Why in News
- On 19 August 2025, India and China held the 24th round of Special Representatives (SR) talks on the boundary issue.
- Talks resumed after a five-year gap (2019–2024) due to the 2020 border crisis.
- Both sides reiterated commitment to the 2005 “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles” agreement as the framework for settlement.
- Agreed to focus on:
- Early harvest settlement of the Sikkim–Tibet boundary.
- New border management mechanisms to prevent 2020-like incidents.
Relevance : GS II (International Relations – Boundary Dispute, Security, Diplomacy, Strategic Affairs).
From Basics
- Historical Context:
- Boundary dispute dates back to colonial demarcations → McMahon Line (Arunachal Pradesh) and Aksai Chin (Ladakh).
- 1962 war → unresolved borders, mistrust.
- 1979 Vajpayee’s visit to China → beginning of normalization.
- Vajpayee’s Role:
- 1998 nuclear tests soured ties, but reconciliation followed.
- 2003: Vajpayee’s visit → Special Representatives (SR) mechanism set up (NSA-level talks).
- Aim: political, not purely technical, resolution.
- 2005 Political Parameters Agreement:
- Settlement to consider strategic interests and settled populations.
- Suggested swap deal:
- China keeps Aksai Chin (strategically vital for it).
- India retains Arunachal Pradesh (populated, culturally tied to India).
- Articles:
- Art. IV – “mutual and equal security”.
- Art. VII – “interests of settled populations” to be protected.
- Subsequent Developments:
- 2007: China reasserted claim on Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) despite Article VII.
- 2013: Both sides reached 18-point consensus (per Menon & Chinese Ambassador Wei Wei).
- Doklam crisis (2017) → revealed partial agreements (Sikkim-Tibet watershed alignment).
- 2020 Galwan crisis → major breakdown of trust, collapse of existing CBMs.
Comprehensive Overview
Strategic Significance of Settlement
- For India:
- Secure borders → reduce military costs of LAC deployment.
- Focus on core strategic challenges (Indian Ocean, Pakistan).
- Normalize relations with China → boost trade & diplomacy.
- For China:
- Stable border allows focus on Taiwan, South China Sea.
- Secures Aksai Chin (vital for Xinjiang–Tibet connectivity).
- Prevents India–U.S. alignment from hardening further.
Key Roadblocks
- Tawang Issue: China insists India concede Tawang, despite India’s settled populations argument.
- Mistrust: 2020 Galwan clash → CBMs (1993, 1996, 2005, 2013) undermined.
- Domestic Politics: Both leaderships risk being seen as compromising on sovereignty.
- Geopolitical Factors: U.S.–China rivalry makes Beijing cautious about India’s growing alignment with Quad.
Present Status (2025)
- 24th SR talks revived the 2005 framework.
- Agreement to:
- Prioritize Sikkim–Tibet boundary finalization (low-hanging fruit).
- Devise new border management mechanisms beyond failed 1996/2005 CBMs.
- Military deployments remain high → both sides paying heavy economic and strategic costs.
The Way Forward
- Political Will Required: A deal exists in principle since 2005–2013; execution stalled by lack of leadership consensus.
- Incremental Approach: Start with Sikkim-Tibet “early harvest”, expand to Ladakh–Arunachal.
- Revived CBMs: Joint patrolling, hotlines, no-weapons protocols must be reworked.
- Strategic Compromise: Both sides must accept “as is, where is” logic — Aksai Chin with China, Arunachal with India.
Key Takeaways
- The 2005 Political Parameters Agreement remains the only negotiated document on India–China boundary.
- Settlement is technically feasible but blocked by political reluctance and trust deficit.
- Without resolution, both countries bear escalating military and economic costs at the LAC.
- A breakthrough requires top-level political push, as Vajpayee once attempted in 2003.
