Prime Minister & Council of Ministers | UPSC Polity Notes

Prime Minister & Council of Ministers | UPSC Polity Notes
🇮🇳 UPSC Polity · GS Paper II

Prime Minister & Council of Ministers

Exhaustive Exam-Oriented Notes — Prelims, GS-II Mains & Interview · With UK & Comparative Analysis

Section 01

One-Page Concept Snapshot (Last-Day Revision)

  • The Prime Minister is the “real executive” in India’s parliamentary democracy — the President is the nominal head while PM exercises actual executive authority (Article 74 & 75).
  • The PM is described as the “keystone of the cabinet arch” (Ivor Jennings) and “first among equals” (primus inter pares) — yet in practice often transcends this, especially with majority support.
  • Council of Ministers (CoM) is the collective body; Cabinet is the inner ring of senior ministers who make key decisions; PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) is the support structure that has grown into a power centre itself.
  • The UK has no written constitution — PM and Cabinet exist purely through conventions. India has a written Constitution (Articles 74–78) that codifies much of this, but still relies on UK-style conventions for day-to-day working.
  • Collective responsibility (Art. 75(3)) means the entire CoM sinks or swims together — if the Lok Sabha passes a no-confidence motion, the entire Council resigns, not just the individual minister.
  • In single-party majority, the PM is virtually supreme — cabinet is subordinate. In coalition governments, the PM must negotiate, accommodate allies, and balance competing agendas, significantly reducing prime-ministerial dominance.
  • PM’s appointment is by the President (Art. 75(1)), but the President’s discretion is limited to situations of hung Parliament — otherwise convention dictates inviting the majority party/coalition leader.
  • A minister who is not a member of either House of Parliament must get elected within 6 months, failing which they cease to be a minister (Art. 75).
  • The 91st Constitutional Amendment (2003) caps the CoM at 15% of the total strength of Lok Sabha — directly addressing the problem of oversized, patronage-driven cabinets.
  • The PM is the link between the President and CoM (Art. 78) — duty to communicate decisions, furnish information, and submit matters for Cabinet consideration if the President requests.
  • Cabinet committees (e.g., Cabinet Committee on Security, Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs) are the actual decision-making engines — full cabinet ratifies rather than deliberates in most cases.
  • The Anti-Defection Law (Tenth Schedule, 52nd Amendment, strengthened by 91st Amendment) ensures stability but critics argue it converts MPs into “voting cattle” controlled by the party whip and PM.
  • India’s PM has no fixed tenure — they serve at the pleasure of the Lok Sabha majority. Contrast with the US President who has a fixed 4-year term regardless of congressional confidence.
  • Question Hour in Parliament is the primary tool for day-to-day accountability of ministers, borrowed from UK conventions; supplemented by Zero Hour (Indian innovation).
  • The debate between “Cabinet government” vs “Prime Ministerial government” is a perennial UPSC theme — the answer depends on PM’s personality, party strength, and coalition constraints.

UPSC Trap Areas

  • Trap 1: The Constitution does not explicitly say the PM must be from the Lok Sabha — convention dictates it, but technically a Rajya Sabha member can be PM (e.g., Indira Gandhi briefly in 1966, Manmohan Singh 2004–14).
  • Trap 2: Article 74 was amended by the 42nd Amendment (1976) to make the President’s obligation to act on CoM advice binding, and the 44th Amendment (1978) added the right of the President to send advice back once — but must act on resubmitted advice.
  • Trap 3: “Collective responsibility” under Art. 75(3) is to the Lok Sabha only, not to Rajya Sabha and not to Parliament as a whole. This is frequently tested.

“The Prime Minister is the keystone of the cabinet arch.”

— Sir Ivor Jennings

“Collective responsibility is the soul of the parliamentary system — without it, responsible government is a mere form without substance.”

— Usable in GS-II Mains Conclusions

“The Cabinet is the steering wheel of the ship of State; the PM is the captain.”

— Usable in Mains Introductions
Section 02

Constitutional Philosophy: Why Prime Minister & Council of Ministers?

Parliamentary Model Rationale

India chose the parliamentary system over the presidential system primarily because of the principle of accountability. In a parliamentary system, the executive (CoM headed by the PM) is drawn from and accountable to the legislature. This creates a “fusion of powers” — the executive cannot act independently of the legislature’s confidence. The Constituent Assembly, led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, explicitly preferred this model as it provides daily and continuous accountability rather than periodic accountability through elections alone (as in the US presidential model).

Cabinet Government as Institutional Bridge

The Cabinet system serves as the institutional bridge between the legislature and the executive. Ministers are members of Parliament (or must become so within 6 months), ensuring that those who make policy are also those who face legislative scrutiny. This bridge prevents the disconnect between law-making and law-execution that can arise in presidential systems. The PM, as head of the Cabinet and leader of the House, is the linchpin of this bridge.

Political Executive vs. Permanent Executive

The Constitution distinguishes between the political executive (PM and CoM — elected, temporary, policy-setting) and the permanent executive (civil services — appointed, continuing, implementation-focused). The PM and ministers provide democratic direction to the permanent bureaucracy, ensuring that governance reflects the people’s mandate rather than bureaucratic inertia.

Responsible Government + Democratic Legitimacy

The PM and CoM derive their legitimacy from the elected Lok Sabha. Collective responsibility ensures that governance remains responsive to the people’s representatives. The system is designed so that a government that loses public confidence (reflected through the Lok Sabha) must resign — making the executive perpetually accountable in a way that fixed-term presidencies cannot achieve.

Written Constitution + UK Conventions: India’s Blend

India’s unique contribution is codifying the essentials of parliamentary government in a written constitution (Articles 74, 75, 77, 78) while still relying on unwritten UK-origin conventions for day-to-day functioning — such as the PM controlling the cabinet agenda, the convention of collective cabinet secrecy, and the practice of the leader of the majority party being invited to form government. This blend provides both legal certainty and functional flexibility.

The office of the Prime Minister and the institution of the Council of Ministers represent the Constituent Assembly’s deliberate choice of accountability over stability. By embedding the parliamentary executive in a written constitution while preserving the organic conventions of the Westminster model, India created a system where democratic legitimacy, collective responsibility, and continuous legislative oversight converge to make the executive the servant — not the master — of the people’s representatives.

Section 03

Origins & Borrowings (Comparative Lens)

What India Borrowed from the UK

The core architecture of India’s executive is modelled on the Westminster parliamentary system. From the UK, India borrowed the Cabinet system where the PM leads a team of ministers drawn from Parliament; the principle of collective responsibility where the entire Cabinet stands or falls together; Question Hour as a mechanism for parliamentary accountability; the convention that the PM is the leader of the majority party; and the concept of the PM as “first among equals” within the Cabinet. Even the terms “Prime Minister” and “Cabinet” are British inheritances.

What India Modified

India did not import the UK model wholesale. Key modifications include: (a) a written Constitution codifying what exists only as convention in the UK (Art. 74, 75); (b) judicial review of executive actions (absent in the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty model); (c) the Anti-Defection Law (Tenth Schedule) to prevent floor-crossing, unknown to British law; (d) federal constraints — India’s PM must navigate Centre-State relations, unlike the UK’s unitary system; and (e) the 91st Amendment capping CoM size, responding to Indian political realities of patronage-driven cabinet expansion.

Contrast with USA (Presidential System)

The US President is both head of state and head of government — combining what in India is split between the President and PM. US Cabinet members (“Secretaries”) are appointed by the President, are not members of Congress, and are not accountable to the legislature. There is no collective responsibility — each Secretary is individually responsible to the President. There is no mechanism of no-confidence motion. The US system prioritizes separation of powers over fusion of powers.

Contrast with France (Semi-Presidential)

France operates a dual executive — the President (directly elected, strong in foreign policy/defence) and the PM (appointed by the President but accountable to the National Assembly). “Cohabitation” occurs when the President and PM belong to different parties — creating a divided executive unknown in India or the UK. The French PM can be dismissed by the National Assembly, making the system partly parliamentary, but the President retains significant independent executive authority.

FeatureIndiaUKUSAFrance
SystemParliamentaryParliamentaryPresidentialSemi-Presidential
Head of StatePresident (nominal)Monarch (nominal)President (real)President (real, esp. foreign)
Head of GovernmentPM (real executive)PM (real executive)PresidentPM (domestic) + President
ConstitutionWrittenUnwritten (conventions)WrittenWritten
Collective responsibilityYes (Art. 75(3))Yes (convention)NoPartially (PM to Assembly)
Ministers from legislature?Must be or becomeYes (convention)No (Secretaries not from Congress)Cannot be simultaneously
No-confidence motion?Yes (against CoM)Yes (convention)No (impeachment ≠ no-confidence)Yes (against PM)
Judicial review of exec?YesLimited (parl. sovereignty)Yes (strong)Yes (Constitutional Council)
Anti-defection law?Yes (Tenth Schedule)NoNoNo
Fixed term for exec?No (confidence-based)No (up to 5 yrs, convention)Yes (4 years)President: 5 yrs fixed; PM: no
Section 04

Constitutional Provisions (Articles Explained)

Article 74 — Council of Ministers to Aid and Advise President

What it says: There shall be a Council of Ministers with the PM at the head to aid and advise the President, who shall act in accordance with such advice. The President may require the CoM to reconsider the advice (44th Amendment), but shall act in accordance with the reconsidered advice. The courts cannot inquire into whether and what advice was tendered by ministers to the President.

Why it exists: This is the constitutional foundation of parliamentary government in India. It establishes that the President is a constitutional head bound by ministerial advice — ensuring the real executive is accountable to Parliament, not an unaccountable head of state.

Key Amendments: The 42nd Amendment (1976) made the word “shall” explicit — the President must act on advice. The 44th Amendment (1978) added the “reconsider once” provision, giving the President a dignified check without veto power.

Courts cannot inquire into the advice tendered by CoM to the President — this is an express constitutional bar (Art. 74(2)). UPSC tests whether judicial review extends to this advice. Answer: No, the advice is non-justiciable, but the action taken on that advice is reviewable.

Article 75 — Other Provisions as to Ministers

What it says: (1) The PM shall be appointed by the President, and other ministers on the PM’s advice. (2) Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the President. (3) The CoM shall be collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. (4) Oath of office before the President. (5) A minister not a member of either House for 6 consecutive months ceases to be a minister. (1A — added by 91st Amendment) The total number of ministers in the CoM shall not exceed 15% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha.

Why it exists: This article contains the essential structural rules of parliamentary government — appointment mechanism, collective responsibility, time limit for non-MP ministers, and the patronage-limiting size cap.

Trap 1: “Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the President” — this really means during the pleasure of the PM, since the President acts on PM’s advice. The PM can effectively dismiss any minister by advising the President accordingly. Trap 2: Collective responsibility is to the Lok Sabha ONLY, not Rajya Sabha.

Article 77 — Conduct of Business of Government of India

What it says: All executive action of the GoI shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President. Orders and instruments made in the President’s name shall be authenticated in the manner specified by rules. The President shall make rules for the convenient transaction of business and allocation of work among ministers.

Why it exists: This formalizes the Rules of Business and Allocation of Business Rules — the administrative architecture that translates constitutional provisions into functional government. The PM, through these rules, controls the machinery of government.

Article 78 — Duties of Prime Minister

What it says: The PM shall (a) communicate to the President all decisions of the CoM relating to administration and proposals for legislation; (b) furnish any information the President calls for relating to administration or legislation; and (c) if the President so requires, submit for CoM consideration any matter on which a minister has taken a decision but the CoM has not considered.

Why it exists: This is the constitutional channel between the Head of State and the Head of Government. It gives the President a right to information and a right to require collective consideration — ensuring the President is not bypassed by individual ministers acting unilaterally.

Article 78(c) is a subtle presidential safeguard — it allows the President to force a decision taken by one minister to be reconsidered by the full Cabinet. This prevents ministerial unilateralism and strengthens collective responsibility.

Article 88 — Rights of Ministers to Speak in Houses

What it says: Every minister shall have the right to speak in, and take part in proceedings of, either House, any joint sitting, and any committee of Parliament — but shall not be entitled to vote unless they are a member of that House.

Why it exists: Ensures ministers can participate in legislative proceedings of both Houses, regardless of which House they belong to. A Rajya Sabha minister can speak in Lok Sabha and vice versa — promoting executive-legislative engagement.

Schedule III — Oath of Office

What it says: Ministers swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution, uphold India’s sovereignty and integrity, faithfully and conscientiously discharge duties, and do right to all without fear, favour, affection, or ill-will. There is also a separate oath of secrecy.

Ministers take TWO oaths — oath of office AND oath of secrecy. The oath of secrecy is the constitutional basis of cabinet confidentiality. UPSC may present only one oath as the complete requirement.

91st Amendment (2003) — Size Cap & Anti-Defection Link

What it says: (a) Total CoM shall not exceed 15% of Lok Sabha’s total strength (Art. 75(1A)). (b) A member disqualified under the Tenth Schedule for defection shall also be disqualified to be appointed as a minister. (c) Similar provisions extended to states (Art. 164(1A)).

Why it exists: Addressed the twin problems of (a) oversized cabinets used as patronage tools (especially in coalition era), and (b) defectors being rewarded with ministerial berths. It links anti-defection law with ministerial appointment, closing a significant loophole.

Section 05

Appointment & Formation of Government

Who Appoints the PM?

The President appoints the PM under Article 75(1). However, this is not a discretionary power in normal circumstances. The President is bound by convention to invite the leader of the majority party (or coalition) in the Lok Sabha to form the government. The President’s discretion becomes real only in situations of a hung Parliament — when no single party or pre-election coalition has a clear majority.

Single Party Majority

When one party wins an absolute majority (272+ seats in Lok Sabha), the choice is straightforward — the President invites that party’s leader. The PM in this scenario has maximum authority: they control the party, the legislature, and the cabinet.

Coalition Government

When no single party has a majority, the President invites the leader of the largest party or the leader of the coalition most likely to command majority support. The President may ask for a letter of support from coalition partners. In this scenario, the PM’s authority is constrained — cabinet formation, policy, and even survival depend on coalition partners’ cooperation.

Hung Parliament & Floor Test

In genuinely hung situations, the President exercises real constitutional discretion. The general principle (established through the S.R. Bommai line of cases, though that dealt with states) is that the question of majority must be tested on the floor of the House, not in the President’s drawing room. The President may set a deadline for the new PM to prove majority through a floor test. If the PM fails the floor test, they must resign.

Appointment of Ministers

Other ministers are appointed by the President on the advice of the PM (Art. 75(1)). In practice, the PM has near-total discretion in selecting ministers in a single-party government, but in a coalition, alliance partners have significant influence over portfolio allocation. The PM allocates portfolios through the Allocation of Business Rules under Article 77.

6-Month Rule for Non-MP Ministers

Under Article 75(5), a minister who is not a member of either House of Parliament for six consecutive months ceases to be a minister. This provision ensures that the principle of parliamentary accountability is not circumvented by appointing outsiders indefinitely. The 6-month window allows a newly-appointed non-MP minister time to get elected to either House.

MCQ Trap 1: “The PM must be a member of the Lok Sabha.” — FALSE. There is no constitutional requirement. Convention prefers Lok Sabha membership, but Rajya Sabha members have served as PM (e.g., Dr. Manmohan Singh).
MCQ Trap 2: “If a minister loses their seat in Parliament, they immediately cease to be a minister.” — FALSE if they are re-elected/nominated to the other House. They cease only after 6 consecutive months of non-membership.
MCQ Trap 3: “The President can refuse to appoint a minister recommended by the PM.” — In practice, NO. The President acts on PM’s advice. Constitutional text says “on the advice of the PM” — leaving no room for presidential discretion on individual appointments.
Mains Analytical Angle: Examine the tension between constitutional text and convention in the appointment of the PM. When does presidential discretion genuinely exist, and what safeguards ensure it is exercised democratically? Discuss with reference to hung Parliament scenarios and the evolution of the floor test as a constitutional convention.
Section 06

Council of Ministers: Types, Hierarchy & Working

A. Council of Ministers vs Cabinet vs Kitchen Cabinet

The Council of Ministers (CoM) is the entire body of ministers of all ranks — it is the constitutional entity collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha under Art. 75(3). The CoM rarely meets as a whole body.

The Cabinet is the inner ring of senior ministers (Cabinet-rank Ministers) who actually make key policy decisions. The Cabinet is not mentioned in the Constitution — it is a product of convention and the Rules of Business. Article 352 (Emergency) is the only article that mentions the word “Cabinet” (after the 44th Amendment), defining it as the CoM consisting of PM and Cabinet-rank Ministers.

The “Kitchen Cabinet” is an informal, extra-constitutional term for the PM’s trusted inner circle of advisors — which may include non-ministers, bureaucrats, and personal advisors. It has no constitutional status but has historically been very influential.

B. Cabinet Committees

Cabinet Committees are sub-groups of the Cabinet constituted under the Rules of Business to handle specific policy domains. They are the real engines of decision-making. Key examples include:

  • Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) — chaired by PM; handles defence, internal security, and strategic matters.
  • Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) — chaired by PM; handles economic policy, industrial licensing, etc.
  • Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) — chaired by PM; handles political issues and coordination.
  • Cabinet Committee on Parliamentary Affairs — chaired by a senior minister; coordinates legislative business.
  • Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) — PM + relevant minister; makes senior bureaucratic appointments.

Decisions of Cabinet Committees are treated as decisions of the full Cabinet unless the full Cabinet specifically reviews them. The PM, being the chairman of the most important committees, controls the decision-making process.

C. Categories of Ministers

CategoryRankCabinet attendance?Independent charge?Notes
Cabinet MinisterHighestYes — member of CabinetYes — heads ministryParticipates in all Cabinet decisions; collectively responsible
Minister of State (Independent Charge)MiddleOnly when invitedYes — heads ministryFunctions like a Cabinet Minister for their ministry but not in Cabinet
Minister of StateMiddleOnly when invitedNo — assists a Cabinet MinisterHandles specific subjects within a ministry
Deputy MinisterLowestNoNoAssists senior ministers; largely a legacy rank, rarely used now

D. Collective Responsibility vs Individual Responsibility

Collective Responsibility (Art. 75(3)): The CoM is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. This means: (a) all ministers publicly support and defend Cabinet decisions, even if they privately disagreed; (b) a no-confidence motion against the CoM brings down the entire government; (c) cabinet secrecy protects internal deliberations. This is the bedrock principle of parliamentary government.

Individual Responsibility (Art. 75(2), convention): Each minister is individually responsible for the administration of their ministry. The PM can ask a minister to resign for policy failure, misconduct, or loss of confidence. The President formally dismisses on PM’s advice. A minister can also be censured by Parliament (through a censure motion specific to them), though they are not constitutionally obligated to resign on censure.

E. No-Confidence, Confidence, and Censure Motions

No-Confidence Motion
Moved in Lok Sabha only → Needs 50 MPs to admit → Debated → If passed → → Entire CoM must resign
No grounds needed · Not against one minister · Tests government survival

Confidence Motion
PM seeks vote of confidence proactively → Usually after forming government or post-crisis
→ If passed → Government validated · If failed → Government falls

Censure Motion
Against a specific minister or policy → Grounds must be stated → Debated → If passed
→ Moral/political consequence only · No constitutional obligation to resign
Key distinction: A no-confidence motion needs no grounds and is against the entire CoM. A censure motion needs stated grounds and can be against an individual minister. Only a no-confidence motion constitutionally compels resignation. Both can only be moved in the Lok Sabha.
Section 07

Powers & Functions of the Prime Minister

A. As Head of Government

The PM is the chief policy-maker and coordinator of the Government of India. They set the national agenda, determine policy priorities, resolve inter-ministerial disputes, and coordinate between various ministries and agencies. In matters of national security, foreign affairs, and major economic decisions, the PM typically takes the lead, often through the Cabinet Committee on Security and Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs which they chair.

B. As Leader of Parliament (Lok Sabha)

The PM is the leader of the Lok Sabha (or leader of the House if a Rajya Sabha member). They control the legislative agenda through the Cabinet Committee on Parliamentary Affairs, direct the party whip to ensure voting discipline, lead government responses to no-confidence motions, and steer major legislation through the House. The PM’s performance in Parliament significantly shapes public confidence and political narrative.

C. As Link Between President and CoM (Article 78)

The PM has three constitutional duties under Article 78: (a) to communicate to the President all decisions of the CoM; (b) to furnish information on administration and legislation as the President calls for; and (c) to submit for CoM consideration any matter decided by an individual minister if the President so requires. This makes the PM the sole constitutional channel between the head of state and the government.

D. As Head of the Cabinet System

The PM forms the Cabinet — selecting ministers, allocating portfolios, reshuffling when needed, and dropping ministers who lose confidence. The PM enforces collective responsibility — a minister who publicly dissents must resign or be dismissed. The PM sets the Cabinet agenda, decides what goes to full Cabinet vs Cabinet Committees, and controls the pace and direction of government decision-making.

E. PMO and “Prime Ministerialisation”

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has evolved from a secretariat into a powerful command centre. Staffed by senior bureaucrats and political advisors, the PMO monitors ministry performance, coordinates inter-ministerial issues, handles sensitive matters directly, and often bypasses the normal cabinet process. This has led to the debate on “Prime Ministerialisation” — the trend where power concentrates in the PM and PMO at the expense of the Cabinet and individual ministers.

AspectStrong PMO / PM-CentricStrong Cabinet / Collective
Decision speedFast — PM decidesSlower — consensus needed
AccountabilityConcentrated in PMDistributed across Cabinet
Policy coherenceHigh — single visionMay be fragmented
Democratic qualityConcerns about authoritarianismMore deliberative
Coalition compatibilityLow — allies feel sidelinedHigh — allies accommodated
Ministerial initiativeLow — PMO controlsHigh — ministers have autonomy
The “Cabinet government vs Prime Ministerial government” debate is a UPSC favourite. The answer should acknowledge that India oscillates between the two depending on PM personality, party strength, and coalition compulsions — neither is constitutionally mandated as the permanent model.
Section 08

Powers & Functions of the Council of Ministers

Policy Formulation & Execution

The CoM, led by the PM, is the chief policy-making body of the Union government. All major domestic and foreign policies originate from or are approved by the Cabinet. Once policy is decided, the permanent executive (civil services) implements it under the political direction of the concerned minister.

Ordinance Advice & Budget Responsibility

The President promulgates ordinances under Article 123 only on the advice of the CoM (per Art. 74). The annual budget (now called Annual Financial Statement) is prepared by the Ministry of Finance under the FM but approved by the Cabinet before being presented to Parliament. The CoM is collectively responsible for the fiscal direction of the country.

Cabinet Decision-Making Process

Most decisions are taken in Cabinet Committees and ratified by the full Cabinet. For matters of exceptional importance, the full Cabinet deliberates. Decisions are recorded by the Cabinet Secretary — the senior-most civil servant who serves as the administrative head of the Cabinet Secretariat. Cabinet meetings are confidential (oath of secrecy under Schedule III).

Collective Responsibility to Lok Sabha

Under Art. 75(3), the CoM functions as a single unit vis-à-vis the Lok Sabha. They collectively defend government policy, share credit and blame, and if the Lok Sabha passes a no-confidence motion, the entire CoM resigns. No minister can publicly distance themselves from a Cabinet decision. This ensures the government speaks with one voice.

Crisis Management & Emergency Roles

During national security crises, natural disasters, or constitutional emergencies, the Cabinet (especially the CCS) becomes the nerve centre of decision-making. The advice to the President to proclaim Emergency (Art. 352) must come from the Cabinet in writing (after the 44th Amendment).

Relation with Civil Services

Ministers exercise political control over the permanent bureaucracy. Each minister heads their ministry, sets policy direction, and is answerable to Parliament for their ministry’s functioning. The civil servants implement policy and provide technical expertise but are subordinate to the political executive. The balance between political direction and bureaucratic independence is a perennial governance challenge.

Section 09

Checks & Accountability Mechanisms

Parliamentary Accountability

Parliament holds the CoM accountable through multiple mechanisms: Question Hour (starred, unstarred, short-notice questions); debates (adjournment motion, calling attention, short-duration); Parliamentary Committees (Public Accounts Committee, Estimates Committee, Committee on Public Undertakings, Departmental Standing Committees); no-confidence motions; and scrutiny of CAG reports (the constitutional auditor whose reports are examined by PAC).

Zero Hour is an Indian innovation — not in rules of procedure but in practice — allowing MPs to raise urgent matters immediately after Question Hour.

Judicial Accountability

While courts cannot inquire into the advice tendered to the President (Art. 74(2)), they can review the actions taken by the government — laws passed, executive orders issued, policies implemented. Judicial review under Articles 13, 14, 19, 21, and 226/32 ensures executive actions comply with fundamental rights and constitutional norms. Courts have struck down executive actions, reviewed ordinance-making frequency, and examined the reasonableness of government policies.

Media & Public Accountability

A free press, RTI (Right to Information Act, 2005), and active civil society function as informal but powerful checks on the executive. Investigative journalism has historically exposed ministerial misconduct, policy failures, and corruption, compelling parliamentary action or judicial intervention.

Federal Constraints

India’s federal structure creates natural checks on the PM and CoM. State governments controlled by opposition parties, the Rajya Sabha (where state-level political dynamics play out), Inter-State Council, GST Council, and NITI Aayog all require the central government to negotiate, persuade, and accommodate rather than dictate.

Anti-Defection Law: Stability vs Debate

The Tenth Schedule ensures government stability by preventing floor-crossing. However, critics argue it converts MPs into “voting cattle” — bound by the party whip, unable to exercise independent judgment or vote against their party even on matters of conscience. This effectively strengthens the PM’s control over the legislative party at the cost of backbench dissent and quality of parliamentary debate.

A balanced Mains answer on accountability should acknowledge: Parliament provides the primary check, judiciary provides the constitutional check, media provides the public check, and federalism provides the structural check — but the anti-defection law has weakened the first of these by reducing MPs’ independence.
Section 10

UK Comparison (Deep Dive)

UK PM: Convention vs Statute

The UK PM exists entirely through convention — there is no written constitutional article creating the office. The PM is the leader of the party that commands a majority in the House of Commons, appointed by the monarch. In contrast, India’s PM is established under Articles 74 and 75 — a written constitutional base supplemented by conventions. This means the UK PM’s powers are more flexible and evolving, while India’s are somewhat anchored in constitutional text.

Cabinet Government: Collective Responsibility

In the UK, collective responsibility is a strict convention: ministers who cannot support a Cabinet decision must resign (the convention was temporarily suspended during the 2016 Brexit referendum). In India, it is a constitutional mandate (Art. 75(3)). The practical functioning is similar, but India’s codification means courts can potentially enforce it, while in the UK it remains entirely a matter of political practice.

Monarch vs Indian President

The UK monarch and the Indian President are both nominal heads of state who act on ministerial advice. Key differences: the monarch’s role is hereditary and essentially irremovable; the Indian President is elected and can be impeached. The monarch has residual “reserve powers” (e.g., dissolving Parliament, though this is now governed by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act’s successor) that are debated; the Indian President’s discretionary powers are more clearly defined by constitutional text and judicial interpretation.

Shadow Cabinet & PMQs vs India

The UK’s Shadow Cabinet is a highly institutionalized opposition structure — the opposition party forms a parallel cabinet with shadow ministers tracking each government department. India has no formal shadow cabinet system. Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) in the UK is a weekly, highly combative session where the PM faces direct opposition questioning — India’s Question Hour serves a similar function but the PM is not specifically required to answer and the intensity of direct PM questioning is lower.

UK Cabinet Committees & “Number 10” vs PMO

The UK PM’s office at 10 Downing Street functions similarly to India’s PMO — coordinating government business, managing communications, and serving as the PM’s command centre. UK Cabinet Committees are also similar in structure and function to India’s. The key difference is scale: India’s PMO has grown significantly larger and more powerful relative to its UK equivalent, partly due to India’s size and complexity.

Coalition Conventions

The UK developed formal coalition conventions during the 2010–15 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition — including a coalition agreement and a “confidence and supply” arrangement (where a smaller party agrees to support the government on confidence votes and budgets without joining the Cabinet). India’s coalition conventions are less formalized — typically based on pre/post-election alliances, Common Minimum Programmes, and informal understandings, often without written coalition agreements.

“First Among Equals” vs “Presidential PM” Debate

The debate exists in both countries. UK PMs like Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair were criticized for “presidential” styles — centralizing power, sidelining the Cabinet, and making personal decisions on major issues (e.g., Iraq War). Similarly, Indian PMs with large majorities have been accused of the same. The debate reflects a universal tension in Westminster systems between collective cabinet government and the concentration of power in the PM.

India vs UK: Comprehensive Comparison

#FeatureIndiaUK
1Constitutional basis of PMWritten (Art. 74, 75)Convention only
2Head of StateElected PresidentHereditary Monarch
3Collective responsibilityConstitutional (Art. 75(3))Convention
4PM must be from Lower House?Convention (not mandatory)Convention (not mandatory)
5Judicial review of executiveStrong (written Constitution)Limited (parl. sovereignty)
6Anti-defection lawYes (Tenth Schedule)No formal law
7CoM size cap15% of Lok Sabha (91st Amdt)No formal cap
8Shadow CabinetNo formal systemHighly institutionalized
9PMQs / Question HourQuestion Hour + Zero HourWeekly PMQs (mandatory)
10Federal constraints on PMStrong (Centre-State)Minimal (unitary + devolution)
11Written coalition agreementRare (CMP style)Formal in 2010 coalition
12Ordinance powerArt. 123 (PM advises)Orders in Council (limited)
13PM’s oathConstitutional (Schedule III)No specific PM oath
14Removal of PMNo-confidence motion (Art. 75(3))No-confidence / party leadership challenge
For UPSC Mains, the India-UK comparison is the most important. Remember: India codified what the UK left to convention; India added judicial review and anti-defection which the UK doesn’t have; India’s PM faces federal constraints absent in the UK’s unitary system; but the fundamental logic — PM as head of cabinet, collectively responsible to the lower house — is identical.
Section 11

Contemporary Issues / Debates

PM-Centric Governance: Pros & Cons

The trend towards PM-centric governance — where major decisions flow through the PMO rather than the Cabinet — has both defenders and critics. Proponents argue it ensures policy coherence, rapid decision-making, and clear accountability. Critics argue it undermines collective responsibility, marginalizes cabinet ministers, weakens parliamentary oversight, and risks authoritarian concentration of power. The truth lies in the balance — strong PM leadership is not inherently anti-democratic, but it must operate within the framework of cabinet deliberation and parliamentary accountability.

Coalition Era vs Majority Era

India’s experience with coalition governments (1989–2014) demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of collective decision-making. Coalition PMs had to negotiate extensively, give partners significant policy influence, and tolerate dissent — producing a more consultative but often slower style of governance. The return to single-party majority brought faster decision-making but also concerns about reduced internal deliberation and executive dominance.

Cabinet Secrecy vs Transparency

The oath of secrecy (Schedule III) underpins cabinet confidentiality — the principle that internal cabinet deliberations must remain private to enable free and frank discussion. However, the Right to Information Act (2005) creates a competing demand for transparency. The tension between these two principles is ongoing: how much of the government’s decision-making process should be open to public scrutiny? Courts have generally upheld cabinet secrecy for deliberative matters but required disclosure of final decisions.

Ordinance Route & Executive Dominance

The ordinance power (Art. 123) was designed for genuine emergencies when Parliament is not in session. However, successive governments have used ordinances routinely — sometimes re-promulgating the same ordinance multiple times to avoid parliamentary scrutiny. The Supreme Court has criticized this practice, holding that repeated re-promulgation amounts to a fraud on the Constitution. This remains a key area where executive convenience clashes with parliamentary supremacy.

PM & Cooperative Federalism

The PM’s role in cooperative federalism has expanded through institutions like the GST Council (constitutional body for indirect tax coordination), NITI Aayog (replacement for Planning Commission, chaired by PM), and various Inter-State Council meetings. These platforms require the PM to engage with state CMs as partners rather than subordinates — introducing a federal check on centralized PM authority.

Ethics Dimension

Questions of ministerial accountability, dissent within the cabinet, the tension between collective responsibility and individual conscience, and the ethics of the anti-defection law’s impact on free parliamentary debate are all live issues for UPSC. The ideal is a system where collective responsibility coexists with healthy internal deliberation — where ministers can dissent privately but solidarity publicly does not become mere silence.

Mini Caselet 1: Ordinance Controversy

A government re-promulgates an ordinance four consecutive times without placing the legislation before Parliament. The opposition alleges this subverts legislative authority. The Supreme Court intervenes, noting that the executive cannot bypass Parliament through the ordinance route. This illustrates the tension between executive efficiency and parliamentary supremacy.

Mini Caselet 2: Coalition Cabinet Compromise

A coalition PM wishes to pursue a major economic reform but the second-largest coalition partner opposes it. The PM must either (a) water down the reform, (b) find an alternative coalition arrangement, or (c) abandon the reform. This illustrates the constraints coalition politics places on PM authority and Cabinet decision-making.

Mini Caselet 3: Ministerial Dissent & Collective Responsibility

A senior cabinet minister publicly criticizes a key government policy. The PM invokes collective responsibility and asks the minister to resign. The minister argues they have a right to dissent. The question arises: does collective responsibility allow any room for principled public disagreement? UK convention (and Indian practice) is clear: the minister must resign or be dismissed.

Section 12

List-Based Prelims Content

  • PM eligibility: Not explicitly stated in the Constitution. By convention: citizen of India, member of either House (preferably Lok Sabha), above 25 (Lok Sabha) or 30 (Rajya Sabha), majority support in Lok Sabha.
  • Oath: Ministers take TWO oaths — (1) oath of office and (2) oath of secrecy — both before the President (Schedule III).
  • 6-month rule (Art. 75(5)): A minister not a member of either House for 6 consecutive months ceases to be a minister.
  • 91st Amendment (2003): CoM size capped at 15% of Lok Sabha strength. Defectors disqualified from ministerial appointment.
  • Collective responsibility (Art. 75(3)): CoM is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha — not Rajya Sabha, not Parliament as a whole.
  • Cabinet decision vs Minister decision: Cabinet decisions bind all ministers (collective responsibility). Individual minister decisions bind only their ministry but can be referred to Cabinet by the President under Art. 78(c).
  • Art. 74 — President bound by advice: Must act on CoM advice. Can return advice once (44th Amendment), but must act on resubmitted advice.
  • Art. 77 — Rules of Business: President makes rules for allocation of work among ministers. PM controls this process.
  • Art. 88 — Minister can speak in either House: But can vote only in the House of which they are a member.
  • “Cabinet” mentioned in Constitution: Only in Art. 352 (after 44th Amendment) — defined as CoM consisting of PM and Cabinet-rank Ministers.
Section 13

UPSC PYQ Mapping & Heat Map

A. PYQ Heat Map

ThemeFrequencyYears (Approx.)Typical Demand
Collective responsibilityHIGHRepeatedly asked (Prelims + Mains)Meaning, scope (Lok Sabha only), implications
PM appointment & conventionsHIGHRepeatedly askedPresident’s discretion, hung Parliament, floor test
Art. 74 — aid & adviceHIGH2015, 2017, repeatedlyBinding nature, 42nd/44th Amendments, justiciability
Council of Ministers vs CabinetMEDIUMPeriodically testedDistinction, constitutional mention (Art. 352 only)
91st Amendment / CoM sizeMEDIUM2004, 201615% cap, anti-defection linkage
No-confidence vs censureMEDIUM2018, occasionallyDifference, Lok Sabha only, consequences
Ordinance-making powerMEDIUMRepeatedly (indirect)Art. 123, CoM advice, re-promulgation issues
India vs UK comparisonMEDIUMMains — recurring themeConventions vs written provisions, PM powers
PMO / Prime MinisterialisationLOW-MEDIUMOccasional Mains questionsCabinet vs PM dominance, coalition era
Cabinet CommitteesLOWRarely directCCS, CCEA, ACC — usually indirect

B. What UPSC Usually Tests

  • Conventions vs Constitution: Where does the Constitution end and convention begin? (PM from Lok Sabha, collective responsibility mechanics)
  • Responsibility mechanisms: Collective vs individual; no-confidence vs censure; Art. 75(3) scope
  • PMO/Cabinet dynamics: Cabinet government vs PM government; who really decides?
  • Coalition impact: How coalitions alter the PM’s power, cabinet functioning, and decision-making
  • India-UK comparison: Written vs unwritten; judicial review vs parliamentary sovereignty; shadow cabinet; PMQs
Section 14

UPSC GS-II Mains Questions

Q1. “The PM of India is not merely ‘first among equals’ but has evolved into a dominant executive.” Critically examine. MAINS ANALYTICAL (15 marks)

Q2. Compare the constitutional position and powers of the PM of India with the PM of the UK. How do written constitutional provisions and unwritten conventions shape their respective authority? MAINS STATIC (15 marks)

Q3. Discuss the meaning and implications of ‘collective responsibility’ under Article 75(3). Has the anti-defection law strengthened or weakened this principle? MAINS CONCEPTUAL (15 marks)

Q4. Examine the role of Cabinet Committees in India’s governance. Do they undermine the principle of collective cabinet decision-making? MAINS ANALYTICAL (10 marks)

Q5. “The 91st Constitutional Amendment was a necessary response to the malaise of bloated cabinets and defection politics.” Evaluate. MAINS DYNAMIC (10 marks)

Q6. What are the duties of the PM under Article 78? How do these duties serve as a check on executive unilateralism? MAINS STATIC (10 marks)

Q7. Distinguish between no-confidence motion, confidence motion, and censure motion. What role do they play in ensuring executive accountability? MAINS STATIC (10 marks)

Q8. Critically analyze the impact of coalition politics on the functioning of the Council of Ministers in India. MAINS DYNAMIC (15 marks)

Q9. “The ordinance-making power has been increasingly used as a tool of executive convenience rather than legislative necessity.” Discuss with constitutional provisions and judicial responses. MAINS DYNAMIC (15 marks)

Q10. Compare the mechanisms of executive accountability in India’s parliamentary system with the USA’s presidential system. Which system provides more effective accountability? MAINS CONCEPTUAL (15 marks)

Q11. Discuss the evolution of the PMO in India. Has the growing power of the PMO undermined the constitutional concept of cabinet government? MAINS ANALYTICAL (10 marks)

Q12. Examine the role of the PM in India’s cooperative federalism framework. How do institutions like the GST Council and NITI Aayog shape Centre-State executive relations? MAINS DYNAMIC (15 marks)

Q13. “Cabinet secrecy is essential for free deliberation, but transparency is essential for democratic accountability.” How does Indian constitutional law balance these competing values? MAINS CONCEPTUAL (10 marks)

Q14. Write an essay: “The parliamentary executive in India — between the text of the Constitution and the conventions of Westminster.” MAINS ANALYTICAL (Essay-style, 15 marks)

Section 15

Answer Writing Frameworks

Universal Template for PM/CoM Questions
STRUCTURE

Define the concept → Constitutional base (cite Articles) → Functioning (how it works in practice) → Issues/Challenges (coalition, PMO dominance, etc.) → Reforms/Judicial viewsWay forward (democratic values + concrete suggestion)

Q1: PM — “First Among Equals” or Dominant Executive?
Introduction

Article 75 positions the PM as the head of the Council of Ministers — described as “first among equals” in the Westminster tradition. However, the actual working of Indian parliamentary democracy suggests a far more dominant role.

Body

Para 1 — Constitutional position: Art. 74 (aid & advice), Art. 75 (appointment), Art. 78 (link to President). PM selects ministers, allocates portfolios, controls cabinet agenda.

Para 2 — PM dominance in practice: PMO as power centre; PM chairs key Cabinet Committees; anti-defection law ensures legislative compliance; single-party majority enhances authority further.

Para 3 — Constraints on dominance: Coalition eras limit PM; Rajya Sabha can block legislation; judiciary reviews executive action; federal dynamics require negotiation; intra-party dissent possible.

Para 4 — UK comparison: UK PM also oscillates between “chairman of a committee” and “presidential PM” (Thatcher, Blair). India mirrors this pattern — personality and majority determine the balance.

Conclusion

The PM’s position is constitutionally that of first among equals, but politically it can range from a constrained coalition manager to a dominant executive. The health of parliamentary democracy requires that PM leadership coexists with genuine cabinet deliberation, parliamentary accountability, and federal respect — regardless of the size of the majority.

Q2: India PM vs UK PM — Written vs Convention
Introduction

Both the Indian and UK PMs head parliamentary governments based on the Westminster model, yet the constitutional foundations differ fundamentally — India’s PM operates under a written Constitution while the UK PM exists entirely through convention.

Body

Para 1 — Constitutional basis: India: Art. 74, 75, 77, 78. UK: No constitutional article — PM is a creature of convention. India codified collective responsibility (Art. 75(3)); UK relies on convention alone.

Para 2 — Powers comparison: Both control cabinet, legislative agenda, appointments. India’s PM faces stronger judicial review; UK PM faces stronger parliamentary questioning (PMQs). India has anti-defection law; UK has no equivalent.

Para 3 — Constraints: India: federal structure, written fundamental rights, judicial activism. UK: parliamentary sovereignty, unitary system, evolving devolution.

Para 4 — Accountability mechanisms: India: Question Hour + Zero Hour, CAG/PAC, no-confidence. UK: PMQs (weekly, mandatory), select committees, leadership challenges.

Conclusion

India’s written constitutional framework provides greater legal certainty and judicial enforceability, while the UK’s convention-based system offers flexibility but depends on political culture. Both systems ultimately rest on the same principle — the PM governs only so long as they command the confidence of the elected lower house.

Q3: Collective Responsibility + Anti-Defection
Introduction

Collective responsibility under Article 75(3) is the constitutional soul of India’s parliamentary system. The anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule) was designed to strengthen political stability, but its relationship with collective responsibility is complex.

Body

Para 1 — Art. 75(3) explained: CoM collectively responsible to Lok Sabha. All ministers bound by Cabinet decisions. No-confidence motion brings down entire government.

Para 2 — Anti-defection strengthens stability: Prevents floor-crossing, ensures governments are not toppled by horse-trading, provides certainty. Directly linked by 91st Amendment (defectors barred from ministry).

Para 3 — Anti-defection weakens debate: MPs cannot vote against party line even on non-confidence issues. Reduces Parliament to a “rubber stamp.” Ministers need not persuade — they command through the whip.

Para 4 — UK comparison: UK has no anti-defection law. MPs can rebel (Brexit votes saw massive Conservative rebellion). Collective responsibility is maintained by convention and political culture, not legal compulsion.

Conclusion

While the anti-defection law has undoubtedly strengthened governmental stability, it has done so at the cost of parliamentary deliberation and individual MP accountability. A reform allowing free votes on non-confidence matters while maintaining the whip on confidence issues would better balance stability with democratic debate.

Q7: No-Confidence vs Confidence vs Censure
Introduction

Parliamentary democracy provides the legislature with specific mechanisms to hold the executive accountable — the no-confidence motion, confidence motion, and censure motion each serve distinct constitutional functions.

Body

Para 1 — No-confidence motion: Moved in Lok Sabha only, no grounds needed, 50 MPs to admit, if passed → entire CoM resigns. Tests government’s survival.

Para 2 — Confidence motion: Proactively sought by PM — usually after forming government or post-crisis. If passed → validates government. If failed → government falls. Demonstrates majority on the floor.

Para 3 — Censure motion: Against specific minister/policy, grounds must be stated, debated, if passed → moral/political consequence only, no constitutional obligation to resign. Tests specific policy, not survival.

Para 4 — Comparative: UK has similar mechanisms through convention. Germany has a “constructive vote of no-confidence” — requiring the opposition to propose an alternative PM simultaneously, preventing destabilization without alternative.

Conclusion

These three mechanisms form a graduated system of accountability — from the ultimate sanction (no-confidence) to targeted criticism (censure). Their effective use depends on a vibrant opposition and a Parliament willing to exercise its oversight role.

Q8: Coalition Politics & CoM Functioning
Introduction

India’s experience with coalition governments has profoundly shaped how the Council of Ministers functions — transforming the PM from a dominant executive to a consensus-builder and the Cabinet from a hierarchical body to a negotiating forum.

Body

Para 1 — Cabinet formation: Coalition partners demand specific portfolios (often powerful ones like Finance, Defence, Home). PM’s freedom to choose ministers is severely constrained. Portfolio allocation becomes a political bargain.

Para 2 — Decision-making: Cabinet meetings become more deliberative (sometimes contentious). Coordination committees of coalition leaders supplement formal cabinet. Common Minimum Programme (CMP) constrains policy direction.

Para 3 — Accountability issues: Collective responsibility is strained — coalition partners may publicly disagree. PM cannot easily dismiss allies’ ministers. Anti-defection law prevents floor-crossing but doesn’t prevent coalition partners from withdrawing support.

Para 4 — Institutional impact: PMO weakens relative to party-level negotiations. Parliament becomes more active as opposition + disgruntled allies use it. Federal dynamics intensify.

Conclusion

Coalition politics introduces a democratic tension: it makes governance more representative and consultative but potentially less efficient and coherent. India’s constitutional framework accommodates both coalition and single-party governments — the key is ensuring that whichever model operates, parliamentary accountability and cabinet deliberation remain intact.

Q9: Ordinance Route — Executive Convenience vs Legislative Necessity
Introduction

Article 123 empowers the President to promulgate ordinances on the Council of Ministers’ advice when Parliament is not in session and immediate action is needed. Designed as an emergency tool, it has increasingly been used as a routine legislative bypass.

Body

Para 1 — Constitutional provision: Art. 123 — ordinance when Parliament not in session; same force as law; must be laid before Parliament; ceases after 6 weeks of reassembly if not approved.

Para 2 — Misuse pattern: Repeated re-promulgation to avoid parliamentary debate. Governments of all political persuasions have used this route extensively — sometimes for politically sensitive reforms.

Para 3 — Judicial response: Supreme Court has held repeated re-promulgation is a “fraud on the Constitution” and subversion of democratic processes. However, judicial intervention is post-facto, not preventive.

Para 4 — UK comparison: UK’s Orders in Council serve a limited similar function but are far more constrained. The UK Parliament’s near-continuous session reduces the need for such executive legislation.

Conclusion

The ordinance power reflects the Constitution’s pragmatic recognition that governance cannot wait for legislative calendars. However, its frequent use undermines parliamentary supremacy. A reform requiring the government to convene Parliament within 30 days of an ordinance, or mandating judicial review of the “necessity” condition, would better protect democratic values.

Q10: Executive Accountability — India vs USA
Introduction

India’s parliamentary system and the USA’s presidential system represent fundamentally different approaches to executive accountability — one through continuous legislative confidence, the other through periodic elections and separation of powers.

Body

Para 1 — India (continuous accountability): PM and CoM accountable to Lok Sabha daily — Question Hour, debates, no-confidence motions, committees. Government falls if it loses majority. Collective responsibility ensures unified accountability.

Para 2 — USA (periodic + structural): President has fixed 4-year term, cannot be removed by Congress (except impeachment for high crimes). Accountability through elections, separation of powers, Congressional oversight (hearings, subpoenas), and independent judiciary.

Para 3 — Strengths & weaknesses: India: more responsive but potentially unstable (coalition era). USA: more stable but can produce gridlock (divided government). India’s anti-defection law reduces the quality of continuous accountability.

Para 4 — France as middle ground: Dual executive — President has electoral accountability, PM has parliamentary accountability. Cohabitation forces power-sharing.

Conclusion

India’s parliamentary model provides more continuous and direct accountability, but its effectiveness depends on a strong opposition, active parliamentary committees, and MPs willing to exercise independent judgment. Neither system is inherently superior — the key is institutional culture and the quality of democratic practice.

Q14 (Essay): Parliamentary Executive — Constitution vs Westminster Conventions
Introduction

India’s parliamentary executive is a unique constitutional experiment — it codifies the Westminster model’s essentials in a written constitution while simultaneously depending on unwritten conventions for its actual functioning. This duality defines the character of India’s executive.

Body

Para 1 — What the Constitution provides: Art. 74 (aid & advice), Art. 75 (appointment, collective responsibility, 6-month rule), Art. 77 (Rules of Business), Art. 78 (PM’s duties). These give legal backbone to parliamentary government.

Para 2 — What conventions supply: PM from Lok Sabha majority; cabinet agenda controlled by PM; cabinet secrecy; leader of opposition as shadow PM; PM controlling the House calendar; coalition management protocols.

Para 3 — Tensions between the two: Constitution says “President appoints PM” — convention limits discretion. Constitution says “ministers hold office during President’s pleasure” — convention means PM’s pleasure. Constitution is silent on PMO, Kitchen Cabinet, Cabinet Committees — all operate through conventions and rules.

Para 4 — Comparative dimension: UK: all convention, no constitutional text. India: text + convention. USA: text + separation, no convention-based executive. India’s blend provides both certainty (justiciable rights) and flexibility (evolutionary governance).

Para 5 — Contemporary challenges: PM-centric governance challenges collective conventions; anti-defection law changes the convention of free votes; coalition conventions in India remain underdeveloped compared to UK. The gap between constitutional text and political practice is widening.

Conclusion

India’s parliamentary executive lives in the space between constitutional text and Westminster conventions — drawing legal authority from the former and operational vitality from the latter. The challenge for Indian democracy is to ensure that neither the rigidity of constitutional interpretation nor the flexibility of convention is exploited to undermine the foundational principle: that the executive exists to serve Parliament, and Parliament exists to serve the people.

Section 16

Prelims MCQs (with Explanations)

Q1. Under Article 75 of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to:

  1. Parliament
  2. Lok Sabha
  3. Rajya Sabha
  4. The President

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (b) Lok Sabha. Art. 75(3) specifically states “House of the People” (Lok Sabha), not Parliament or Rajya Sabha.

Q2. Consider the following statements: (1) The word ‘Cabinet’ is mentioned in Article 74 of the Constitution. (2) The 44th Amendment introduced the term ‘Cabinet’ in the context of Emergency provisions. Which is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (b) 2 only. ‘Cabinet’ is NOT in Art. 74. The 44th Amendment inserted it in Art. 352 (Emergency) — defined as CoM of PM + Cabinet-rank Ministers.

Q3. A minister who is not a member of either House of Parliament for a period of ___ consecutive months ceases to be a minister:

  1. 3 months
  2. 6 months
  3. 9 months
  4. 12 months

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (b) 6 months. Article 75(5) clearly states six consecutive months.

Q4. Under which article does the PM have a duty to communicate decisions of the CoM to the President?

  1. Article 74
  2. Article 75
  3. Article 77
  4. Article 78

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (d) Article 78. This article specifies three duties of the PM vis-à-vis the President: communicate decisions, furnish information, and submit matters for Cabinet consideration.

Q5. The total number of ministers in the Council of Ministers shall not exceed:

  1. 10% of Lok Sabha strength
  2. 12% of Lok Sabha strength
  3. 15% of Lok Sabha strength
  4. 20% of Lok Sabha strength

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (c) 15%. Inserted by the 91st Constitutional Amendment (2003) as Article 75(1A).

Q6. Which of the following correctly describes the 42nd and 44th Amendments regarding Article 74?

  1. 42nd made advice binding; 44th removed the binding nature
  2. 42nd made advice binding; 44th added right to return advice once
  3. 44th made advice binding; 42nd added right to return advice once
  4. Both amendments made advice binding

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (b). The 42nd Amendment (1976) made it explicit that the President “shall” act on CoM advice. The 44th Amendment (1978) added the President’s power to return advice once for reconsideration — but must act on resubmitted advice.

Q7. A no-confidence motion in India:

  1. Can be moved in either House of Parliament
  2. Requires stated grounds for its admission
  3. If passed, results in the resignation of only the PM
  4. Requires the support of at least 50 members to be admitted

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (d). No-confidence motion: Lok Sabha only, no grounds needed, 50 MPs to admit, if passed → entire CoM (not just PM) resigns.

Q8. Which of the following is NOT a duty of the PM under Article 78?

  1. Communicate decisions of CoM to the President
  2. Furnish information on administration as President calls for
  3. Advise the President on appointment of Governors
  4. Submit for CoM consideration matters decided by individual ministers if President requires

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (c). Article 78 specifies three duties: communicate decisions, furnish information, submit matters for CoM. Advising on Governor appointments is not part of Art. 78 (though PM does advise under Art. 155).

Q9. Consider: (1) The PM must be a member of the Lok Sabha as per the Constitution. (2) A Rajya Sabha member has served as PM. Which is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both
  4. Neither

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (b) 2 only. Constitution does NOT mandate PM from Lok Sabha — it is convention. Dr. Manmohan Singh served as PM from Rajya Sabha (2004–14).

Q10. The 91st Constitutional Amendment deals with:

  1. Capping the size of CoM and barring defectors from ministership
  2. Right to Education
  3. Goods and Services Tax
  4. Anti-defection law — original enactment

[ Hover to reveal ]✅ (a). The 91st Amendment (2003) caps CoM at 15% of Lok Sabha strength and bars defectors (disqualified under Tenth Schedule) from ministerial appointment. Note: The original anti-defection law was the 52nd Amendment (1985).

Section 17

Frequently Asked Questions

Can the PM be a Rajya Sabha member?
Yes. There is no constitutional requirement that the PM must be from the Lok Sabha. It is a convention, not a constitutional mandate, that the PM is typically from the Lower House. Dr. Manmohan Singh served as PM from 2004–2014 as a Rajya Sabha member. However, since the CoM is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, a Rajya Sabha PM must ensure they have majority support in the Lok Sabha through their party/coalition.
Can a minister be a non-member of Parliament?
Yes, but only temporarily. Under Article 75(5), a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament can be appointed as a minister, but they must become a member of either House within six consecutive months. If they fail to get elected or nominated within this period, they cease to be a minister.
Is the PM the “Head of State”?
No. The PM is the Head of Government, not the Head of State. The President of India is the Head of State. In India’s parliamentary system, the Head of State (President) is the nominal executive, while the Head of Government (PM) is the real executive. This distinction is important — the PM represents the government domestically and internationally, but formal state functions and constitutional authority (like assent to bills, appointment of constitutional functionaries) vest in the President.
Who controls the Cabinet agenda?
The PM controls the Cabinet agenda — this is a convention, not a constitutional provision. The Cabinet Secretariat, headed by the Cabinet Secretary (senior-most civil servant), prepares the agenda under the PM’s direction. The PM decides which matters come before the full Cabinet, which go to Cabinet Committees, and the order of priority. This agenda-setting power is one of the PM’s most significant sources of authority.
What happens if the PM resigns?
If the PM resigns, the entire Council of Ministers is deemed to have resigned. This is because the CoM exists at the pleasure of the President, which in practice means at the PM’s pleasure. When the PM — the head and link — goes, the entire cabinet falls. The President then invites the next person most likely to command Lok Sabha majority to form the government, or if no one can, may dissolve the Lok Sabha and call fresh elections.
Are ministers individually responsible to Parliament?
Yes, in addition to collective responsibility. Each minister is individually responsible for their ministry’s administration. They must answer questions in Parliament about their ministry, face debates on their ministry’s functioning, and can be the subject of a censure motion. However, individual responsibility does not have the same constitutional force as collective responsibility — a censure motion does not constitutionally compel resignation (though it creates strong political pressure). The PM can also dismiss a minister by advising the President accordingly.
What is the difference between the Council of Ministers and the Cabinet?
The Council of Ministers (CoM) is the entire body of all ministers of all ranks — Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State, and Deputy Ministers. It is the constitutional entity mentioned in Articles 74 and 75. The Cabinet is the smaller inner body of only Cabinet-rank Ministers who make key policy decisions. The Cabinet is a subset of the CoM. The Constitution mentions “Cabinet” only once — in Article 352 (after the 44th Amendment). In practice, the Cabinet is the real decision-making body; the full CoM rarely meets.
Can the President refuse to accept the PM’s advice?
After the 42nd Amendment (1976), the President is constitutionally bound to act on the CoM’s advice. The 44th Amendment (1978) allows the President to return the advice once for reconsideration, but the President must act in accordance with the reconsidered advice. So the President can delay and express disagreement, but cannot ultimately refuse to act on the CoM’s advice. This ensures the elected government has the final say while giving the President a dignified advisory role.
What is the constitutional basis of the PMO?
The PMO has no direct constitutional basis. It operates under the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules and the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules — both framed under Article 77. The PMO is essentially an administrative office that supports the PM in discharging their constitutional functions. Its power derives entirely from the PM’s authority. The PMO’s growing influence is a matter of administrative practice and political convention, not constitutional design.
Is there a constitutional limit to the number of times a PM can serve?
No. Unlike the US President (limited to two terms by the 22nd Amendment), there is no term limit for the PM in India’s Constitution. A person can serve as PM for as long as they command the confidence of the Lok Sabha. Jawaharlal Nehru served as PM for approximately 17 years. There is no constitutional provision preventing re-appointment after a gap either.
What is a “floor test” and where is it mentioned in the Constitution?
A “floor test” is a vote on the floor of the Lok Sabha to determine whether the government commands majority support. The term “floor test” is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. It is a constitutional convention that has been endorsed by the Supreme Court as the proper way to determine majority. The general principle is that the question of majority should be decided on the floor of the House, not in the President’s chambers — a principle established through various judicial pronouncements related to government formation and dissolution.
Can the PM hold additional ministerial portfolios?
Yes. The PM can and often does hold additional ministerial portfolios. There is no constitutional bar on this. PMs frequently retain important portfolios (such as Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions; Atomic Energy; Space; etc.) directly under themselves, administered through the PMO. This is a matter of administrative convenience and political choice, not constitutional requirement.

Legacy IAS, Bangalore

Comprehensive UPSC Polity Notes — Prime Minister & Council of Ministers

Prepared for Prelims, GS-II Mains & Interview · All rights reserved

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