty fell 1.6%; inflation risk |
| Strategic (Chabahar) | India’s Iran connectivity route now inaccessible | Central Asia connectivity disrupted |
- Strait closed March 1
- Iran attacks Gulf ships
- US strikes on Bandar Abbas
- 16 Iranian minelayers destroyed
- No strategic LPG reserve
- LPG import dependency 60%
- PMUY demand surge, no buffer
- Coal stock: 88 days buffer
- IEA: 400M barrels (record)
- Kuwait downed 8 drones
- Saudi intercepted missiles
- Trump: “war could end soon”
- MEA deplores attacks
- PM: “No need to panic”
- Supply maintenance order
- Home Secy: State monitoring
- Policy contradiction: India cut Russian oil imports under US pressure before the crisis — losing a discounted alternative precisely when it needed one. The Hindu editorial notes India “squandered Moscow’s trust” with no lasting US benefit.
- Infrastructure deficit: India has 9.5 days of crude SPR vs IEA’s recommended 90 days. LPG underground storage = under 2 days. This is a structural long-term failure, not a crisis-response lapse.
- Communication failure: Government communicated through off-record briefings for days; inter-ministerial press conference came late and took no questions — fuelling panic faster than warranted.
- PMUY paradox: The scheme added 10 crore LPG connections without building strategic storage — dramatically increasing demand dependency without supply security.
- Global comparison: EU mandates 90% gas storage fill before winter; US maintains 90-day SPR. India’s comparable metric is 9.5 days for crude, under 2 days for LPG.
- Build LPG strategic reserve: Target 30-day LPG reserve; invest in salt caverns (Rajasthan’s Bikaner-Barmer belt via EIL-DEEP Germany partnership).
- Diversify energy sources: Accelerate US LPG deal (2.2 MMT/year), African oil, and Russian LNG contracts independent of political pressure.
- True strategic autonomy: India must stop oscillating between US and Russia based on diplomatic weather — long-term sovereign energy policy required.
- Accelerate renewables: Ethanol blending, solar cooking, induction cooktop subsidies — reduce structural LPG dependence over medium term.
- Crisis communication protocol: Establish designated energy crisis spokesperson with 24-hour briefing framework for public communication.
- SDG-7 linkage: Affordable and Clean Energy for All — requires energy security infrastructure, not just demand expansion without supply-side resilience.
Q. With reference to India’s Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR), consider the following statements:
1. India’s SPR facilities are located at Vishakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur.
2. The IEA recommends a minimum of 90 days of import coverage for member countries.
3. India is a full member of the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Which of the above statements is/are correct?
- 1 and 2 only
- 2 and 3 only
- 1 and 3 only
- 1, 2 and 3
Statement 1 ✅: India has three underground SPR facilities — Vishakhapatnam (~9.75 MMBbl), Mangaluru (~3.0 MMBbl), and Padur (~6.0 MMBbl) — holding ~9.5 days of crude consumption.
Statement 2 ✅: The IEA mandates that member countries hold emergency oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net imports (under the 1974 International Energy Program).
Statement 3 ❌: India is not a full member of the IEA — it holds Association member status (since 2017). Full membership requires OECD membership. India participates in emergency response exercises but is not bound by the 90-day mandate.
- The Supreme Court upheld the right to die with dignity of Harish Rana, 32, in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for 13 years, by allowing withdrawal of Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) — the first implementation of its own 2018 guidelines.
- SC formally retired “passive euthanasia” and replaced it with “Withdrawing or Withholding of Medical Treatment” (WWMT); active euthanasia remains impermissible.
- AIIMS Delhi directed to provide palliative care; CMOs directed to form Secondary Medical Boards; SC urged Parliament to enact specific legislation.
- Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty. SC has progressively interpreted it to include right to die with dignity; Gian Kaur (1996) had restricted this earlier.
- Common Cause v. Union of India (2018): Five-judge Constitution Bench recognised right to die with dignity; issued guidelines for advance medical directives (“living wills”); coined “passive euthanasia.”
- Aruna Shanbaug Case (2011): SC permitted passive euthanasia for PVS patients; established two-tier medical board system.
- Active vs. WWMT: Active euthanasia (lethal injection) — impermissible; WWMT (withdrawing life support) — permissible under strict procedural conditions.
- Persistent Vegetative State (PVS): Severely impaired consciousness; brainstem functions intact but no awareness; distinguished from brain death.
(Hospital-level)
(CMO-constituted)
| Aspect | Active Euthanasia | WWMT (formerly “Passive Euthanasia”) |
|---|---|---|
| Mechanism | Positive overt act (e.g., lethal injection) | Withdrawing/withholding life support |
| Source of harm | Doctor introduces new cause of death | Underlying condition takes natural course |
| Legality in India | ❌ Impermissible | ✅ Permissible under strict conditions |
| Global status | Legal in Netherlands, Belgium, Canada | Legal in most democracies (UK, USA, etc.) |
- Landmark terminological shift: Retiring “passive euthanasia” removes stigma and aligns India with global medical and legal best practices. The new term WWMT is medically precise.
- Dignity as constitutional value: Justice Pardiwala’s formulation — “when bodily invasion increases and prognosis decreases, state’s interest in preserving life must yield to dignity” — is a significant evolution of Article 21 jurisprudence.
- Palliative care gap: SC’s direction to AIIMS reveals a systemic failure — India has fewer than 5,000 trained palliative care specialists for 1.4 billion people. Right to dignified death remains inaccessible to most.
- Legislative vacuum: SC has now urged Parliament for the third time (after 2011, 2018) to enact specific legislation — this legislative inaction is a constitutional failure.
- GS-IV dimension: The case raises questions about autonomy, surrogate decision-making by families, and the ethical limits of medical technology.
- Enact specific legislation: Parliament must pass a Medical Treatment of Terminally Ill Patients Act incorporating WWMT procedures, living wills, and advance medical directive frameworks.
- Strengthen palliative care: Integrate into National Health Mission; train district-level officers; establish hospice care infrastructure.
- Simplify advance directives: Current process too complex for ordinary citizens — implement accessible, patient-friendly procedures.
- SDG-3 linkage: Good Health and Well-Being — end-of-life care is part of universal health coverage.
Q. With reference to the right to die with dignity in India, which of the following is/are correct?
1. The Gian Kaur case (1996) first recognised the right to die with dignity under Article 21.
2. The Common Cause judgment (2018) recognised validity of advance medical directives (“living wills”).
3. In 2026, the Supreme Court replaced “passive euthanasia” with “Withdrawing or Withholding of Medical Treatment” (WWMT).
- 1 and 2 only
- 2 and 3 only
- 1 and 3 only
- 1, 2 and 3
Statement 1 ❌: In Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996), the SC held that Article 21 does NOT include the right to die. It was the Common Cause (2018) five-judge bench that first recognised the right to die with dignity under Article 21.
Statement 2 ✅: The 2018 Common Cause Constitution Bench held that right to die with dignity is a fundamental right and recognised validity of advance medical directives (living wills) subject to procedural safeguards.
Statement 3 ✅: In the March 2026 Harish Rana judgment, Justice J.B. Pardiwala declared “passive euthanasia” obsolete and replaced it with the medically precise term “Withdrawing or Withholding of Medical Treatment” (WWMT).
Why Is India Staring at an LPG Deficit?
- India’s LPG supply chain was severely disrupted by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz amid the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict (March 2026).
- India’s total underground LPG storage (1.4 lakh MT) is less than two days of consumption — a critical gap ignored despite a decade of PMUY-led demand surge.
- With 60% import dependency and no new storage caverns planned, India’s energy security architecture is structurally unprepared for supply shocks.
| Parameter | Detail |
|---|---|
| Key Scheme | PMUY (2016): 10 crore new LPG connections to BPL women; total 33 crore domestic connections |
| LPG Underground Storage | 2 caverns: Vizag (2007) + Mangaluru (2025); Total = 1.4 lakh MT (<2 days supply) |
| LPG Imports (2024-25) | ~18 MMT; tripled from 2011-12; Qatar 34%, UAE 26%, Kuwait 8.3% |
| Import Dependency | 60% of total need; 90% routes via Strait of Hormuz |
| India’s Crude Storage | ISPRL: 3 caverns (Padur, Mangaluru, Vizag) = ~5 MMT crude (~17 days cover) |
| New U.S. LPG Deal | 2.2 MMT/year; but 45-day shipping time vs Gulf cargoes |
| Budget 2026-27 | LPG subsidy cut by 27%: Rs.15,121 cr to Rs.11,085 cr |
- 40% domestic production only
- 60% import dependent
- 90% imports via Hormuz
- No new caverns planned (MoPNG 2025)
- 33 crore domestic connections
- PMUY added 10 crore poor households
- 2nd largest LPG consumer globally
- LNG imports also at record 27 MMT
- 1.4 lakh MT = less than 2 days supply
- EU stores ~25% of annual gas use
- IEA flagged India’s storage weakness
- Salt caverns – Bikaner-Barmer (Rajasthan)
- EIL-DEEP Germany partnership
- Depleted KG, Cambay basin reservoirs
- Peninsular Shield rock caverns (proven)
| Country/Region | Gas Storage (% Annual Use) | Strategic Reserve Mandate |
|---|---|---|
| European Union | ~25% | 90% fill before winter (post-2022 mandate) |
| United States | High (shale buffer) | Strategic Petroleum Reserve (crude) |
| India (LPG) | Less than 0.2% | None for LPG; 17 days crude only |
- Policy Asymmetry: PMUY expanded demand (welfare goal) without matching supply-security infrastructure — classic welfare vs. resilience trade-off.
- Fiscal Contradiction: Subsidy cut of 27% in Budget 2026-27 came weeks before a supply crisis — poor timing aggravated by geopolitical blindness.
- Geopolitical Concentration Risk: Qatar + UAE = 60% of imports. U.S. LPG is strategically sound but logistically slow (45-day shipping).
- Missing Storage Mandate: Unlike crude oil (IEA mandates 90-day stocks), no equivalent LPG storage mandate exists domestically.
- Crisis Communication Failure: Reliance on anonymous briefings and delayed press conferences triggered panic — governance deficit exposed.
- Induction Cooktop Opportunity: 4x spike in cooktop sales signals organic shift; no pre-existing policy to incentivise this transition.
| Timeframe | Measure |
|---|---|
| Immediate | Activate ISPRL; fast-track U.S. LPG; expand DAC (Delivery Authentication Code) to prevent diversion |
| Short-Term | Build salt cavern storage in Bikaner-Barmer; subsidise induction cooktops |
| Medium-Term | Mandate 15-day LPG strategic buffer; diversify supply (U.S., Australia, Africa) |
| Long-Term | SDG-7: shift to electricity-based cooking; expand domestic gas production; cut import dependency below 40% |
| Governance | Establish Energy Security Council; real-time LPG inventory dashboard; crisis communication SOP |
Q. With reference to India’s LPG sector, consider the following statements:
1. India is the second-largest consumer of LPG in the world.
2. The Strait of Hormuz lies between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
3. India’s total underground LPG storage is less than two days of consumption.
4. ISPRL manages India’s LPG underground caverns.
- 1 and 3 only
- 2 and 4 only
- 1, 3 and 4 only
- 1, 2, 3 and 4
Statement 1 ✔: India is the second-largest LPG consumer globally (~3 million tonnes/month).
Statement 2 ✘: Strait of Hormuz lies between Iran and Oman, not Saudi Arabia.
Statement 3 ✔: Vizag + Mangaluru caverns = 1.4 lakh MT = less than 2 days of India’s ~80,000 MT/day consumption.
Statement 4 ✘: ISPRL manages crude oil strategic reserves. LPG caverns are operated by OMCs (IOCL, BPCL, HPCL).
Youth-Backed RSP Win Signals Nepal’s New Political Era
- Nepal’s Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) won a landslide in the March 5, 2026 general elections — 125 of 165 FPTP seats; 51.57 lakh PR votes (highest of all parties).
- Balen Shah (former rapper, structural engineer, Kathmandu Mayor) named PM candidate; Rabi Lamichhane retains party presidency.
- This is the first single-party majority since Nepal’s 2015 Constitution — ending a decade of coalition instability driven by NC and CPN-UML.
- For India, a pivotal opportunity to reset bilateral ties under the Neighbourhood First Policy.
| Parameter | Detail |
|---|---|
| Nepal Parliament | 275-seat House of Representatives: 165 FPTP + 110 PR; Majority = 138 seats |
| 2015 Constitution | Established federal democratic republic; first single-party majority under it: RSP 2026 |
| Gen Z Movement (Sept 2025) | Mass youth protests against corruption and nepotism — led to Interim PM Sushila Karki (former Chief Justice) |
| RSP History | Founded 2022; 20 seats in 2022; 125 FPTP seats in 2026 |
| India-Nepal Key Agreements | Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950); Power Trade Agreement; Transit Treaty |
| Key Bilateral Project | Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project (~6,000 MW) — long-pending; India-Nepal joint venture |
| India’s Policy Framework | Neighbourhood First Policy; BIMSTEC; hydropower cooperation |
- Gen Z anti-corruption movement (Sept 2025)
- 52% voters aged 18-40
- “Bacha Patra” manifesto: clean governance, judicial reform
- Frustration with NC + CPN-UML corruption
- Reset without baggage of old parties
- Hydropower: Pancheshwar 6,000 MW
- Infrastructure: roads, rail, transmission lines
- Educational exchange, ICCR scholarships
- RSP untested in foreign policy
- Anti-India sentiment if India appears overbearing
- China leveraging Nepal’s BRI connectivity
- Unmet youth expectations may cause instability
- 1. Respect democratic process
- 2. Partnership through development, not patronage
- 3. Quiet diplomacy over visibility
| Dimension | Old Parties (NC, CPN-UML) | RSP (New Leadership) |
|---|---|---|
| Governance Style | Coalition bargaining, instability | Single-party mandate, reform-focused |
| Voter Base | Traditional cadre-based | Youth-driven, urban, social-media led |
| Foreign Policy | Experienced India-China balancing | Untested; open to fresh engagement |
| India Relationship | Historically complex, periodic tensions | Clean slate — opportunity for India |
- India’s Perennial Challenge: India has often been perceived as overbearing in Nepal. RSP’s anti-establishment roots make it doubly important to adopt a non-patronising approach.
- China Factor: Beijing has pushed BRI, Kathmandu-Tibet railway, and trade corridors. India must match China’s infrastructure pitch with timely project delivery — not just commitments.
- RSP’s Inexperience Risk: Since 2015, no single party had formed a majority. Inner-party fissures and unmet expectations could rapidly destabilise the RSP government.
- Water Diplomacy Opportunity: Pancheshwar (6,000 MW) has been stalled for decades — its revival would be the most powerful signal of India’s genuine partnership intent.
- Open Border Dynamics: India-Nepal’s open border is unique globally but remains sensitive. New Delhi must handle migration concerns carefully.
- Development Diplomacy: Prioritise completion of committed projects (Raxaul-Kathmandu rail, cross-border transmission lines) over political signalling.
- Youth Engagement: Expand ICCR scholarships and India-Nepal youth forums targeting RSP’s 18-40 demographic base.
- Quiet Diplomacy: Avoid public endorsement of specific leaders; maintain consistent engagement regardless of political configurations in Kathmandu.
- Economic Integration: Fast-track Pancheshwar Project; explore joint ventures in IT, pharma, tourism; strengthen BIMSTEC multilateral framework.
Q. Consider the following statements about Nepal’s political system:
1. Nepal’s House of Representatives has 275 seats, of which 110 are filled through Proportional Representation.
2. The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) was founded in 2019.
3. No single party won a parliamentary majority in Nepal from 2015 to 2025.
4. The Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project is a joint hydropower initiative between India and Nepal.
- 1, 3 and 4 only
- 2 and 3 only
- 1, 2 and 4 only
- 1, 2, 3 and 4
Statement 1 ✔: Nepal HoR = 275 seats: 165 FPTP + 110 PR. Correct.
Statement 2 ✘: RSP was founded in 2022, not 2019.
Statement 3 ✔: Since the 2015 Constitution, no single party had won a majority until RSP’s 2026 victory.
Statement 4 ✔: Pancheshwar (~6,000 MW) on the Mahakali River is a long-pending India-Nepal joint hydropower project.
Holding Up Half the Sky: Women in Indian Agriculture — Underpaid and Undercounted
- India has 117.6 million women in agriculture — yet only 10% of rural women own land and women’s wages are less than 50% of male wages in many states.
- Rural female LFPR rose from 35% (2011-12) to 46.5% (2023-24) but this growth is driven by distress self-employment, not genuine labour market inclusion.
- Published on the occasion of the International Year of the Woman Farmer (FAO, 2026) — exposes structural inequality in India’s farm economy.
| Parameter | Key Data |
|---|---|
| Total Women in Agriculture | 117.6 million (21.7M hired + 95.1M self-employed + 0.8M regular) — PLFS 2023-24 |
| Historic Milestone | Women hired workers (21.7M) now exceed men (19.7M) — first time in post-Independence India |
| LFPR (Rural Women) | 35% (2011-12) to 46.5% (2023-24); global average: 57-63% |
| Self-Employment Share | 60% (2011-12) to 73% (2023-24) — reflects distress, not empowerment |
| Wage Data | Tamil Nadu: Rs.290/day (less than 50% of male wages); National avg: Rs.384/day; Kerala: Rs.646/day |
| Livestock Implicit Wage | ~Rs.100/day — only 2/5th of agricultural wage rate |
| Land Ownership | Only 10% of rural women own land — denies credit, insurance, bargaining power |
| PARI Project | Foundation for Agrarian Studies; 27-village dataset used in this study |
- Crop production: 1/3 to 61% of labour (by region)
- Livestock: primary workforce; 40M rural households with milch animals
- Wage labour: 16%-71% across regions
- Tamil Nadu: Rs.290/day (less than 50% of male)
- UP: Rs.242-276/day
- Kerala: Rs.646/day (highest)
- Livestock implicit: ~Rs.100/day
- Only 10% own land
- 73% self-employed (no formal labour rights)
- Care work intermingled with farm work
- PLFS undercounts women’s work
- No gender-disaggregated family farm data
- No land titling programme for women
- Equal Remuneration Act (1976) poorly enforced
- MGNREGS wage parity: partial progress
| State / Source | Women’s Daily Wage | Wage Gap |
|---|---|---|
| Kerala | Rs.646/day | Narrower |
| Tamil Nadu (PARI villages) | Rs.290/day | More than 50% gap vs. men |
| Uttar Pradesh (PARI villages) | Rs.242-276/day | Narrower in absolute terms |
| All-India (Labour Bureau, Nov 2025) | Rs.384/day | Significant gap from male wages |
- Statistical Invisibility: PLFS fails to capture seasonal, home-based, unpaid care-integrated work — actual women workers are likely higher than 117.6 million.
- Feminisation Without Empowerment: 73% self-employment rate reflects agrarian distress, not progress. The label “worker” masks poverty.
- Land Rights Paradox: Women form ~50% of farm workforce but own only 10% of farmland — denying credit access, insurance, and bargaining power.
- Wage Stagnation: After inflation adjustment, women’s agricultural wages have barely risen in a decade despite the Equal Remuneration Act (1976).
- Care Economy Burden: Women’s unpaid farm + livestock + domestic work remains economically invisible — India has no satellite account for unpaid care.
- FAO Estimate: Equal access to land, credit, and inputs could raise agricultural output by 2.5-4% and reduce global hunger by 100-150 million.
- Land Titling: Joint titling for married couples; prioritise women in land redistribution; accelerate DILRMP (Digital India Land Records Modernisation Programme).
- Wage Enforcement: Gender wage audit in agriculture; link MGNREGS revisions to gender parity benchmarks.
- Data Reform: Redesign PLFS to capture seasonal, home-based, unpaid agricultural work — disaggregated by gender, sector, asset ownership.
- Credit Access: Expand Kisan Credit Cards and PM-KISAN to women as primary beneficiaries; strengthen NABARD SHG-bank linkage.
- Livestock Value Chain: Formalise dairy women’s implicit earnings; link to institutional credit (AMUL model expansion).
- SDG Alignment: SDG-1 (No Poverty), SDG-2 (Zero Hunger), SDG-5 (Gender Equality), SDG-8 (Decent Work).
Q. With reference to women’s participation in Indian agriculture (PLFS 2023-24), which statements are correct?
1. Rural female LFPR increased from 35% (2011-12) to 46.5% (2023-24).
2. Women hired agricultural workers now outnumber male hired workers for the first time in post-Independence India.
3. The increase in rural women workers is mainly in regular wage or salaried employment.
4. The all-India average daily agricultural wage for women was Rs.384 (Labour Bureau, Nov 2025).
- 1, 2 and 4 only
- 2 and 3 only
- 1 and 4 only
- 1, 2, 3 and 4
Statement 1 ✔: Correct as per PLFS data.
Statement 2 ✔: Women hired workers (21.7M) exceed men (19.7M) — first time in post-Independence India.
Statement 3 ✘: The increase is in self-employment (60% to 73%), not regular/salaried employment. Reflects distress, not inclusion.
Statement 4 ✔: Labour Bureau (Nov 2025): All-India women’s agricultural wage = Rs.384/day; Kerala highest at Rs.646/day.
- The Supreme Court expressed strong displeasure over a “laconic” affidavit by the NCERT Director claiming a banned Class 8 Social Science chapter on “corruption in judiciary” had been “duly rewritten” — without specifying who rewrote it, how, or when.
- The Court mandated that any revised chapter must be approved by an expert committee (comprising a former senior judge, an eminent academic, and a renowned legal practitioner) before publication, and directed the government to re-examine the NSTC.
| Element | Details |
|---|---|
| Banned textbook | NCERT Class 8 Social Science — chapter on “corruption in judiciary” |
| Ban order | February 26, 2026 — SC ordered “blanket and complete ban” |
| Copies withdrawn | Over 82,000 copies withdrawn by Centre before ban order |
| Textbook Development Team (TDT) | Michel Danino, Suparna Divakar, Alok Prasanna Kumar |
| NCERT Director | Dinesh Prasad Saklani — filed the affidavit deemed “laconic” |
| Expert committee ordered | Former senior judge + eminent academic + renowned legal practitioner |
| Additional direction | Expert committee to associate with National Judicial Academy (NJA) on legal studies curriculum for all classes |
| NSTC reform | SC directed government to revisit composition of National Syllabus and Teaching Learning Material Committee |
- NCERT: National Council of Educational Research and Training — autonomous body under Ministry of Education.
- National Judicial Academy (NJA), Bhopal: Autonomous body under Supreme Court for judicial training and research.
- Right to Education Act, 2009: Article 21A — free and compulsory education for 6-14 years; textbook quality integral to this right.
- Article 19(1)(a): SC clarified it is “not averse to legitimate criticism” of the judiciary — protecting objective criticism while condemning deliberate misrepresentation.
| 📊 Competing Constitutional Values in This Case | |
|---|---|
| Value | Issue Raised |
| Freedom of Expression (Art. 19(1)(a)) | SC clarified: legitimate criticism of judiciary is protected; deliberate misrepresentation is not |
| Right to Education (Art. 21A) | Quality and accuracy of school textbooks is integral to the right to education |
| Judicial Independence | SC’s concern: biased content could undermine public confidence in judiciary over time |
| Accountability in Governance | NCERT Director’s vague affidavit = evasion of accountability; SC rightly demanded specifics |
- Governance accountability: The NCERT Director’s vague affidavit is a classic case of bureaucratic evasiveness — claiming action without providing evidence. The SC’s sharp response is a model for demanding specific accountability.
- Judicial balance: The SC explicitly clarified it is “not averse to legitimate criticism” of the judiciary — an important distinction protecting academic freedom while condemning deliberate misrepresentation.
- Expert committee precedent: Mandating expert oversight for textbook content on sensitive institutional topics sets an important precedent for ensuring factual accuracy in curriculum.
- NSTC reform urgency: The case highlights systemic weakness in how India’s national textbook development committees are constituted — without adequate peer review or legal expertise.
- NEP 2020 alignment: NEP 2020 calls for critical thinking and reduced content load — curriculum reform requires careful balancing of critical inquiry with institutional accuracy.
- Reform NSTC composition: Include retired judges, practicing lawyers, legal academics, and civil society in textbook development teams for chapters touching constitutional institutions.
- Transparent peer review: Establish mandatory peer review protocols for NCERT textbooks before publication.
- Judicial literacy curriculum: Collaborate with NJA to develop a comprehensive, factually accurate legal studies curriculum for all school classes.
- Social media accountability: The SC’s direction to identify websites spreading irresponsible content needs a structured framework linked to IT Rules 2021.
- SDG linkage: SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), SDG 4 (Quality Education).
- NCERT: Autonomous under Ministry of Education; develops school textbooks and curricula
- NSTC: National Syllabus and Teaching Learning Material Committee — oversees curriculum development
- National Judicial Academy (NJA): Located in Bhopal; under the Supreme Court for judicial training
- RTE Act, 2009: Article 21A; free and compulsory education for 6-14 years
- NEP 2020: Emphasises critical thinking, multidisciplinary education, reduced content load
- Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech — includes legitimate criticism of public institutions
Q. Consider the following statements about NCERT and India’s educational governance:
1. NCERT is an autonomous body under the Ministry of Education.
2. The National Judicial Academy (NJA) is located in Bhopal and functions under the Supreme Court of India.
3. The Right to Education Act, 2009 provides for free and compulsory education to children between 6 and 14 years of age.
4. The National Education Policy 2020 was the first NEP to be released after the original National Policy on Education, 1986.
- 1, 2 and 3 only
- 1, 3 and 4 only
- 2, 3 and 4 only
- 1, 2, 3 and 4
Statement 1: Correct. NCERT is an autonomous organisation under the Ministry of Education.
Statement 2: Correct. The National Judicial Academy is in Bhopal, functioning under the SC of India.
Statement 3: Correct. RTE Act, 2009 under Article 21A provides free and compulsory education for children aged 6-14 years.
Statement 4: Incorrect. NEP 2020 is NOT the first NEP after 1986. The 1986 policy was revised in 1992. NEP 2020 is the third NEP (after 1968, 1986/1992).
- A study in Conservation Biology finds that Anti-Depredation Squads (ADS) in Assam’s Sonitpur district — designed by WWF-India to reduce human-elephant conflict — are actually associated with a 2 to 3 times increase in accidental elephant deaths, while showing no discernible impact on human mortality.
- The study (20 years of data) suggests that searchlights and firecrackers used by ADS create a “landscape of fear” that causes elephants to stray into ditches, electric wires, and rail tracks.
| Parameter | Details |
|---|---|
| ADS launched | 2003 in Sonitpur district, Assam (WWF-India + Forest Department) |
| ADS scaled up | 2008 by Assam government; new squads still being formed |
| ADS composition | 10-15 male volunteers; given searchlights and firecrackers |
| Study data period | 20 years of elephant deaths in Sonitpur |
| Key finding | 2-3x increase in accidental elephant deaths in ADS villages |
| “14 additional deaths in as many years” | Attributable to ADS presence statistically |
| Cause of deaths | Ditches, electrocution, train collisions — NOT direct conflict |
| Impact on humans | No discernible impact on human mortality |
| Lead author | Nitin Sekar, Conservation X Labs (formerly WWF-India) |
| Statistical analysis | E. Somanathan, Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Delhi |
| Assam’s wild elephants | More than 5,000 — second largest population in India |
| ADS presence beyond Assam | West Bengal, Odisha, Chhattisgarh |
| Elephant Task Force 2010 | Identified Sonitpur as priority landscape for elephant conservation |
- Project Elephant: Launched 1992 by MoEFCC; 33 Elephant Reserves across India; provides financial and technical support to range states.
- Wildlife Protection Act, 1972: Asian elephants in Schedule I — highest protection; killing is a non-bailable offence.
- CITES: Asian elephants in Appendix I — prohibits international commercial trade.
- IUCN Status: Asian elephant — Endangered (EN).
- Elephant Corridors: WTI mapped 101 corridors in India; Sonitpur-Kaziranga is a priority corridor.
- Conservation intervention without evaluation: ADS operated for over 20 years across multiple states as part of national guidelines — without a single rigorous evaluation. This is a systemic failure in conservation governance.
- Association vs. causation: WWF-India rightly cautions the study establishes association, not causation — key data gaps include lack of ground-truthing and the fact that ADS are only active in the cropping season while death data covers the full year.
- Precautionary principle: Even if causation is unproven, a 2-3x statistical association with increased accidental deaths warrants immediate re-evaluation — the precautionary principle in environmental law demands no less.
- Scale of proliferation risk: If the association holds causally, India’s 4-state ADS programme could be inadvertently causing additional elephant deaths across West Bengal, Odisha and Chhattisgarh.
- Disorganised chasing alternative: WWF-India argues that even if ADS has negative effects, the alternative (disorganised individual chasing) may be worse — highlighting the difficulty of replacing existing interventions without better alternatives.
- Immediate evaluation: Conduct a prompt, multi-group rigorous evaluation of ADS across all four states — as recommended by lead author Nitin Sekar.
- Adaptive management: ADS squads should modify practices — reduce aggressive chasing and substitute with less frightening deterrents.
- Technology solutions: GPS collars and mobile early warning systems (Elephant Early Warning System — EEWS used in Tamil Nadu and Kerala) allow communities to avoid elephants rather than chase them.
- Beehive fences: African success with beehive fences as deterrents — non-threatening to elephant behaviour; applicable to Indian context.
- Habitat restoration: Long-term solution lies in restoring elephant corridors; Project Elephant’s corridor protection initiative needs accelerated funding.
- Institutional mandate: Mandate evaluation of all wildlife conflict interventions before scaling — embed this in Project Elephant guidelines and state forest policies.
- SDG linkage: SDG 15 (Life on Land), SDG 11 (Sustainable Communities — human-wildlife coexistence), SDG 17 (Partnerships).
- Project Elephant: Launched 1992 by MoEFCC; 33 Elephant Reserves; flagship wildlife protection programme
- Asian Elephant IUCN status: Endangered (EN); Schedule I of WPA 1972; CITES Appendix I
- Elephant Task Force (2010): Report “Gajah” — identified 5 priority landscapes including Sonitpur, Assam
- Sonitpur, Assam: North-central Assam; priority elephant conservation landscape
- WWF-India: World Wildlife Fund-India; designed ADS in 2003
- Precautionary Principle: Environmental law principle — when in doubt about harm, take preventive action; part of Rio Declaration (1992)
- WTI: Wildlife Trust of India — mapped 101 elephant corridors in India
Q. With reference to elephant conservation in India, consider the following statements:
1. The Asian elephant is listed under Schedule I of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, which provides it the highest level of protection.
2. Project Elephant was launched in 1973 as India’s first wildlife protection initiative.
3. The Elephant Task Force (2010) report was titled “Gajah” and identified five priority landscapes for elephant conservation.
4. The Asian elephant is classified as Endangered (EN) on the IUCN Red List.
- 1, 3 and 4 only
- 1, 2 and 4 only
- 2, 3 and 4 only
- 1, 2, 3 and 4
Statement 1: Correct. Asian elephant is in Schedule I of WPA 1972 — highest protection category.
Statement 2: Incorrect. Project Elephant was launched in 1992, NOT 1973. Project Tiger was launched in 1973. This is a common Prelims confusion trap.
Statement 3: Correct. The Elephant Task Force (2010), chaired by Mahesh Rangarajan, submitted the report “Gajah” identifying 5 priority elephant conservation landscapes.
Statement 4: Correct. The Asian elephant (Elephas maximus) is classified as Endangered (EN) on the IUCN Red List due to habitat loss, fragmentation, and human-wildlife conflict.
❓ Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) — UPSC Current Affairs March 12, 2026
SEO-optimised FAQs for UPSC aspirants based on The Hindu, March 12, 2026
Content is based on The Hindu, Bengaluru Edition, March 12, 2026.
All analysis is exam-oriented and prepared by the Legacy IAS academic team.


