Context

Returning to war nearly a month after signing a memorandum of understanding towards peace in West Asia, the U.S. and Iran ran strikes on targets across the region. Iran threatened to halt all energy exports from West Asia over the blockade — "The export of oil and gas from the region will be either for everyone or for no one" — as Brent crude prices neared $85 a barrel.

Background & Key Facts

• U.S. strikes: The U.S. Central Command said it launched a "wave of strikes" designed to further degrade military capabilities Iran has used to attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian state media reported strikes near the port of Bandar Abbas, on the island of Qeshm, and on Bandar Imam Khomeini. Iranian media later said new U.S. strikes hit the southern port city of Bushehr, home to the country's only civilian nuclear plant.
• Iran's retaliation: Iran's Revolutionary Guards said they targeted the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, where the military said it had intercepted attacks against civilian targets, while Jordan's armed forces said they had downed three missiles from Tehran.
• Peace MoU "dismantled": Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said the renewed U.S. blockade on Iranian ports "has, in a way, dismantled the Islamabad memorandum", referring to the interim deal reached last month to halt hostilities and pursue peace talks. The Guards also threatened on Wednesday to halt all energy exports from West Asia over the blockade.
• Price impact: The Brent crude oil, the international standard, traded close to $85 a barrel on Wednesday — more than 15% higher than the price before the war, but still below the nearly $120 reached at the height of the crisis. Crude oil prices climbed higher as U.S. actions and Iran stepped up attacks, heightening uncertainty about energy flows. The chart shows daily Brent crude oil prices ranging from 60.75 to 84.61, the highest level in almost a month (Jan 02, 2026 – July 15, 2026).
• IMF's warning: Analysts with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have warned that while a surplus of oil had kept prices low, "much of that room has now been used up".
• Trump's threat: Trump said the U.S. would expand strikes on Iran next week to target power plants and bridges if there is no deal — "We're going to knock out all their power plants. We're going to knock out all their bridges unless they get to the table and negotiate." Meanwhile, Iran's IRGC threatened to close "all other export corridors that benefit the U.S. and its allies".
• India link: A Norwegian tanker was hit by an explosion caused by an unidentified device off the Omani coast; the crisis response company NFI Network said no injuries. India's SIR extension and energy-import concerns feature alongside.

Context

This opinion piece argues that the present impasse over Iran's nuclear future lays bare the enduring hypocrisy at the heart of the global non-proliferation order: as talks in Doha stumble through disputes over frozen assets and verification mechanisms, Tehran is being pressed to accept full dismantlement of its enriched uranium stockpile in exchange for economic compensation for decades of sanctions.

Background & Key Facts

• The demand: Iran insists it will not relinquish its sovereign right to enrich uranium. The demand is unequivocal — the five recognised weapons powers, and Israel, undeclared but widely known to possess the bomb, face no comparable ultimatum to disarm.
• Unequal rules: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) institutionalised a hierarchy rather than dismantling it: it divided the world into nuclear "haves" and "have-nots", and enjoined the latter to restrain while the former continue to modernise their nuclear arsenals.
• The outliers: Against this backdrop, the piece notes, is not an anomaly. India and Pakistan, both outside the NPT, possess substantial nuclear arsenals and are welcomed as strategic partners by the very powers that patrol the non-proliferation order. Israel, whose nuclear programme is an open secret, has never submitted to inspection and is never named in the discourse of proliferation risk. Iran, by contrast, pursued enrichment within a legal framework, submitted to the most intrusive inspection regime in the world under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and was met with unilateral American withdrawal, the reimposition of sanctions, and the renewed threat of military destruction.
• Historical contradiction: There is a deeper historical contradiction that the current discourse labours to suppress. The global nuclear order is, in a fundamental sense, anchored in an act of unparalleled destruction: the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Those remain the only instances in history of nuclear weapons being deployed in conflict. They established the catastrophic potential of such arms as well as the precedent that their use could be justified, and absorbed into the language of strategic necessity by the state that employed them. The U.S. survived this act morally, emerging successfully as the designated guardian of nuclear order.
• The enduring paradox: The question, in the end, is not whether Iran should or should not enrich uranium. It is whether the framework within which that question is posed is coherent, consistent, or just. By any honest reckoning, it is none of these things. Until that framework is confronted directly, and not obscured by the language of non-proliferation, the contradictions at the heart of the nuclear age will continue to compound. The answer to that question has been available since 1955, when Einstein and Bertrand Russell unambiguously asserted that nuclear weapons must be abolished altogether, by all states, without exception, or the logic of deterrence will produce the catastrophe it claims to prevent.
• JCPOA's fate: The unravelling of the JCPOA remains one of the most instructive episodes in recent diplomatic history, precisely because it was so revealing. Negotiated painstakingly under the Barack Obama administration, the agreement represented a genuinely achieved instance of multilateral diplomacy. Its abandonment by the Donald Trump administration in 2018 sent a message that resonated far beyond Tehran.

Context

The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA), chaired by PM Narendra Modi, cleared several projects: two major highway projects worth ₹25,400 crore to ease congestion in Varanasi; 9 new gas-based urea plants with a production capacity of 10 MT; ₹1.27 lakh crore for the second edition of the India Semiconductor Mission (Semicon 2.0); and ₹62,500 crore for the Mobile Phone Manufacturing Programme (MPMS).

Background & Key Facts

• Semicon 2.0: The Cabinet has accorded approval for the ₹1.27 lakh crore for the second edition of India Semiconductor Mission. IT and Broadcasting Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw said the programme will focus on design, development and production of indigenous chips. "We will be self-reliant in the production of indigenous chips by the end of this programme," the minister said. The mission has six sub-pillars, highlighting that "Semicon 2.0 will have six pillars. The first pillar will be the design of chips".
• Semicon 1.0 base: The government had allocated ₹76,000 crore for the first edition, under which it had approved 12 projects with cumulative investments of around ₹1.64 lakh crore. The majority of the investment in the sector has come from technology firm Tata Electronics and its semiconductor arm.
• Mobile manufacturing: The Cabinet also approved an outlay of ₹62,500 crore for the MPMS, aimed at building Indian brands to achieve technological sovereignty and scale up to global mobile production to capture the significant economic value, and create Indian patents in design and research and development.
• Highways: The highway projects, to be implemented by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), include a 43.218-km (km) corridor linking NH-19 and Kashi Railway Station from around 50 minutes to 25 minutes, while the NH-31 project will halve the journey between NH-31 and Kashi Railway Station from 40 minutes to 20 minutes. The government said the corridors are part of the PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan. The NHAI corridor will comprise a predominantly elevated four-and-six lane carriageway with flyovers, loops, ramps and service roads. Designed for operating speeds of 80–100 kmph, the projects are expected to significantly reduce travel times across the city.
• Urea demand: The Cabinet also approved the National Investment Policy for Urea (NIPU 2026) to set up "eight-nine" new gas-based plants with a production capacity of 10 million tons to make the country self-reliant in the most widely consumed fertiliser. The new investment framework, which assumes significance as it will encourage new investments in the sector, is an extension of the 2012 New Investment Policy (NIP) with revisions. Key changes compared with NIP 2012 include the separation of fixed and variable costs for greater transparency, the introduction of a return on equity (RoE) band with a floor at 12% and a ceiling at 16%, and mitigation of foreign exchange risk through conversion of fixed costs into the rupee after the signing of the gas-supply agreement. Under the 2012 NIP, which expired in October 2019, six new urea units were set up, including four through joint-venture firms of nominated public-sector undertaking, and two units by private companies.

Context

With the Monsoon Session of Parliament beginning July 20, the ruling NDA and the Opposition INDIA bloc are firming up strategies ahead of the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, which proposes to raise the number of Lok Sabha seats to 850 and initiate the delimitation process. The NDA banks on splits in Trinamool and Sena, and realignment in Tamil Nadu.

Background & Key Facts

• The requirement: The Bill requires a two-thirds majority in the House to be passed. The issue acquired a sense of urgency over Wednesday as Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Eknath Shinde reportedly met Union Home Minister Amit Shah in New Delhi.
• Numbers game: The NDA government's sustained effort is to secure a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha to pass the Constitution amendment Bill. Earlier in the day, she was reported to have said that if the pre-proposed delimitation Bill was introduced, "there would be little reason to oppose it".
• Outreach to INDIA allies: The BJP has, meanwhile, stepped up its outreach to parties in the INDIA bloc in an effort to secure the numbers required to pass the amendment Bill, which also forms the basis for implementing women's reservation from the 2029 Lok Sabha election.
• Congress's strategy: The Congress's parliamentary group is scheduled to meet today. Sources said the party's top leadership is upset that the government is trying to secure a two-thirds majority through the "defection route". According to BJP leaders and government sources, realignment following the recent Assembly elections in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, the rolling alliance expects to reach 353 members, still 11 short of the two-thirds requirement of 364 required to amend the Constitution.
• Rajya Sabha: In the Rajya Sabha too, the BJP's numbers are set to improve after three TDP-supported allies. After July 24, the BJP's strength in the Upper House is expected to rise by two.
• NCP factor: The NDA has been pushed up prices in Lok Sabha; sources said the NCP (SP) could support the Bill. "The formula for implementation should be given in writing," she said. Sources said the BJP has also reopened talks with the DMK after its break with the Congress.

Context

The Government of the NCT of Delhi has given a big push towards transition to electric vehicles through its new Delhi Electric Vehicles Policy, 2026, notified on June 30. Delhi's target of registering only EV three-wheelers from 2027 seems achievable, but the path to the same for two-wheelers from 2028 is likely to be bumpier.

Background & Key Facts

• The deadlines: The policy has set aggressive deadlines for three-wheelers, light commercial vehicles such as mini trucks and two-wheelers. Only EVs in the first two categories can be registered from January 1, 2027, with the deadline for two-wheelers set at January 1, 2028.
• Pollution source: Table 1 shows the major contributors to Delhi's pollution during summer and winter: Transport 23% (winter range 19–24) and 19% (summer range 18–21); Industry 9 (9–10); Dust 15 (10–18), 27 (25–31); Biomass burning 20 (17–23), 12 (11–14); Secondary particulate matter 27 (24–28), 17 (16–19); Other sources 6, 11.
• Three-wheelers on track: Of the roughly 1.05 crore two-wheelers on Delhi's roads, only 1.7% are EVs. In new registrations as well, two-wheelers are showing only marginal improvements. Moreover, Delhi is not switching to EV two-wheelers at a noticeably faster rate than the country at the moment, for the rapid transition it is targeting by the end of 2027 (Chart 1). Of the 12,809 new three-wheelers registered till the first week of July this year, 8,419 were electric (65.7%).
• The two-wheeler problem: The number of two-wheelers getting registered in Delhi every year shows the massive leap needed in sales. Of the 5.68 lakh two-wheelers registered in 2025-26, only 41,263 (7.25%) were EVs (Chart 2). Even with a conservative assumption that the demand for new two-wheelers and consequently the two-wheeler registrations will remain at the same level, the sale of EV two-wheelers should see at least a twelve-fold (1300%) jump by next year if the policy's target has to be met by January 1, 2028.
• Segment split: The two segments are, however, at different stages of the transition to electric mobility. Three-wheelers account for only four per cent of the total vehicles in the city, but they get hit high daily utilisation and mileage, "resulting in a disproportionate contribution to urban air pollution". Table 2 shows the EV/total split: Two-wheelers 1,80,368 EV of 1,05,11,109 total (1.71% of total); Three-wheelers 2,68,124 EV of 6,21,240 (43.16%); Four-wheelers 43,102 EV of 44,30,563 (0.97%).
• Charging infrastructure: The effective implementation of the EV policy will also require Delhi to ramp up the availability of support infrastructure. Delhi Transco Limited has been tasked with expanding public charging facilities. Delhi presently has 771 charging points, which are unevenly distributed and highly concentrated in the southern region (Chart 3) — Table 3 shows public charging points across districts in Delhi (East 141, West 83, South Central 219, South West 51, North 191, North East 14, North West 49).

Context

In the fortnight following the transition from the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) to the Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission Gramin (VB-G RAM G), the number of registered workers fell from 27 crore to 26.33 crore, a net reduction of 67.6 lakh workers — an analysis by LibTech India contests the government's claim that this does not reflect continuous verification.

Background & Key Facts

• The dip: A net reduction of 67.6 lakh workers, or 2.5% of the total workforce enrolled under the rural employment programme, according to an analysis by LibTech India. The number of active workers — those who have worked at least once in the last three years under the programme — also fell from 10.84 crore to 10.57 crore, a decline of about 26.3 lakh workers (2.43%). The VB-G RAM G 2025 came into force on July 1, 2026.
• Government's response: The Ministry officials also put the onus on the States, arguing that they have to follow the Standard Operating Procedures prescribed by the Centre for any deletions. They added that no complaints had been received regarding denial of employment due to non-completion of e-KYC or face authentication and that about 84,000 Gram Rozgar Guarantee Cards covering 1.91 lakh workers had already been issued under the new law.
• 'Dynamic figure': The Rural Development Ministry officials, however, disputed the findings, saying the analysis covered only a short period and did not reflect the continuous verification, updating and renewal of worker and job card records undertaken by States and Union Territories. "The number of registered and active workers is a dynamic figure and changes as records are updated, the officials said."
• E-KYC in question: The group said that although transition guidelines provided that e-KYC verification would be optional, workers should not be denied employment because of pending e-KYC. There was little clarity on how workers unable to complete e-KYC or facial recognition-based verification would be protected from omission. "The publicly available framework did not explain in comparable operational detail how workers unable to complete e-KYC or Face Recognition System (FRS) would be carried over, how omissions would be identified, or how appeal would work," said Venkateswarlu Kuruva, researcher at LibTech India.
• Verification data: LibTech described the latest decline as the fourth major reduction in worker numbers in recent years to coincide with a digital compliance measure, following Aadhaar-based payments in 2022-23, mandatory e-KYC in 2025 and facial recognition-based attendance verification in 2026. Notably, they saw 5.98 lakh workers removed from the rolls, Uttar Pradesh 8.06 lakh and Telangana 7.2 lakh.

Context

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued the "Guidance on Regulatory Expectations for Data Governance Practices for Banks and other Regulated Entities (REs)" — prescribing a comprehensive framework to strengthen data governance across the banking system, as increasing digitalisation of the financial sector and growing adoption of technology-driven business models make data governance critical.

Background & Key Facts

• Objective: To improve data quality, accountability, risk management and security while ensuring compliance with the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023, and other applicable laws.
• Why now: As the volume, variety and velocity of data continue to rise, effective data governance has become crucial to ensure data stays accurate, consistent, secure and fit for purpose across functions and systems, the RBI said. Weaknesses in data governance and its management can lead to broader financial, operational, compliance and reputational risk for the REs, it said.
• Proportionality: All REs have been directed to establish a comprehensive Data Governance Framework (DGF) aligned with overall risk-management framework. The framework needs to be proportionate to the size, complexity, business model and technology infrastructure of each bank, while covering all aspects of data governance, including organisational structure, policies, processes, and mechanisms and the entire data lifecycle.
• Draft released: Recognising this, the draft has been released to support REs in strengthening their data governance framework and promoting sound practices relating to data management across the data lifecycle. The RBI has also asked banks to review the framework annually or more frequently whenever required.

Context

China's economy grew 4.3% in the second quarter of 2026, according to data released by China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) — the slowest growth since 2022, when China was still in the grips of the pandemic, and below the government's already-lowered annual target of 4.5–5%. The country faces a real-estate slowdown, sluggish consumption, and serious challenges in the job market.

Background & Key Facts

• The data: China's GDP expanded by 4.3% in the second quarter, down from 5% in the first quarter. In March 2026, China's National People's Congress (NPC), or Parliament, announced a 4.5–5% target for the year, which was the lowest since 1991.
• Weak internals: Other economic indicators released on Wednesday showed a 5.7% drop in fixed-asset investment and sluggish retail sales — an important marker of consumption, which the government hopes will drive future growth for a historically investment-reliant economy. In May, retail sales fell 0.6% from last year, another low since the pandemic. June showed a slight recovery to a 1.1% increase in retail sales of goods.
• Reliability caveat: Most economists have noted improvements in the reliability of statistics, with numbers becoming harder to fudge coinciding with the global integration of China's economy and more transparency into the performance of Chinese companies, many of which are publicly listed. At the same time, it is important to note that economists still closely watch China's official data, as numbers reveal how the government wants to portray the state of the economy and may signal potential policy changes.
• Property drag: If real estate is about "location, location, location", China's slowdown story is in many ways about "real estate, real estate and real estate". In the first half of the year, property investment fell 18%, a remarkable slowdown for an economy once driven by real estate growth. This isn't only about the property sector. The spillover effects are hard to overstate. An entire swathe of the economy is in a slump, from construction to every related industry that has for decades relied on a booming property sector, from lighting to furniture. Then there is the psychological impact in a country where most people's savings are locked into real estate given the low returns from regulated interest rates that make bank deposits unappealing.
• Jobs pressure: Boosting domestic consumption and minimising job losses are likely to top its concerns, especially with many graduates currently entering the workforce. Urban unemployment remained flat at 5.1% in June. Mr. Mao said "efforts will be stepped up to secure the steady development of employment", with a target to create 12 million new urban jobs in 2026, despite the concerns about hiring impacted by AI.
• Local government debt: The broader problem for Beijing is that it's not only property developers but local governments also have been hard hit by the slump, with real estate sales a major contributor of revenues. Many tier-two and tier-three cities have seen a major cash crunch, impacting spending on infrastructure and social services. Beijing announced a plan for consumption, with a 2030 retail sales target of 60 trillion yuan ($8.86 trillion), up from 2025. Earlier this week, China announced a first of its kind five-year plan for consumption, with a 2030 retail sales target of 60 trillion yuan.
• Data fudging concern: "Captivated by quick gains," it warned, "some authorities engaged in accounting gimmicks to inflate apparent rises in fiscal revenue, masking actual budget strains." The extent of the crunch remains unclear with some looking to fudge the data to mask the state of their finances, as the Communist Party's own anti-corruption watchdog warned recently. It cited the example of one plot of land being sold "18 times" in the southern city of Nanning "without ever changing hands", reported the South China Morning Post, with the fudge allowing "the city government to artificially shore up its fiscal revenue by 2.83 billion yuan (US$46 million) in 2024".

Context

The Centre has announced that India aims for full digital rollout of its criminal justice system from July 1, 2027, after which the procedures related to investigations and trials under the new criminal laws will be recorded digitally through the Interoperable Criminal Justice System (ICJS). This "Letter and Spirit" piece argues the shift in approach to justice has made the criminal justice system more citizen-oriented.

Background & Key Facts

• What the CJS is: The criminal justice system comprises the police, courts, prisons, forensics, and prosecution services, and aims at ensuring that individuals who suffer injury or loss at the hand of others can present their cases and seek justice.
• Adversarial vs inquisitorial: Justice cannot be delivered unless the rights of the accused and the interests of the victim and the society are balanced. This has been the fundamental principle of the criminal justice system, particularly in common law countries that follow the adversarial system. These countries base their legal systems primarily on judicial precedents and uncodified case law rather than strict statutory codes. On the other hand, the inquisitorial system is practised in civil law countries, where rules are codified into comprehensive written statutes rather than shaped by judicial precedent. Under this system, the judge plays an active role in investigating the facts and determining the outcome of the case on the basis of inquiry and investigation. Thus, the precision of decision depends largely on the skills and prudence of the judge concerned.
• Changed attitude: The reforms in the criminal law have opened a new avenue for the delivery of justice. To be more appropriate, the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) have been replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) with the idea of transformation. While the erstwhile penal code was implemented with an idea to punish the accused, the BNS believes in the delivery of justice through retribution. The new code has a democratic approach, placing greater emphasis on individual than on the matters relating to crimes. The criminal procedure code believed that trial of a 'criminal' was being conducted whereas the BNSS considers an accused as a citizen whose rights should be balanced with the interests of the victim without any prejudice. Thus, the shift in approach to justice has contributed to making the criminal justice system more democratic and citizen-oriented, while strengthening the protection of the principles of natural justice that are embedded constitutional framework of India.
• Forensics push: The recent announcement by the Centre to enhance the efficiency of the criminal justice system through digitisation assumes considerable significance. In the field of forensics, the new criminal laws have made forensic examination of crime scenes mandatory for offences punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more. In view of this requirement, the number of forensic laboratories has increased from 129 in 2023 to 154 in 2025. However, according to the National Crime Records Bureau, only 46% of FIRs were digitally transmitted to courts. Since this accounts for less than half of all registered cases, it suggests that the digital chain of the criminal justice system remains incomplete.
• Uneven progress: Although most states have implemented various components of the criminal justice digitisation system, progress remains uneven. In this context, full digital rollout by 2027 will fill this gap and make the system more efficient. In this context, the Supreme Court in Visakha v. State of Rajasthan (1997) gave guidelines to prevent sexual harassment of women at workplace holding that such an act violates Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution — an instance of courts filling legislative gaps in areas where the law is silent, thereby ensuring the effective administration of justice.

Context

The second Indian Wildlife Ecology Conference (IWEC) at Ashoka University, Sonepat (July 10–12), became a forum where researchers from universities, government agencies, NGOs, and field stations got together to figure out where the discipline is heading — using insights into evolutionary history, long-term monitoring, and public policy.

Background & Key Facts

• Why now: Wildlife ecology in India looks different today than it did a decade ago. Climate change, habitat fragmentation, invasive species, and rapid development are shifting ecosystems faster than scholars can document them. Thus, ecologists are interested in how biodiversity has changed as well as how it is likely to change next. The conference was conceived by the late wildlife biologist Ajith Kumar as a national platform for India's wildlife ecologists to exchange ideas.
• Biodiversity at scale: The conference's three paired plenary sessions showed how wildlife ecologists are studying, taking in evolutionary history, ecosystem change, bird conservation, citizen science, and animal physiology. Jahnavi Joshi (CSIR-Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology, Hyderabad) spoke of how geological history and climate gradients shaped the diversity of woody plants in the Western Ghats. Using phylogenetic analyses, she examined whether different parts of the mountain range function as evolutionary 'cradles', where new species originate, or 'museums', where ancient lineages persist.
• Climate futures: Mahesh Sankaran (National Centre for Biological Sciences, Bengaluru) turned to the future of India's montane grasslands under climate change, drawing on projections from the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to show how rising temperature, increasingly variable rainfall, and extreme weather will reshape these already vulnerable ecosystems, alongside how human-driven pressures such as altered nutrient cycles and land-use change.
• Citizen science: Vivek Menon (Wildlife Trust of India), in turn, said conservation centred on species remains indispensable because "the natural world sustains us, but we are losing the species that sustain it". Suhel Quader (Nature Conservation Foundation, Mysuru) spoke of citizen-science platforms such as eBird India generating observations at scales impossible in conventional field studies, helping researchers track migration and species distributions. Asad Rahmani (Bombay Natural History Society) surveyed pressures on the country's birds such as habitat loss, infrastructure, and climate change — pointing to the drying of Kashmir's Shallabugh wetland and urged scientists and citizens alike to speak up for wildlife.
• Physiology: Maria Thaker (Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru) drew on studies of the spiny-tailed lizard to show how desert reptiles regulate body temperature and adjust their nutritional requirements across seasons. "Lizards, like other ectothermic vertebrates, are behaviourally thermoregulated, but will not be able to handle future climate warming," she said.
• Free-ranging dogs: In a discussion called 'Extinction of Experience: The Decline of Field-based Ecology', moderated by Robin Vijayan (Indian Institute of Science Education and Research, Tirupati), panellists discussed how ecology is adapting to rapid advances in artificial intelligence and drones. Chandrima Home (Srishti Manipal Institute of Art, Design, and Technology, Bengaluru) argued that the label "free-ranging dogs" captured these populations more accurately than "stray" or "feral", since only a small fraction comes into conflict with wildlife and livestock. Panellists also reflected on the role of Animal Birth Control programmes alongside the need to improve waste management and stronger municipal governance, arguing that dog populations track feral populations as closely as any carnivore does in the wild. As Anindita Bhadra (IISER Kolkata) put it, "We want our cities to be smart, but we can't manage our garbage."
• Spider silk & microbiome: Swapnil Kiran (CSIR-CCMB Hyderabad) spoke about her work on quantifying the economic burden of snakebite mortality and morbidity in rural India using a community-based ecological epidemiology approach. Sibasish Sahoo (Amity University, Noida) has documented how Asian elephants change the way they behave in the mining landscapes of Keonjhar, Odisha, to navigate increasingly fragmented habitats, utilising a mix of field-based, spatial, and analytical methods. In a special address, philanthropist and one of the conference's sponsors Rohini Nilekani likened wildlife ecologists to the breeze that carries a spider's silk, allowing it to cast a web that would otherwise be impossible to build.

Context

For half a century, millions of workers have repeated a task across the deserts in northern China: inserting forearm-length sticks into shifting sand, first in a row, then in an intersecting line, gradually forming a grid. Known as the Three-North Shelterbelt Program or the Green Wall, this decades-long campaign against the spreading of desert conditions has yielded measurable progress — but scientists caution that preserving the gains will require decades of continued effort.

Background & Key Facts

• The technique: Known as "straw checkerboards", it is a simple yet widely used method to stabilise sand dunes against the wind and help plants take root by using water supplied through an irrigation system. The widespread lattice is created across the sand has become the iconic image of China's decades-long campaign against the spreading of desert conditions.
• Achievements: Forests planted by the program now cover a cumulative 500,000 sq km. The area of desertified land in northern China peaked in 2000, and it has been reduced by over 1,000 sq km each year since then, according to data published by state media. The Chinese government said the initiative launched in 1978 has played a crucial role in transforming vast regions covering nearly half of China from "the desertification advancing and people retreating" to "greenery advancing and the desertification retreating".
• Persistent threats: For a long time, drought, overgrazing and farming removed vegetation, harmed the soil and made areas vulnerable to wind and sandstorms. That kind of degradation of the land over time is known as desertification.
• UN framework: "The broad significance of the Three-North Program is not only the scale of restoration, but the long-term political commitment behind it," said Barron Joseph Orr, chief scientist for the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification. He added that reversing desertification is possible when it becomes part of long-term development strategies.
• Achievements & caution: The progress is the result of the efforts of frontline sand-control workers, along with top-level planning and substantial state investment, said Zhu Jiaojun, a scientist at the Institute of Applied Ecology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, who has long been dedicated to the construction and management of the program. He added that increased rainfall in recent years in some areas has made vegetation restoration easier. "The achievement of desertification combat is due to people's hard work and a bit of luck with climate," he said.
• The data: According to long-term monitoring data by Zhu's team, China's desertified land has shrunk by around 10% overall since 2000, and areas of severely or extremely desertified land have decreased by more than 40%. Forest cover in the program area has risen from around 5% in 1978 to 14% in 2022.
• Scale of labour: In a recent government-organised media tour to a corner of Kubuqi Desert, about 800 km to the west of Beijing, 60-year-old Yin Yuzhen recounted her early days of being a sand-control worker. Four decades ago, she recalled, the sand often blew so thick that it made it hard to see a short distance. "But now we can see the sun. We can see the green in the distance. We can see the road," said Yin. Zhu, the scientist, estimated that over 300 million rural labourers have been involved in the program, mostly on a paid, part-time basis.

Context

It has been over two and a half years since the Supreme Court of India recorded the Union government's solemn assurance that Statehood would be restored to Jammu and Kashmir. This editorial argues that New Delhi cannot keep stalling the restoration of Statehood to J&K.

Background & Key Facts

• The assurance: No timeline was recorded, but the expectation was that it would happen within a reasonable period and steps would be taken progressively. That the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government has done nothing on this front since then can only mean that it has interpreted the lack of a timeline as a licence for the indefinite deferral of Statehood.
• Political assurances: This is despite repeated assurances from the Centre. Prime Minister Narendra Modi pledged it in the run-up to the J&K elections, and Home Minister Amit Shah reiterated it on the floor of Parliament. Unsurprisingly, the inaction has driven J&K Chief Minister Omar Abdullah to organise a series of agitations and rallies, culminating in a sit-in at Jantar Mantar on July 20. His grievance, and that of the province, is legitimate. The retention of Union Territory status even after popular elections subordinates the elected government to an unelected Lieutenant Governor who retains preponderant authority over the bureaucracy, the police and other institutions. There is no privileged justification for perpetuating this arrangement once elections have been held and a government installed.
• Security argument: New Delhi's rationale for inaction has been trite: "security", invoked by the Solicitor General before the Court late last year, citing the Pahalgam attack, its bearing on a petition seeking restoration of Statehood. But this argument cuts no ice. By the government's account, the attack was orchestrated by whether J&K's elected representatives are to be trusted with the powers of a full State. If anything, empowering elected leaders to address local grievances is precisely how a polity assuages concerns before they turn into resentment, which fed into cycles of militancy in the Kashmir Valley for decades. The Centre's handling of J&K, Ladakh and even Manipur reveals a troubling pattern in how border regions with substantial minority populations are treated.
• Security in the North-East: Secure in its dominance across the north, the west and now the east, the BJP appears to regard the concerns of citizens in these provinces as expendable. Such a view is myopic: governance that treats a border region as politically dispensable only deepens alienation, and instability soon spills over and unsettles governance overall. The BJP seems cynically content to leave the Statehood question hanging until the political arithmetic, already sought to be reworked through delimitation in J&K, tilts decisively in its favour. A promise made to the Court, to Parliament and to the people of J&K cannot be held in abeyance until political circumstances turn expedient for the BJP.