Civil society, scientists raise alarm over safety gaps in WHO pandemic pact

Why in news ?

Ongoing WHO negotiations

• WHO members are negotiating the PABS annex before the 79th World Health Assembly (May 2026), making it the last unresolved operational pillar of the first global pandemic treaty.
• February 2026 open letters from scientists and civil society flagged weak biosecurity and diluted benefit-sharing, warning current draft may prioritise speed over safety and fairness.

Basics and static context

What is pathogen sharing and why it exists ?

• Pathogen sharing involves countries providing virus samples and genetic sequences to global databases for surveillance, vaccine R&D and diagnostics; e.g., rapid SARS-CoV-2 sequencing in 2020 enabled mRNA vaccine design within months.
• WHO-led systems like GISRS for influenza since 1952 show pathogen sharing accelerates risk detection; seasonal flu vaccines are reformulated biannually using globally shared strains, demonstrating long-standing public-health value.

What is PABS under the Pandemic Agreement ?

• Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) links rapid sharing of pathogens with fair access to vaccines, drugs and diagnostics; conceptually similar to WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework.
• The Pandemic Agreement (2025) emerged after COVID-19 exposed governance gaps; despite COVAX, high-income countries pre-purchased large shares of early doses, leaving low-income countries dependent on donations and delayed supply.

Global equity dimension

COVID-era lessons

• During COVID-19, over 70% of people in low-income countries had not received a first dose by mid-2021, while many rich countries had surplus contracts, illustrating structural inequity in vaccine access.
• Countries like South Africa shared variant data (e.g., Omicron) but later faced travel bans and delayed vaccine access, creating distrust around “share-now, benefit-later” arrangements.

Biosecurity and technology risks

Misuse of genetic data

• Public genetic sequences can enable synthetic reconstruction of viruses; in 2017, researchers recreated horsepox virus, showing feasibility of synthesising large viral genomes using commercially available DNA fragments.
• Costs of DNA synthesis have fallen sharply over two decades, lowering entry barriers for advanced labs and raising dual-use concerns when oversight and identity verification are weak.

AI and synthetic biology

• AI tools can assist in protein design and sequence optimisation; while beneficial for vaccines, the same tools could hypothetically help design more transmissible or immune-evasive variants if misused.
• Experts note bio-risk now combines digital (cyber + data) and biological domains, requiring cybersecurity standards for genomic databases similar to those used in critical digital infrastructure.

Governance and legal concerns

Accountability gaps

• Civil society letters argue draft PABS makes benefit sharing optional, allowing companies to choose contribution types; contrast this with PIP Framework where manufacturers commit specific benefit contributions.
• Lack of mandatory reporting for lab accidents or cyber breaches contrasts with biosafety norms in many countries where notifiable incidents are legally reportable to regulators.

Transparency deficits

• Critics highlight limited pre-sharing of negotiation texts and restricted civil society participation, unlike some climate negotiations where draft texts are circulated widely for stakeholder input.

Public health and development implications

Trust and cooperation

• If countries fear unfair returns, they may delay sharing samples; Indonesia in 2007 withheld H5N1 samples over vaccine access concerns, showing how equity disputes can hinder surveillance.
• Reduced sharing slows variant detection, undermining early warning systems that saved time during Ebola, Zika and COVID-19 responses.

Way forward

Stronger safeguards

• Mandate verified identities and access logs for genomic databases, similar to controlled-access clinical data repositories used for human genome research.
• Require reporting of lab incidents and risky research, aligning with Biosafety Level (BSL) norms already applied in high-containment laboratories worldwide.

Fair benefit sharing

• Create binding financial and product commitments from companies, with predefined shares for WHO stockpiles, learning from advance market commitments used in pneumococcal vaccines.
• Guarantee technology transfer and licensing during emergencies, as seen in mRNA tech-transfer hubs supported by WHO in countries like South Africa.

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