Contents
The Real Barriers to Trade Are No Longer Tariffs
Anuj Gupta — Managing Director, BowerGroupAsia · The Hindu- The editorial argues that tariffs have become a side-show in modern trade diplomacy; the real determinant of market access today is the Non-Tariff Barrier (NTB) — regulations, certifications, testing and licensing requirements.
- Trigger: the February 2026 India–U.S. joint statement on an interim trade framework — U.S. reciprocal tariff cut to 18%, India’s pledge toward zero duties on American goods, and a $500 billion purchase commitment — dominated headlines, but the White House fact sheet’s more consequential line was the mutual commitment to remove NTBs.
- Core argument: “the tariff headline was the press release; the NTBs on both sides are the actual problem.”
- India is urged to move past tariff bargaining and treat its own and its partners’ regulatory architecture as the next frontier of trade negotiation.
- Since the WTO’s founding in 1995, average member tariffs have fallen by nearly half, yet protectionism has migrated to NTBs, which now touch ~90% of global trade — a sixfold rise over three decades.
- The TBT Agreement and SPS Agreement (both entered into force in 1995, as part of the Uruguay Round package that created the WTO) are the multilateral disciplines meant to stop technical and health-safety regulations from becoming disguised trade barriers — countries may set their own protection levels but must justify them on scientific, transparent, non-discriminatory grounds.
- Over 20,000 global product/safety regulations have emerged over 70 years; more than half have appeared since 2000, creating a dense, overlapping regulatory web.
- In 2025 alone, governments filed over 7,700 NTB and health-related trade notifications with the WTO — ten times the 1995 figure.
- NTB coverage of imports (WTO/World Bank data): EU ~94%, U.S. ~77%, India ~45%.
- EU model: the world’s most expansive regulatory architecture — environmental rules, chemical safety, packaging standards, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU Deforestation Regulation.
- U.S. model: NTBs driven by strategic competition and security — export controls, entity lists, restrictions on semiconductors, AI chips and advanced computing hardware (a technology-denial logic distinct from classic regulatory protectionism).
- India’s shift: traditionally tariff-heavy, India is now expanding quality control orders (QCOs) on electronics, machinery and chemicals as part of its industrial strategy to reduce import dependence.
- The FTA-utilisation paradox: India’s tariff concessions exist on paper but underperform in practice — the ASEAN-India FTA (in force since 2010) sees preferential utilisation below 50%, partly because Indonesian registration rules restrict pharmaceutical exports and Thai customs procedures force gems and jewellery exporters to reroute via Hong Kong.
- With Japan (FTA since 2011), Indian pharma exports remain negligible — market approvals take 5–7 years, and Japan resists recognising international testing standards. With South Korea, bilateral trade reached $27 billion (2024-25), but India accounted for only $6.5 billion. Overall, India’s FTA utilisation rate is ~25%, against 70–80% for developed economies.
- India’s newer agreements signal change: the UAE CEPA mandates automatic recognition of medicines approved by major global regulators and mutual acceptance of lab testing; the India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) — signed 10 March 2024, in force since 1 October 2025 (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland) — goes further, with mutual recognition of standards, streamlined conformity assessment, and a standing NTB sub-committee, making NTB reduction a legally binding obligation for the first time in an Indian FTA.
- In favour — Diagnosis matches the data: the WTO-notification trend (roughly 770 in 1995 to 7,700+ in 2025) and the persistent FTA-utilisation gap objectively support the claim that NTBs, not tariffs, now decide market access.
- In favour — Explains the FTA-underperformance puzzle: tariff concessions on paper (ASEAN, Japan, Korea) have not translated into trade gains precisely because NTBs neutralise them once goods reach the border.
- In favour — India’s own newest deals validate the thesis: the UAE CEPA and India–EFTA TEPA show a deliberate pivot toward binding NTB-reduction clauses, confirming the policy direction is already shifting in this direction.
- In favour — Strategic coherence: the framing lets India use NTBs (QCOs) for industrial policy at home while negotiating their removal abroad, provided this is done transparently and proportionately.
- Against — Not all NTBs are protectionism: many serve legitimate public-interest goals under WTO-permitted SPS/TBT exceptions (food safety, environmental protection); treating every NTB as obstruction risks delegitimising genuine regulation.
- Against — Asymmetric negotiating capacity: harmonising standards and securing mutual recognition requires deep regulatory and laboratory infrastructure; large economies can impose de facto barriers without technically violating WTO rules, while smaller exporters lack the capacity to contest them.
- Against — Conflation of categories: U.S. technology-export controls on semiconductors and AI chips are tied to national security, not classic market-protection NTBs, making them far less negotiable in a trade-liberalisation framework than EU-style product standards.
- Against — Domestic exposure: India’s own expanding QCOs could themselves draw WTO or bilateral NTB complaints — India risks being both complainant and target within the same negotiating cycle.
- Institutionalise standing NTB sub-committees (the India–EFTA TEPA template) across all existing and future FTAs, including with ASEAN and Japan.
- Pursue sector-specific Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) on testing and certification — pharmaceuticals, gems and jewellery, electronics — to cut duplicate compliance costs.
- Build domestic testing and certification infrastructure so MSME exporters can meet partner-country standards rather than relying on ad hoc, case-by-case negotiation.
- Calibrate India’s own quality control orders to align with international standards rather than purely domestic specifications, reducing the risk of reciprocal NTB action against Indian exports.
- Push for stronger WTO-level transparency disciplines on NTB notification and justification, given the steep rise in filings since 1995.
- TBT & SPS Agreements (1995): the core WTO disciplines on technical regulations and food/animal/plant health measures respectively — permit countries to set their own protection levels, subject to scientific justification, transparency and non-discrimination.
- India–EFTA TEPA: EFTA states are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland; the agreement bundles a binding USD 100 billion investment / 1 million jobs commitment from EFTA over 15 years alongside its NTB-reduction obligations.
- Intro: Frame the February 2026 India-U.S. joint statement’s tariff headlines against its buried NTB-removal clause.
- Body 1 — Evidence for the NTB-primacy thesis: the WTO notification surge, and the FTA-utilisation gap across ASEAN, Japan and South Korea.
- Body 2 — Counterpoints: legitimate regulatory diversity under SPS/TBT exceptions, asymmetric negotiating capacity, and the conflation of security-driven versus standard-driven NTBs.
- Conclusion: India’s UAE CEPA and India–EFTA TEPA template as the way forward — institutionalised, binding NTB-reduction mechanisms balanced against legitimate regulatory sovereignty.
Consider the following statements regarding Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs):
1. The WTO’s TBT and SPS Agreements both entered into force in 1995, alongside the establishment of the WTO.
2. The India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement is India’s first FTA to make NTB reduction a legally binding obligation.
3. NTB coverage of imports is currently higher in India than in the European Union.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Statement 1 — Correct. Both the TBT and SPS Agreements entered into force in 1995 as part of the Uruguay Round package that created the WTO.
Statement 2 — Correct. The India–EFTA TEPA is the first Indian FTA with a legally binding NTB-reduction obligation, via its standing sub-committee.
Statement 3 — Incorrect. NTB coverage is far higher in the EU (~94%) than in India (~45%).
Essential Upgrades — India’s Statistical System
The Hindu Editorial- The government has carried out a long-overdue overhaul of India’s core economic databases — GDP, IIP, CPI and WPI — updating outdated base years and aligning methods with international best practice.
- The editorial frames this as welcome but late: base years had been frozen at 2011 or 2012 for over a decade despite the economy’s structural transformation (GST, digital/e-commerce growth, formalisation).
- A parallel ask: a time-bound, undelayed Census to complete the modernisation of India’s statistical base.
- Together, the upgrades are intended to make India’s headline statistics more representative of reality and bring them in line with international best practice.
- MoSPI released the new GDP series with base year 2022-23 on 27 February 2026, incorporating methodological upgrades including the double-deflator approach long demanded by statisticians and the IMF.
- A new CPI series with base year 2024, a more inclusive item basket and revised weights, was released on 12 February 2026 — it feeds directly into RBI’s monetary-policy (repo-rate) decisions.
- A new IIP series, base year 2022-23, followed in early June 2026, with strengthened data collection.
- The WPI (Ministry of Commerce & Industry’s DPIIT/Office of Economic Adviser) released its new series, also base year 2022-23, on Monday, 15 June 2026 — alongside India’s first-ever Producer Price Index (PPI) for goods and services.
- The PPI is intended to replace the WPI over the next five years, in line with IMF recommendations and advanced-economy practice, offering a clearer picture of price changes at the producer stage for both goods and services.
- The IMF has historically given India’s national accounts a recurring “C” grade under its data-quality assessment framework — the editorial expects these upgrades to improve that rating.
- Why rebasing matters: a base year frozen since 2011-12 could not capture GST-driven formalisation, the digital/e-commerce economy, or post-pandemic structural shifts; every additional year of delay made GDP, inflation and IIP readings progressively less representative.
- Double deflation: deflates output and inputs separately, rather than via a single blanket deflator, producing more accurate real-GDP estimates; MoSPI has reportedly expanded its deflator basket from roughly 180 to ~600 items for this purpose.
- Supply-Use Table (SUT) integration: aims to reduce the long-standing statistical discrepancy between production-side and expenditure-side GDP estimates.
- WPI → PPI transition: the new PPI (output PPI plus an experimental input PPI) initially covers manufacturing, agriculture, electricity and mining for goods, plus seven service sectors — banking, securities transactions, insurance, pension fund management, railways, air passenger transport and telecom — with more services to follow via GST Network data.
- Fiscal-arithmetic effect: independent analysis suggests the new GDP series shows nominal GDP roughly 3–4% lower than under the old base — this tightens fiscal-deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios and carries implications for India’s growth-target narrative.
- Coordination across ministries: GDP/CPI/IIP rebasing sits with MoSPI, while WPI/PPI sits with the Commerce Ministry’s DPIIT — the near-simultaneous release window suggests a coordinated rather than piecemeal upgrade.
- In favour — International alignment: brings India’s statistical framework in line with SNA 2008 and the IMF’s Quarterly National Accounts Manual practice, directly addressing the IMF’s recurring “C” grade critique.
- In favour — Greater representativeness: a base year of 2022-23 (a “normal” post-COVID year) better captures the services-led, digitally-formalising structure of today’s economy than 2011-12 ever could.
- In favour — Better policy inputs: improved CPI/WPI accuracy yields a better GDP deflator, strengthening real-growth estimates used for monetary policy, fiscal planning and international comparisons.
- In favour — Closing a long-flagged gap: the shift to PPI addresses a reform most advanced economies completed decades ago, and the coordinated MoSPI + Commerce Ministry timing signals systemic rather than cosmetic change.
- Against — Time-series discontinuity: a new base year breaks comparability with historical data; back-series splicing (reportedly expected only around end-2026) leaves a transitional gap for researchers, investors and policymakers.
- Against — Fiscal-optics complication: a ~3–4% lower nominal GDP under the new series tightens debt/deficit ratios just as India pursues fiscal consolidation — a side-effect the editorial does not directly address.
- Against — The delay is itself the story: the editorial’s own framing — “long overdue” — is a criticism in itself; global practice favours rebasing roughly every five years, yet India let the 2011-12 base run for well over a decade.
- Against — Transitional incompleteness: input-PPI remains “experimental” and Service-PPI initially covers only seven sectors, while WPI continues in parallel for five more years — a temporary dual-reporting burden with limited immediate analytical payoff.
- Publish a transparent back-series/splicing methodology promptly so researchers, the RBI and fiscal planners can bridge old and new series without ambiguity.
- Institutionalise a fixed rebasing cycle (e.g., every five years, as in OECD practice) to prevent another decade-long lag.
- Expand PPI’s service-sector coverage beyond the initial seven sectors using GSTN data, and graduate input-PPI out of “experimental” status.
- Strengthen State-level statistical capacity so GSDP estimates keep pace with the new national methodology, replacing proxy/allocation-based methods with direct estimation.
- Complete Census 2027 on schedule — already under way, with houselisting from April 2026 and population enumeration in February–March 2027, including caste enumeration for the first time since 1931 — to anchor the entire statistical upgrade on current demographic reality.
- Double deflation: separately deflates output and inputs for more accurate real-GDP estimation; deflator basket expanded from ~180 to ~600 items.
- PPI service-sector coverage (Phase 1): banking, securities transactions, insurance, pension fund management, railways, air passenger transport and telecom.
- Intro: Note the 2026 cluster of base-year revisions and the IMF’s recurring data-quality critique as context.
- Body 1 — Gains: methodological alignment with SNA 2008, improved deflators, and the introduction of the PPI.
- Body 2 — Limits: time-series discontinuity, fiscal-ratio side-effects, transitional/experimental gaps, and the still-pending full Census data as the deeper underlying gap.
- Conclusion: Sustained statistical credibility requires a fixed rebasing cycle and a timely Census, not one-off corrections.
Consider the following statements:
1. India’s new GDP series (base year 2022-23) uses the double-deflation method.
2. The Producer Price Index (PPI) is intended to fully replace the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) within five years of its introduction.
3. The new CPI series uses 2024 as its base year.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
Statement 1 — Correct. The new GDP series (base 2022-23) uses double deflation, deflating outputs and inputs separately.
Statement 2 — Correct. The government has stated the PPI will gradually replace the WPI over the next five years.
Statement 3 — Correct. The new CPI series uses 2024 as its base year, distinct from GDP/IIP/WPI’s 2022-23.


