Current Affairs 27 March 2026

  1. Pink Bollworm, Cotton Crisis And Implications For India
  2. Gold Price Fall During Crisis – Changing Safe Haven Dynamics
  3. India Exploring Local Currency Trade For Oil Imports
  4. Living Will And End-of-Life Care In India
  5. UDAN Scheme Revamp – Regional Connectivity And Viability Concerns
  6. Punjab–Rajasthan Water Dispute – ₹1.44 Lakh Crore Claim
  7. WTO Dispute Settlement Crisis And India’s Position


  • The resurgence of pink bollworm (Pectinophora gossypiella) has triggered a cotton productivity crisis in India, especially in north-western states like Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan.
  • Once controlled by Bt cotton (early 2000s), the pest has developed resistance since ~2010s, leading to sharp yield decline and farmer losses.

Relevance  

GS I (Geography / Society)

  • Cropping patterns and regional shifts (cotton paddy in NW India)
  • Agrarian distress and rural livelihood patterns
  • Impact on women labour and migration

GS III (Agriculture / Economy / Environment)

  • Agricultural productivity decline and pest resistance
  • GM crops (Bt cotton) and technological limitations
  • Climate-unsuitable cropping and groundwater depletion
  • Agri-value chains and textile industry linkages

Practice Question

  • The pink bollworm crisis highlights structural weaknesses in Indias cotton economy.” Analyse.(250 Words)
  • India is among the largest cotton producers globally, but productivity remains low compared to countries like USA, China, Brazil.
  • Cotton contributes to:
    • Textile industry (~45 million jobs)
    • Export earnings (~$1215 billion annually)
    • Livelihoods of ~6 million farmers
  • Production declined from 36.07 million bales (2019–20) to 29.72 million bales (2024–25) (~14.84% fall).
  • Pink bollworm is a major cotton pest that damages bolls internally, reducing yield and fibre quality.
  • Bt cotton initially effective due to Bacillus thuringiensis toxin, but pest developed genetic resistance, reducing effectiveness.
  • Yield impact:
    • Earlier: 10–12 quintals/acre
    • Current: ~34 quintals/acre in affected regions
  • Continuous monocropping of Bt cotton and lack of refuge crops accelerated resistance development.
  • Cost of cultivation: ~40,000 per acre vs returns ~25,000, resulting in losses ~15,000 per acre.
  • Market price often ₹1,0001,600 below MSP, due to quality issues and weak procurement.
  • Farmers face triple burden:
    • Pest infestation
    • Rising input costs
    • Price realisation failure
  • Cotton area declined from 0.72 million ha (2019–20) to 0.40 million ha (2024–25).
  • District-level losses up to ₹17,500 per acre reported (CCSHAU study).
  • Yield volatility: 714 kg/ha (2019)264 kg/ha (2022)~534 kg/ha (2024).
  • Farmers shifting from cotton to paddy, despite ecological unsuitability.
  • Example: Sirsa district saw 55.18% increase in paddy area (20202024).
  • This shift worsens groundwater depletion in already water-stressed regions of north-west India.
  • MSP exists but procurement is weak, forcing farmers into distress sales.
  • Crop insurance (PMFBY) suffers from delayed or denied payouts, reducing effectiveness.
  • Incentives like:
    • 3,000/acre (desi cotton)
    • 8,000/acre (Mera Pani-Meri Virasat)
      have low uptake due to market and seed constraints.
  • Cotton is labour-intensive, especially for manual picking, supporting rural employment.
  • Decline in cotton reduces employment for women labourers, with seasonal income loss of ₹10,00015,000.
  • Shift to paddy increases reliance on migrant labour, displacing local workers and increasing distress migration.
  • Overdependence on single technology (Bt cotton) without continuous innovation.
  • Weak R&D ecosystem for developing next-generation pest-resistant varieties.
  • Lack of value chain integration (ginning, textiles, exports) reduces farmer share in final price.
  • Limited availability of desi cotton seeds despite better resilience.
  • Threat to textile industry supply chain, increasing reliance on cotton imports.
  • Undermines crop diversification and sustainability goals, especially in water-stressed regions.
  • Reflects larger agrarian issue of price-cost imbalance and technological stagnation.
  • Indicates limits of genetically modified crops without integrated pest management.
  • Develop next-generation pest-resistant cotton varieties and strengthen public sector seed research.
  • Promote Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and enforce refuge policy to delay resistance development.
  • Strengthen MSP procurement mechanisms and ensure better price realisation.
  • Improve insurance delivery (PMFBY) with timely payouts and transparency.
  • Promote diversified cropping systems with assured markets to reduce monoculture risks.
  • Expand cotton value chain (processing, textiles) to enhance farmer income share.
  • Pink bollworm: major cotton pest; affects bolls internally
  • Bt cotton: introduced early 2000s using Bacillus thuringiensis
  • Cotton production: 36.07 → 29.72 million bales
  • Haryana cotton area: 0.72 → 0.40 million ha
  • Scheme: Mera Pani-Meri Virasat (8,000/acre)


  • Contrary to historical trends, gold prices fell sharply during the West Asian conflict (Feb 2026), declining from ~1.9 lakh to ~1.3 lakh per 10 grams in India.
  • Traditionally a safe haven asset, gold usually rises during crises (e.g., 2008 crisis, COVID-19, Ukraine war 2022), but current behaviour reflects changing macro-financial dynamics.

Relevance

GS II (IR)

  • Impact of global conflicts (West Asia) on financial markets
  • Role of US dollar dominance in global economy

GS Paper III (Economy)

  • Monetary policy: interest rates, inflation, bond markets
  • Safe haven assets (gold, dollar, US Treasuries)
  • External sector dynamics and capital flows
  • Commodity price behaviour under crisis

Practice Question

  • Why did gold fail to act as a safe haven during recent global crises? Analyse.(250 Words)
  • Gold acts as a store of value when uncertainty rises, especially when financial markets, currencies, or institutions are unstable.
  • It becomes attractive when interest rates fall, as gold does not yield returns, reducing its opportunity cost relative to bonds.
  • A weak US dollar boosts gold demand globally, as gold becomes cheaper for non-dollar buyers, increasing prices.
  • The West Asian conflict triggered a sharp rise in crude oil prices (> $120/barrel), creating inflationary pressures globally.
  • Markets now expect interest rates to remain higher for longer, reversing earlier expectations of rate cuts by central banks.
  • Higher expected interest rates increase returns on US Treasury bonds, making gold (a non-yielding asset) less attractive.
  • Rising interest rate expectations led to capital inflows into US bonds, strengthening the US dollar.
  • A stronger dollar makes gold more expensive globally, reducing demand and putting downward pressure on prices.
  • Thus, key drivers of gold rallies (low rates + weak dollar) moved in the opposite direction simultaneously.
  • Gold had already reached record highs (~1.8–1.9 lakh per 10 grams; >$5,000/ounce globally) before the conflict, creating scope for correction.
  • Falling prices triggered automatic sell orders (stop-loss), causing a chain reaction of selling and accelerating price decline.
  • Investors facing losses in equities sold gold to book profits and meet liquidity needs, reinforcing downward pressure.
  • In the short run, the US dollar has re-emerged as the primary safe haven, especially during inflation-driven crises.
  • Oil price rise increases global demand for dollars (since oil is dollar-denominated), further strengthening the currency.
  • Despite diversification trends (dollar share in reserves: ~71% → <60%), the dollar remains dominant in global trade and reserves.
  • Central banks continue to accumulate gold reserves, reflecting long-term confidence as a sanction-proof asset.
  • After Russia asset freeze (2022), countries increased gold holdings as it is immune to financial sanctions.
  • Gold ETF inflows in India remained positive for 10 consecutive months, indicating sustained investment demand.
  • Gold imports fell 38% month-on-month (Feb 2026) but remained ~80% higher year-on-year, indicating underlying demand strength.
  • Physical jewellery demand softened due to high prices, but investment demand via ETFs remained resilient.
  • Gold continues to play a key role in household savings, inflation hedge, and cultural asset in India.
  • Current episode highlights that gold behaves differently depending on type of crisis:
    • Financial crisis gold rises
    • Inflation + high interest rates gold may fall
  • Indicates shift from uncertainty-driven demandto interest rate-driven valuation in global financial markets.
  • If oil prices stabilise, inflation concerns may ease, leading to rate cuts favourable for gold.
  • If conflict intensifies and inflation persists, stagflation scenario may emerge, which historically supports gold prices.
  • Long-term outlook remains bullish, with corrections seen as part of cyclical market adjustments.
  • Gold priced in US dollars globally
  • Relationship:
    • Interest rates ↑ → Gold
    • Dollar ↑ → Gold
  • Safe haven assets: Gold, US dollar, US Treasury bonds
  • Stagflation: High inflation + low growth


  • India is exploring local currency trade with GCC countries to reduce dependence on the US dollar for oil imports, which constitute nearly 80% of total crude imports.
  • The move is driven by surging oil prices ($69 $123/barrel) and rupee depreciation (91.3 → 94.1/$), increasing India’s import burden.

Relevance

GS II (IR)

  • IndiaGCC relations and energy diplomacy
  • De-dollarisation and global financial geopolitics
  • Strategic balancing between US and emerging blocs

GS Paper III (Economy)

  • Current Account Deficit (CAD) and exchange rate
  • External sector vulnerability and forex management
  • Rupee internationalisation
  • Trade settlement mechanisms and currency risks

Practice Question

  • Analyse the implications of local currency trade for Indias energy security and external stability.(250 Words)
  • GCC countries account for ~49% of Indias oil imports, while Russia contributes ~30.4% (Apr 2025–Jan 2026).
  • India’s crude basket price rose to $123.15/barrel, significantly increasing import bills and widening current account deficit pressures.
  • Each currency conversion costs ~12% per transaction, leading to cumulative costs of ~5–6% in multi-stage conversions.
  • Rupee depreciation increases cost of dollar-denominated imports, making oil more expensive and worsening inflation and fiscal pressures.
  • High oil prices amplify import costs, creating a double shock: price effect + exchange rate effect.
  • Local currency trade reduces transaction costs, exchange rate risks, and dependency on dollar liquidity.
  • Potential savings of 5–6% on high-value oil transactions can significantly reduce India’s import bill and fiscal stress.
  • Helps stabilise current account deficit (CAD) by lowering outflow of foreign exchange reserves.
  • Reduces exposure to currency volatility, improving predictability in trade payments.
  • Indicates gradual move towards de-dollarisation in trade, aligning with global trends of currency diversification.
  • Strengthens economic ties with GCC countries, which are India’s key energy partners.
  • However, may attract US pressure, as the US has historically opposed alternatives to the dollar in global trade.
  • India already uses local currencies and dirham-based payments for Russian oil imports.
  • Similar arrangements have been explored with countries like UAE (rupee-dirham trade mechanism).
  • Reduces currency conversion costs (12% per stage), especially in multi-currency transactions.
  • Enhances trade settlement efficiency and speed, avoiding multiple intermediary conversions.
  • Promotes internationalisation of the rupee and strengthens India’s financial sovereignty.
  • Limited acceptance of rupee internationally, especially among oil-exporting nations with dollar-linked economies.
  • Risk of geopolitical backlash, particularly from the US, including potential tariff or trade pressures.
  • Currency volatility and lack of deep financial markets for rupee settlement may limit scalability.
  • GCC economies are heavily dollar-pegged, making transition to alternative currencies complex.
  • Develop bilateral currency swap agreements and settlement mechanisms with GCC countries.
  • Strengthen rupee internationalisation through trade invoicing, financial markets, and reserve currency usage.
  • Build robust payment infrastructure (like UPI cross-border, digital currency frameworks) for seamless transactions.
  • Maintain a balanced approach, ensuring diversification without disrupting strategic ties with the US.
  • India imports ~85% of crude oil needs
  • GCC share: ~49%; Russia: ~30.4%
  • Oil priced in US dollars globally
  • Indian crude basket: $123.15/barrel (2026)
  • Currency conversion cost: ~12% per stage


  • A living will (advance directive) is a legal document specifying an individual’s preferences regarding life-sustaining treatment in terminal or irreversible conditions, ensuring dignity in end-of-life care.
  • Recognised by the Supreme Court in Common Cause vs Union of India (2018), it upholds patient autonomy and right to die with dignity under Article 21.

Relevance  

GS Paper I (Society)

  • Changing attitudes towards death, dignity, and autonomy
  • Family structures and decision-making

GS Paper II (Polity / Governance)

  • Article 21: Right to life with dignity
  • Supreme Court judgments (Common Cause case)
  • Healthcare governance and palliative care policy

GS Paper III (Social Sector)

  • Healthcare infrastructure and palliative care systems
  • Cost of healthcare and end-of-life expenditure

Practice Question

  • Discuss the ethical and legal dimensions of living wills in India.(250 Words)
  • It allows individuals to decide in advance whether to accept or refuse life-support interventions such as ventilators, CPR, artificial feeding, or ICU care in irreversible conditions.
  • Applies only when a person is terminally ill or in irreversible states (e.g., persistent vegetative state, metastatic cancer), not for routine or curable illnesses.
  • Requires signature of the individual, two witnesses, and attestation by a notary/gazetted officer, with recent simplification removing magistrate requirement.
  • Prevents unnecessary prolongation of suffering, especially in cases with no hope of recovery.
  • Reduces emotional burden on families, who otherwise face difficult decisions amid conflict, guilt, and uncertainty.
  • Ensures doctors respect patient preferences, rather than defaulting to aggressive life-prolonging treatments.
  • Studies show it does not affect survival, but reduces unnecessary interventions and healthcare costs.
  • Most end-of-life decisions are family-driven or doctor-driven, often leading to continued ICU care even in terminal cases.
  • Lack of awareness leads to patients spending final days on life support, disconnected from family, with poor quality of life.
  • Palliative care access remains limited, despite guidelines by Indian Association of Palliative Care (IAPC) and Indian Society of Critical Care Medicine (ISCCM).
  • Reflects tension between sanctity of life vs quality of life in medical ethics.
  • Challenges patriarchal and family-centric decision-making, shifting focus to individual autonomy.
  • Cultural reluctance to discuss death leads to lack of preparedness and planning.
  • Risk of misuse or misunderstanding if clear guidelines and safeguards are not followed.
  • Common Cause (2018): Legalised passive euthanasia and recognised living wills.
  • Recent SC rulings (e.g., Harish Rana case 2026) clarified that withdrawal of artificial feeding/medical support can be allowed under medical supervision.
  • Simplified procedure: removed requirement of judicial magistrate approval, making implementation easier.
  • Living will can specify preferences such as:
    • No ventilator support
    • No artificial feeding
    • No CPR
    • Preference for palliative/comfort care
  • It is flexible and revisable, allowing individuals to update preferences over time.
  • Requires prior discussion with family members and treating doctors to avoid future disputes.
  • Low awareness and social taboo around death planning.
  • Limited integration into hospital protocols and medical practice.
  • Absence of strong palliative care infrastructure, especially in rural India.
  • Fear among doctors of legal liability and ethical dilemmas.
  • Increase public awareness campaigns on living wills and end-of-life planning.
  • Integrate advance directives into digital health records (Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission).
  • Strengthen palliative care services and include them in primary healthcare.
  • Provide legal clarity and standardised templates for easy adoption.
  • Train healthcare professionals in end-of-life communication and ethical decision-making.
  • Living will = Advance directive
  • Recognised in 2018 SC judgment (Common Cause case)
  • Applies only to terminal/irreversible conditions
  • Requires 2 witnesses + notary/gazetted officer
  • Linked to Article 21 (right to dignity)


  • The government has revamped the UDAN (Ude Desh ka Aam Nagrik) scheme with an outlay of ₹28,840 crore, marking a ~6-fold increase from the earlier ₹4,500 crore allocation (2017).
  • The reform aims to address low route viability and high discontinuation rates, shifting focus from infrastructure creation to sustained operational support.

Relevance

GS II (Governance)

  • Public policy design and subsidy frameworks
  • Role of government in regional development
  • Centrestate coordination in infrastructure

GS III (Economy / Infrastructure)

  • Aviation sector development
  • Viability Gap Funding (VGF)
  • Infrastructure financing and regional growth
  • Tourism and logistics connectivity

Practice Question

  • Critically evaluate the performance of UDAN scheme and recent reforms.(250 Words)
  • Subsidy period extended from 3 years to 5 years for regional routes to improve long-term sustainability.
  • Funding mechanism shifted from RCS levy (airfare-based) to direct budgetary support (exchequer-funded), reducing burden on passengers.
  • ₹10,043 crore allocated specifically for Viability Gap Funding (VGF) to airlines over 10 years.
  • Out of 663 routes launched (since 2017), 327 routes discontinued (~49%), indicating poor sustainability.
  • Only 7–10% of routes remained viable after subsidy withdrawal (CAG findings).
  • Of 95 revived airports, 15 became non-operational, highlighting underutilisation of infrastructure.
  • 100 airports to be redeveloped from unused airstrips with ₹12,159 crore outlay over 8 years.
  • Support for operations and maintenance (O&M):
    • ₹3.06 crore per airport
    • ₹90 lakh per heliport/water aerodrome
    • Total ₹2,577 crore for ~441 aerodromes
  • Development of 200 helipads at ₹15 crore each (total ₹3,661 crore) to improve last-mile connectivity in remote areas.
  • Airlines bid for routes under UDAN; selected airlines receive VGF subsidy.
  • In return, airlines must cap fares at ₹2,500 per hour of flight for 50% of seats, ensuring affordability.
  • Commercial unviability of Tier-2 and Tier-3 routes due to low passenger demand and high operational costs.
  • Over-reliance on short-term subsidies (earlier 3 years) failed to create self-sustaining routes.
  • Infrastructure created without adequate traffic demand assessment led to idle airports.
  • Higher subsidy burden shifts cost to government finances, increasing fiscal expenditure.
  • However, improved connectivity can boost regional economies, tourism, trade, and employment generation.
  • Reduces regional imbalance in aviation access, aligning with inclusive growth objectives.
  • Transition from infrastructure-centric approach viability-centric approach.
  • Recognition that regional aviation requires long-term state support, not short-term market correction.
  • Direct exchequer funding improves transparency and predictability compared to indirect levy mechanism.
  • Enhances connectivity to remote, hilly, and underserved regions, improving national integration.
  • Supports multi-modal connectivity vision under PM Gati Shakti.
  • Boosts defence and emergency access in border and strategic areas via helipads and small airports.
  • Risk of continued dependency on subsidies, without achieving long-term route viability.
  • Potential inefficiencies in route selection and demand forecasting.
  • Limited airline participation due to thin profit margins in regional aviation.
  • High operational costs (fuel, maintenance) may still deter sustainability despite extended subsidies.
  • Improve route selection using data-driven demand forecasting to ensure viability.
  • Encourage smaller aircraft and regional carriers suited for low-demand routes.
  • Integrate UDAN with tourism circuits, cargo logistics, and regional economic planning.
  • Strengthen state government participation and incentives for last-mile connectivity.
  • Gradually move towards hybrid funding models combining public support and private viability.
  • UDAN launched: 2017
  • Fare cap: ₹2,500 per hour (50% seats)
  • Revamp outlay: ₹28,840 crore
  • Routes launched: 663; ~327 discontinued
  • Subsidy: Viability Gap Funding (VGF)


  • Punjab CM has demanded ₹1.44 lakh crore from Rajasthan for use of ~18,000 cusecs water since 1960, reviving a long-standing dispute over Ravi-Beas river waters.
  • Issue combines colonial-era agreements, post-Independence allocations, and present water scarcity, making it a complex inter-state dispute.

Relevance

GS I (Geography)

  • River systems (RaviBeas) and water distribution
  • Water scarcity and regional imbalances

GS II (Polity / Governance)

  • Inter-state water disputes (Article 131)
  • Federalism and river water sharing
  • Role of tribunals and Supreme Court

Practice Question

  • Analyse the legal and constitutional dimensions of inter-state water disputes in India.(250 Words)
  • 1920s Agreement (Bikaner–Punjab):
    • Maharaja Ganga Singh secured water from Sutlej (Gang Canal).
    • Rajasthan (Bikaner) paid royalty/usage charges linked to irrigated land.
  • Payments continued till ~1960, after which the system was discontinued.
  • Indus Waters Treaty (1960):
    • India got full control over Ravi, Beas, Sutlej (Eastern rivers).
    • Water reallocation became an internal matter, not commercial.
  • Development of Harike Barrage + Rajasthan Canal (Indira Gandhi Canal) enabled large-scale diversion to Rajasthan.
  • Royalty-based payment system ended; water treated as inter-state allocation.
  • Tripartite agreement (Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan) fixed total availability at 17.17 MAF.
  • Allocation:
    • Rajasthan: 8.6 MAF (largest share)
    • Punjab & Haryana shared remaining
  • Rajasthan’s entitlement formalised despite being a non-riparian state.
  • Beas River originates from Beas Kund near Rohtang Pass (Himachal Pradesh, ~4,000 m) and flows through Himachal Pradesh and Punjab, joining Sutlej at Harike Barrage.
  • Ravi River originates in Chamba (Himachal Pradesh) near Rohtang region, flows through Punjab, and enters Pakistan to join Chenab.
  • Both are part of the Indus River System and classified as Eastern Rivers under Indus Waters Treaty (1960), giving India full usage rights.
  • Punjab Termination of Agreements Act (2004) attempted to scrap water-sharing agreements.
  • However, it protected existing utilisation, so Rajasthan’s supply continued.
  • Supreme Court (2016) ruled that a state cannot unilaterally terminate inter-state agreements, restoring legal validity of earlier arrangements.
  • Based on riparian principle:
    • States through which rivers flow should have primary rights over water.
  • Rajasthan is a non-riparian state (not in Ravi-Beas basin), yet has largest share.
  • Punjab argues that historical diversion has imposed economic and ecological cost, now quantified as ₹1.44 lakh crore.
  • Water availability assumptions (surplus waters) used in 1981 have weakened due to:
    • Climate variability
    • Increased demand
    • Over-extraction
  • Punjab groundwater extraction: 156.36% of annual recharge (highest in India) vs national average ~60.63%.
  • Canal irrigation in Punjab increased from ~26.5% (2022) to ~78% (2025), indicating rising internal demand.
  • Relies on Indira Gandhi Canal system for irrigation in Thar desert region.
  • Water supports agriculture, livelihoods, and desert development, making reallocation politically and economically sensitive.
  • Conflict between riparian rights vs national redistribution for regional equity.
  • Historical allocations remain fixed despite changing hydrological realities.
  • Lack of updated basin-level water assessment and adaptive allocation mechanism.
  • Political dimension: water disputes linked to federal tensions and regional identity.
  • Severe groundwater depletion in Punjab and sustainability concerns.
  • Increasing focus on water security and river basin management at national level.
  • Quantifying claim (₹1.44 lakh crore) converts political grievance into negotiation leverage.
  • Punjab may approach Supreme Court (Article 131 inter-state disputes).
  • Issue can be revisited through Ravi-Beas Tribunal (pending for decades).
  • Any resolution requires Centre-mediated negotiation among states.
  • Revisiting allocations may trigger chain reaction of inter-state disputes across India.
  • Balancing equity (desert irrigation) vs rights (riparian states) is politically sensitive.
  • Lack of consensus on actual water availability (MAF estimates outdated).
  • Conduct fresh basin-level hydrological assessment based on current data.
  • Move towards dynamic allocation mechanisms, not fixed historical quotas.
  • Strengthen river basin authorities for integrated water management.
  • Promote water-use efficiency (micro-irrigation, crop diversification) in both states.
  • Encourage cooperative federalism through negotiated settlements rather than litigation.
  • Indus Waters Treaty (1960): Eastern rivers to India
  • Ravi-Beas allocation (1981): Total 17.17 MAF
  • Rajasthan share: 8.6 MAF
  • Punjab groundwater extraction: 156.36%
  • Article 131: SC jurisdiction in inter-state disputes


  • India has called for restoring a fully functional WTO dispute settlement system, highlighting paralysis since 2019 due to US blocking Appellate Body appointments.
  • The issue was raised at the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14), Cameroon (2026), reflecting a deep crisis in global trade governance.

Relevance  

GS II (IR)

  • WTO crisis and multilateralism
  • India as voice of Global South
  • Trade diplomacy and negotiations

GS III (Economy)

  • Global trade governance
  • Dispute settlement mechanism
  • Digital trade and e-commerce issues
  • Impact on developing economies

Practice Question

  • Discuss the implications of WTO dispute settlement crisis on global trade governance.(250 Words)
  • WTO’s dispute settlement system (DSS) was a two-tier mechanism:
    • Panel stage
    • Appellate Body (final authority)
  • Since December 2019, the Appellate Body is non-functional due to insufficient judges (<3 required).
  • Trigger: US opposition, citing concerns over judicial overreach and delays.

Indias Core Position

  • Calls for automatic and binding dispute settlement restoration, ensuring predictability and rule-based trade order.
  • Opposes dysfunctional systemdepriving members of effective redressal.
  • Advocates reforms that preserve core WTO principles:
    • Non-discrimination
    • Consensus-based decision-making
    • Equity and inclusiveness

Key Reform Concerns

  • Developed countries pushing for plurilateral agreements (outside consensus), risking fragmentation of WTO.
  • India supports multilateral, consensus-driven approach, resisting dilution of developing country interests.
  • Debate over moratorium on customs duties on e-commerce:
    • In place since 1998
    • Renewed every 2 years

Indias Stand On E-Commerce Moratorium

  • India (with South Africa, Indonesia) seeks reconsideration/ending of moratorium.
  • Argument:
    • Loss of tariff revenue
    • Constraint on policy space for digital industrialisation
  • UNCTAD estimate:
    • Developing countries may lose ~$10 billion annually in tariff revenue.
  • By 2025, digital services projected to form ~56% of global services exports, amplifying revenue loss concerns.

Economic Implications

  • Weak dispute system reduces trust in global trade rules, increasing unilateralism.
  • Benefits powerful economies, while developing countries lose enforcement capability.
  • Digital trade rules without tariffs may deepen digital divide and limit domestic industry growth.

Strategic Dimensions

  • Crisis reflects shift from multilateralism → power-based trade order.
  • India positioning itself as voice of Global South, advocating fair rules.
  • Aligns with broader push for reformed multilateral institutions (WTO, IMF, World Bank).

Challenges

  • US resistance remains a major obstacle to restoring Appellate Body.
  • Divergence between developed vs developing countries on digital trade, subsidies, and transparency.
  • Rise of regional trade agreements (RTAs) reducing WTO centrality.

Way Forward

  • Restore Appellate Body with reformed procedures addressing US concerns (timelines, mandate clarity).
  • Strengthen consensus-based multilateralism, avoiding fragmentation via plurilaterals.
  • Revisit e-commerce moratorium with balanced approach ensuring revenue + innovation.
  • Enhance capacity of developing countries in dispute settlement and digital trade negotiations.

Prelims Pointers

  • WTO Appellate Body non-functional since 2019
  • MC14 held in Cameroon (2026)
  • E-commerce moratorium: since 1998
  • DSS requires minimum 3 judges
  • India + South Africa oppose continuation of moratorium

Book a Free Demo Class

March 2026
M T W T F S S
 1
2345678
9101112131415
16171819202122
23242526272829
3031  
Categories

Get free Counselling and ₹25,000 Discount

Fill the form – Our experts will call you within 30 mins.