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India- China and the LAC Crisis

Context:

Earlier this month, during a literary festival in Ajmer, former Army Chief Gen Naravane labelled China as India’s primary threat. He suggested that confrontation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was beneficial as it exposed a ground reality that Delhi was hesitant to acknowledge. Last week, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Defence Secretary Giridhar Armane spoke candidly about the situation, bluntly acknowledging the truth, a stance that is likely to provoke anger from Beijing.

Relevance:

GS2-

Bilateral, Regional and Global Groupings and Agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests

Mains Question:

With reference to the Line of Actual Control crises, discuss how reliable has the US been for India. How have India’s and China’s engagements been on global forums and how do each of them see the crisis today? (15 Marks, 250 Words).

Past Diplomatic Uproars:

  • In 1998, when India conducted nuclear test, China was cited as the reason, causing significant displeasure in Beijing. The then Foreign Minister had to travel to Beijing to address the issue.
  • Sometime later, the then Defence Minister referred to China as the number one threat, although it was inaccurately reported as the “No. 1 enemy.” This sparked a diplomatic uproar, as China is highly sensitive to being perceived as a threat by any country.

India’s Remarks on China in Global Forums:

  • The government aims to achieve a complete diplomatic resolution to Chinese intrusions, although a more assertive stance was taken in late February.
  • During the Raisina Dialogue, the External Affairs Minister emphasized that India should not allow China to engage in psychological tactics. To counter this, he suggested employing alternative means, hinting at seeking a better balance with the help of the United States.
  • His remarks followed Defence Secretary statement at the INDUS-X FORUM in Delhi, where he referred to Beijing as a bully and expressed the expectation of U.S. support in case it is needed.
  • It’s noteworthy that India has not sought U.S. military support since 1962, and labelling China as a bully is likely to provoke a strong reaction.

How Reliable has the US Been?

  • So far, the United States has provided India with high-tech military equipment valued at USD 20 billion, with additional financial support in the pipeline.
  • During the PLA incursions in Ladakh and Tawang, the U.S. offered critical real-time intelligence and high-altitude equipment for India’s counter-deployment.
  • Although it’s unclear whether discussions have taken place regarding combat contingencies on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and U.S. assistance, the historical context of seeking U.S. military aid during the 1962 conflict with China is mentioned.
  • The plea made by the Defence Secretary underscores a strong commitment to mutual support in the face of a common threat. However, it raises the crucial question of the reliability of the U.S. as a partner, given India’s historical experience with U.S. sanctions and embargoes.
  • Recalling past instances, such as inserting a clause in a contract with the UK to exclude U.S. parts from Hawk trainer aircraft, underscores India’s caution.
  • Similarly, the U.S. questions India’s reliability due to its close ties with the USSR/Russia and pursuit of strategic autonomy. During the Munich Security Conference, the External Affairs Minister addressed concerns about U.S. expectations, stating that India is capable of making multiple choices based on its intelligence and interests.

Border Issues and Bilateral Relations:

  • Jaishankar asserts that China has violated protocols and trust, disrupting the tranquility of the border crucial for normal bilateral relations. In contrast, China maintains that border issues and bilateral relations are distinct matters.
  • Its spokesperson repeatedly emphasizes to India that the border problem is a historical remnant and not representative of the entirety of China-India relations.
  • Recently, the spokesperson stated, “It is unwise and inappropriate for the Indian side to insist on linking the border with bilateral relations.”
  • Despite China closing the door on further demilitarization in Depsang and Demchok, pivotal launchpads for potential offensive actions by India, the Indian objective is to sustain dialogue and diplomacy.
  • The External Affairs Minister remains resolute in pursuing ‘equilibrium’ in bilateral relations, even as successive Army Chiefs call for a return to the status quo ante April 2020. This approach is employed to defer any discussion of ‘China’ during the ongoing election campaign.
  • During the Raisina Dialogue last month, China delivered a final blow when India pointed out that the primary obstacle to Security Council reforms is not a Western country, subtly alluding to China.
  • In response, China countered, asserting that reforms should benefit all member states rather than serving the selfish interests of a few.

Conclusion:

China’s persistent coercive behavior is escalating, and Jaishankar’s mention of India’s swift counter-deployment along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is akin to closing the stable door after the horse has already bolted. Without a significant increase in India’s deterrence capabilities against China, especially considering the military modernization budget is less than the previous year’s in real terms, Beijing will likely continue to exert dominance over Delhi.


May 2024
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