The Hindu – UPSC News Analysis
- Delhi Police told the Supreme Court that its May 18 ruling upholding ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ even in UAPA cases may conflict with Section 43-D(5) of UAPA — and suggested a larger Bench review the issue.
- The Additional Solicitor-General argued that the May 18 judgment by Justices Nagarathna and Bhuyan did not correctly account for the mandatory presumption under Section 43-D(5) — where the word used is ‘shall’, reversing the presumption of innocence.
- This arose during bail hearings for 2020 Delhi riots accused Abdul Khalid Sai and Tasleem Ahmad.
- UAPA 1967 (as amended in 2008, 2012, 2019): Primary anti-terror legislation. Section 43-D(5) creates a near-absolute bar to bail if charges are prima facie true.
- K.A. Najeeb (2021): Three-judge SC Bench held that prolonged incarceration + delayed trial can override Section 43-D(5) on constitutional grounds (Art. 21).
- May 18, 2026 Judgment: Two-judge Bench reiterated K.A. Najeeb — bail is the rule, extended detention is punitive. Expressed reservations on earlier Umar Khalid bail denial.
- Conflicting Benches: Two coordinate (equal) Benches have now taken divergent positions — Delhi Police argues this warrants a larger Bench (3 or more judges) for resolution.
- Article 21: Right to life and personal liberty — applies to undertrial prisoners and cannot be suspended by statute alone.
| Position | State’s Argument | Accused’s Argument |
|---|---|---|
| Bail principle | Section 43-D(5) uses ‘shall’ — presumption of innocence takes a backseat | Art. 21 guarantees liberty; prolonged incarceration = punishment without trial |
| Najeeb case | Najeeb allows bail as exception, not rule in UAPA cases | Najeeb holds constitutional courts can always grant bail — it is binding |
| Policy concern | UAPA requires strict deterrence; bail normalisation weakens national security law | UAPA misused as instrument to suppress dissent; bail normalisation protects liberty |
- Judicial inconsistency: Two coordinate Benches of the same court reaching opposite conclusions creates legal uncertainty for thousands of UAPA accused.
- UAPA as political tool: Successive governments have used UAPA to detain activists, students, and journalists — the broad definition of “unlawful activity” is ripe for misuse.
- Self-reproach but no relief: SC criticised its own January 2025 bail denial — yet Umar Khalid’s interim bail for bereavement was denied the very next day by a sessions court, showing the gap between judicial pronouncements and ground reality.
- International comparison: UK’s Terrorism Act allows bail with conditions; European Court of Human Rights mandates bail review every reasonable period — India’s ‘shall refuse bail’ norm is internationally anomalous.
- Burden on accused: Under current practice, the burden shifts entirely to the accused to disprove prima facie truth — a reversal of the foundational presumption of innocence.
- Constitution Bench reference: A five-judge Constitution Bench should settle the question — does prolonged incarceration under UAPA always trigger Art. 21 override?
- Mandatory bail review: Legislatively mandate bail review hearings after every 6 months of undertrial UAPA detention.
- Speedy trial courts: Designate time-bound UAPA courts with 180-day charge-framing deadlines to make prolonged detention less likely.
- Law Commission: 268th Law Commission Report’s safeguards on anti-terror misuse must be implemented.
- Align with SDG 16 — Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.
The judicial debate over UAPA bail provisions highlights a fundamental tension between national security imperatives and constitutional rights. Critically examine the issue and suggest a framework that balances both concerns.
1. The K.A. Najeeb (2021) judgment held that prolonged incarceration can override Section 43-D(5) of UAPA.
2. Section 43-D(5) of UAPA uses the word “may” to restrict bail, giving courts discretion.
3. Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be overridden by statutory bail restrictions under anti-terror laws.
Select the correct option:
- (A) 1 only
- (B) 2 and 3 only
- (C) 1 and 3 only
- (D) 1, 2 and 3
- PM Modi attended the Third India-Nordic Summit in Oslo, meeting leaders of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden — culminating in a decision to upgrade ties to a ‘Green Technology and Innovation Strategic Partnership’.
- All five Nordic nations backed India’s permanent UNSC seat bid and welcomed India’s application for Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership.
- Norway’s PM urged India to use its Russia channels to push for a Ukraine ceasefire, while respecting India’s energy needs — a nuanced diplomatic signal.
- India-Nordic Summit: First held in 2018 in Stockholm; third edition in Oslo, 2026. All five Nordic countries are high-income democracies with advanced welfare states.
- Nordic countries and India-EU FTA: Denmark, Sweden, Finland — EU members (part of India-EU FTA signed Jan 2026). Norway and Iceland — EFTA members (India-TEPA, 2024).
- India’s UNSC bid: India seeks permanent membership in a reformed UN Security Council as part of the G4 group (India, Germany, Japan, Brazil).
- NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group): 48-member group controlling nuclear trade; India not yet a member — China blocks admission. Nordic support is diplomatically significant.
- India’s combined trade with all five Nordic countries: $19 billion — modest relative to other EU trade blocs; significant room for growth.
- Arctic Council: India has been a permanent observer since 2013; Norway is a key Arctic state — climate research and polar cooperation is an emerging area.
| Country | Trade Agreement with India | Key Areas of Cooperation |
|---|---|---|
| Denmark | India-EU FTA (Jan 2026) | Green shipping, wind energy, dairy |
| Sweden | India-EU FTA (Jan 2026) | Defence tech, pharmaceuticals, EVs |
| Finland | India-EU FTA (Jan 2026) | Digital infrastructure, telecom, forestry |
| Norway | India-EFTA TEPA (2024) | Offshore energy, sovereign fund investment, seafood |
| Iceland | India-EFTA TEPA (2024) | Geothermal energy, fisheries, Arctic research |
- Press freedom optics: Modi’s refusal to take media questions at Nordic press events drew criticism — MEA’s defence (India is a “civilisational democracy”) was seen as deflection and undermined soft power goals.
- Russia divergence: Norway’s expectation that India leverage Russia for Ukraine ceasefire conflicts with India’s strategic autonomy — the Pahalgam terror attack and India-Pakistan conflict further complicate India’s bandwidth for Ukraine diplomacy.
- Low trade base: $19 billion combined India-Nordic trade is disproportionately low given Nordic wealth and technological capability — implementation of FTAs must be accelerated.
- China factor on NSG: Nordic support for India’s NSG membership remains politically valuable but insufficient without China’s consent — the diplomatic value is largely symbolic at this stage.
- Adani-Norway wealth fund controversy: Opposition’s allegation that Modi’s visit was linked to Norges Bank removing Adani Green from its blacklist adds reputational complexity to the diplomatic visit.
- Operationalise partnerships: Move beyond MoUs to binding investment frameworks — set sector-specific targets (offshore wind GW, maritime vessels, digital infra projects).
- Arctic engagement: Upgrade India’s participation in Arctic Council to contribute on climate science — aligns with India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) doctrine.
- People-to-people exchanges: Nordic universities-India research collaboration on clean tech should be institutionalised.
- UNSC reform: India must leverage Nordic support multilaterally at the UN General Assembly to build momentum for UNSC expansion.
- Align with SDG 7 (Clean Energy) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for Goals).
India’s engagement with Nordic countries has moved beyond trade to a ‘Green Technology and Innovation Strategic Partnership’. Analyse the significance of this shift and the challenges in translating it into concrete outcomes.
1. Denmark 2. Finland 3. Norway 4. Sweden 5. Iceland
Select the correct answer:
- (A) 1, 2 and 4 only
- (B) 1, 2 and 4 only (Denmark, Finland, Sweden are EU members; Norway and Iceland are EFTA members)
- (C) 1, 3 and 5 only
- (D) All five are EU members
- West Asia crisis-driven fuel price spikes are accelerating India’s interest in electric vehicles (EVs), especially two-wheelers. However, the article argues the real challenge lies not in scooters but in electrifying freight — India’s supply chains.
- Full fleet electrification by 2047 (at 50%) would require an additional 500 TWh/year of electricity — roughly a third of India’s current generation — demanding a massive, clean grid expansion.
- Without a national grid strategy integrating EV demand, India risks replacing oil dependence with coal dependence.
- India’s vehicle fleet: ~420 million registered vehicles. Full electrification needs 900–1,100 TWh/year additional electricity.
- FAME Scheme: Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles — Phases I and II supported EV adoption; Phase III under discussion.
- National Electric Mobility Mission Plan (NEMMP): Targets 30% EV penetration by 2030.
- Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme (RDSS): Reform programme for electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs) — aims to reduce losses and improve financial health.
- DISCOMs: India’s electricity distribution companies — already carry significant accumulated losses; not financially ready for EV-scale grid upgrades.
- Golden Quadrilateral & Dedicated Freight Corridors (DFC): India’s major highway and rail freight routes — critical for electric truck deployment planning.
- Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs): ~6.26 million in India; consume 1.2–1.5 kWh/km at 60,000 km/year. Electrifying HGVs alone needs 450–565 TWh/year.
| Power Source | Strength | Limitation | Role in EV Grid |
|---|---|---|---|
| Solar & Wind | Lowest cost; fastest deployment | 25–30% capacity factor; intermittent | Primary source; needs storage |
| Nuclear | High capacity factor; baseload; low carbon | Long build time; high upfront cost | Firm baseload for freight/highway |
| Pumped Hydro + Batteries | Bridges variable supply & demand | Geography-dependent; costly | Storage and grid balancing |
| Gas | Flexible peaking capacity | Carbon emissions; import dependency | Short-term peak management only |
| Coal | — | Replaces oil dependence with coal; no emissions gain | Must NOT be part of EV grid |
- Political vs actual priority mismatch: Two-wheelers get political attention and subsidies; but they contribute only 7% of total EV demand. Freight electrification — the real challenge — receives minimal policy attention.
- Evening peak risk: If millions of EVs charge at 7 PM (evening peak), modelling suggests additional instantaneous loads of hundreds of GW — potentially destabilising the grid.
- DISCOM crisis: India’s distribution companies are already in financial distress — they have not budgeted for the massive high-tension depot connections needed for electric trucks.
- No smart-charging mandate: Every conventional charger installed today without smart-charging capability is a retrofit cost later — a critical infrastructure lock-in problem.
- Battery waste crisis: India lacks EV battery recycling infrastructure at scale — transition risks creating a new toxic waste crisis while solving an energy one.
- Coal trap: If incremental TWh come from coal, India replaces Gulf oil import dependence with Australian/Indonesian coal dependence — defeating the purpose of electrification.
- EV demand in capacity planning: National Electricity Policy must model EV load at 30%, 50%, and 100% fleet electrification scenarios for 2047.
- Mandate smart-charging: All new EV chargers must have smart-charging capability — time-of-use pricing and grid-responsive charging.
- Golden Quadrilateral power mapping: Before electric trucks reach commercial scale, map power infrastructure needs along all major freight corridors.
- Inter-ministerial EV grid committee: Bridge Transport, Power, and DISCOM finance ministries — no part of the system should plan in isolation.
- RDSS with EV benchmarks: Reform DISCOM finances with EV-readiness as a criterion for RDSS funding.
- Micro-modular nuclear reactors: For highway and urban freight hubs needing firm baseload — weather-independent power near demand centres.
- Align with SDG 7 (Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Infrastructure), SDG 13 (Climate Action).
“India’s electric vehicle transition, if not accompanied by a comprehensive grid strategy, risks replacing one energy dependency with another.” Critically examine this statement with reference to India’s freight electrification challenge and the role of clean energy mix.
1. Two-wheelers, despite being the largest vehicle class, contribute the least to total EV electricity demand at full conversion.
2. Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) constitute barely 2% of India’s registered fleet but could account for most of total freight electricity demand.
3. The RDSS scheme was launched to strengthen India’s renewable energy generation capacity.
Which of the above statements are correct?
- (A) 1 only
- (B) 1 and 2 only
- (C) 2 and 3 only
- (D) 1, 2 and 3
- The Madhya Pradesh High Court ruled (May 15, 2026) that the Bhojshala-Kamal Maula complex in Dhar, MP was a Hindu temple — based on archaeological evidence and the Ayodhya judgment’s principles of “preponderance of probability” and “faith and belief.”
- The case proceeded despite the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, via a loophole for “ancient and historical monuments” under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (AMASR Act).
- The Hindu editorial argues that shared use of disputed religious sites is more compatible with democratic coexistence than adversarial judicial determination of “who was there first.”
- Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991: Freezes the religious character of all places of worship as on August 15, 1947. Prevents conversion of any place of worship. Exception: Ram Janmabhoomi case (already in litigation).
- Section 4(3) — AMASR Loophole: The Act exempts “ancient and historical monuments” under the AMASR Act, 1958 — this has been used to allow surveys and character determination of medieval structures.
- Ayodhya Judgment (2019): SC used “preponderance of probability” and “faith and belief” as evidentiary standards. The Bhojshala ruling now applies the same principles — creating a template for similar cases.
- Other disputed sites: Gyanvapi Mosque (Varanasi), Shahi Idgah (Mathura), Bijamandal Complex — all face similar legal challenges. The Bhojshala precedent expands the landscape.
- ASI 2003 arrangement: Archaeological Survey of India arranged alternating use — Hindus on Thursdays, Muslims on Fridays. This shared arrangement is now under threat.
| Aspect | Places of Worship Act 1991 | Bhojshala Verdict Reality |
|---|---|---|
| Purpose | Freeze religious character of all sites as on 15 Aug 1947 | Judicial determination of “original” character allowed via AMASR loophole |
| Shared use | Implied — status quo preserved | Muslim side told to seek alternative land; shared use dismantled |
| Precedent | Ayodhya exception should be unique | Creates template for challenging Gyanvapi, Shahi Idgah, and more |
| Constitutional value | Secularism, fraternity, rule of law | Archaeological ambiguity weaponised for majoritarian consolidation |
- AMASR loophole is a “procedural side door”: Courts using the AMASR exemption effectively hollow out the 1991 Act without formally striking it down — an indirect nullification of parliamentary intent.
- Medievalist trap: Courts asking “who was there first” in medieval structures invites arbitrary temporal lines — why stop at medieval conquest? Why not pre-Hindu histories? The logic has no principled stopping point.
- Judiciary in politically polarised terrain: Even if courts believe they are neutral, judicial findings are weaponised by politically backed entities like Hindu Front for Justice — who use rulings to organise and consolidate agitation.
- Minority insecurity: Every successful challenge to a mosque or mazaar on archaeological grounds deepens communal insecurity — a direct threat to the Constitution’s promise of fraternity.
- Cascade effect: The Gyanvapi, Shahi Idgah, and Bijamandal cases are all now strengthened by the Bhojshala precedent — potentially opening hundreds of disputed sites to litigation.
- Close the AMASR loophole: Parliament must amend the Places of Worship Act, 1991 to explicitly include ancient monuments — leaving no procedural side doors.
- Supreme Court intervention: SC should examine whether surveys and character-determination orders for AMASR-protected sites are consistent with the 1991 Act’s spirit.
- Restore shared use: The 2003 ASI arrangement of alternating use is the most practical expression of constitutional fraternity — courts should uphold it as a default.
- Inter-faith dialogue: Government-facilitated dialogue at disputed sites is far preferable to adversarial litigation that produces winners and losers.
- Uphold Articles 25–28 (Freedom of Religion) and Article 51A(e) (Duty to promote harmony and renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of any group).
The Bhojshala judgment exposes a fundamental tension between archaeological truth-seeking and the constitutional mandate of the Places of Worship Act, 1991. Critically examine the implications of this verdict for secularism, minority rights, and communal harmony in India.
1. The Act freezes the religious character of all places of worship as they existed on 15 August 1947.
2. The Act applies to the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute.
3. The Act exempts ancient and historical monuments covered under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958.
- (A) 1 only
- (B) 1 and 2 only
- (C) 1 and 3 only
- (D) 1, 2 and 3
- WHO has declared the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) — acting with unusual speed, skipping the expert panel advisory step.
- The outbreak involves the rare Bundibugyo strain — for which existing vaccines (highly effective against the Zaire strain) are currently untested. As of May 16: 8 confirmed cases, 246 suspected cases, 80 suspected deaths in DRC’s Ituri province; 2 confirmed cases in Kampala, Uganda.
- India’s Health Ministry has stated risk remains “minimal” but has strengthened surveillance at ports of entry.
- PHEIC (Public Health Emergency of International Concern): WHO’s highest level of global health alert under the International Health Regulations (IHR), 2005. Triggers international cooperation, resource mobilisation, and travel/trade risk assessments.
- Ebola Virus Disease (EVD): Caused by Filoviridae family viruses. Spreads through direct contact with body fluids. Fatality rate 25–50% (up to 90% in outbreaks). No confirmed cure.
- Bundibugyo Strain: Rare; first identified 2007 in Uganda. Unlike Zaire strain, no proven vaccine or therapeutic. WHO’s approved Ebola vaccines (rVSV-ZEBOV/Ervebo and Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo) target the Zaire strain only.
- 2014–16 West Africa Outbreak: Most severe in history — 28,600+ cases, 11,325+ deaths across Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone.
- IHR 2005: International Health Regulations — legally binding instrument under WHO; requires member states to notify WHO of potential PHEIC events and maintain core public health capacities.
- India currently has no reported Ebola cases — Union Health Ministry confirmed minimal risk on May 19, 2026.
| Aspect | Zaire Strain | Bundibugyo Strain (Current) |
|---|---|---|
| Fatality rate | Up to 90% | 25–50% |
| Outbreaks | Multiple, large (incl. 2014–16) | Rare; first identified 2007 |
| Vaccine | Ervebo (rVSV-ZEBOV) — highly effective | Ervebo being investigated; efficacy unproven |
| Treatment | mAb114, REGN-EB3 — approved | Currently untested for this strain |
| 2026 geography | Not in current outbreak | DRC’s Ituri province + Kampala, Uganda |
- Conflict-zone containment challenge: DRC’s Ituri province has been in active conflict for years — patient tracing, safe burials, and vaccination campaigns are nearly impossible in conflict settings.
- Vaccine gap: India stocks Ervebo (if at all) for Zaire strain — a Bundibugyo outbreak would find India with no effective countermeasure. This is a strategic health gap.
- WHO’s bold decision: Bypassing the emergency committee was unusual — signals WHO learned from COVID-19 delay criticism. But it also raises questions about the process integrity of PHEIC declarations.
- India’s ports of entry risk: With 60+ international airports and active air links to East/Central Africa, India must strengthen thermal screening, IHR notification compliance, and rapid response protocols.
- Global health governance: The pandemic treaty negotiations (ongoing at WHO since 2021) take on fresh urgency — Ebola 2026 shows that disease preparedness cannot wait for diplomatic consensus.
- Strengthen port health: Activate IHR-compliant screening at all international airports with Africa links — thermal imaging + symptom questionnaires + rapid isolation protocols.
- Vaccine diversification: India should engage WHO/CEPI for access to experimental Bundibugyo-strain vaccines as they become available.
- ICMR stockpile planning: Develop a strategic reserve of EVD diagnostics and PPE in line with India’s Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme (IDSP).
- Support DRC/Uganda response: India’s vaccine manufacturing capacity (Serum Institute, Bharat Biotech) should be offered to WHO for emergency production scale-up.
- Align with SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-Being) and IHR 2005 obligations.
The Ebola PHEIC of 2026 highlights persistent gaps in global health architecture and India’s disease preparedness. Examine India’s strengths and vulnerabilities in responding to emerging infectious disease threats of international concern.
1. PHEIC is declared by the WHO Director-General under the International Health Regulations (IHR), 2005.
2. A PHEIC declaration mandates all member states to impose trade and travel restrictions.
3. COVID-19 (2020), Mpox (2022), and Ebola (various years) have all been declared PHEICs by WHO.
- (A) 1 only
- (B) 2 and 3 only
- (C) 1 and 3 only
- (D) 1, 2 and 3
- With the Strait of Hormuz closed by Iran (source of 60% of India’s LPG), the U.S. has emerged as India’s major LPG supplier. However, LPG imports from the U.S. are declining due to a critical shortage of gas carrier ships.
- Ships must now take the Cape of Good Hope route (around Africa) instead of the Suez Canal — adding 20+ days to voyage duration, tightening vessel availability and pushing freight rates sharply higher.
- This highlights India’s structural weakness in LPG maritime logistics — insufficient Indian-flagged Very Large Gas Carriers (VLGCs) for long-haul U.S. routes.
- LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas): Used for cooking (domestic), industry, and petrochemicals. India is one of the world’s largest LPG importers.
- India’s LPG dependence: Persian Gulf (Qatar, UAE, Kuwait) supplied 60% of India’s LPG before the Hormuz closure. Daily consumption ~80,000 tonnes; storage only ~1.4 lakh tonnes (~1.75 days).
- Strait of Hormuz: Iran effectively closed the strait since the U.S.-Israel war (Feb 2026). Iran now operates the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) to control passage.
- Suez Canal route: India-U.S. LPG ships have avoided Suez since Jan 2024 due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb. The Cape of Good Hope route adds 20+ days and significant cost.
- VLGC (Very Large Gas Carrier): India only has ~4 VLGCs that have been redirected to the U.S. route — grossly insufficient for monthly import requirements of 10+ lakh tonnes.
- Panama Canal congestion: LNG ships have priority over LPG ships at Panama Canal — further delaying LPG carriers to Asia.
| Route | Distance/Time | Risk Factor | Current Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Persian Gulf–India (via Hormuz) | ~10 days | Hormuz closed by Iran | Not viable |
| U.S.–India via Suez Canal | ~45 days | Houthi attacks in Red Sea | Avoided since Jan 2024 |
| U.S.–India via Cape of Good Hope | ~90 days round trip | Higher cost, longer time | Current primary route; VLGC shortage |
- Fleet inadequacy: India’s Indian-flagged VLGC fleet (only ~4 ships) was designed for short Persian Gulf routes, not 90-day U.S. round trips — a strategic maritime gap exposed by the crisis.
- No underground LPG storage: India’s LPG storage of 1.4 lakh tonnes covers barely 1.75 days of consumption — any supply disruption immediately creates shortages.
- Panama Canal bottleneck: LNG ships’ priority over LPG at Panama Canal is a systemic global shipping problem — India has little leverage to change international canal rules.
- Freight rate spiral: Cape rerouting has materially tightened vessel availability and pushed freight rates sharply higher across all major routes — increasing India’s effective import cost beyond just crude oil price increases.
- Cooking gas for poor: LPG is a welfare good for hundreds of millions of Indian households using Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana connections — supply disruption is a social justice issue, not just an economic one.
- Expand Indian-flagged VLGC fleet: India must build or acquire at least 15–20 VLGCs to handle long-haul U.S./Australia routes — a national strategic maritime priority.
- Underground LPG storage: Build strategic underground LPG reserves (minimum 15-day coverage) similar to strategic petroleum reserves — at Vizag, Mangaluru, Ennore.
- Diversify LPG sources: Angola, Nigeria, Australia, Norway as alternative LPG suppliers — reduce concentration risk from Gulf.
- Accelerate PNG and electric cooking: Piped Natural Gas and electric induction stoves reduce LPG dependency at the household level — Ujjwala beneficiaries should be transitioned over time.
- Strengthen the Sagarmala programme to include strategic LPG port and storage infrastructure at coastal hubs.
The West Asia crisis has exposed critical vulnerabilities in India’s LPG supply chain, from maritime logistics to storage capacity. Examine these vulnerabilities and suggest a comprehensive strategy for India’s LPG energy security.
1. The Strait of Hormuz was the source of approximately 60% of India’s LPG supply before the crisis.
2. India’s U.S.-bound LPG ships now primarily use the Cape of Good Hope route due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
3. India has one of the world’s largest fleets of Very Large Gas Carriers (VLGCs) to handle long-haul LPG routes.
Which of the above statements are correct?
- (A) 1 only
- (B) 1 and 2 only
- (C) 2 and 3 only
- (D) 1, 2 and 3
- The Supreme Court refused to modify its November 2025 order directing removal of stray dogs from high-footfall public institutions (hospitals, schools, bus depots, railway stations).
- The Court clarified stray dogs cannot be “re-released” even after vaccination and sterilisation into institutional areas — and permitted euthanasia for “rabid, incurably ill, or demonstrably dangerous/aggressive dogs.”
- The Court directed States to establish at least one fully functional Animal Birth Control (ABC) Centre in every district — identifying a systemic absence of ABC infrastructure as the core problem.
- Animal Birth Control (ABC) Rules, 2023: Issued under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. Governs sterilisation, vaccination, and release of stray dogs. Currently interpreted as giving stray dogs a near-absolute right to public spaces.
- Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960: Primary animal welfare legislation. Prohibits unnecessary killing of animals.
- Article 21: SC held that the right to live with dignity includes the right to access public spaces without apprehension of dog attacks — extending Art. 21 protections to human safety in public spaces.
- India’s dog-bite statistics: India reports among the world’s highest dog-bite cases annually — with hundreds of deaths from rabies every year, predominantly in rural areas.
- Implementation gap: ABC infrastructure is absent in most districts — the SC’s mandate for one ABC centre per district is welcome but requires massive state investment and veterinary human resources.
- Euthanasia controversy: Animal rights groups argue euthanasia is a regressive step — effective ABC (sterilise-vaccinate-release) programmes have demonstrated success in reducing stray dog populations ethically over time.
- Rabies control gap: India has not achieved the WHO target of zero dog-mediated human rabies deaths by 2030 — the stray dog population continues to grow in most cities.
- Institutional liability: Hospitals and schools with dog attack incidents face liability gaps — a clearer regulatory framework for institutional premises is needed.
- National Stray Dog Population Control Mission: Time-bound, funded, monitored programme — one ABC centre per district as SC directed, with veterinary staff and funding from NHM.
- Anti-rabies vaccination drives: Universal coverage of stray dogs with anti-rabies vaccine — aligned with WHO’s 2030 zero-rabies target.
- Adopt-a-Dog programmes: Promote responsible pet ownership and adoption as long-term solution to stray dog population.
- AWBI role: Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI) should be empowered and funded to oversee ABC programme compliance at State level.
- Align with SDG 3 (Good Health) and SDG 15 (Life on Land — animal welfare).
The Supreme Court’s directions on stray dogs reflect the tension between animal welfare considerations and the fundamental right to safety in public spaces. Examine the constitutional and policy dimensions of this issue and suggest a comprehensive urban animal management framework for India.
1. ABC Rules were issued under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.
2. ABC Rules require sterilisation and vaccination of stray dogs before releasing them back to their area of capture.
3. The Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI) is a constitutional body established under Article 48A.
Which of the above are correct?
- (A) 1 and 2 only
- (B) 2 and 3 only
- (C) 1 and 3 only
- (D) 1, 2 and 3
- A landmark study published in Nature (April 15, 2026) by Harvard Medical School researchers compared 15,836 ancient DNA sequences from Western Eurasia with 6,438 modern human sequences — the largest survey of ancient human genomes ever conducted.
- Using new statistical methods, the team found that gene frequency changes over 8–10 millennia were driven by natural selection (not just migration or genetic drift) — with striking implications for blood types, disease susceptibility, skin tone, and modern lifestyle traits.
- The study also notes that a comparable ancient DNA study of South Asian (including Indian) ancestors is yet to be done — underscoring a gap in Indian genetic heritage research.
- Ancient DNA (aDNA): DNA extracted from skeletal remains of deceased individuals. Allows reconstruction of historical gene pools and tracking of evolutionary change.
- Carbon-14 Dating: Radioactive isotope of carbon with a half-life of 5,730 years. Used to date ancient skeletal remains by measuring residual C-14 concentration. Effective up to ~50,000 years.
- Natural Selection: Process by which heritable traits that improve survival/reproduction become more common over generations. Charles Darwin’s foundational concept — now confirmed through genomic data.
- Genetic Drift: Random fluctuation in gene frequency due to chance — especially in small populations. Distinguished from natural selection by statistical analysis.
- ABO Blood Group: Determined by the ABO gene; variants A, B, O. Blood types are ancient — shared with great apes. Study found B variant increasing in West Eurasians over last 6,000 years.
- CCR5 Gene (Δ32 variant): Provides complete resistance to HIV-1 infection. Found to have been increasing in frequency 6,000–2,000 years ago — driven by then-unknown ancient pathogens, not HIV (which originated in early 20th century).
- India’s aDNA gap: South Asians have complex genetic ancestry — Iranian Neolithic Farmers, Western Steppe Herders, Ancient Ancestral South Indians (AASI), East/SE Asians. A comparable study for India could transform understanding of Indian prehistory, caste genetics, and population history.
- Coeliac disease insight: HLA-DQB1 variant (gluten sensitivity) increased from 0% to 20% over 4,000 years — yet agriculture began 10,000 years ago. The cause remains unknown — a critical gap in human evolutionary medicine.
- Ethical dimensions: Ancient DNA studies raise questions about informed consent for deceased individuals’ genetic legacy, indigenous data sovereignty, and the risk of misuse for racial or caste-based narratives.
- Application to public health: Understanding which gene variants have been selected for disease resistance vs. susceptibility can inform precision medicine and vaccine targeting.
- India’s own aDNA programme: ICMR, CCMB, and Deccan College (Pune) should collaborate on a systematic ancient DNA survey of Indian skeletal remains — to map South Asian genetic evolutionary history.
- Ethical framework for aDNA: Develop an Indian regulatory framework for ancient human genomic research — balancing scientific advancement with cultural and community sensitivities.
- Genomics in public health: India’s 2023 Genome India Project (1 lakh Indian genomes) should be complemented by an ancient genomics programme for evolutionary baseline data.
- Align with SDG 3 (Good Health) and SDG 9 (Innovation and Research Infrastructure).
The study of ancient DNA is transforming our understanding of human evolutionary history and has significant implications for public health and medicine. Examine the key findings of recent ancient genomics research and discuss why India needs its own systematic ancient DNA programme.
1. Carbon-14 is produced when cosmic rays collide with nitrogen atoms in the upper atmosphere.
2. Carbon-14 has a half-life of approximately 5,730 years.
3. Carbon-14 dating can be reliably used to date samples up to approximately 5 million years old.
Which of the above are correct?
- (A) 1 only
- (B) 1 and 2 only
- (C) 2 and 3 only
- (D) 1, 2 and 3
Legacy IAS — UPSC Civil Services Coaching | Bengaluru, Karnataka
The Hindu News Analysis | May 20, 2026 | For educational purposes only. All news sourced from The Hindu, Bengaluru City Edition.
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