Parliament of India
Presiding Officers, Sessions & Procedural Architecture — Comprehensive Notes
Quorum of the House
Constitutional Basis
Article 100(3) provides that until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the quorum to constitute a meeting of either House of Parliament shall be one-tenth of the total number of members of the House. This means 55 members in Lok Sabha (total: 545) and approximately 25 members in Rajya Sabha (total: 245).
Meaning & Significance
Quorum denotes the minimum number of members required to be present for valid transaction of business. It ensures that decisions of Parliament carry a democratic minimum of representative presence. If at any time during a meeting of a House there is no quorum, the presiding officer is duty-bound to either adjourn the House or suspend the meeting until there is a quorum.
What Happens if Quorum Is Not Met?
The Rules of Procedure mandate that if a member raises a point of quorum and the count reveals inadequate numbers, the Chair either rings the bell for a prescribed period to summon members, or adjourns/suspends proceedings. Any business transacted in the absence of quorum is not automatically void — it can only be challenged if the point of quorum is actually raised. This is a crucial distinction often tested in Prelims.
Why Quorum Is Rarely Invoked
In practice, Houses routinely function with fewer than one-tenth members present. The point of quorum is a parliamentary weapon: it is raised strategically by the opposition to embarrass the treasury benches or stall proceedings. Most routine legislative business proceeds without any member formally challenging the quorum. This raises serious questions about the democratic legitimacy of legislation passed in near-empty chambers — a recurrent theme in GS-II essays.
Lok Sabha vs Rajya Sabha
The constitutional requirement is identical for both Houses — one-tenth. There is no differential standard. However, given the smaller size of Rajya Sabha, the absolute number required (approximately 25) is significantly lower, making quorum challenges rarer in the Upper House.
| Feature | India | UK House of Commons | US Congress |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quorum | 1/10th of total membership | 40 out of 650 (~6.2%) | Simple majority (218 in House, 51 in Senate) |
| Enforcement | Rarely invoked; point-based | Rarely enforced; conventions govern | Strictly enforced; quorum calls routine |
| Constitutional Basis | Article 100(3) | Standing Orders | Article I, Section 5 of US Constitution |
| Consequence | Adjournment or suspension | Business suspended; bell rung | Business halted; Sergeant-at-Arms may compel attendance |
The US standard is notably the most demanding — requiring a simple majority. In practice, this means quorum calls in the US serve as procedural tools to delay business, somewhat similar to India, but with far greater frequency and institutional consequence.
- Quorum is 1/10th, not 1/3rd or simple majority. A frequent wrong option in UPSC.
- Quorum requirement is under Article 100, not Article 85 (which deals with sessions).
- Parliament can change the quorum by law — the Constitution itself permits this (“until Parliament by law otherwise provides”).
- Business conducted without quorum is not automatically void unless challenged at that moment.
The gap between the constitutional quorum standard and the actual attendance in Indian Parliament raises fundamental questions about democratic legitimacy. When landmark legislation is passed with a mere fraction of the House present, it undermines the representative principle that underpins parliamentary democracy. The Constituent Assembly debated this issue and settled on one-tenth as a pragmatic minimum — yet the founders assumed this would be a floor, not the norm. The reluctance of members to remain present for debates, combined with party whips focusing attendance only for division votes, has converted the House into an instrument of executive validation rather than deliberative governance. Reformers have suggested electronic attendance tracking, mandatory minimum sitting hours, and linking MP attendance to privileges. The real question for GS-II analysis is whether the quorum rule serves as a guardian of democratic process or merely a procedural formality in an era of executive dominance.
Presiding Officers of Parliament
A. Role of Pro-tem Speaker
Appointment & Constitutional Basis
The Pro-tem Speaker is appointed by the President of India under constitutional convention (not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution). By convention, the senior-most member of the newly constituted Lok Sabha is appointed. The President administers the oath to the Pro-tem Speaker, who then administers the oath to other members.
Functions
- Administer the oath of office to newly elected members of Lok Sabha.
- Preside over the House until a new Speaker is elected.
- Conduct the election of the Speaker.
Limitations & Temporary Nature
The Pro-tem Speaker’s authority ceases the moment the new Speaker is elected. The office is entirely transitional and carries no continuing constitutional authority. The Pro-tem Speaker has no power regarding Money Bill certification, anti-defection adjudication, or any other substantive function of the Speaker.
- Pro-tem Speaker is appointed by the President, not the Prime Minister or outgoing Speaker.
- The office is based on convention, not on any specific Article of the Constitution.
- The Pro-tem Speaker need not be the senior-most member — convention, not law, governs this.
B. Speaker of Lok Sabha
1. Appointment & Election
The Speaker is elected by Lok Sabha from amongst its members, as per Article 93. The election is conducted by means of a motion moved in the House. By convention, the Speaker is from the ruling party or coalition, though there is no constitutional bar on an opposition member being elected. The date for the Speaker’s election is fixed by the President. Article 94 deals with vacation and resignation of the Speaker.
2. Removal
Under Article 94, the Speaker can be removed by a resolution of the Lok Sabha passed by a majority of all the then members of the House (effective majority). A 14-day advance notice must be given for moving such a resolution. While the resolution is under consideration, the Speaker cannot preside over the House but can be present and participate in the proceedings, retaining the right to vote in the first instance (not casting vote only). This is a unique feature — the Speaker fights for survival as a member, not from the Chair.
3. Powers & Functions
A. Administrative Powers: The Speaker is the principal spokesperson and administrative head of Lok Sabha. All matters of accommodation, staff, and infrastructure of the House Secretariat come under the Speaker’s authority. The Speaker controls the allocation of rooms and other facilities to members and represents Lok Sabha in its dealings with the President, Rajya Sabha, and external bodies.
B. Legislative Powers: The Speaker determines the order of business, decides which bills and motions shall be taken up, and interprets the Rules of Procedure. The Speaker’s most constitutionally significant legislative power is the certification of Money Bills under Article 110. Once certified, this decision is final and cannot be questioned in any court — a power that has generated considerable controversy, most notably during the passage of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 as a Money Bill.
C. Disciplinary Powers: The Speaker maintains order in the House, can name and suspend disorderly members, and can order withdrawal of members from the House. The Speaker directs that unparliamentary language be expunged from records. The power to suspend members under Rule 374 and Rule 374A is exercised solely by the Speaker.
D. Financial Powers (Money Bill Certification): Under Article 110(3), the Speaker’s certification that a Bill is a Money Bill is conclusive. This makes the Speaker the final arbiter of the most significant procedural question in financial legislation — whether Rajya Sabha gets substantive amending power or merely a recommendatory voice. The Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Aadhaar case, 2018) upheld the Speaker’s certification by a 4:1 majority, though Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s dissent called for limited judicial review of this power.
E. Quasi-Judicial Powers (Anti-Defection): Under the Tenth Schedule (inserted by the 52nd Amendment, 1985), the Speaker adjudicates disqualification petitions arising from defection. This quasi-judicial role was upheld in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), where the Supreme Court held that the Speaker’s decision is subject to judicial review only on grounds of mala fide, perversity, or violation of constitutional mandate — not on merits. However, in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020), the Supreme Court expressed concern over inordinate delays by Speakers in deciding disqualification petitions and suggested that Parliament should consider an independent tribunal mechanism.
Criticism & Neutrality Debate
The question of the Speaker’s impartiality is central to GS-II discourse. Unlike the UK Speaker who severs all party ties upon election, the Indian Speaker continues to be a member of the ruling party. This creates an inherent tension when the Speaker exercises powers under the Tenth Schedule — adjudicating defection cases where the ruling party itself is a stakeholder. The Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms and various Law Commission Reports have recommended that anti-defection matters should be referred to the Election Commission or a judicial body, removing this burden from the Speaker.
- Removal requires effective majority (majority of then members), not simple or absolute majority.
- Speaker does not vacate office upon dissolution — continues until the new Lok Sabha meets.
- Speaker votes only in case of a tie (casting vote) — Article 100(1).
- Speaker is not a member of any committee but is ex-officio Chairman of the Business Advisory Committee, Rules Committee, and General Purposes Committee.
- Money Bill certification is not subject to judicial review (majority view in Aadhaar case).
C. Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha
The Deputy Speaker is also elected from among the members of Lok Sabha under Article 93. By convention (not constitutional requirement), the position is offered to a member of the opposition, though this convention has been breached on multiple occasions. The Deputy Speaker presides over sessions in the absence of the Speaker and enjoys all powers of the Speaker when so presiding. The removal procedure mirrors that of the Speaker — a resolution with 14-day notice passed by effective majority under Article 94.
A significant procedural point: when the Deputy Speaker presides, the Speaker cannot override the Deputy Speaker’s rulings. However, when a resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker is being considered, the Speaker (not the Deputy Speaker) presides. When a resolution for the removal of the Speaker is being considered, the Deputy Speaker presides.
D. Chairman of Rajya Sabha (Vice-President of India)
The Vice-President of India is the ex-officio Chairman of Rajya Sabha under Article 64. This is structurally different from the Speaker of Lok Sabha, who is an elected member of the House. The Chairman is not a member of Rajya Sabha and therefore does not vote in the first instance — only exercises a casting vote in the event of a tie.
Powers Compared to Speaker
The Chairman does not have the power to certify Money Bills (that power rests exclusively with the Speaker). The Chairman presides over joint sittings only if the Speaker is absent. The Chairman’s role in anti-defection cases within Rajya Sabha mirrors the Speaker’s role in Lok Sabha. However, the Chairman cannot be removed by a resolution of Rajya Sabha alone — removal follows the procedure under Article 67, which requires a resolution passed by Rajya Sabha by effective majority and agreed to by Lok Sabha (analogous to impeachment-like procedure, though less onerous than presidential impeachment).
E. Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha
Elected by Rajya Sabha from among its members under Article 89(2). The Deputy Chairman presides in the absence of the Chairman and exercises all the Chairman’s powers when doing so. Removal is by a resolution passed by a majority of all the then members of Rajya Sabha (Article 90), with 14 days’ advance notice — mirroring the Deputy Speaker’s removal in Lok Sabha.
F. Panel of Chairpersons (Both Houses)
Under the Rules of Procedure of both Houses, the Speaker/Chairman nominates a Panel of Chairpersons — typically not more than 10 members in Lok Sabha and a similar number in Rajya Sabha. Any member of this Panel can preside over the House in the absence of both the Speaker/Chairman and Deputy Speaker/Deputy Chairman. Their authority is temporary and limited to the session or part of session over which they preside. They do not have the power to adjudicate anti-defection matters or certify Money Bills.
The hierarchy of presiding authority in Lok Sabha: Speaker → Deputy Speaker → Panel of Chairpersons member. In Rajya Sabha: Chairman → Deputy Chairman → Panel of Chairpersons member.
🔁 Comparative Analysis — Presiding Officers
| Feature | India (LS Speaker) | UK Speaker | US Speaker (House) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Neutrality | Expected by convention; not severed from party | Completely non-partisan; resigns from party | Partisan — leader of majority party |
| Political Affiliation | Remains member of ruling party | Stands as “Speaker seeking re-election” (no party) | Actively heads the majority caucus |
| Anti-Defection Power | Yes — under Tenth Schedule | No equivalent | No equivalent |
| Money Bill Certification | Yes — under Article 110 | Yes — certifies “Money Bills” for Parliament Act procedure | No equivalent (all bills originate in House) |
| Election | Elected by House members | Elected by House; convention of unopposed re-election | Elected by House (majority party nominee) |
| Voting | Casting vote only | Casting vote only (convention: status quo) | Can vote on all matters |
| Tenure | Duration of Lok Sabha (5 years) or until resignation/removal | Until resignation; can serve across Parliaments | 2-year term (each Congress) |
| Feature | Chairman of Rajya Sabha (India) | US Vice-President (Senate President) |
|---|---|---|
| Membership | Not a member of Rajya Sabha | Not a member of Senate |
| Voting | Casting vote only | Casting vote only |
| Role in Legislation | No Money Bill certification | No special financial role |
| Succession | Succeeds to President in vacancy | First in line of presidential succession |
| Removal | Resolution by RS + agreement by LS | Impeachment (same as President) |
| Practical Presiding | Regularly presides | Rarely presides; President Pro Tempore handles |
Leader of House, Leader of Opposition & Whip
A. Leader of the House
The Leader of the House in Lok Sabha is the Prime Minister (if a member of Lok Sabha) or a Minister nominated by the PM. In Rajya Sabha, the Leader of the House is a Minister nominated by the PM from among Rajya Sabha members. The Leader of the House is responsible for scheduling government business, coordinating with the opposition on the legislative agenda, and representing the government’s position on procedural and policy matters. This office is governed by parliamentary convention rather than any specific constitutional provision.
B. Leader of the Opposition (LoO)
The Leader of the Opposition enjoys statutory recognition under the Salary and Allowances of Leaders of Opposition in Parliament Act, 1977. To be recognized as LoO, the leader must belong to the largest opposition party — and by convention (upheld by successive Speakers), that party must command at least 10% of the total seats in the House (i.e., 55 seats in Lok Sabha).
This 10% threshold has been controversial. In the 16th Lok Sabha (2014–2019), the Indian National Congress won only 44 seats, and the Speaker declined to recognize an LoO. This had cascading consequences for the appointment process of bodies like Lokpal, CBI Director, CVC, and NHRC Chairperson — where the LoO is a statutory member of the selection committee. The debate centers on whether this threshold serves institutional propriety or weakens democratic accountability by depriving the opposition of a formal voice in key appointments.
C. Whip
The Whip (formally, Chief Whip) is appointed by each party to enforce party discipline, ensure attendance during crucial votes, and communicate the party leadership’s position to members. Whips are not constitutional functionaries but derive significance from the Rules of Procedure and the anti-defection law.
Types of Whips
- One-line Whip: Informational — informs members about a vote. Attendance not mandatory.
- Two-line Whip: Members expected to be present. Underlined twice.
- Three-line Whip: Most serious — members must be present and vote as per party direction. Violation can trigger disqualification under the Tenth Schedule.
Consequences of Violation
Violation of a three-line whip — voting against party direction or abstaining — can lead to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. The party leadership reports the violation to the Speaker/Chairman, who then adjudicates the matter. This mechanism gives the whip extraordinary coercive power over individual MPs, effectively subordinating legislative conscience to party command.
| Feature | India | UK | USA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whip System | Three-tier; backed by Tenth Schedule | Three-tier; enforced through party sanction | Weak; members vote independently frequently |
| Consequence of Defiance | Disqualification from House | Loss of party membership/privileges; no disqualification | Minimal — may lose committee assignments |
| Anti-Defection Law | Yes — Tenth Schedule | No statutory equivalent | No |
| Free Vote | Extremely rare; only on conscience matters | Occasional free votes on ethical issues | Common; party discipline is persuasive, not coercive |
Analytical Question: Does the anti-defection law strengthen Parliament by ensuring stability, or weaken it by converting MPs into mere voting machines? The dominant academic view (Kashyap, Austin) holds that while the Tenth Schedule prevented the “Aaya Ram Gaya Ram” syndrome of floor-crossing, it has come at the cost of deliberative democracy — MPs cannot vote their conscience even on matters of grave public interest without risking their seats.
Sessions of Parliament
Constitutional Basis
Article 85(1) mandates that the President shall from time to time summon each House of Parliament, and the maximum gap between two sessions cannot exceed six months. This ensures that Parliament meets at least twice a year. However, by convention, three sessions are held annually.
Types of Sessions
- Budget Session (February–May): The longest session; Union Budget is presented; Finance Bill and Appropriation Bill are passed. Often has a recess in between for Departmental Standing Committees to examine Demands for Grants.
- Monsoon Session (July–August): Legislative business and accountability mechanisms (Question Hour, debates) dominate.
- Winter Session (November–December): Typically the shortest; remaining legislative agenda is addressed.
Critical Terminology — Clearly Differentiated
| Term | Meaning | Who Orders | Effect on Bills | Effect on Committees |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Summoning | Calling Parliament into session | President (on Cabinet advice) | Enables introduction & consideration of Bills | Committees can meet during sessions |
| Adjournment | Suspension of sitting to a specified date/time within a session | Presiding Officer (Speaker/Chairman) | No effect — Bills remain pending | No effect — continue functioning |
| Adjournment Sine Die | Termination of a sitting indefinitely (no date specified) | Presiding Officer | No effect — Bills remain pending | No effect |
| Recess | Break within a session (e.g., Budget Session recess) | Decided by Business Advisory Committee | No effect | Committees may meet during recess |
| Prorogation | Formal end of a session (not dissolution) | President (on Cabinet advice) | Pending notices, motions, and resolutions lapse; Bills do NOT lapse | Committees continue |
| Dissolution | End of the life of Lok Sabha | President (on PM’s advice, or constitutional crisis) | Bills pending in Lok Sabha lapse; Bills passed by LS & pending in RS lapse; Bills pending in RS (originated there) do NOT lapse | Committees stand dissolved |
Prorogation ≠ Dissolution. Prorogation ends a session; Dissolution ends the House itself. Bills survive prorogation but certain bills lapse on dissolution. This distinction is the most frequently tested concept in this chapter.
Effect of Prorogation vs Dissolution
| Aspect | Prorogation | Dissolution |
|---|---|---|
| Pending Bills | Do NOT lapse — continue in next session | Bills pending in Lok Sabha LAPSE |
| Bills passed by one House, pending in other | Continue | Lapse if originated in or pending in LS |
| Bills pending in Rajya Sabha (originated there) | Continue | Do NOT lapse (RS is permanent) |
| Bills assented to by President | No effect — already law | No effect — already law |
| Joint Sitting notice under Art. 108 | Does not lapse | Lapses |
| Money Bills | Continue | Lapse (even if passed by LS and pending in RS) |
| Pending Notices/Motions | Lapse | Lapse |
| Committees | Continue to function | Stand dissolved |
Flowchart — Fate of Bills on Dissolution
If the President has notified a Joint Sitting under Article 108 before dissolution, the bill does NOT lapse, and the Joint Sitting can be held with the new Lok Sabha. However, if no such notification has been issued, the bill lapses entirely.
Lame Duck Session
Meaning
A lame duck session refers to the last session of the outgoing legislature, held after elections have been conducted but before the new legislature convenes. The members participating are those who may not return to the new House, making the session one of diminished democratic mandate.
Indian Context vs US Context
In the United States, the lame duck session is constitutionally defined — the period between the November election and the January inauguration of the new Congress. The 20th Amendment (1933) was specifically designed to shorten this period. In India, the concept is less formalized but functionally identical. When a Lok Sabha’s term is about to expire and elections have been announced, any remaining session is effectively a lame duck session. India does not have a constitutional prohibition on substantive legislation during this period, unlike some democratic norms elsewhere.
Relevance
Lame duck sessions raise democratic legitimacy concerns — legislators who have been voted out continue to exercise legislative power. The convention in India is to avoid major legislation during such sessions, but no binding rule prevents it. This is a useful concept for GS-II essays on democratic accountability and parliamentary conventions.
Lapse of Bills During Dissolution of Lok Sabha
Bills That LAPSE
- A Bill pending in Lok Sabha (whether at any stage — introduction, committee, consideration, or passing).
- A Bill passed by Lok Sabha but pending in Rajya Sabha.
- A Joint Sitting notification pending under Article 108, if not actually notified before dissolution.
Bills That Do NOT Lapse
- A Bill pending in Rajya Sabha that did not originate in Lok Sabha (since Rajya Sabha is a continuing chamber).
- A Bill passed by both Houses and awaiting Presidential assent — it has left the domain of Parliament.
- A Bill returned by the President for reconsideration under Article 111 — however, this is debatable and context-dependent.
- A Bill where a Joint Sitting has been notified under Article 108(5) before dissolution — survives for the joint sitting with the new Lok Sabha.
- Trap 1: “All pending Bills lapse on dissolution.” — False. Bills pending in RS (originating there) do NOT lapse.
- Trap 2: “Bills passed by both Houses lapse if President has not given assent.” — False. Once passed by both Houses, the Bill is with the President, outside Parliament’s domain.
- Trap 3: “Rajya Sabha also gets dissolved.” — False. Rajya Sabha is a permanent/continuing House; it is never dissolved.
- Trap 4: “Prorogation causes Bills to lapse.” — False. Only dissolution causes certain Bills to lapse. Prorogation only terminates pending notices and motions.
- Trap 5: “A Bill pending in a Joint Committee lapses on dissolution.” — True — this is the tricky correct statement. Joint Committee Reports lapse if Lok Sabha is dissolved and the committee was constituted by Lok Sabha. (Exception: if constituted by RS on an RS-origin Bill.)
UPSC Orientation Section
A. Prelims Focus Areas
| Topic | Key Articles / Facts | Common Trap |
|---|---|---|
| Quorum | Art. 100(3) — 1/10th | Confusing with 1/3rd or majority |
| Speaker Removal | Art. 94 — Effective majority, 14-day notice | Confusing with simple majority or absolute majority |
| Chairman Removal | Art. 67 — RS resolution + LS agreement | Thinking RS alone can remove |
| Speaker vs Chairman | Speaker certifies Money Bills; Chairman does not | Assuming both have equal powers |
| Six-month Rule | Art. 85(1) — Max gap between sessions | Thinking it mandates three sessions |
| Pro-tem Speaker | Convention-based; appointed by President | Attributing to a specific Article |
| Dissolution & Bills | RS-origin Bills survive; LS Bills lapse | “All Bills lapse” is incorrect |
| LoO Recognition | 10% seats convention; 1977 Act | Thinking it is a constitutional post |
B. Mains Focus Areas
- Neutrality of the Speaker: Contrast Indian Speaker with UK Speaker. Discuss Tenth Schedule implications, the Kihoto Hollohan and Keisham Meghachandra judgments, and reform proposals (transferring anti-defection adjudication to an independent tribunal).
- Anti-Defection & Decline of Deliberation: The Tenth Schedule has transformed Parliament from a deliberative body to a vote-counting exercise. Free conscience votes are virtually impossible. Link to party whip system and its coercive nature.
- Executive Dominance Through Sessions Control: The executive decides when Parliament meets (through the President, acting on Cabinet advice). Declining number of sitting days (from 120+ in the 1950s to 60–70 in recent Lok Sabhas) indicates executive control over the legislative calendar. Raise question: should there be a minimum mandatory number of sitting days?
- Reforms Suggested: National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC, 2002) recommended minimum 120 sitting days for LS and 100 for RS. Dinesh Goswami Committee recommendations on anti-defection. Law Commission proposals on Speaker neutrality.
UPSC Mains Questions (Topic-wise)
Q1. “The Speaker of Lok Sabha is expected to be impartial, yet remains a member of the ruling party.” Critically examine the institutional contradictions in the office of the Speaker and suggest reforms. (250 words)
Q2. Distinguish between Prorogation and Dissolution of Parliament. Discuss the effect of each on pending legislation. (150 words)
Q3. “The Tenth Schedule, while curbing defection, has undermined the deliberative character of Parliament.” Discuss in the context of the role of the Whip and the Speaker’s quasi-judicial function. (250 words)
Q4. What is the constitutional significance of the quorum in Indian Parliament? Why is it rarely enforced in practice? (150 words)
Q5. The non-recognition of the Leader of Opposition in the 16th Lok Sabha raised questions about the effectiveness of democratic accountability. Examine the implications for institutional appointments requiring LoO’s participation. (250 words)
Q6. Compare the powers of the Speaker of Lok Sabha with those of the Chairman of Rajya Sabha. Why does the Constitution treat them differently? (150 words)
Q7. “The power to certify a Money Bill under Article 110 makes the Speaker the most powerful non-executive constitutional authority.” Discuss with reference to the Aadhaar Act controversy. (250 words)
Q8. Explain the concept of “Lame Duck Session.” How does the Indian experience differ from the American context? (150 words)
Q9. “The declining number of parliamentary sitting days reflects the growing dominance of the executive over the legislature.” Critically examine. What reforms would restore the balance? (250 words)
Q10. The Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) suggested that anti-defection cases should be adjudicated by an independent tribunal rather than the Speaker. Evaluate the merits of this proposal. (250 words)
Q11. What is the role and composition of the Panel of Chairpersons in both Houses? How do their powers differ from those of the Speaker or Chairman? (150 words)
Q12. Compare the Whip system in India, UK, and USA. Does the Indian anti-defection framework make the Whip more coercive than its counterparts? Discuss. (250 words)
Answer Writing Frameworks
Framework — Q1: Impartiality of the Speaker
Framework — Q3: Tenth Schedule & Deliberative Parliament
Framework — Q5: Non-Recognition of LoO
Framework — Q7: Money Bill Certification Power
Framework — Q9: Declining Sitting Days
Framework — Q10: Independent Tribunal for Anti-Defection
Frequently Asked Questions
Can the Speaker be removed by a simple majority?
No. Under Article 94, the Speaker can be removed only by a resolution passed by a majority of all the then members of Lok Sabha (effective majority), not a simple majority of those present and voting. Additionally, a 14-day advance notice must be given. This is a higher threshold than ordinary business and ensures that the removal of the Speaker is a deliberate, considered act of the House.
Why is the Speaker called the “Guardian of the House”?
The Speaker is the custodian of the rights and privileges of the House, its committees, and its members. The Speaker protects the House from executive encroachment, ensures that parliamentary procedures are followed, and maintains order during debates. The Speaker represents the collective authority of the House to the outside world — to the President, the judiciary, and other constitutional bodies. This guardian role is why the Speaker’s impartiality is so critical — a partisan guardian defeats the purpose of the office.
What happens if Parliament does not meet for 6 months?
Article 85(1) mandates that the gap between two sessions cannot exceed six months. If this provision is violated, it would be a constitutional breach. The session would need to be summoned immediately. In theory, the Supreme Court could intervene through its power of judicial review to compel the executive to advise the President to summon Parliament. However, this has not been tested in Indian judicial history because no government has dared breach this explicit constitutional mandate.
Does the Rajya Sabha dissolve?
No. Rajya Sabha is a permanent or continuing House — it is never dissolved. One-third of its members retire every two years under Article 83(1), and fresh elections fill these vacancies. This continuity is a fundamental feature of the Upper House and is why Bills pending in Rajya Sabha (that originated there) do not lapse upon dissolution of Lok Sabha. The concept of dissolution applies exclusively to Lok Sabha under Article 85(2).
Why is Money Bill certification by the Speaker controversial?
The controversy stems from two issues. First, the Speaker’s certification under Article 110(3) is final and conclusive — no court can question it. This places extraordinary unchecked power in a single office-holder. Second, the Speaker remains politically affiliated with the ruling party, creating potential for misuse — certifying Bills as Money Bills to bypass Rajya Sabha scrutiny. The Aadhaar Act (2016) is the most prominent example: the Bill contained provisions far beyond the scope of Article 110(1), yet was certified as a Money Bill, effectively denying Rajya Sabha its amending power. Justice Chandrachud’s dissent in the Puttaswamy case (2018) called for limited judicial review on grounds of manifest error — a position that remains academically persuasive but is not yet the law.
Can the Speaker vote in Lok Sabha?
The Speaker does not vote in the first instance. Under Article 100(1), the Speaker (or the person acting as such) has a casting vote only — exercised when there is a tie. This is a deliberate design to reinforce the Speaker’s impartiality. However, during a resolution for the Speaker’s own removal, the Speaker can vote in the first instance (as a member, not as Speaker), since the Speaker is not presiding at that time. This nuance is frequently tested in Prelims.
What is the difference between adjournment and prorogation?
Adjournment suspends a sitting within a session — it is ordered by the presiding officer and has no effect on pending business. Prorogation terminates an entire session — it is ordered by the President and causes all pending notices, motions, and resolutions to lapse (but Bills survive). The key distinction: adjournment is an intra-session pause; prorogation is an inter-session boundary. Adjournment sine die (without a fixed date) is often followed by prorogation, but the two are procedurally distinct acts.
Is the Leader of Opposition a constitutional post?
No. The Leader of Opposition is a statutory post, recognized under the Salary and Allowances of Leaders of Opposition in Parliament Act, 1977. It is not mentioned in the Constitution. The 10% seat threshold for recognition is a convention based on Speaker’s ruling, not law. Despite being non-constitutional, the LoO’s role is functionally critical — the LoO participates in selection committees for Lokpal, CBI Director, CVC, CIC, and other key bodies. The absence of a recognized LoO (as in the 16th Lok Sabha) creates institutional gaps that the current statutory framework does not adequately address.
Who presides over a Joint Sitting of Parliament?
The Speaker of Lok Sabha presides over Joint Sittings under Article 108. If the Speaker is absent, the Deputy Speaker presides. If neither is available, the Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha presides. If none of them are available, such other person as may be determined by the members present presides. The Chairman of Rajya Sabha does NOT preside over Joint Sittings — this is a critical Prelims fact.
What happens to Parliamentary Committees on dissolution?
All committees of Lok Sabha stand dissolved upon the dissolution of Lok Sabha. This includes Standing Committees, Select Committees, and Joint Committees appointed on the motion of Lok Sabha. However, Joint Committees appointed on the motion of Rajya Sabha (where the RS initiated the committee) do not stand dissolved, since Rajya Sabha itself is permanent. Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs), while comprising members of both Houses, are reconstituted after the new Lok Sabha is formed.


