Why Is It in News?
- A 5-judge Constitution Bench delivered its opinion on the 16th Presidential Reference.
- The Court held that:
- Judiciary cannot impose fixed timelines on the President/Governors for assent to State Bills.
- Judiciary cannot presume “deemed consent” if they fail to act within a court-mandated deadline.
- The Court simultaneously criticised “prolonged and evasive inaction” by Governors and the Centre.
Relevance
GS-2: Polity, Constitution, Governance
- Federal relations (Centre–State dynamics).
- Powers & discretion of Governor/President.
- Doctrine of separation of powers.
- Judicial review and limits of judicial activism.
- Article 200–201 interpretation.
GS-2: Executive–Legislature Relations
- Impact of delayed assent on State legislative functioning.
GS-2: Constitutional Bodies
- Presidential Reference jurisdiction under Art. 143.
Constitutional Provisions on Assent to Bills
Articles Involved
- Art. 200: Governor’s options on State Bills—
• Assent
• Withhold assent
• Return for reconsideration
• Reserve for President - Art. 201: President’s options—
• Assent
• Withhold assent
• Return (if not a Money Bill) - No explicit time limit in Constitution for either office to act.
Principle of Constitutional Morality
- Offices must act “within a reasonable time” as part of constitutional trust.
What Triggered the Presidential Reference?
- Growing friction between Opposition-ruled States and Governors.
- Allegations of:
- Bills being kept pending for months/years.
- Governors reserving Bills excessively for the President.
- High Courts (notably Madras HC) began discussing soft timelines.
- Union Government sought clarity via Presidential Reference.
Supreme Court’s Key Findings
A. Judiciary cannot prescribe hard timelines
- Timelines imposed by courts are “one-size-fits-all” and violate:
- Separation of Powers (basic structure).
- Explicit constitutional design of discretionary spaces for constitutional heads.
B. No “deemed consent” at expiry of timelines
- Courts cannot assume assent if deadlines lapse.
- Such assumption = judiciary usurping constitutional functions.
C. But constitutional heads cannot sit indefinitely
- Court strongly criticised “prolonged and evasive inaction” by Governors/President.
- Observed:
- Constitutional heads must record reasons, avoid indefinite delay.
- Inaction cannot be used as a political veto.
D. Presidential Reference is NOT an “appeal in disguise”
- Some States argued the Centre used this as an appeal against unfavourable HC rulings.
- SC held:
- Advisory opinions can correct or clarify the law.
- Not bound by lower court decisions.
Constitutional Overview
A. Doctrine of Separation of Powers (cited by Court)
- Cites Kesavananda Bharati, Indira Gandhi, Puttaswamy.
- Judiciary cannot intrude into executive discretion of constitutional offices.
B. Federal Balance
- Constitution assigns the Governor a limited discretionary role, not a political one.
- Indefinite delays threaten:
- Basic federalism (S.R. Bommai, Nabam Rebia).
- Legislative autonomy of States.
C. Reasonableness Standard
- Though no timelines prescribed, Court implies:
- “Reasonable time” must be context-specific.
- Non-action is reviewable if it becomes arbitrary or mala fide.
Related Case Law
- Nabam Rebia (2016): Governor cannot interfere with legislative process except where Constitution permits.
- Shamsher Singh (1974): Governor acts on aid & advice, except in limited areas.
- Rameshwar Prasad (2006): Discretion subject to judicial review if mala fide.
Implications for Centre–State Relations
Positive
- Reaffirms judicial restraint.
- Avoids courts overriding federal constitutional design.
Concerns
- Gives administrative space for Governors to delay Bills.
- States fear misuse in politically sensitive Bills.
Net Effect
- A balanced but status-quo reinforcing opinion:
- No mandatory deadlines.
- Strong moral-constitutional rebuke of delays.
