India may change stance amid U.S. tariffs

Context: India, Russia, and Global Energy Geopolitics

• Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western nations (especially the U.S. and EU) imposed sanctions to curtail Russian oil revenues.
• India, as the world’s 3rd-largest oil importer, ramped up discounted purchases of Russian crude to meet energy needs and stabilize inflation.
  • Russian crude’s share in India’s imports rose from <2% in 2021 to over 35% by early 2023.
• India defends these purchases as necessary for national interest and economic stability.

Relevance : GS 2(International Relations) , GS 3(Energy Security)

MEA’s Latest Statement: A Clearer, Assertive Tone

• The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) issued its strongest defense yet of Russian oil imports.
• Asserted India will take “all necessary measures” to protect its energy and economic interests.
• Marked a tonal shift from earlier low-key responses to Western criticism post-2022.

Trigger: Threats from U.S. President Donald Trump

• Trump accused India of selling Russian oil for “massive profits” while ignoring Ukrainian deaths.
• Threatened “substantial” new tariffs on Indian goods, in addition to a 25% global tariff that kicks in soon.
• This echoes previous U.S. actions:
  • In 2018–19, India had to reduce oil imports from Iran and Venezuela due to U.S. secondary sanctions.
  • Then too, U.S. tariffs (e.g., on steel, aluminum) created tensions in trade ties.

India’s Response to U.S. & EU: Calling Out Double Standards

• The MEA pointed out:
  • Both U.S. and EU continue to buy Russian energy, fertilizers, minerals, and steel.
  • No similar penalties imposed on China, the largest buyer of Russian oil (about 2 million bpd in 2024).
• Unstated hypocrisy: Western silence on their support for Israel amid Gaza war (over 60,000 deaths), while moralizing over Ukraine.

India’s Strategic Options Ahead

1. Maintain Status Quo
   1. Continue Russian oil imports, possibly increasing them.
   2. Absorb sanctions while pushing for FTAs with EU, U.S., UK to reduce friction.

• Diversify Energy Partners
  • Accelerate FTA talks with:
    • GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union), Australia, New Zealand.
    • ASEAN-India Trade pact revision or re-entry into RCEP may be explored.
  • Secure alternate suppliers: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE, U.S., Brazil.
• Retaliatory Counter-Measures
  • Delay trade talks: India-EU BTIA (Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement), U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum.
  • Slow down cooperation in nuclear energy, defence, critical minerals.
  • Leverage India’s strategic role in Indo-Pacific, Quad to extract concessions.

Broader Implications

• Shift in diplomatic posture: From submissive (e.g., Iran/Venezuela episode) to assertive realpolitik.
• Rise of multipolar diplomacy: India signals it will not be bullied into Western strategic camps.
• Watchpoint: Will this impact India-U.S. ties in Quad, Indo-Pacific vision, and high-tech cooperation?

Data Snapshot (as of 2024-25 estimates)

• India’s monthly Russian crude imports: ~1.3–1.5 million barrels/day.
• Russia is India’s top oil supplier, followed by Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
• Discounted rates on Russian Urals crude saved India ~$5-6 billion in 2023.
• India’s exports to U.S.: ~$80 billion/year; imports from U.S.: ~$60 billion/year (2023-24).
• India-EU BTIA talks ongoing since 2007; trade with EU ~$115 billion/year.

Conclusion

India’s statement marks a growing confidence in shaping its own energy diplomacy and foreign policy — one rooted in pragmatism, national interest, and global multipolarity. It signals that India is willing to push back against perceived Western hypocrisy while keeping its strategic options open across economic and geopolitical fronts.